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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL OVERVIEW 
1.1   Introduction 
 On 16 January 1989, the Security Council adopted Resolution 629 
determining 1 April 1989 as D-day for the implementation of Resolution 435,1  
preparing the way for the independence of Namibia. The United Nations supervised 
the elections in November 1989, with SWAPO gaining a conclusive victory. On 21 
March 1990, Namibia became independent.   
Despite political expectations of a completely new legal system incorporating 
elements of customary law and totally disbanding Roman Dutch Law, the Namibian 
Constitution maintained the law of the territory before independence. The legal 
transition was not to be revolutionary. Independence Day was just another day in the 
courts of Namibia.  
The laws, legal system and the officials of the court, smoothly moved over 
from one dispensation to the other. The Constitution did not only opt for the Roman 
Dutch Law and English adversarial procedural law, it also made sure that the judges, 
the prosecutorial authority and the major decision making body, the Judicial Service 
Commission, would be in the hands of the pre-independence role players for at least 
some time.2  It was only on the bench of the lower courts that the government could 
initially make some moderate steps towards transformation.3 However, the 
Constitution was meant to change and transform the old non-representative 
parliamentary democracy to a Constitutional democracy.  
The new High Court of Namibia was a continuation of the pre-independent 
Supreme Court of South West Africa/Namibia. The Bench was a mixed group and 
included Namibian-born Afrikaners like Justice Strydom and acting Justice Muller, 
and South Africans Judges Levy, Hendler and Bethuen. Shortly before 
independence Namibian activist advocate cum politician Bryan O’Linn, known for his 
defence of SWAPO members and guerrilla fighters of the SWAPO military wing, 
People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (Plan) was appointed to the Bench. The first 
                                            
1
Carpenter, G. 1987. Introduction to South African International Law, Durban: Butterworths, p. 59. 
2
See Steytler, N. 1991.The Judicialization of Namibian Politics, 9 South African Journal on Human 
Rights, p. 477. 
3
After independence, Namibia uncritically took over the South African custom that magistrates were 
civil servants appointed by and working under the auspices of the Minister of Justice. It was only in 
Mostert v Minister of Justice NR 2003 11 (SC) when the Supreme Court declared the practice 
unconstitutional. 
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appointee to the Supreme Court Bench was Justice Berker, the first chief justice of 
Namibia. 
The new rulers were not comfortable with the post-independence legal 
system. The separation of powers and the specific historical make-up of the judiciary 
and prosecutorial authority, limited their powers. The major liberation movement, 
SWAPO Party of Namibia (SWAPO) wanted a just dispensation demanding 
immediate radical changes. SWAPO wanted a judiciary who respect their laws and 
assist them in creating a new society after a century of colonialism, but had to bear 
with the colonial system and office bearers for the time being. The Constitution was 
the instrument to rid Namibia of its unjust past. 
It is this struggle between constitutional values, constitutional aspirations and 
practical politics, that I wish to deal with in my analysis of the constitutional 
jurisprudence of Namibia. Karl Klare differentiates between a formalistic approach to 
law and transformative constitutionalism.4 Woolman and Davis emphasise the 
importance of understanding the ideology behind a constitution if the courts want to 
get to the real meaning of constitutional directives5. 
Both Klare and Woolman/Davis challenge the general accepted myth of the 
apartheid era that the making of law is the prerogative of the legislator and the courts 
only need to interpret and apply these laws at the hand of clear and simple rules. 
The post-apartheid constitutional democracies in South Africa and Namibia ended 
the rule-based interpretation of statutes by the old standard textbooks of authors 
such as Steyn.6 Apart from the typical parliamentary democratic judicial role of 
interpreting and applying the laws of the legislator (and often the directives of the 
executive embedded in Proclamations and other executive quasi-legislative 
declarations), the judiciary in a constitutional democracy also carries the burden to 
protect the constitutional dispensation against unconstitutional legislation and 
executive directives. 
It is, however more than a mere parliamentary democracy vis-á-vis a 
constitutional democracy. How does one make sense of the sometimes unexpected 
                                            
4
Klare, K. 1998. Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 SAJHR, p. 146. 
5
Woolman, S and Davis, D. 1996. The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, Classical Liberalism, 
Creole Liberalism and the Application of Fundamental Rights under the Interim and the Final 
Constitutions.  12 SAJHR, p. 361. 
6
Steyn, L. 1974. Die Uitleg van Wette, (The Interpretation of Statutes), Cape Town: Juta and Co. 
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and surprising differences in the interpretation of the Namibian Constitution by 
judges? Is there an ideological or legal foundation for the different approaches? Is 
one legal and the other political? If so, can one say that one approach is of necessity 
wrong and the other right? If not, is there any foundation for legal certainty other than 
the final words by the Supreme Court?  
This study is about these questions. The answers are not obvious.  It deals 
with models of interpretation in the constitutional jurisprudence of the Namibian 
courts between 21 March 1990, when Namibia became independent, and December 
2004. It is, however, not a neutral approach looking and analysing all the 
possibilities of constitutional interpretation. I deal with the interpretation of an 
independent Namibia in a contextual manner. While South African colonial rule in 
Namibia was an occupation with a very specific political ideology and an even more 
specific futuristic expectation, the courts – like their masters in South Africa, the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court – operated under the presumption that legal 
interpretation can be political neutral.  
Consequently, the courts bound themselves to an almost impossible ideal. 
Despite the fact that the whole post 1948 (when the Nationalist Party came to power 
and implemented the policy of apartheid) law making process was defiled with an 
ideology of an advantaged white society and an oppressed black society, the courts 
wanted to apply the law without taking cognisance of the injustice embedded in it.  
In legal positivism the South African courts and the Supreme Court of South 
West Africa/Namibia found a strong ally in their endeavour to remain neutral, fair and 
just in an oppressive society without moving away from their only objective: to 
interpret the law. South Africa and Namibia were not alone in their positivist 
approach. It was also the basic approach of the United States Supreme Court. In the 
academia Oxford scholar, HLA Hart laid the legal foundation followed by academics 
and the courts in many western liberal democracies.  
When the American Realists and Hart’s successor in Oxford, Ronald Dworkin, 
challenged the apolitical positivism in the United States and Europe, Witwatersrand 
University scholar John Dugard challenged it in South Africa. He went beyond calling 
it a bad model, or attempting to replace it with something better. He did not even 
make a choice between Dworkin’s Reconstruction and the model (if one can speak 
of a model) of the Realists and opted for an undefined combination of the two.  
 9 
More important, however, was Dugard’s thesis that positivism was the reason 
for the impotence of the South African courts and its inability to provide justice to the 
oppressed people. Since South Africa administered Namibia in contravention of 
several United Nations Security Council resolutions like one of its provinces, his 
criticism applied mutatis mutandis to the Supreme Court of South West Africa.  
Shortly after the first democratic governments were instated in Namibia (1990) 
and South Africa (1994) a colleague of John Dugard, Ettienne Mureinik, published an 
article on constitutional interpretation.7 His emphasis was not on interpretation per 
se, but an attempt to assign a broader task to the South African constitution and the 
courts. Constitutional interpretation, he asserts, is much more than declaring the law. 
He used the metaphor of a bridge to explain his understanding of constitutional 
jurisprudence. The constitution is a bridge to take a nation from oppression to 
liberation, from injustice to the rule of law, from inequality and division to unity, from 
apartheid to justice. In other words, constitutional adjudication must keep the ideals 
of the constitution and the constitutional state in mind. The judgments of the courts 
must be contextualised. It has to be the vehicle to attain the high values and 
expectations of the constitution. 
There is no public legal debate in Namibia on issues like majoritarianism and 
constitutionalism, positivism, natural law and post-modernism, the rights of the victim 
vis-à-vis the right of the accused, and other constitutional issues. Whenever these 
debates take place, it is often populist politicians attacking the judiciary for not taking 
the will of the people into account, for being unpatriotic, for taking sides with 
oppressors, racists and enemies of the state.8  
While the actions of populists can be annoying, one can understand both the 
frustrations of the people with the Constitution and the frustration of the jurists with 
the naivety of the politicians or their lack of insight in constitutionalism. This thesis 
will attempt to debate the different constitutional approaches to legal hermeneutics. I 
will evaluate the common grounds, but also the ideological and legal differences 
between judgments. In some instances, there may even be opposed hermeneutical 
keys used by judges upholding the same Constitution and the same values. 
                                            
7
 Mureinik, E. 1994. A Bridge to where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights.10 SAJHR, p. 31. 
8
 For an example see Nyanchama M. 1996. Editorial. New Year Internet Edition, Misa Free Press. 
Windhoek: Media Institute of Southern Africa. Available at 
 https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/soc.culture.kenya/pXwB3CkAQsI. Last accessed on 3 April 
2015. 
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To call it a hermeneutical study, would give too broad meaning to the word 
hermeneutics. This study is not so much a study of the text of the Namibian 
Constitution per se. It is a study of the interpretation of the Constitutional text and its 
effects on transforming society. Constitutional interpretation has always been 
controversial and contested. The early value-based judgments of the neo-
constitutionalists were severely questioned and criticised by the old school who 
contested the idea that a constitution is a sui generis with different interpretive rules. 
This controversy imbedded several modern day legal issues: the struggle for a 
correct constitutional hermeneutic, the struggle between positivism and post-
modernism and the struggle between majoritarianism and constitutional counter-
majoritarianism. To use Klare and Woolman/Davis, the battle between formalism and 
transformative constitutionalism or between a pure liberal approach and liberalism 
that care about the needs of people, or in the understanding of Woolman and Davis, 
the battle between liberalism and Creole liberalism. 
The judgments themselves were often part of a debate between 
representatives of different schools of thought on how to understand and interpret 
the Constitution.9 It is also a reflection of the morals, the values and aspirations of 
the people. The judges do not agree on the method of establishing the values and 
norms of the people, neither are there general norms and values accepted by all the 
judges of the High and Supreme Court benches.  
I will always come back to one question: How do we read the Namibian 
Constitution? Should we approach it like any other legislation (and maybe follow the 
strict division between the executive powers of government and the role of the 
judiciary)? Alternatively, should we accept the socio-political dimensions of the 
judiciary, and more specifically, the special role of the judiciary as the protector of a 
constitution in constitutional democracies? 
The interpretation of the Constitution is not only a legal issue, as we have 
already seen. The new government, more so than a government in a stable, old 
democracy, wants to see the transformation of society. The Constitution cannot be 
limited to creating the legal framework of the post-independent Namibia. The 
                                            
9
This is especially true of the judgments of Judge O’Linn. See for example his long discourses against 
Mahomed in S   v Vries 1996 (2) SACR 638 (NM) and The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection 
Board v Erna Elizabeth Frank and Another 2001 NR 107 (SC). But see also acting Supreme Court 
Judge Dumbutshena’s criticism of O’Linn in Kauesa  v  Minister of Home Affairs and Others,1996 (4) 
SA 965 (NMS). I shall return to these cases later. 
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Constituent Assembly also wanted it to have a political dimension, hence the 
inclusion of chapter 11 on government policy, a chapter loaded with state obligations 
to bring social justice to the not-haves, or the provision for affirmative action in article 
23, to address the inequalities of the past.  
However, the relationship between government and the courts were not 
always plain sailing. The opinion formers in government have often felt alienated 
from the Constitution, especially when it protected rights or actions that went 
contrary to the plans and values of the SWAPO Party. How can their Constitution be 
interpreted in such a way that it nullifies much of what the Party has always believed 
in?10 
The attitude of the people, and especially the governing elite, towards the 
Constitution went through several stages since its inception on 21 March 1990. 
These attitudes are often related to other frustrations and not necessarily an ex post 
facto disagreement with the text. The conflict of ministers with the foreign judges had 
little to do with the fact that they were not Namibians. It was much more a frustration 
with restrictions that the Constitution and the legal system in general placed on the 
ruling party and the government. 
The ghost of apartheid was never out of the picture. Namibia did not begin its 
nationhood on a clean slate. It inherited hundred years of inequality and severe 
oppression, first by Germany, and since 1916, by South Africa. The Constitution is a 
multi-faceted document. On the one hand, it had to satisfy South Africa that the white 
Namibians and their property would be safe in an independent Namibia. With the 
assistance of the Eminent Persons Group11 and the United Nations, the 
Constitutional Principles of 198212 made it possible to ease the fears of the whites 
and other minorities.  
On the other hand, the inequalities had to be addressed. The Preamble left 
no doubt that the Constitutional drafters intended it to play an important role in this 
redress of history. It speaks of the “rights so long denied to the people of Namibia by 
                                            
10
See Chapter 5, subsection 5.5 on p.111. Kleynhans and Others, a Different Scenario.  
11
Constitutional Principles by the Western Contact Group or the Eminent Persons Group, consisting of 
the Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States. The Constitutional Principles was 
an attempt by the western group to ease the fears of both South Africa and the internal parties (the 
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and some smaller parties who co-operated with South Africa in the 
Transitional Government for National Unity). 
12
United Nations, Organisation. 1982. Principles for a Constituent Assembly and for a Constitution of 
an independent Namibia New York: UN document (S/15287), accepted by the Security Council as 
part of Resolution 435 on 12 July 1982. 
 12 
colonialism, racism and apartheid”. The people are consequently “determined to 
adopt a Constitution which expresses for ourselves and our children our resolve to 
cherish and to protect the gains of our long struggle” and “desire to promote amongst 
all of us the dignity of the individual”.13  
The compromises, aimed at peace and reconciliation on the one hand and 
the determination to transform society and give the previous disadvantaged equal 
opportunities on the other, remained causes of disagreement. These opposing 
interests are clearly illustrated in Art 16 of the Constitution that makes provision for 
both the protection of property rights and the right of the State to expropriate in the 
public interest. Amoo and Hering suggested that even the protection of property 
rights creates more conflict than reconciliation.14 Only white property rights, they 
pointed out, are protected by Art 16, while traditional property rights generally fall 
outside the ambit of legally registered rights and as a consequence outside the ambit 
of constitutional protection. At the same time, the white commercial farmers 
experienced every expropriation as an attack on the predominantly white agricultural 
society and an infringement of Art 16. 
I will finally look at the constant conflict between competing constitutional 
interpretive jurisprudential models. This competition is never without political 
significance. I will look at the interpretive models of the   Supreme and High Courts 
from two angles: 
- To what extend does the judgment honour the Namibian Constitution?  
and 
- To what extend will the judgment transform the Namibian society? 
In conclusion: while every judgment claims to be solely an interpretation of 
law, the spectacles used by the interpreter always play an important role. A literal or 
positivist approach has the potential to maintain the status quo, while a 
transformative interpretation, or a value judgment, leans more towards a broader 
interpretation to uphold the spirit of constitutional values. 
In the process, Namibia’s apartheid past will always feature in the 
background. Does a judgment radically break the historical ties of the law with the 
ideology of apartheid, or does it under the guise of literal interpretation, original intent 
                                            
13
Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990. 
14
Amoo, S and Harring, S. 2010. Intellectual Property under the Namibian Constitution, in Bösl, A, 
Horn, N and Du Pisani, A. Constitutional Democracy in Namibia. A Critical Analysis After Two 
Decades. Windhoek: Macmillan Education, Namibia, p. 299. 
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or positivism “baptise” old outdated apartheid structures in constitutional jargon, 
making them acceptable? 
 
1.2   Modus operandi 
Following the mentioned article by the late Ettienne Mureinik15, Karl Klare 
wrote his now famous article on transformative constitutionalism.16 Klare developed 
the basic idea further that the courts in a democratic South Africa have the obligation 
to interpret the constitution in a transformative manner. Articles on the meaning of 
transformative constitutionalism abounds. Pityana defines transformative 
constitutionalism as follows: 
 
... this has to do with the duty for judges to reflect the racial, 
gender, disability, geographic and class demographics of our 
country. 
 
The concept of transformative constitutionalism was both heartily acclaimed 
and vigorously opposed. The usefulness of a transformative interpretation of a liberal 
constitution lies in the fact that it treats a constitution with an entrenched bill of rights 
as a sui generis that needs to be interpreted in a manner that appreciates the 
necessity of an interpretation that will lead to a transformed society. Alternatively, to 
quote Klare, one can define it as “a long-term project of constitutional enactment, 
interpretation, and enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a 
historical context of conducive political developments) to transforming a country's 
political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, 
and egalitarian direction”.17 It is important to note that transformative 
constitutionalism sees the need to give credence to both the text and the political 
context. This two-dimensional approach is especially of value in a new democracy 
with an undemocratic oppressive past such as Namibia. 
I begin with a brief overview of traditional and liberal positivism and its 
presence in apartheid South Africa. I will also look at the two most prominent legal 
philosophers in the South African context, Oxford professor and liberal legal 
philosopher, Herbert Hart, and his successor Ronald Dworkin and their influence on 
                                            
15
Mureinik, E. 1994, 10 SAJHR, p. 31. 
16
Klare, K. 1998. Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 SAJHR, p. 146. 
17
Ibid, p. 151. 
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South Africa. I will also look at the dilemma of moral judges in applying immoral laws 
in South Africa, and by implication in Namibia. I will also look at the ground breaking 
work of John Dugard – the first significant deviation from rigid positivism of the 
apartheid era as an early attempt to formulate transformative constitutionalism. 
I will then turn to Klare and his version of transformative constitutionalism, 
backed by Justice Pius Langa, Dennis Davis and others, as well as some 
developments in the field, followed by the constitutional defenders of positivism like 
Roux, a critic of Klare, Cockrell and others. 
This will lay the foundation for my evaluation of Namibian constitutional 
jurisprudence. I will, where possible look at judgments from two competing 
interpretive models, liberal positivism and transformative constitutionalism.  
Finally, I will consider the success of Namibian constitutional jurisprudence in 
terms of maintaining legal clarity on the one hand and constructing a just society. 
Like any academic researcher, I have specific preferences such as 
transformative constitutionalism, based on my sympathy for both the American 
Realists and the critical legal studies movement.  However, my objective is not to 
enforce a transformative interpretation on every Namibian case. The approach that I 
follow is somewhat ‘Dworkinian’ in that I look at the legal and socio-political 
consequences of the Constitutional cases in the Namibian courts and value the 
transformative effects thereof rather than dealing with methodology as a 
philosophical or academic venture.  
 
1.2.1  The inclusion of the Supreme Court of SWA/Namibia judgments during 
the time of the Transitional Government of National Unity 
The inclusion of a section on the pre-independent judgments of the Supreme 
Court of South West Africa/Namibia during the time of the transitional government of 
national unity may surprise some. However, constitutionality was not an entirely new 
concept in Namibia. When international opinion turned against South Africa, it 
instituted a “transitional government of national unity” involving the so-called internal 
parties, in an attempt to obtain a political settlement without the participation of the 
major liberation movement. The founding document of the transitional government, 
Proclamation 101, included a Bill of Rights, annexed to the Proclamation.   
The international community never acknowledged the transitional government 
and Proclamation 101 was not a Constitution. The courts did not have review 
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powers, the South African Appellate Division was still the final legal authority, and 
even the government themselves did not hesitate to undermine the human rights 
embedded in the Bill of Rights when it suited their political  agenda.18 
Despite the shortcomings of Proclamation 101, the Supreme Court of South 
West Africa/Namibia had to take cognisance of constitutional interpretation.  At more 
or less the time when they were first confronted with the Bill of Rights attached to 
Proclamation 101, some of the so-called homelands or Bantustans in South Africa 
gained ‘independence’ and accepted Bills of Rights as part of their Constitutions.19  
The Supreme Court of South West Africa/Namibia had to deal with 
constitutionalism, and the positive constitutional developments in the courts of the 
so-called independent “states”, the divide-and-rule ethnic homelands of the apartheid 
system.  Several good constitutional judgments came from that enviroNMent and 
assisted in laying foundations for a constitutional dispensation in Namibia. 
Unfortunately, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa was still 
the final authority in Namibia and the Supreme Court of South West Africa/Namibia 
could not ignore their supremacy as the final decider of facts and law. 
The exercise was extremely positive. Some of the judges like Berker, Strydom 
and Levy prepared themselves for the new dispensation. They struggled with the 
hermeneutical issues before independence.  When independence came, the 
Namibian High Court was already prepared for their Constitutional mandate. The 
other judges followed suit. It seems as if the Bench was unanimous in embracing a 
value-based approach to Constitutional issues. The Supreme Court, which consisted 
of mainly foreign acting judges under the leadership of Namibian Chief Justice 
Berker, followed suit.  
It is safe to say that the German and Afrikaans-speaking Namibian judges and 
the South African judges, all appointed during the apartheid era, made a genuine 
effort to accept the judicial realities of independence. They immediately started to 
develop a jurisprudence befitting the transition from a South African-dominated 
                                            
18
See: Cabinet of the Transitional  Government for the Territory of South West Africa v Eins 1988 (3) 
SA 369 (A), Cabinet for the Interim  Government for the Territory of South West Africa v Bessinger 
and Others, 1989 (1) SA 618 (SWA), Chikane  v  Cabinet for the Territory of South West Africa 1990 
(1) SA 349 (A). But see also Ex Parte Cabinet for the Interim Government for the Territory of South 
West Africa: In Re Advisory Opinion in Terms of S 19(2) of Proc. R101 of 1985 (RSA) 1988 (2) SA 
832 (SWA). 
19
The independent homelands – Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana, were never officially 
recognized by the international community. They were reintegrated into South Africa in 1994.  
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parliamentary sovereignty to a constitutional democracy. The Supreme Court with its 
predominant foreign bench did not differ much from the High Court in the initial 
stages of the new republic. 
After independence, the prosecutorial authority and especially the judges had 
to operate within the framework of the Constitution. While they were at ease 
interpreting the laws and common law of the country, the impact of the Bill of Rights, 
democracy and the supremacy of the Constitution, posed new demands on them. 
 
1.2.2  Analysing the judgments with reference to the Bench 
The specific reference to presiding judges in Namibian cases needs some 
clarification. In some jurisdictions – Germany is a good example – the specific judges 
on the bench are generally ignored. In the United States, scholars and interpreters 
discuss the political conviction and other alliances of presiding judges. German 
Constitutional law gained attention in South Africa in the judgments, writings and 
choices of the library material of the Constitutional Court of former Constitutional 
Justice Laurie Ackermann. Namibia was likewise influenced through the judgments 
of High Court Judge O’Linn and Chief Justice Berker. Despite the strong influence of 
the German Basic Law and German adjudication on South Africa and Namibia, 
interpreters and observers of the South African and Namibian Courts follow the 
American pattern and take notice of the compilation the bench.20  
It seems important to take cognizance of the bench if there is a clear 
indication that the two competing interpretive models in Namibia were driven in the 
early years by two strong personalities as well as other factors. The adjudicative 
differences between Justices O’Linn and Mahomed were not co-incidental side 
issues. It goes to the crux of this thesis: the jurisprudential conservative approach of 
O’Linn versus the transformative methodology of Mahomed.  
I have stated my sympathy for (albeit not absolute approval of) the American 
Realists, the CLS movement and the work of Karl Klare in South Africa. While the 
Realists were the first group to point to the influence of the personalities on the 
bench, Klare emphasised the fact that it is impossible to operate without a political 
                                            
20
See the blog of constitutional expert and University of Cape Town law professor Pierre de Vos, 
Constitutionally Speaking. Available at http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/. See also Horn, N. 2012. 
Becoming Fred Rodell: Predicting the Result of the Second Supreme Court Appeal on the 2009 
Election. Namibia Law Journal (NLJ) Vol. 4, no 1, p. 127. 
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framework. Conscientious acceptance of the transformative obligation of the judiciary 
in a young democracy does not make transformative constitutionalism more political 
than a conservative approach. A conservative approach will not necessarily result in 
a-political judgments. The hidden politics of the status quo – the politics of apartheid 
– clouded in judicial purity then serves as a cork to prevent transformation of the 
legal system. Klare made the following observation- 
A more political self-consciousness and candid legal process 
would surely be faithful to the Constitutional democratic 
ethos....21 
And again: 
In the common case, e.g. the US during most periods denying 
the politics of adjudication, legitimates the status quo and 
obscures the possibility, and therefore the desirability, of social 
change.22 
  
The objective of the thesis is, however, not to declare either the Klare 
approach or Cockrell’s “soft positivism” the best hermeneutical tool to unlock the 
Constitution. It is rather an evaluation of the success of the superior courts to engage 
in transformative constitutionalism. 
  
1.2.3  The Choice of Cases 
I tried to look at the most important cases of the period, important in the sense 
of its contribution to constitutional development and jurisprudence.  These choices 
are always subjective and there may be cases I selected that will seem to be 
irrelevant choices for some, while good arguments can surely be made out for those 
cases that I left out. 
I did not specifically choose cases with high public interest or political 
opposition to the judgments, although both considerations played a role in the 
process. Cases are not of interest to the public and the politicians without good 
reason. While it may be based on the sensational aspects of a case, the clashes 
between the courts and public opinion or the judiciary and the executive are based 
on the understanding of the functions of the courts, or their independence or the 
battle between majoritarianism and counter-majoritarianism. 
                                            
21
Klare, K. 1998. Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 SAJHR p. 165. 
22
Ibid, p. 167. 
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I am nevertheless convinced that the choices cover the most important cases 
and enough of the debates and controversies of the first fourteen years of 
constitutional democracy to understand the jurisprudential development of the era.  
 
1.2.4  The South African Debate 
Namibia has been occupied by South Africa since 1915 and officially 
governed since 1919. Its common Roman Dutch law dates back to those times. 
Since 1919, the Appellate Division was also the highest court of appeal for South 
West Africa. 
Namibia did not have a national university before independence and 
Namibian legal practitioners were never known to be public debaters or academic 
authors. Consequently, the debate of Namibian cases took place in the South 
African journals. After independence, Namibia was the focus of several academic 
articles and the Namibian constitutional cases were regularly reported in the South 
African Law Reports, the South African Criminal Law Reports and the Butterworth 
Constitutional Law Reports.  
When the democratic process started in South Africa with the Codesa multi-
party negotiations in 2002, the focus of the academic debate moved away from 
Namibia. The decision of Namibian stakeholders to have their own law reports, lead 
to the disappearance of Namibian cases from the South African Law Reports and the 
South African Criminal Law Reports. South African academics and practitioners do 
not subscribe to the Namibian Law Reports in big numbers. Consequently, by the 
mid nineties Namibian case, legislation and jurisprudential development, were 
scarcely found in the South African law journals. 
At the same time, the South African interim constitution and later the final 
constitution were the subject of fierce debates in South African and international law 
journals. Even after the founding of a law faculty at the University of Namibia under 
the leadership of Zimbabwean academic Walter Kamba and Bremen law professor 
Manfred Hinz, debates in articles and books on the Namibian Constitution remained 
limited to contributions of a small band of academics. 
The South African debate deals with issues relevant to Namibia such as the 
big positivist debate between progressive academics, many followers of the Critical 
Legal Studies movement (CLS), personified by Karl Klare, and academics believing 
that a positivist approach does not necessarily exclude transformative jurisprudence.  
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For this reason, I have incorporated some of the South African debates in my 
analysis of Namibian judgments and jurisprudential development. While these 
debates seldom refer to Namibia, they nevertheless shed light on issues that should 
be debated, and often are debated in the corridors of the High and Supreme Court or 
even in the courts themselves, albeit without using academic jargon and without 
references to the likes of Herbert Hart, Richard Dworkin or Duncan Kennedy. 
Admittedly, inviting the South African academics to the Namibian debate while 
they are commenting on a different (although somewhat similar) constitution in an 
entirely different environment is a challenging endeavour. The possibility to hear 
something the South African authors never said, or would have said differently if they 
commented on their neighbours, is always there. Yet, the issues are so interrelated 
that one cannot ignore the South African debates.  
The South African connection, however, is not merely based on the similarity 
of the Namibian and South African constitutions. The peoples of the two countries 
also share a common history of oppression. Not only were both countries victims of 
the 19th century European scramble for Africa which brought with colonialism its 
inherent racism and oppression, the majority of South Africans and Namibians also 
shared a common  history of oppression and humiliation under the apartheid policies 
of the Nationalist Party from 1948. 
Apartheid was more than institutionalised racism. It was an all-embracing 
ideology affecting every aspect of the lives of the people and the political and 
administrative actions of government. Education, religion, cultural expressions, 
language, habitat were all pressed into the racial moulds of inferior and superior 
races and ethnic groups. 
Like the constitutional issues, the debate on the influence of apartheid on the 
judiciary took place in South Africa. The President of South Africa appointed the pre-
independent judges in Namibia or South West Africa. Moreover, the Appellate 
Division with its seat in Bloemfontein, South Africa, was the court of final instance of 
the Supreme Court of South West Africa/Namibia.  
The apartheid system with its tentacles in all sectors of society still hovers 
over the jurisprudence of both the apartheid era and the post-apartheid era. The role 
of positivist judges in advancing apartheid laws remains an ongoing debate in South 
Africa. 
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Even the debate on transformative constitutionalism is not devoid of a fierce 
debate between those who accuse positivism of supporting apartheid laws or even 
creating a framework to justify or give legality to apartheid laws, and the neo-
positivists who argue that positivism, was not inherently an ally of oppressive political 
ideologies.  Like any other jurisprudential model, it can be abused. 
As I have already noted23 this debate is ongoing, both in South Africa and to a 
lesser extent, in Namibia. Consequently, the thesis will start will an overview of the 
positivist/apartheid debate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
23
See 1.1 above. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LEGAL HERMENEUTICS, OPPRESSION AND APARTHEID 
2.1   Introduction 
 I do not intend to go over the field of interpretation as it is taught in southern 
African universities. This thesis is not an exercise in comparing the Namibian 
Constitution with the post-1994 academic constitutionalism in South Africa with its 
different hermeneutical approaches. The main emphasis here is to look at the 
narrow, hard line positivism of the pre-independent era and look at the changes and 
confirmations of the process that took place after 1990 in Namibia.  
 The independence of Namibia and the democratisation of South Africa 
changed the way in which the courts, scholars and practitioners approached legal 
interpretation. In Namibia, the Supreme Court of South West Africa/Namibia had an 
opportunity before independence to lay some foundations for the democratic era.
 Namibian independence in 1990 was followed by democratisation in South 
Africa four years later. If the process of constitutional jurisprudence was a slow 
process until 1994, the South African judgments and the systematic evaluations and 
interpretations of the academic community in the former colonial power, developed 
new opportunities for Namibian constitutional development. Numerous articles, 
books and judgments appeared, introducing a radical break with the jurisprudence of 
the apartheid era. 
In the pre-democratic South African and the pre-independent Namibian 
courts, the issue of interpretive models or hermeneutical rules seldom featured. 
Understanding the law was not a complicated process. The standard books on 
interpretation of statutes or the common law, laid down the rules and the courts, after 
developing some more rules, found the truth.24 
If any interpretive model was prominent, it was an uncomplicated legal 
positivist approach of legal philosophers like HLA Hart. Hart was often misinterpreted 
as a conservative, which made him a comfortable ally in the apartheid era. His 
theory that law and justice had no direct relation with one another also made it easy 
for the South African and South West African  judges working under an apartheid 
government and sometimes severe oppressive legislation not to ask too many 
                                            
24
 See Steyn, L. 1974. Die Uitleg van Wette, (The Interpretation of Statutes), Cape Town: Juta and 
Co. for a typical example of the approach of the South African legal fraternity before democratisation. 
Justice Steyn was the Chief Justice of South Africa from 1959 – 1971. 
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questions on justice and morality. Hart also discarded the idea that politics should 
play any role whatsoever in jurisprudence and interpretation. 
The English case R v A Wimbledon Justices: Ex parte Derwent25 describes 
the approach followed unchallenged by almost all South African courts before 1994 
as well as South West African courts before 1984.  
Although in construing an Act of Parliament the Court must 
always try to give effect to the intention of the Act and must look 
not only at the remedy provided but also at the mischief aimed 
at, it cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which 
are not there . .  
 
Pierre Schlag26 compares this approach to the pre-enlightened theological 
argument for the proof of God. More specifically, he asserts that the formal structure 
of the legal argument resemble the “cosmological proof, the argument from design, 
and the ontological proof of God”. 
Schlag quotes the early twentieth century Justice Joseph Beale who defended 
the dictum “Judges do not create law, they just interpret it”.  According to Beale, the 
decisions of common-law courts are guided by a common law that is always already 
changing and progressive.  Judges do not make law;  they find it. If the opposite was 
true, Beale asserts, it would “be a usurpation of sovereign authority”.27 
It is the formal structure of these legal arguments that is in 
question here. My claim is that these legal arguments bear an 
uncanny and disturbing similarity to various proofs of God. 
Specifically, they resemble …………………..  
Thus, despite its secular pretensions, legal thought is in part a 
kind of theological activity. A more controversial and perhaps 
more surprising point is that, for those who believe in law, there 
is no alternative but to participate in this covertly theological 
discourse. For those legal academics that find this prospect 
unappealing, the alternative is clear: stop trying to "do law," or 
more accurately, stop pretending to "do law”.  
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1953 (1) QB 380, 1953 (1) All ER 390 (QB). 
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Law as the Continuation of God by Other Means, California Law Review 1997 Vol. 85, p. 27.  
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Beale J. 1935. Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, California Law Review 1935, p.38. See also the 
judgment of a serving US Supreme Court judge, Scalia, J, in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 
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Clearly, the reluctance of judicial officials to do anything but finding the law is 
not an invention of the South African law under apartheid. Apart from being one of 
the basic tenets of several jurisprudential theories28, it has always been a safe haven 
for the bench in times of moral uncertainty.   The now well-known Jones v Van der 
Sandt case,29 dating back to the slavery controversy in the pre-civil war United 
States of America, embodied the intense conflict between two legal mind-sets that 
were to be repeated in future generations.30 
The moral justification for slavery was under severe attack at the time of the 
Jones case. In several federal states, slavery was abolished. Jones, a slave owner in 
Kentucky, where slavery was legal, sued Van der Sandt, a resident of Ohio, an 
abolitionist state.  
The Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Ohio in 
favour of Jones.31  The Constitution acknowledged the property rights on slaves, and 
guaranteed these rights. The Courts enforced it in abolitionist states in terms of acts 
of Congress. Consequently, the Court ruled it had no right to consider an alleged 
invalidity and inexpediency of laws recognizing slavery.  
Dworkin pointed out that the arguments posed on behalf of Van der Sandt 
centred around the validity of laws contradicting natural law or the onus on the courts 
to enforce unjust laws.32 
…. that is a political question, settled by each state for itself; and 
the federal power over it is limited by the people of the States in 
the constitution itself, as one of its sacred compromises, an 
which we possess no authority as a judicial body to modify or 
overrule. 
                                            
28
The basic tenet of natural law and natural justice is the relationship between morally good or 
approved actions and that which comes natural. See for example Harris, J. 1980. Legal Philosophy, 
London: Butterworths, p. 6 f, Christie, G and Martin P, 1996 (first edition 1973). Jurisprudence, Texts 
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interpretation of Calvinism sanctioned apartheid from the perspective of a religious worldview, it is not 
difficult to sanction the law from the same perspective. In both cases, a basic logical understanding of 
the system ruled critical thinking and critical interpretation out. 
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The interpretive issue however lies much deeper than a mere choice between 
legal positivism and natural law. The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin suggests that 
the real issue at stake is the principles of justice and fairness embodied in the 
general structure of the Constitution itself.33  The general structure of the American 
Constitution, asserts Dworkin, is one of individual freedom antagonistic to slavery. 
Further, the Fugitive Slave Act is inconsistent with the American conception of 
federalism by disallowing an abolitionist state the right to   supervise the capture of 
slaves in its territory. 
In other words, the hermeneutical key to interpret the Constitution is the 
values it represents. Consequently, it cannot be said that an anti-slavery 
interpretation was based on the morality of some judges. It was an error in law. They 
were rather…. more central to the law than were the particular and transitory policies 
of the slavery compromise.34 
Although Ronald Dworkin used natural law principles and relied on the 
inherent legitimacy of the judicial tradition, he is not a proponent of natural law as 
such. Neither is he a legal positivist. For him legal theory has its foundation in the 
rights of the individual rather that a moral standard or a system based on rights. 
Without going into Dworkin’s legal philosophy here, it is clear that the 
fundamentalist literalist interpretation of the texts is seldom a neutral academic 
exercise. In nineteenth century America, it served the interests of the wealthy slave 
owners. In pre-independent Namibia or pre-1994 South Africa, it served an unjust 
political system. 
Schlag correctly pointed to the weakness of the formalist approach. It 
operated from a premise that legal interpretation is always based on law rather than 
less jurisprudentially appealing such as power, politics or rent seeking.35 In other 
words, its point of departure is an outdated nineteenth century understanding of truth 
and interpretation of texts. It assumes that the interpreter can somehow distance 
herself/himself from all other influences and approach a text subjective.  
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2.2   Hart and Dworkin, interpreters between the times  
 The Oxford scholar, Herbert Hart, was in some ways a continuation of the 
positivism of the second half of the nineteenth century with its emphasis on a general 
theory of jurisprudence that can be applied to all legal systems. In addition, when it 
comes to legal certainty, Hart denies that there can be more than one answer to an 
interpretive issue. While Hart acknowledge that in certain cases there may be a 
penumbra of doubt or a fringe of vagueness, the core of certainty is clear.36 
 Central to his understanding of law, Hart followed the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century positivists in their search for a general theory of jurisprudence 
applicable to all legal systems.37 He also followed the basic idea that there is a clear 
dividing line between law and morality, or the law as it is and the law as it ought to 
be.38 This separation of law and morality has been a shield for conservative jurists in 
South Africa for much of the nineteenth and twentieth century to concentrate almost 
exclusively on the law as it is without developing a concern for what the law ought to 
be. 
 In his debate with legal realist Len Fuller, Hart defended this separation. Fuller 
asserted that some laws were so iniquitous that they cannot be classified as law at 
all.  In other words, even if a norm will be accepted as law on all other grounds, if it 
includes all elements necessary to be called law, except for moral acceptability, it 
cannot be classified as law. 
 This disqualification goes beyond Fuller’s well-known thesis that laws which 
did not meet the procedural requirements, his eight attributes,39 were not law at all. 
Fuller’s example of the wife of a Nazi dissent soldier, who reported him for 
dishonouring the Führer and the Nazi state during the war, is well known. After the 
war she was charged with illegally depriving her husband from his freedom. Her 
defence was that she merely reported him for contravening the law as it was at the 
time. She was eventually only convicted for malicious conduct. Fuller, however, 
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contended that she should have been convicted for her invalid moral behaviour. 
Before doing that, however, the Court had to find the Nazi laws invalid.40 
 Hart was at pains to point out that he did not condone unjust laws and did not 
hide behind the separation between law and morality to condone injustice. On the 
contrary, people will be better equipped to resist iniquitous laws when they 
understand that “the certification of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the 
question of obedience”.41 
 The insistence of the judges in the apartheid era that they did not have the 
authority to set a “minimal threshold of moral appeal” (Mureinik quoting Dworkin) 
before they can acknowledge the legality of statutes, was certainly inspired by Hart’s 
clear black-and-white positivism, which does not mean that Hart presented an 
ideological foundation for apartheid.  
 One of the major ideological foundations of apartheid was the principles of 
core values or a common morality of the people (volk), which the Nationalist Party 
wanted to protect with a series of laws. One of the most vulgar of these laws was 
section 16 of the Immorality Act, 23 of 1957, which classified sexual intercourse over 
the colour line as an immoral act and criminalised such sexual intercourse, even if it 
was practiced in privacy between two consenting adults.   
While Hart opposed morality deriving from natural law, his views on values, 
norms and convictions can easily be interpreted by the proponents of apartheid as 
an approval of their “volksmoraal” (peoples or national morality).  
Hart, debating with British judge Lord Patrick Devlin42, vigorously opposed the 
idea of natural law as a source for morality43. Yet, he distinguished between positive 
morality and critical morality. The so-called morality keeps a society together, i.e. the 
values, norms and convictions of society, Hart refers to as positive morality, while 
critical morality are the attributes allowing society to evaluate and criticise the 
structures and institutions of society.  
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 The influence of Hart’s determinism on the apartheid era has some merit. 
Interpreters bound by the text, especially statutes, were also bound by determinism. 
The discretion of the judge or the interpreter remains on the fringes and do not deal 
with conflict or gaps, the penumbra, in a discretionary manner. This sounds very 
much like the submission of the South African legal fraternity before the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. The strong element of determinism in Hart’s thinking 
made it possible for South African positivists to hide behind the literal meaning of the 
text of apartheid legislation. 
 However, it must be remembered that Hart was no conservative in any sense 
of the word, least in the sense of the South African/Namibian political thought. He 
was a liberal thinker and his legal philosophy emanates from his basic liberal 
philosophy. Hart was an astound opponent of conceptual jurisprudence, a movement 
that accepts there can be more than one valid norm applicable to a set of facts, and 
in applying different norms, it will lead to different results in a case. Conceptual 
jurists also believe that there will be new situations for which no norm or value has 
been developed earlier.44   
 Liberal constitutional interpreters following Hart’s positivism will argue that 
there is nothing intrinsically wrong with his distinction between morality and law. On 
the contrary by emphasising critical morality creates the opportunity for opposition 
against unjust and oppressive regimes. 
 Hart, in his criticism of Devlin, retrieved to a basic natural law concept. 
Societal values, Hart held, should be limited to a “minimum content of natural law”. In 
other words, the state should not legalise for more than the basic morals needed for 
survival. In this regard rules enforcing moral values should be limited to restricting 
violence, theft and deception.45 
 Hart also objected to any notion that society would be destroyed if the core 
common morality were destroyed. Oelsen compared the way in which the common 
morality doctrine operated under apartheid with the ‘blindness’ of the United States 
Supreme Court to the injustices of the slave trade.46  The apartheid government 
used the doctrine of common morality of the white community (more specifically the 
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Afrikaners) to make laws such as the Immorality Act47, even when they offended one 
specific group in the broader South African society, namely people of mixed descent.  
 However the prohibition of mixed marriages and the specific section 16 of the 
Immorality Act48 were sold to the white voters as needed moral values to protect the 
culture and possibly the future existence of whites in South Africa, more specifically 
the Afrikaners. 
 After 1994 with the arrival of democracy, the Constitutional Court in South 
Africa was faced with fact that the death penalty seemed to be in contradiction of the 
Constitution while the majority of the people supported it. Chaskalson had the 
following to say in that regard: 
If public opinion were to be decisive, there would be no need for 
constitutional adjudication. The protection of rights could then be 
left to Parliament, which has a mandate from the public, and is 
answerable to the public for the way its mandate is to be 
exercised, but this would be a return to parliamentary 
sovereignty, and a retreat from the new legal order established 
by the …Constitution.49 
 
 The two examples above are probably not enough to understand exactly what 
Hart meant by the distinction between critical and positive morality. Marmor 
suggested that realism relies on this distinction when it distinguishes between critical 
and positive aspects of law.50 A legally valid norm may turn out to be legally false 
from the perspective of critical normative values, as we have already seen.  
 In his determinism, however, Hart’s position was open for abuse by positivist 
conservative judges. Yet, even in his application of the so-called difficult cases, Hart 
was all but fundamentalist in his approach. In the case of the core, the results were 
determined. When it comes to the penumbra, there is an element of discretion, or 
even judicial law making. Yet, the judge’s discretion is limited. 
Hart rejected the sceptics who accept that in the difficult cases (Hart’s 
penumbra of doubt) the judge’s ideology and own opinions will determine his or her 
judgment. Legal rights, Hart maintained, exists when they are “manifestly accepted” 
by the bulk of the relevant community in the sense that they flow either from rules 
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which are themselves accepted or from rules which are valid according to other 
accepted rules.51 
 When Hart looked at the controversial cases, those rare occasions when 
there is no answer to be found in the manifestly accepted rules of a community, the 
judge may have some discretion or even an option of law making. These functions, 
however, is never arbitrary, but flows from the generally accepted rules and norms of 
society. 
 Dworkin radically opposed Hart in his approach to difficult or controversial 
cases. According his understanding the British/American legal system always 
provide for one right answer in controversial cases.52  One can expect of all “modern 
developed and complex legal systems” to follow this basic principle.53 
 A right that cannot or do not exist in controversial cases, must be construed 
as a claim made from within the enterprise: 
We can only make sense of (a) philosopher’s claim if we take it 
to report the special conditions of an enterprise.54 
 
 In other words, a logic answer or philosophical conclusion to a question of law 
in a controversial case cannot be answered merely as a result of good and logical 
argument and reason. Such and answer will only be good and philosophically 
correct, but can never be a legal answer. The philosopher’s claim must come from 
within the legal community.55    
 However, one cannot assert as true, every proposition of law in a 
controversial case, but only a proposition consistent with the theory of law that 
justifies settled law the best. In other worlds, the judge will weigh all the proposed 
positions in the light of the theory of law and settled law. Positions less consistent 
with the theory of law or the settled law may be denied as false positions.56 
 The judge then, is not creating law and does not have any discretion. The 
penumbra that Hart refers to is not really a penumbra since there is existing law (the 
                                            
51
Hart, 1961. Chapters iv – vi.  
52
Dworkin, R. 1977. Why Bakke has no case. New York Review of Books, November 10, 1977, p.  32. 
See also 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press, pp. 289ff. 
53
Dworkin, R. 1977. The Philosophy of Law. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. New York: Oxford 
University Press, p. 84. See also 1975. Hard Cases, Harvard Law Review, Vol.  88, No. 6, p. 1057. 
54
Dworkin. R. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously, p. 289. 
55
See Dworkin, R.  1977. The Philosophy of Law. Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 81 and, 1977. Why Bakke has no Case, New York Review of Books, p. 28. 
56
Dworkin, R. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge. p. 283. 
 30 
position consistent with the theory of law and settled law). The judge needs only to 
apply it. 
 The debate between Hart and Dworkin goes much deeper than this. Hart has 
a special liberal approach to law. Unlike Dworkin, Hart was not so much interested in 
the criticism of law or legal policy. His interest was in the classification of the general 
framework of legal thought.57 For Dworkin the external aspect of a rule is the mere 
regulatory aspect of behaviour that is common to both rules and habits.58 He used 
the phrase external attitude to describe those humans who are only concerned with 
the rules “when and because they judge that unpleasant consequences are likely to 
follow violation”.59 For Hart on the other hand, the internal point of view or attitude is 
not a prediction of behaviour, but an accepted standard of behaviour to which 
humans conform and demand others to conform. 
 The Hart/Dworkin debate created an opportunity for conservative and liberal 
scholars to remain within the realm of positivism or liberalism without carrying the 
burden of a legal philosophy that serves interests of the apartheid regime.  The 
harsh approach of the post 1948 (the year when the Nationalist party came to power 
and introduced apartheid) superior court benches60 was generally accepted as a 
typical amoral fundamentalism linked to Austin’s understanding of law as the 
command of the powerful.  
 It is, however Dworkin’s approach to the difficult cases (Hart’s penumbra) 
where Dworkin comes with a different approach. Even the hard cases have only one 
possible solution, which Dworkin refers to as “the best constructive interpretation”.61 
In this sense Dworkin is perhaps even further removed from more recent interpretive 
experiments such as realism and CLS than Hart. However, Dworkin nevertheless 
gave an opportunity to progressive jurists in South Africa to move away from the rigid 
positivist approach of the courts of the apartheid era. 
As early as 1971 Witwatersrand law professor John Dugard challenged the 
positivism of the courts for its negative impact on civil liberties.62 The demise of 
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natural law in the mid twentieth century and the influence of English law, Dugard 
argued, created a South African legal system concerned only with rules. This 
extreme reliance on the command theory of nineteenth century positivists is the main 
reason for the South African judiciary’s inability to protect civil liberties. 
  Kroeze observed that the influence of Hart and other “soft” positivists in 
Europe and the United States did not influence South African system.63  Dugard, she 
pointed out, was however, not clear on the alternative. In 1971 he did not consider 
Hart as an option that will soften nineteenth century positivism and Dworkin was not 
yet known in South Africa. Consequently he suggested a combination of natural law 
and realism.64 Dugard and Mureinik’s alternative to positivism will be discussed as a 
transformative model for constitutionalism below.  
 In the subsequent debate Forsyth and Schiller65  defended positivism by 
referring to the difference between positivism and authoritarianism or by explaining 
positivism in terms of the Hartian development rather than the nineteenth century 
insistence on law as the command of the powerful. Dyzenhaus,66  not a positivist, 
made an important contribution in removing the caricatures of positivism and 
critically introduced Hart as the twentieth century face of positivism. Dworkin and 
Hart remained part of the interpretive debate, despite new trends in Namibia and 
South Africa after independence and democratisation. 
 
2.3   Hinz (Allott) and the limits of law 
 Manfred Hinz, founding Deputy Dean and later Dean of the Faculty of Law at 
the University of Namibia, brings a different perspective on the Hart/Dworkin 
debate.67 Relying on Antony Allott,68 he suggests a third way. According to Hinz the 
law does not always present only one answer in every possible case (Dworkin) 
neither does the judge has discretion in all cases on the penumbra.  
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Hinz sees in Allott’s “limits of law” a very particular element of the concept of 
legal pluralism. In other words, the law does not present a legal answer for every 
thinkable legal problem. Hinz refers to a South African Constitutional Law case69 
where the bench affirmed the constitutional rights and status of the status of same 
sex couples, but gave the legislator the opportunity to correct the issue rather than 
“simply read the appropriate gender-neutral language” into the existing legal 
instrument70, as suggested by an article in Business Day.71 
Hinz sees a very specific legal and jurisprudential meaning in the concept of 
the limits of law. While he does not elaborate on the issue, he hinted that an “open-
ended” (my phrase – JNH) limitless concept of law where only human rights 
determines the boundaries of law, can eventually lead to law without rules and law 
without any philosophical foundation. In other words, even human rights principles 
need to be based on rules and principles. 
While Allott (and Hinz?) basically agreed with Hart’s general concepts of law 
and legal institutions, he also looked at the “effectiveness or ineffectiveness of law” 
as a yardstick in assessing the limits of law.72 Since law is a system of 
communication, it carries the same limits of communication in general. 
Consequently, communication disturbances will affect the implementation and 
enforceability of law. Hinz points to several such disturbances such as  
- legislators imposing “ambitious legal innovations while modern society fail 
to respond to it; 
- social and cultural enviroNMent such as imposing colonial laws on people 
with no Western culture or background; and 
- the influence of other normative statements such as religious, moral and 
habitual. If society aligns itself with these statements, it weakens law and 
frustrates legal norms.73 
Hinz bemoans the fact that Allott’s understanding of the limits of law was 
generally ignored by legal philosophers. He assigned it to the inability of legal 
interpretation to take cognisance of the “functioning and backgrounds of law and 
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political institutions”, which was left to anthropology.74 Allott has, as Hinz pointed out, 
predicted that his theories will be ignored by the legal fraternity because of its 
populist approach.75  
 I will return to Hinz’s theories in chapter 6.8.  Suffice it to say that Hinz (relying 
on Allott) opens the door for looking beyond the dispute between Hart and Dworkin 
in dealing with difficult cases. 
 
2.4   Southern African Judiciary and Apartheid 
Namibia never had a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The transition 
from colonialism was extremely smooth in the Namibian courts. One of the reasons 
for the smooth transition was undoubtedly the role of the Supreme Court of South 
West Africa in the 1980’s.  
While the transition of the highest court in South West Africa made it relatively 
easy for the Supreme and High Courts of Namibia to adapt to the demands of a 
constitutional bench after 1990, it prevented any analysis of the political role of the 
judges of the High Court of South West Africa. 
The South African superior court judges were not so privileged. They, together 
with other interest groups such as the churches, civil society and the politicians of 
the apartheid era, had to appear before the Truth and reconciliation Commission. 
Their judgments and interpretations were scrutinised and their support for an unjust 
political system severely evaluated. 
Since South West Africa was such an integral part of the South African legal 
system under colonial rule, it is appropriate to look at the defences and explanations 
of the South African judiciary after apartheid. The Supreme Court of South West 
Africa was subjected to the South African Supreme Court of Appeal in Bloemfontein, 
the vast majority of South African statutes were made applicable in South West 
Africa, and the countries shared the same common law and jurisprudence in terms of 
the stare decesis rule. Most of the judges were South Africans.  
 The legal profession in South Africa defended the judiciary on grounds very 
similar to the defence of liberal judges implementing slavery legislation in the United 
States during the 19th century. The chief justice at the time of the hearings of the 
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Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Judge Corbett, made several 
submissions in defence of the bench’s submissive role during the apartheid era.76 
Firstly Corbett pointed out that during the apartheid era the judges bound 
themselves to laws and customs of the Republic of South Africa by their oaths of 
loyalty, whereas under the new dispensation they bind themselves to uphold the 
Constitution. In the parliamentary democracy of the old order, the courts had no 
authority to review statutory laws or common law. The Courts could not declare it 
unconstitutional or refer it back to parliament.77  
This, according to the former chief justice, does not mean that the courts did 
not play a role in limiting the effects of the unjust laws of its time. Whenever courts 
were required to interpret unclear laws, it always opted for an interpretation that did 
not produce inequity. The judge did not give examples of such cases. 
His own bona fides cannot be doubted. Human rights watchers have often 
recognized his human rights record.78 While it is possibly true of Corbett, there were 
also several unfortunate events where judges uncritically applied the inhumane laws 
of the apartheid government. Even Judge Corbett understanding of the role of the 
judiciary did not give much hope that the courts could be institutions of change and 
justice in the apartheid era. Only if there was no traditional interpretation available, 
could the courts opt for a fair and just interpretation. 
Secondly, the courts generally interpreted legislation in the light of the Roman 
Dutch law presumption that the legislature does not intend to interfere with the 
jurisdiction of the courts or to change the common law more than was clearly and 
unambiguously intended.  The effect of all this, Corbett states, was that the courts 
often ameliorated harsh laws.  
However, as early as 1989, Arthur Chaskalson, known for his defence of 
political offenders since the 1960’s, and later President of the Constitutional Court 
and chief justice of South Africa, stated that the judiciary not only had the power to 
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play a role in dismantling apartheid, but also the judicial obligation.  In a paper in 
198979 Chaskalson pointed to the discrepancy between the common law heritage 
requiring judges to interpret statutes in such a way that it denies all forms of 
discrimination and a demand from the legislature to apply repugnant laws without 
questioning. 
They were at one and the same time being asked to articulate 
and give effect to equitable common law principles, and to 
uphold and enforce discriminatory laws: at one and the same 
time to be an instrument of justice and at another to be an 
instrument of oppression.80 
 
Thus, while Chaskalson portrayed an element of understanding the dilemma 
of the South African judges under the apartheid regime, he nevertheless dismissed 
the myth that the judges were merely interpreting the discriminatory statutes as 
humane and broad as possible.  The common law with its interpretive presumptions 
laid a burden on the courts to treat all humans equal and to give maximum effect to 
equality. The statutory law, erecting the pillars of the apartheid society, made a 
mockery of these principles. The judiciary largely opted to ignore this contradiction. 
Rather than interpreting the repugnant laws in the light of the common law heritage 
of South Africa, the judiciary allowed the oppressive laws to sit judgment over the 
common law. 
Consequently, Corbett defined the role of the judiciary extremely narrow. Its 
only positive contribution was to interpret ambiguous laws in such a manner that 
principles of justice, equality and liberty is served. For Chaskalson, the duty of 
judges in the apartheid era went further than that.  In all aspects of interpretation 
they had to interpret from a basis of the Rule of Law.  
Corbett works with a narrow understanding of the role of the judiciary, and a 
broad understanding of the role of Parliament. For him statute law takes precedence 
over common law. Consequently, common law changes when the political 
ideologists introduce a new framework for society. That framework, he asserted, is a 
given for the judiciary. They cannot change it. Chaskalson saw a basic principle of 
justice embedded in the legal system and in this case in the common law. If the 
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sovereign undermines this foundation, the judiciary has a duty to speak up. This duty 
operates in both a parliamentary democracy and in a constitutional dispensation. 
Dugard observed that the South African judges approached their judicial 
function in an unduly narrow manner.81  The positivist approach of the judiciary 
resulted in a juxtaposition between rules and values. Consequently, the pre-
democratic courts made a radical distinction between law and morality. Already in 
the 1970’s Dugard proposed that judicial positivism should be replaced by a value-
based approach.82 Dugard’s approach, however, should not be seen as radical in the 
sense of the rising critical legal studies movement that developed in the 1970’s in the 
United States and Europe. While his leanings was towards the creativity of the bench 
proclaimed by the American Realists, linked with an acknowledgement of natural law 
values,83 Dugard was never a radical thinker. 
He blamed the positivist approach of the South African judges under apartheid 
for the narrow interpretation of the law. The result of this positivism was a self-
imposed blindness or as Dugard calls it, a “jurisprudential cloak of concealment” 
which is paraded as analytical jurisprudence, while it is in fact the judicial expression 
of conservative politics.84 
Dugard suggested that this damning influence of political conservatism could 
have been countered by what he calls “traditional natural law values”. Dugard 
described these natural law values as freedoms and rights: 
- Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention without trial; 
- Freedom from cruel and unusual punishment; 
- The right to legal representation; 
- The right to be heard before one’s liberty is taken away; 
- Freedom of speech and literary expression; 
- Freedom of the press; 
- Freedom of assembly; and 
- Freedom of movement.85 
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An insistence that these rights are based on natural law principles sounds 
somewhat conservative and even ridiculous in the 21st century. These rights and 
freedoms are given entities in modern constitutions. They usually refer only to civil 
and political rights. However, it serves as a reminder of exactly how oppressive the 
apartheid cum colonial government was in the 1970’s.  
At the University of the Witwatersrand, where Dugard was a professor, 
Ettienne Mureinik, joined in Dugard’s criticism of positivism and his plea for a return 
to natural law. Mureinik introduced Ronald Dworkin, the liberal successor of positivist 
icon HLA Hart at Oxford. In an almost prophetic pre-empting the excuses of the 
judiciary before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Mureinik suggested in the 
late 1980’s when it became clear that the apartheid government was at the end of 
the road, that legislation in terms of Dworkin’s philosophy should satisfy a certain 
adjustment after 1994.86 
 While Dugard and Mureinik addressed a specific problem of non-resistance of 
the courts to the unjust apartheid regime, it can also be seen as a transformative 
model for the new, democratic South Africa. Mureinik’s metaphor of the Constitution 
being the bridge from the old regime of oppression to a new democratic 
dispensation, expresses the idea of constitutional transformation in an enlightened 
way. 
 Dugard had a very specific problem with South African judges who followed 
their counterparts in England in concealing conservative politics in the guise of 
analytical jurisprudence.87 
 Dugard’s alternative to the positivist judges of the apartheid era was the 
creativity of the bench proclaimed by the American Realists, linked with an 
acknowledgement of natural law values.88 
 While the apartheid laws of the Nationalist government did not comply with 
the moral expectations for justifiable legislation, the apartheid statutes were only a 
small component of the corpus of South African legal resources.89 If the bench was 
willing to consider to the Dworkinian test of a minimal threshold of moral appeal, they 
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could apply laws and common law with a moral basis as a counter for the oppressive 
laws. 
In the same vein, Dyzenhaus suggested that the real problem of the era was 
the unwillingness of judges to allow any moral sensibilities to have an impact on 
interpretation. In other words, the judges explicitly chose not to give heed to values 
in their judgments, even those obligated upon them by the common law.90 
The power of the ruling party and its influence as the overwhelming majority in 
Parliament made it difficult for the judges to rock the boat. If they interpreted an 
ambiguous statute in such a way that it defeated the aims of the government, the 
Parliament could simply draft an amendment to obtain its initial goals.91 
This does not mean that none of the judges had a moral inclination. However, 
Dyzenhaus correctly pointed out that the general inclination was not to explore 
alternative models of interpretation. Dworkin’s allegations against the American 
judges of the 19th century have some application here.  If the judges of the apartheid 
era saw the broader picture of the common law, and its demands for equality, 
freedom and justice, they could have posed a stronger challenge to the suppressive 
apartheid laws. Referring to Minister of Interior  v  Lockhart,92 Dyzenhaus showed 
that the courts opted for a narrow interpretation of statutes and found power to 
discriminate unreasonably clearly implied in a discriminatory statute, although the 
Nationalist Party parliamentarians denied in Parliamentary debates that it was the 
intention of the legislation to discriminate.93 
While the new constitutional dispensation in Namibia and South Africa opened 
the doors for new models of legal interpretation, it would be wrong to assume that 
the pre-independent Namibian courts had no option but to follow  the wishes and 
whims of the South African legislators. As Chaskalson pointed out, the common law 
further provided precedents for the bench to resist oppressive legislation.  
It will be an oversimplification to assume that the difference between Corbett 
on the one hand and Chaskalson/Dugard/Dyzenhaus on the other is a mere political 
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issue. On the contrary, Corbett can hardly be defined as a political conservative in 
the South African context. Neither can Dugard, for example be identified as left or 
any other political tag beyond centrist liberal. It is not even a question of two political 
systems, constitutionalism or parliamentary democracy. At the crux of the difference 
lies opposing schools of thought. It may be that the positivism of the judges in the 
apartheid era was escapism for some, but it can also be a judicial choice for some 
variation of positivism, or ‘soft positivism’ and against the post-modernist judicial 
activism.   The ‘soft positivist’ line of thinking emphasises legal clarity and a clear 
distinction between the roles of the legislator to make law vis-à-vis the role of the 
judiciary to interpret law.   
The other school is primarily interested in justice. Law and the legal system 
should not only order and maintain society, it must do it in a just and fair manner. 
Where the legislator fails to legislate according to the underpinning historical 
principles of justice, equality and fairness, the courts have an obligation to interpret 
the laws in the light of the novel (Dworkin) written by the legal system over centuries.  
In a more radical form, the legal realists and later the critical legal studies 
movement (CLS) doubt that legal clarity is possible. For the Realists it did not make 
sense given the different models of interpretation and especially the different 
personalities and backgrounds of the judges to think that five or more US Supreme 
Court judges can come to an unanimous decision or a concurring judgment. CLS 
sees the reasons for judgments – legal principles, previous rulings, abiding by the 
stare decesis rule - merely as smokescreens for ideological bourgeoisie choices 
(mostly at the cost of the poor and powerless).   
The judgments of the Appellate Division overturning judgments of the 
Supreme Court of South West Africa/Namibia between 1986 and independence in 
1990 is an indication of the tremendous influence of political ideology and the 
ideological framework of apartheid on the judiciary.94 On the other hand, the 
Supreme Court of South West Africa/Namibia proved that the South African 
oppressive laws could be challenged successfully, despite the fact that the judges 
like the South African Supreme Court benches, were products of the system. 
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2.5   Transformative Constitutionalism 
It came as no surprise that academics took up the challenge of the likes of 
Mureinik and Dugard against positivism after Namibian independence and 
democratisation in South Africa. Several academics challenged the heritage of the 
apartheid era for its alliance with Western legal positivism and liberalism. 95 
Even the term liberalism became suspect after 1994. It was no longer seen as 
an expression of progressive thinking challenging the ideological apartheid heresy.  
The natural law approach of Dugard and the liberal Dworkinian model of Mureinik 
came under the same scrutiny as positivism.96 
As stated earlier, an article by Karl Klare set the scene for the jurisprudential 
debate on the role of a post-modernist or CLS approach (or at least an approach 
sympathetic to CLS insights) vis-à-vis traditional liberal jurisprudence.97 
The challenge did not go unanswered. Traditional liberals and positivist 
thinkers eventually challenged the initial strong appreciation of what is now known as 
transformative constitutionalism. They did not suggest that the post-apartheid society 
should give up all the victories of the constitutional jurisprudence either. However, 
they strongly challenged the idea that liberal positivist jurisprudence of the likes of 
Herbert Hart or the liberal natural law approach of Ronald Dworkin is necessarily 
unfit for a progressive constitutional jurisprudential model.98 
Karl Klare’s article stirred the South African constitutional debate.99 His attack 
on a liberal literalist interpretation of the South African Constitution and the 
insistence that a post-liberal constitution justifies a post-liberal interpretive model 
found wide support, so much so that a conference was organised in 2008 to evaluate 
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the development of transformative constitutionalism in ten years since the 
appearance of his article. 100 
Klare used  Mureinik’s article to elaborate on the significance and uniqueness 
of constitutional interpretation and more directly the transformative role of the new 
constitution in South African adjudication.101 The democratic transition of South 
Africa, personified and spearheaded by the constitution, “is intended to be a bridge 
from authoritarianism to a new culture of justification, a culture in which every 
exercise of power is expected to be justified’”.102 
Klare used a long quote of Mureinik to introduce his understanding of exactly 
what in the South African legal system needs to transformation. Mureinik looked at 
the repression and the serial state of emergencies in the last years of the apartheid 
government and questioned the role of a conscientious judge. Without mentioning 
Chief Justice Corbett, Mureinik refers to the dilemma Corbett discussed in his 
representation to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. If the conscientious 
judge, faithful to his oath to uphold the laws of the day, yet forced to do it in such a 
way that he/she nullifies or at least minimize the effect on the victims, Mureinik saw 
no way that such a legal system still has a place for justice.103  The fetters of unjust 
law will eventually destroy such judges’ capacity of justice. The constitutional 
dispensation, Klare commented, needs a new way of looking at the role of the legal 
system in general and judges in particular. Klare defined transformative 
constitutionalism as follows: 
 
.. a long term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation 
and enforcement committed ... to transforming a country’s 
political and social institutions and power relationships in a 
democratic participatory and egalitarian direction. 
Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of 
inducing large scale social change through large scale 
nonviolent political processes grounded in law. I have in mind a 
transformation vast enough to be inadequately captured by the 
phrase ‘reform,’ but short of or different from ‘revolution’ in any 
sense of the word.104 
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Klare’s point of departure is that the South African Constitution signifies a 
break with traditional liberalism and the creation of what he calls “an empowered 
model of democracy”.105 The South African constitution should therefore not be read 
as if it is just another product of liberalism. Klare called it a post-liberal constitution. 
He identified the features that signify the break as ”multiculturalism, close attention to 
gender and sexual identity, emphasis on participation and governmental 
transparency, enviroNMentalism and the extension of democratic credentials into the 
private sphere”.106 
Klare is not always clear on how important it is for issues of adjudication to 
accept a post-liberal reading of the constitution. On the one hand he states that his 
article is not meant to convince everyone that a post-liberal reading is the correct 
interpretation of the constitution, but rather to invite dialogue.107 However, he also 
raised the problem with opting for a liberal interpretation without dialogue. Since the  
liberal approach has always been seen as the correct “legal” interpretation and post-
liberalism as “political”, Klare doubted that transformative interpretation would get a 
fair hearing if post-liberalism vis-á-vis liberalism, as foundations of interpretation 
were not debated.108 The political dimension of interpretation is the real issue that 
Klare dealt with. One gets the idea that transformative constitutionalism is closely 
linked to a post-liberal reading.   
Klare stated that the drafters of the Constitution, by dramatically moving away 
from liberalism, expected the interpreters not to interpret the South African 
Constitution through the lens of “classical legalistic methods”.109 Consequently, he 
sees it as a legal necessity that that a “transformative conception of adjudicative 
process and method” be applied to interpret the South African Constitution.110 
The critics of a transformative constitutional model emphasise the problematic 
relationship between law and politics in adjudication, and the tension between 
judicial constraint and judicial activism. Klare opted not to use the word “activism” but 
rather spoke of the freedom of judges “to accomplish justice”.111 The constitution so 
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dramatically altered the substantive constitutional foundations and assumptions that 
it is impossible to believe that the drafters assumed that the constitution would be 
interpreted “constraint by the intellectual instincts and habits of mind” of the lawyers 
of the apartheid era.112 
But we balk at the idea of transformative adjudication, because 
this suggests an invitation to judges as distinct from legislators, 
to attempt in their work to accomplish political projects.113 
 
Klare, quoting CLS scholar and Harvard professor Duncan Kennedy,114 
repeated the old argument against a reliance on the text only: Texts do not self-
generate their meaning, but need to be interpreted. Constraint, however, is not an 
objective legal rule with defined rules and therefore hardly measurable. If anything, 
constraint is culturally constructed. In other words, they are constrained less by the 
clear and unambiguous language than by a traditional fear to enter the political 
arena. 
Yet, judges, lawyers and academics, in the words of Duncan Kennedy, have 
no specific legal criteria to come to correct conclusions apart from the persuasive 
“deployment of the argumentative tools that legal culture makes available to judges 
trying to generate the effect of legal necessity”. Consequently, in contested cases it 
is hardly possible to speak of a correct, non-strategized legal solution, or a solution 
derived only from legal argument rather than strategic use of the law. 115 
Klare dedicated one section to go over the old arguments that constraint and 
judicial activism are equally political. He used the realist argument that judges cannot 
exclude the personal and political values from the interpretive process. The question 
is no longer, to what extent can a judge distance herself from her a priori convictions, 
since “the traditional rule-of-law ideal is quite simply impossible”.116 Further, not only 
the Realists or CLS advocates rely on external extra-legal personal or political 
sources to adjudicate in matters where there is no clear legal answer. Klare points to 
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Hart’s solution for the penumbral question, or Dworkin’s method of coherence and 
integrity.117 
Klare saw his position as a direct response to the philosophy embedded in the 
constitution, which he defines as post-liberal and perceived transformative 
constitutionalism as something more that adjudication and interpretation of the 
wording of the constitutional text. The adjudicators need constant reminders through 
the process of adjudication to be aware of the values and objectives of the 
constitution and to consider it. The interpreting, adjudication and implementing the 
constitutional text must lead to fulfil the ideals of the constitution: a non-racial, non-
discriminatory, democratic society. In this process it is inevitable to include political 
issues and conclusions. 
Klare’s interpretive model closely relates to the values and views of the 
American Realists and to some extend the CLS movement, more specifically the 
position of Duncan Kennedy. He warned that the constraint literalist approach of the 
apartheid era could hardly be duplicated in the new constitutional dispensation. One 
cannot speak of a broad, purposive interpretation of rights and at the same time 
ignore the clear objectives of the constitution envisaged in the Preamble and the 
total structure of the document. An activist judge, or as Klare chose to call it, a 
progressive bench, is the tool to implement transformative constitutionalism. 
The known models of interpretation that encourage an activism searching for 
truth beyond the written text, and what is known as legal issues, are American 
Realism and CLS. Duncan Kennedy has become synonymous of CLS. Realism and 
CLS are both open to include other disciplines such as philosophy, sociology and 
even political science to interpret the constitutional text. In addition, it does not shy 
away from an open-minded understanding of the political consequences texts to be 
interpreted. 
When it comes to post-1994 jurisprudence, the South African Constitutional 
Court has stated on several occasions that constitutional interpretation demands 
more than a literalist approach:  
- Kriegler stated that “the judicial process, especially in the field of 
constitutional adjudication, calls for value judgments in which extra-legal  
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considerations may loom large”,118  
- Mahomed, CJ  in the same case stated that the South African constitution 
“represents a decisive break from and a ringing rejection of that part of the 
past which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular and repressive and 
a vigorous identification of and commitment to a democratic, universalistic, 
caring and inspirationally egalitarian ethos, expressly articulated in the 
Constitution,”119 
- Mandala, J refers to “ ...a document that seeks to transform the status quo 
ante into a new order”.120 The list goes on. 
The need for transformative constitutionalism is clear. What Klare has done is 
rolling out a model that will fit the demand of transformation. While Klare repeated 
several times that he is not necessarily advocating a post-liberal constitutional 
tag, neither does he want to sell a specific interpretive mode, he only gave 
attention to the post-liberal understanding of the constitution and only used the 
basic approach to judicial activism usually identified with American Realism and 
CLS.  
Klare is at pains to point out that he does not use the terms progressive and 
conservative in a political sense of ‘left’ and ‘right’. A progressive judgment in the 
USA often comes from a political conservative bench and vice versa.121 
Coming back to Klare’s initial rejection of the dichotomy between pure legal 
arguments and results on the one hand and political arguments and results on the 
other, Klare concluded that the constraint judgment is also political and influenced by 
the judge’s own enviroNMent, personality and understanding. The difference 
between the judge constraint by the status quo and an activist, or progressive judge 
is not a legal approach vis-à-vis a political approach. The progressive judge or 
scholar has a clear understanding of the process of incorporating other scientific 
fields, and the necessity of political judgments and political consequences of his/her 
judgments. The conservative judge, however, bound by perceived constraints, locks 
anything out of his/her consideration that does not fit his/her traditional 
understanding .of the watertight separation between law and politics. 
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Klare observed that the initial process of transformation in South Africa was 
marked by a strong element of legal conservatism. 
In this context “conservatism” does not refer to political ideology. 
I mean rather cautious traditions of analysis common to South 
African lawyers of all political outlooks. Even the most optimistic 
proponents of progressive social change often display the same 
jurisprudential habits of mind as shown by their more pessimistic 
or political conservative colleagues.122 
 
Klare suggests that the hermeneutical key for constitutional interpretation is to 
be found in the political framework and structure of the constitution. He further 
contends, in the same line of thinking as Judge Chaskalson that it is not a case of 
the post-independent interpretation being political and the interpretation of the 
previous dispensation being pure legal interpretation. The apartheid interpretation 
was as political as any value-based interpretation can be.123 
As we have seen, he opted for an a priori egalitarian point of departure.  Since 
the South African constitution like the Namibian one, is in the first place the bridge to 
take South Africa from apartheid to a just, inclusive society, one cannot interpret sub-
divisions without constantly being reminded of the foundation and intention of the 
document as a whole. 
Klare’s point is well taken. One cannot speak of values as if they are eternal, 
non-changing universal principles that are somewhere out there for the judges to 
discover. This rigid, natural law approach does not have that followers in a post-
modern pluralist society.   
Klare further demonstrated that a pure legal argument does not exist. He uses 
the concepts legal constraint and adjudication to explain the conflict between 
aspects of law that a judge deals with and the extra-judicial material that comes into 
play to determine values.124 All legal texts maintain elements of constraint that binds 
the interpreter. However, even the constraints are not clear-cut legal principles, but 
matter of interpretation, “not an innate, (i.e. uninterpreted (sic) property of the 
material themselves that we can know objectively)”.125 
The adjudicators are not subjective interpreters who come to the text in total 
objectivity. They work with the materials of previous adjudicators (an important 
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aspect of the common law with its stare decesis-rule). They also bring their culture, 
history and personal values to the table.  
In a lecture at Stellenbosch University former Chief Justice Pius Langa looked 
at transformative constitutionalism in a broader sense.126 Without the reliance on 
American Realism or CLS, Langa nevertheless dealt with most of the issues raised 
by Klare.  He gets his definition of transformative constitutionalism from the Epilogue 
of the constitution: 
…a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society 
characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, 
and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, 
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development 
opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, 
class, belief or sex. 
 
Langa shared most of Klare’s criticism of the courts in the apartheid era. His 
emphasis on economic transformation is even stronger than that of Klare. For him 
the skewed “provision of services to all and the levelling of the economic playing 
fields” must be central to any concept of transformative constitutionalism.127 For 
Langa socio-economic justice are more than protecting individuals from state 
interference.  It is not enough to burden the state to allow formal equality  without 
doing anything. Transformation means access to education and an active obligation 
on the State to implement structures such as affirmative action to create 
opportunities for those left behind in the previous unjust system.128 Langa bemoaned 
the fact that the South African legal culture emphasises a formalist approach to law 
rather than substantive argument.129  The role of judges in the new dispensation 
must be a total round about turn - 
..., judges bear the ultimate responsibility to justify their 
decisions not only by reference to authority, but by reference to 
ideas and values.130 
 
Quoting Botha and Van der Walt,131 Langa questioned Mureinik’s 
constitutional metaphor of a bridge. While the interim constitution could be seen as a 
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bridge or a space between an unstable past and an uncertain future, real 
transformative constitutionalism does not fit the metaphor.  It is a permanent ideal 
and not a temporary route to equal access to resources and services. The 
constitution will always create the space for dialogue and contestation where no 
practice or idea is cast in stone and where new “ways of being are constantly 
explored and crated”.132 
Quoting several examples, Langa opines that the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa has made the transition to a progressive, transformative court, without 
throwing away the baby with the bathwater. Where words are clear, he asserts the 
courts have no rights to enter the arena of the legislator.  
Were the courts to completely discard any adherence to the 
text they would enter squarely into the domain of the legislature 
as creators rather than interpreters of the law. That is clearly 
not what the Constitution envisages.133 
 
It falls outside the scope of this thesis to analyse the South African 
Constitutional Court or its judgments. Suffice it to take note of the fact that a 
respected chief justice of South Africa embraced the principle of transformative 
constitutionalism without simultaneous opted for an interpretive module linked with 
the American Realists or CLS. Referring to the accusation (of Klare?) that the South 
African legal culture is generally caught in the web of formalism and conservatism, 
Langa stated that not all the members of the legal fraternity are like that. He quoted 
the resistance against apartheid by the legal fraternity as evidence of the opposite.134 
 Woolman and Davis, like Klare, see the Constitution as a radical break with 
liberalism. Interpreting the case of Du Plessis v De Klerk,135  the authors found the 
ideological position of the Court as the key to understand a judgment. The first 
appellant was the editor of the newspaper The Pretoria News, the second the owner 
and publisher of the newspaper and the third a journalist writing some disputed 
articles for the newspaper. The articles claimed that the first respondent, one Gert de 
Klerk and his company, the second respondent, were transporting arms to the 
Angolan rebel movement, UNITA. In doing so South African citizens contravened air 
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regulations and destabilised Angola. The Transvaal Provincial Division of the 
Supreme Court referred two issues to the Constitutional Court: 
- Whether chapter 3 (the Bill of Rights) of the interim South African 
Constitution had horizontal application; 
- Whether the Constitution can operate retrospectively (the Interim 
Constitution came into operation after the act in question was executed, but before 
the case of De Klerk against the appellants went to court).  
The Constitutional Court answered both questions in the negative and stated  
that the South African Constitution, unlike the Namibian Constitution,  does not 
provide for the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights.136 However, the 
fundamental questions are extremely relevant: What role does an a priori ideological 
position play in the interpretation of the Constitution? Or, to look at it from the 
perspective of the Bench: Is it imperative for the Court to take notice of the basic 
values or ideological foundation enshrined in a constitution?  
Woolman and Davis137 began their argument by finding the ideological 
foundation of the South African constitution. They call the ideology underpinning the 
South African Constitution ‘Creole Liberalism’138. Their Creole liberalism is 
reminiscent of what Klare called post-liberalism. One can also call it liberalism with a 
human face, or liberalism with a heart, vis-à-vis classical liberalism with its 
conservative faith in the positive powers of the free market system and the almost 
messianic faith that the market and market power will order society for the best. 
Creole liberalism opposes the pretext of classical liberalism that the 
government only has a negative responsibility not to interfere in the private lives of 
individuals and only protects the individual from interference of their fundamental 
rights. Classical liberalism remains neutral in the contest of different rights. Creole 
liberalism, on the other hand demands that the State provides active support to the 
vision of meaningful life for those who are not dominant in society, thus also giving 
preference to the rights supporting the weakest members of society.  
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While Klare is at pains to place his article within a mosaic of interpretive 
keys,139  in other words, within the framework of post-modernist thinking, Woolman 
and Davis are clearly moving towards Dworkinian certainty.140 However, Davis 
disagreed with Dworkin on one very crucial point: Dworkin does not leave room for 
different results in constitutional interpretation. If the judges follow the interpretive 
rules of Hercules, J., even the divide between conservative and liberal becomes 
irrelevant. Right moral application inevitably leads to correct answers. Woolman and 
Davis, on the other hand, maintained that the a priori application of political model 
determines the outcome of the interpretation. The correct hermeneutical interpretive 
keys and a correct a priori political understanding of the Constitution equally 
guarantee the correctness of the interpretation.141 
Woolman and Davis were explicit in their rejection of Justice Kentridge’s 
judgment. They did not argue that Creole liberalism is a better option than classical 
liberalism. For them Judge Kentridge erred in law in De Klerk v Du Plessis142 by 
unlocking the constitutional right to freedom of expression with a liberal key.  
The authors discussed several flaws in Kentridge’s judgment. His 
fundamentalist emphasis on the text does not allow the text to speak for itself and his 
use of foreign authorities is susceptible.143  Woolman/Davis does not appreciate his 
conservative approach to the role of the Constitutional Court in developing the 
common law at the hand of the Constitution and the judge’s rejection of the 
horizontal application of the Bill of Human Rights. However, the misdirection of the 
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judge is the result of the hermeneutical key that he (and the concurring judges of the 
Constitutional Court) used to unlock the law.  
Classical liberal political theory and the application of the 
doctrine enunciated by the court in Du Plessis v De Klerk are 
clearly linked to one another. Classical liberal theory takes a 
view of individual freedom which depends upon a minimal state 
refraining from interference in the ‘private’ affairs of individuals, 
while simultaneously protecting individuals from such 
interference by other members of society.144 
 
While the interim Constitution was still uncertain on the position of horizontal 
application, the wording of the final Constitution left no uncertainty.  Since the 
common law still significantly restricts the life choices of many South Africans, and 
determine their lives, the authors concluded that classical liberal theory does not 
unlock the intention of the Constitution to transform society into a radical, free 
society. Consequently, the judgment is wrong, not only because the judge or judges 
erred or misdirected themselves in applying the law, but especially in opting for a 
specific hermeneutical pretext, in this case, classical liberal political theory. Lastly, 
the authors pose Creole liberalism as the hermeneutical key to unlock the 
Constitution.  
While they obviously have a personal preference for Creole liberalism,145 their 
choice is posed by the Constitution itself.146 Three useful insights of Woolman and 
Davis, on the one hand and Klare on the other, are important when we look at 
Namibian judgments -  
- Klare’s thesis that the literal interpreters are no less political than those 
who work with a value-based hermeneutics; 
- Both Klare and Woolman/Davis’ theses that political theory often operates 
as a pretext or hermeneutical a priori in constitutional interpretation; and 
- Woolman/Davis’s insistence that value based judgments is not 
discretionary decisions as suggested by post-modernist theorists. 
 Woolman/Davis’ article did not intend to analyse the political and economic 
realities of the new South Africa. However, at the time of the judgment all indications 
were pointing to a market economy with some control structures that will allow 
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government the final say in all economic matters. There was little or no signs of a 
caring liberal market economy or even less a moderate social-democratic 
interventionist economy based on the needs of the most vulnerable people in 
society. 
 
2.6   Positivism a Problem? 
 The value of a positivist approach in a constitutional democracy remains a 
debatable point. I have pointed out that John Dugard saw positivism as the main 
reason for judges to ignore the immorality of the apartheid laws.147 However, South 
African scholars such as Cockrell, Fagan and Roux disputed the negative role of 
positivism. Roux asserted that positivism could be a valuable model in constitutional 
interpretation and transformation.  
In the international arena scholars regularly blame positivism for the rise and 
maintenance of ideological heresies.  The German law professor Gustav Radbruch 
blamed positivism for the total surrender of the legal fraternity to Hitler.148 However, 
Thomas Mertens challenged the thesis of Radbruch.149 He pointed out that 
Radbruch himself as a positivist, was never attracted to the Nazism. His support of 
the Weimar Republic is but one indication that Radbruch’s positivism was not 
popular amongst the German legal fraternity when Hitler came to power.150 He also 
pointed out that the positivist Kelsen lost his post immediately when the Nazi’s took 
over, while the fierce opponent of positivism, Carl Schmidt’s post-1933 articles are 
filled with anti-Semitism. 
 In South Africa Klare151 with his concept of transformative constitutionalism, 
and other interpreters such as Woolman and Davis152 made huge inroads into the 
original domain of legal positivism. However, it soon became clear that positivism is 
not dead yet.  Moderate positivists such as Fagan153 and Cockrell154 do not operate 
                                            
147
Dugard, J. 1971. The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberties, in 88 SALJ, pp. 181 – 200. 
148
See Radbruch, G. 1946. Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht, originally in 
Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung 1 (1946), 105–108; Radbruch, G. 1957. Der Mensch im 
Recht. 1957. Göttingen: Vanden-hoeck und Ruprech. 
149
Nazism, Legal Positivism and Radbruch’s Thesis on Statutory Injustice. 2003. Law and Critique 14, 
pp. 277–295. 
150
Ibid, p. 280 f. 
151
Klare, p. 146. 
152
Woolman and Davis, p.  361ff. 
153
Fagan, A. 1995: In Defence of the Obvious: Ordinary Language and the Identification of 
Constitutional Rules, 11 SAJHR, p. 545 ff. 
154
See: Cockrell, A. 1966. Rainbow Jurisprudence in 12 SAJHR, pp. 1 – 38. 
 53 
with an old-fashioned view of law. Cockrell challenged the anti-positivist interpreters 
to lift both the academic debate and the judgments of the superior courts to the level 
of substantive legal issues rather than structural law. The test for good or bad 
judgments, Cockrell held, should not be an ideological shibboleth test for or against 
value-based or positivist judgments.  
Not every interpreter or constitutional theorist was ready to depart from the 
clear words of the legal text. The old middle-aged white Afrikaner jungle judges 
were not the only ones protesting against the value-based approach. In the English-
speaking world and to a lesser extent, amongst the so-called Scandinavian 
positivists, literalism does not equal political conservatism.155 
In the South African context, the analytical positivists entered the 
constitutional debate on the side of legal scholars who found the value-approach of 
the post-democratic South African courts, especially the Constitutional Court, 
somewhat overboard.  The strongest attack against Klare came from Theunis Roux, 
constitutional scholar, presently professor of law at the University of New South 
Wales.156 Roux presented a paper at the conference in Stellenbosch celebrating ten 
years of Klare’s article on transformative constitutionalism, joining Anton Fagan and 
Alfred Cockrell in defence of positivism. 
Roux’s main thesis is that Klare’s transformative constitutionalism was based 
on the claim that the methodology and political commitments of the American 
Critical Legal Studies movement (CLS) was the only legitimate interpretive method 
to unlock the potential of the South African constitution.  The flaw in Klare’s position, 
Roux maintained, is the absence of any real alternative and an explanation on how 
transformative constitutionalism deviates from classical positivism or the liberal 
interpretation methods of Dworkin and others (mainstream traditionalist liberals, as 
he calls them).157 
Roux set out to prove that the methodology of Dworkin is as a good approach 
to transformative constitutionalism, and possibly “a more easily defensible way of 
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giving effect to the progressive values underlying the Constitution than the method 
Klare advocates”.158 The first contradiction in Klare’s approach, Roux asserted, is 
the fact that he sells his interpretive method, which he defines as a post-liberal 
reading, as the only plausible method to interpret the South African constitution, 
which will lead to an empowerment model of democracy. Roux, however overstated 
his position here. Klare left no doubt in the mind of the reader that he interpreted the 
South African constitution as a post-liberal rather than a traditional liberal document. 
However, he also made it clear that he is open for a debate on a liberal reading    
vis-à-vis his post-liberal statement. The debate was necessary to prevent the 
traditionalists to use a liberal position to cut off any political adjudication without 
considering the necessity of a transformative model of interpretation. 
Roux asserted that reading of the Constitution according to the accepted 
conventions of legal reasoning would provide for an empowerment model of 
democracy.159 Further, CLS has always asserted that it is impossible for several 
judges to use the same model of interpretation and come to the same conclusion. 
Klare, however came up with one interpretative method, grounded in the thinking 
and philosophy of CLS, as “the best interpretation and therefore the one that should 
guide South African judges and lawyers”. The CLS movement rejects the idea of 
one original intent as an interpretive point of departure.  Yet, Klare used this 
argument, usually posed by the proponents of what he calls the “classical legalist 
method”.160 Only, in his understanding the intention of the constitutional mothers 
and fathers was not the pursuance of a conservative agenda, but a post-liberal 
transformative agenda of building a participatory democracy on the principle of 
empowerment.  
To put it differently, Klare, while rejecting the legalism of the apartheid era, 
opened the backdoor for another form of legalism and determinism. Consequently, 
while Klare often refers to the Constitution as a radical break with the past, he came 
up with an interpretive methodology that is so general that it poses no substantive 
legal challenge for the traditionalists, liberals and classical legalists, and falls in the 
same structural and procedural pitfalls as the methodology he wished to challenge 
at its core.  
                                            
158
Ibid. 
159
Ibid, p. 262. 
160
Ibid, p. 264. 
 55 
In defence of the traditionalist method of adjudication, Roux pointed out that 
the traditional division between politics and law, or a conservative legal agenda will 
not result in a South African judge concluding very different from Klare’s 
transformative constitutional results.  
…a mainstream liberal could read the Constitution as a 
transformative Constitution using a Dworkinian best-
interpretation approach. A hartian legal positivist could do the 
same thing. There is nothing particular penumbral, after all, 
about the “essential features” Klare identifies.…both of these 
mainstream liberal interpretive methods… could be used to 
read the Constitution in an interpretive way.161 
 
Roux also rejected Klare’s contention that liberal legalists favour opaque 
forms of legal reasoning, or that they objected to judicial value choices.162 He then 
went on to apply Dworkinian legal reasoning to the constitutional issues discussed 
by Klare to point out that in all cases a Dworkinian judge or lawyer will be able to 
develop transformative constitutional jurisprudence. 
It is not necessary for this study to go into the detail of Roux’s article. It is 
true that the South African and Namibian judges operated with an extremely narrow 
and a-political interpretive methodology. However, the condemnation of all liberal 
models, reminiscent of the post-apartheid rejection of all forms of pre-independent, 
pre-democratisation liberal politics as insignificant, does not tell the whole story. It 
does not give credit to those liberal scholars such as Dugard and Mureinik, and the 
progressive bench of the South West African Supreme Court for their valuable 
contribution to a critical legal fraternity and an independent judiciary.  
In addition, it is a somewhat over breath to identify all positivist and liberal 
expressions of jurisprudence with the North American over-politicised Supreme 
Court bench.  
Anton Fagan applied the philosophies of Joseph Raz, Israeli Oxford scholar, 
to answer the strong value driven approach of the South African Constitutional 
Court.163 Fagan links his thesis with Raz’ concepts of conformity and compliance.  
He underlines the superior achievements of a court by relying on the textual moral 
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position rather than the morals of the external rules of constitutional interpretation. 
The external rules merely open the door for the moral position of the judges.   
The Constituent Assembly had the power and the ability to frame 
constitutional rules in any way it wanted, yet did not do it. Therefore, the Courts 
must accept the text itself as the interpretive rules and honour this rule-making act 
by giving the text its original meaning.164 
Consequently, Fagan concluded that since the source of the constitutional 
rules is the constitutional text, the interpreter needs no external assistance from 
non-legal sources. The text, more specifically, the original meaning of the words of 
the text is also the legal source of the interpreter.  Thus, it is the linguistic words of 
the text that needs to be interpreted, not even the original intention, derived from 
extra-textual sources, such as the minutes of the Constituent Assembly.  
Fagan saw legal stability and certainty in keeping to the text rather than 
importing so-called constitutional rules. It makes no sense to work from a set of 
constitutional rules unless one is convinced that following the rules is a morally 
better choice than following its own moral judgments.  
Davis observed that the theory of language that Fagan used works well as 
long as there are no ambiguities or difficulties in the text itself.165  But the theory of 
semantic autonomy falls apart the moment words create symbols, ideas and 
meanings that neither the user nor the interpreter conceived.  
Davis further pointed out that it was exactly this contradictory semantic 
possibility that lead HLA Hart to make provision for the preservation of clarity on the 
core, while an element of discretion is allowed on the periphery.166 
Cockrell aimed his criticism not only at the Constitutional Court, but also at 
what he called positivism bashing.167 Using a differentiation between formal 
reasoning and substantive reasoning, Cockrell maintained that the South African 
legal system has not moved from an extreme formal reasoning to a substantive form 
of reasoning since the coming of democracy, and especially the acceptance of a 
Constitutional dispensation.  
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The title of the paper, Rainbow jurisprudence, is somewhat misleading. It has 
nothing to do with the overused metaphor of a rainbow to personify the new 
reconciled South African rainbow nation. Cockrell’s rainbow is a metaphor of 
confusing and contradictory judgments. 
Cockrell did not criticize value-based judgments per se. Rather he opted for 
what he calls soft positivism.168  Soft positivism allows for a substantive form of 
reasoning if the text itself requires a value judgment. As an example, he referred to 
the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution. The Bill is structured in such a 
way that it is impossible to interpret it by merely formal reasoning.  
Cockrell quoted Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette169 to address 
the issue of public opinion in interpreting the Constitution.  Since a Bill of Rights is 
designed to take certain issues out of the public domain and out of the hands of the 
legislature, public opinion can have no bearing on the reasoning of the Court in 
deciding on these issues. Consequently, norms and values must derive from the 
constitution. The soft positivism that Cockrell relied on, falls outside the domain of 
rigid, literalist interpretation. 
 Roux’s insights are important correctives on Klare’s vision for transformative 
constitutionalism.  The point that the likes of Roux, Fagan and Cockrell make is that 
transformative constitutionalism can also become a rigid and fundamentalist 
approach.  While CLS and fundamentalism are two extreme opposites, if the 
hermeneutical tool based on CLS becomes an absolute, the two opposites can move 
dangerously close to each other. 
Roux’s criticism of transformative constitutionalism is not a rejection of CLS 
insights or a plea for the return to Dworkin’s Reconstruction theory, or positivism.  
Roux asserted that the South African constitution is so obviously transformative that 
both Hart’s positivism and Dworkin’s liberalism fit the development of a 
transformative jurisprudence. 
 In the same vein Cockrell identified the option for procedure over substantive 
argument as the real problem of constitutional interpretation. Cockrell (and Fagan) 
further criticized the general perception that positivism is per definition against value-
based judgments.  The problem is not with bringing values into the process, but the 
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structural way in which values are brought in.  Determining the values is often ad hoc 
without any substantive justification for the process. 
 
2.7   Summary  
In its crudest form positivism and transformative constitutionalism stand in 
total opposition against each other. If one reads Klare’s dictum as a defence of 
classical realism or CLS that excludes all other interpretive models, the critical 
comments of Roux become crucial.  
On the one hand, positivist can criticise transformative constitutionalism, of 
not being honest to its own roots since CLS and Realism have always denied the 
idea of a conforming single legal position. Consequently, they are giving a distorted 
view of positivism. Or the positivist can see transformative constitutionalism as an 
express deviation from the constitutional text to open the door for political reasoning. 
Alternatively, one can refuse to see the need for a transformative approach to 
constitutional interpretation, working with the myth that even Hart rejected, assuming 
that the words of the constitution will always be clear.  
On the other hand one can operate with a bias against positivism per se – the 
complaint of both Roux and Cockrell. Roux has convincingly argued that a “soft’ 
positivists or a liberal followers of Dworkin’s theories do not necessarily oppose the 
principle of transformative constitutionalism.  
While one can never use the term middle ground when working with 
diametrically opposed methodologies, a third way is possible. Klare opened the way 
for such an approach when he stated that while he strongly believes a post-liberal 
reading of the South African constitution is the way to go, he is open to debate the 
issue with others. Roux has opened that debate. The third way is to be open for both 
Klare and Roux’s approaches. Whether the courts opt for a cautious approach to 
social and economic rights using Dworkin’s theory of the best solution or working 
more progressively with a clear objective to develop the individual’s right to socio-
economic rights, both will work towards transformative adjudication and a model for 
transforming society. 
The approach of the late Justice Pius Langa, former chief justice of South 
Africa and at the time of his death, an acting judge of the Namibian Supreme Court is 
a good example of exploring transformative options without making the clear wording 
of the constitution or legislation with constitutional relevance obsolete. On the one 
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hand, he expected judges to “bear the ultimate responsibility to justify their decisions 
not only by reference to authority, but by reference to ideas and values”. At the same 
time he cautions courts to “…the consequences of completely discard any 
adherence to the text” since they would then “enter squarely into the domain of the 
legislature as creators rather than interpreters of the law”.170 
In dealing with the constitutional jurisprudence I will constantly look at the way 
in which the judgments adjudicate on and develop the rights and freedoms of the 
Namibian people.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE TIME BETWEEN THE TIMES: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN 
PRE-INDEPENDENT SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA  
3.1   Historical Background 
 Not all of civil society and the churches supported the efforts of the South 
African government, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and other internal parties to 
establish independence from South Africa without including SWAPO. The Council of 
Churches, their alleviated denominations, and several civil society organisations did 
not see the reforms of the interim government as a significant development. The 
internal wing of SWAPO and pro-SWAPO groups in Namibia played a dual role 
between 1978 and 1990. They boycotted all efforts that exclude SWAPO in exile 
from a negotiated settlement. At the same time, they used the interim structures to 
further their objectives for a free, democratic Namibia.171 
 When the interim government introduced a type of a constitution with an 
annexed Bill of Rights, the pro-SWAPO forces tested the constitutional principles in 
Court. Proclamation 101 did not comply with all the requirements for an international 
recognised constitution. South West Africa/Namibia, as the country was called under 
the interim government, was not a sovereign state, and the Bill of Rights was only an 
annexure.  
 However, it was a significant and historical development. While SWAPO was 
still excluded from the process, the South African government made their intention 
clear to put Namibia on the road to independence. Once Proclamation R101 of 1985 
with its Bill of Rights came into operation, Namibians did not hesitate to claim those 
rights and to approach the Supreme Court to enforce them. The Courts interpreted it 
as if it was a Constitution. 
 Between 1978 and 1985, several South African attempts failed to establish an 
internationally acceptable internal settlement without including the liberation 
movements, SWAPO and the South West Africa National Union (SWANU). In 1985, 
the State President of South Africa, acting in terms of section 38 of the South West 
Africa Constitution Act,172 issued South West Africa Legislative and Executive 
Authority Establishment Proclamation R101 to establish a so-called Transitional 
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Government of National Unity (TGNU).173 The Proclamation made provision for a 
Legislative Assembly and a Cabinet. 
Proclamation R101 included a Bill of Fundamental Rights and Objectives in an 
annexure, as well as an article providing for the review of laws that contradicted the 
Bill of Rights.174 As we shall see, the Supreme Court of SWA/Namibia approached 
the Bill of Rights in a liberal, purposive manner. Despite the political pressure of the 
armed struggle and a transitional government that still operated in the spirit of its 
colonial masters, the Court protected the rights of citizens in the spirit of a 
constitutional democracy in the making. 
Neither the interim government nor the highest court in South Africa gave any 
indication to the international world or to SWAPO that they were serious about the 
implementation of a Bill of Rights. The international community had to wait several 
more years for the interim government and the internal parties to catch up with the 
insights of the Supreme Court of South West Africa/Namibia. 
Although the judges of the Supreme Court of South West Africa/Namibia 
never saw themselves as a constitutional court, they nevertheless took the Bill of 
Fundamental Rights serious and in more than one way prepared the way for a 
constitutional democracy. The phrase “transformative constitutionalism” has not 
been generally known within the southern African legal fraternity in 1985. Yet, the 
judgments of the Supreme Court were transforming in several facets of legal thinking 
and changed adjudication in Namibia.  
The transitional government, on the other hand, constantly used its right of 
appeal to limit the application of their own initiative: an interim constitution, with an 
entrenched Bill of Rights. 
Proclamation 101 and its attached Bill of Rights was in more than one way the 
first taste of transformative constitutionalism. Zaaruka points the importance of 
Proclamation 101: 
The period from 1985, witnessed a change in the Supreme 
Court of South West Africa/Namibia as they started questioning 
some of apartheid laws application in Namibia with the adoption 
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of Proclamation R101 of 1985. This marked a major departure 
from the earlier period as the country prepared for transition to 
independence175.  
 
It is unfortunate that the South African Appellate Division, which remained the 
final legal authority in Namibia, did not deviate from their stance on parliamentary 
sovereignty. It ignored the challenge of the Namibian Court to evaluate the values 
and aims of the Bill of Rights and followed the traditional, rigid approach by looking 
primarily at the intention of the legislator and the legal interpretation surrounding the 
issues. Their constant rejection of the transformative judgments of the Supreme 
Court was a typical example of the old order clinging to a diverged form of 
fundamentalist positivism.176  
While the Transitional Government and South Africa possibly saw 
Proclamation 101 and its attached Bill of Rights as an instrument in the so-called 
battle for the soul and the mind of the people, activists were quick to use it in their 
struggle for independence. To use Mureinik’s metaphor, it became a bridge from 
oppression to freedom. While the judges of the Supreme Court of South West 
Africa/Namibia may never have heard the phrase “transformative constitutionalism” 
they were indeed transforming the legal system and to some extent, the Namibian 
society.    
 
3.2.   Katofa: The first challenge for the Interim Government 
It did not take long for the transitional government to be confronted with 
human rights issues. The first case did not initially deal with the Bill of Rights of 
Proclamation R101, but with another notorious Administrator-General Proclamation: 
AG 26 of 1978.177 The latter Proclamation severely restricted the rights of people 
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detained without trial or access to a court of law.178 The Katofa case was heard 
shortly before the enactment of Proclamation R101. The legality of Proclamation AG 
26 of 1978 in the light of the Bill of Rights was later argued before the Supreme 
Court of Appeal. 
Katofa179 was the brother of Josef Katofa, a detainee under Proclamation AG 
26 0f 1978. The applicant brought a typical habeas corpus writ,180 requesting the 
Administrator-General to produce the person of Josef Katofa to the court, and to 
furnish information to the court as to whether the latter was under arrest, on what 
charges he had been arrested, why he was being detained, and granting him access 
to a legal practitioner. 
While there is nothing in the Proclamation preventing a detainee access to a 
lawyer, Josef Katofa’s attorney was not allowed to see him. Since the detainee did 
not see a magistrate or a medical practitioner as prescribed by the Proclamation, his 
attorney wrote a letter to the Administrator-General, stating that the detention was 
illegal and demanding his client’s release. 
In his answering affidavit, the Administrator-General insisted that since the 
Proclamation gave him the authority to lay down conditions of detention, he had the 
discretion to allow or disallow visits by a lawyer. He was also obliged to give reasons 
for the detention to the detainee, but not to anyone else. The Administrator-General 
stated that the detainee had not asked for these reasons, and neither had he 
requested that he be visited by an attorney. 
This fundamentalist reliance on textual nuances was typical of the South 
African authorities. Even the long detention of Joseph Katofa was concealed by 
detaining him under different Proclamations: he was initially detained in terms of 
section 4(2) of Proclamation AG 9 of 1977, and on 30 May 1984 in terms of section 5 
bis of Proclamation AG 9 of 1977. 
On 14 November 1984, Katofa was arrested and detained in terms of section 
2 of Proclamation AG 26 of 1978. The Administrator-General stated that he was 
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convinced that the detainee was a person as provided for in the stated section, 
without referring to any specifics that confirmed this conviction.181 
The Supreme Court of SWA/Namibia would have nothing of this. While not 
referring specifically to the annexed Bill of Rights of Proclamation R101, since the 
Proclamation only came into operation a month later, it concentrated on the rights of 
the individual. The court used specific constitutional language. It referred to liberty 
and the right to see an attorney as fundamental rights, with Judge Berker referring to 
the problem as “one of the most basic constitutional importance”.182 
The court insisted that the authorities comply with all the conditions set for 
depriving the detainee of his liberty in the Proclamation. In answer to a point in limine 
by the respondent that the case was not a matter of urgency since the detainee had 
been arrested more than a year earlier, the court responded that – 
… the present case concerned the liberty of the subject. As such 
it involved the infringement of a fundamental right and it was of 
necessity one of urgency.183 
 
The court made it clear that the habeas corpus writ or the Roman Dutch 
remedy of de homine libero et exhibendo184 intend to protect the liberty of subjects. 
Quoting Principal Immigration Officer and Minister of Interior v Narayansamy, the 
court stated that every individual – 
… is entitled to ask the Court for his release, and the Court is 
bound to grant it, unless there is some legal cause for his 
detention.185 
 
The fact that a court does not have jurisdiction “to pronounce upon the 
functions or recommendations of the review committee”186 does not mean that a 
detainee cannot approach the court if he/she desires a remedy other than reviewing 
a recommendation of the review committee. 
In this particular case, the Court found that the Administrator-General was 
convinced at the time of the arrest and the time of the application, that the detainee 
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was a person provided for in section 2 of the Proclamation. However, that was not 
reason enough to relieve him of the burden to prove that the detainee had been 
legally detained. Since the Proclamation provided for the Administrator-General to 
furnish the detainee with reasons for the detention, it does not make sense that a 
Court be deprived of that information.187 
Under the circumstances, the court could not find that the detainee was in 
legal detention. Since there were not strict and punctual compliance with the 
provisions of sections 5(1) and 6(1) of the Proclamation, which allowed the detainee 
to visits by a magistrate and a medical practitioner for specifically prescribed 
intervals, although not conclusive, this was an indication that the detainee had been 
illegally detained. 
Access to legal representation, a fundamental right in liberal constitutional 
democracies, was also taken seriously by the court and interpreted in a broad 
manner. The fact that the Administrator-General was enabled to lay down conditions 
for the detention of the detainee did not imply that he could refuse the detainee his 
fundamental right to legal representation. In an almost prophetic manner, the court 
relied heavily on Mandela v Minister of Prisons188 to underline the fact that the right 
of access to one’s legal advisor survived incarceration, even under security 
legislation, unless it was attenuated by legislation. In the case before the court, the 
advice of an attorney was not excluded and, in a sense, was implied. 
Furthermore, by necessary implication, one cannot find that any of the 
provisions would be defeated if a detainee consulted with his attorney. Indeed, the 
opposite seems to be the case: 
[S]ection 7(2) makes provision for a detainee to submit his case 
in writing for investigation by a review committee. Who better to 
prepare his case, even if he can write, than his own attorney? 
Section 7(4) seems to indicate that this in fact was in the 
lawgiver's mind because that section provides that no person, 
"other than a person in the service of the State whose presence 
is considered necessary by the chairman", shall attend 
proceedings of the review committee. In other words, while the 
documentation for the attention of the review committee can be 
prepared by the attorney, there is specific provision that he may 
not attend the committee proceedings. 
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Consequently, the application was granted. The Administrator-General was 
ordered to grant Katofa access to his attorney, and a rule nisi (interim order) was 
granted. 
On 17 June 1985, a mere seven days after the judgment, Proclamation R101 
of 1985 came into effect. The functions of the Administrator-General were 
transferred to the Transitional Government, more specifically the Cabinet of the 
Executive Authority. Consequently, the affidavit in reply to the rule nisi was made by 
the Chairman of the Cabinet of SWA, Mr Dawid Bezuidenhout. Mr Bezuidenhout 
again made only an ipsi dixit statement to the effect that, after familiarising himself 
with all the documents, he was satisfied that the release of the detainee “at this time 
is not advisable”.189 The Court rejected his plea:  
The question is then whether or not the plea rose by Mr 
Bezuidenhout that “in the interests of the security of the State 
and of the public interest”, he is entitled to refuse to give 
reasons or to place the necessary information before this Court 
is sound in law.190 
 
In terms of the Proclamation, the Court stated, the Administrator-General or 
the Cabinet had no privilege to withhold reasons for a detention: such privilege was 
only to withhold information.191 
As a result, the rule was made final. The Cabinet was not satisfied with the 
result and appealed. The appeal was a huge blow for the recognition of the new 
quasi-constitutional development in Namibia. While the Appellate Division rejected 
the appeal on the grounds that Mr Bezuidenhout did not relieve the burden of 
proving that the detainee was in legal detention, it also addressed the review powers 
of the courts in terms of Proclamation R101.192 
The respondent held that, since section 2 of Proclamation AG 26 of 1978 was 
in conflict with the Bill of Fundamental Rights and Objectives of Proclamation R101 
of 1978, the former ceased to exist as a law. However, section 34 of Proclamation 
R101 of 1985 did not make provision for legislation that was in clear contradiction of 
the Bill of Rights. Thus, the Appellate Division ruled that existing legislation remained 
in place after the enactment of Proclamation R101 – 
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… if it was constitutionally enacted by a competent authority. 
It falls outside the scope of this paper to go into the interpretation of section 34 
of Proclamation R101. Suffice it to quote counsel for Katofa on this point:193 
The absurdity (and tautology in this respect) is two-fold: if it was 
not enacted by a competent authority, or was not 
“constitutionally enacted” for any other reason, it could hardly be 
an “existing law”. … In the second place, the Court's approach 
requires it to be accepted that at the same time as a new test for 
statutory validity was introduced (“met sy strenger vereistes”), 
the lawgiver provided that any existing law survived if it either 
met the stringent substantive requirements thus imposed or if it 
met the anodyne procedural requirement of being 
“constitutionally enacted”. … [T]his approach … fails to adopt 
the correct approach to interpreting constitutional provisions … 
The proclamation remains a constitutional, right-giving statute, 
and is to be interpreted in accordance with the special rules 
which apply to such provisions. 
 
The Katofa case was repeated in the years between 1985 and 1989, when the 
transition to an independent Namibia started under UN supervision. 
 
3.3   Constitutional Developments after Katofa 
Two cases – one initiated by the Council of Churches when the transitional 
government refused South African clergyman Frank Chikane entrance into Namibia, 
and the other initiated by Namibian-based community activist Uli Eins194 – set the 
scene for constitutional interpretation in Namibia. 
Both cases dealt with applications attacking the constitutionality of section 9 of 
the Residence of Certain Persons in South West Africa Regulation Act, Act 33 of 
1985. The Act empowered the transitional government to deny people who were not 
born in SWA/Namibia residence and entrance rights under certain circumstances. In 
the Eins case, the applicant approached the court because, in terms of an Act of the 
Legislative Assembly, he could be unconstitutionally removed from the territory. 
Eins was born in Germany. Since 1973, he had lived unrestrictedly in SWA as 
a South African citizen because SWA was not a sovereign country. Eins alleged that 
section 9 of the said Act was unconstitutional because it unreasonably discriminated 
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against residents not born in the territory vis-à-vis people born in the territory, 
members of the Defence Force, and South African public servants living and working 
in the territory.195 
 Eins attacked section 9 of the Act because it was in conflict with Articles 3, 4, 
9 and 10 of the Bill of Rights.196 The Cabinet opted to dispute Eins’ locus standi 
rather than the constitutionality of an Act that ignored the constitutional 
developments in the territory. 
Following the precedent of the Katofa case, the Supreme Court of 
SWA/Namibia was serious in developing a constitutional dispensation for Namibia. It 
was not willing to be tied down by technical questions, but wanted to get to the crux 
of the matter: Did the Act infringe on the constitutional rights of a vast number of 
people in the territory? To put it in a more constitutional framework: Was the court 
obliged to exercise its powers in terms of article 19 of Proclamation R101 and 
declare section 9 of Act 33 of 1985 unconstitutional? 
The court refused to answer the question of locus standi in the abstract. Locus 
standi depends on the nature of the litigation, in this case an application based on 
constitutional rights that were severely limited by the same people who had given the 
territory Proclamation R101 and its annexed Bill of Rights. 
The Supreme Court of SWA used its powers in terms of article 19(1)197 of 
Proclamation R101 and declared section 9 of Act 33 of 1985 – 
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… unconstitutional, invalid and unenforceable for want of 
compliance with the Bill of Fundamental Rights incorporated in 
Proclamation R101 of 1985. 
 
On the day that the Court declared section 9 unconstitutional, the Council of 
Churches in Namibia attacked section 9 of Act 33 of 1985 after the Cabinet refused 
the South African clergyman and activist, Frank Chikane, entrance into Namibia, on 
the grounds that it was incompatible with the Declaration of Fundamental Freedoms. 
While the Declaration embodied a fundamental rule against discrimination, section 9 
differentiated between two categories of people. The Supreme Court of SWA dealt 
with the issue in a progressive, transformative manner. The Eins judgment was 
made applicable in the Chikane case and the notice prohibiting Chikane entrance 
into the territory was declared invalid and of no legal effect. 
However, the transitional government was more interested in restricting their 
political opponents than serving their own Constitution. They appealed against both 
the Chikane and the Eins judgments. Although the appellant in the Chikane case did 
not rely on the unconstitutionality of section 9 of Act 33, both parties and the Court 
agreed that the Appellate Division should also consider the judgment of the Eins 
case, ruling that the said section 9 was unconstitutional. The Court made the issue a 
legal one by asking if the classification was reasonable. The reasonableness again 
had to be determined by the intention of the Act, and by whether the differentiation 
had a rational relation to the result that was to be attained by the classification. 
On the question as to whether section 9 was unconstitutional since it excluded 
the audi alteram partem rule (the right of a party to be heard), the Appellate Division 
again began with the intention of the legislation. As a point of departure, it also 
worked with the rule of ut res magis valeatquam pereat, i.e. that the legislator is 
presumed to have made a valid and effective provision. 
From here, it attempted to make section 9 compatible with a Bill of Rights by 
departing from the position that it would prefer a construction in which the Act and 
the Rule of Law are not necessarily incompatible if a minimum allowance for the audi 
alteram partem is included in the Act. 
The Court approached Eins’ challenge in the same manner. It restricted the 
application of the Bill of Rights by pointing out that Eins, a South African citizen living 
in SWA/Namibia, had always been restricted in his residence rights. Section 9 of Act 
33 of 1985 was just a repetition of earlier proclamations, it pronounced, and Eins 
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could have faced deportation in terms of the security legislation. It further ruled that 
since restrictions to the enjoyment of certain residential rights had always been part 
of Namibian law, the categorisation of section 9 could not be seen as unreasonable 
and, therefore derogation from the Bill of Rights was permissible. 
Hence, the Appellate Division of South Africa ignored the basic rule of 
constitutional interpretation: To interpret fundamental rights in a broad and purposive 
manner. Instead, the explicit rights given by the Bill of Rights we subjected to old 
colonial proclamations, notably the oppressive security laws. 
The political context of the Chikane and Eins judgments was, however, the 
invisible subtext. While the SWA/Namibian Court prepared itself for an independent 
constitutional democracy, the Appellate Division was still trapped in the limited scope 
of the apartheid government. The ‘total onslaught’,198 which needed special 
measures, seems to be the unwritten agenda behind the Court’s strictly textual 
interpretation. On the restrictions of rights, the judge had the following to say:199 
Daarbenewens is 'n persoon soos die respondent, ingevolge art. 
5 van die Wet op Oproerige Byeenkomste 17 van 1956, 
onderworpe aan verwydering uit die gebied indien hy skuldig 
bevind word aan 'n misdryf in art 2 van daardie Wet bedoel (wat, 
onder andere, betrekking het op die verwekking van 'n gevoel 
van ernstige vyandigheid tussen verskillende dele van die 
inwoners van die gebied. . ... Daarbenewens kan 'n persoon wat 
'n gevoel van ernstige vyandigheid tussen die verskillende dele 
van die inwoners van die gebied verwek ingevolge voormelde 
art. 5 uit die gebied verwyder word. 'n Persoon beskik slegs oor 
regte vir sover dit nie deur die een of ander Wet ingeperk of 
weggeneem is nie.[Emphasis added] 
 
(Besides, a person defined like the respondent is, in terms of 
section 5 of Act 17 of 1956, subjected to removal from the 
territory if he is convicted of a crime in terms of section 2 of the 
said Act (which includes the creation of a feeling of serious 
enmity between different sections of the population of the 
territory). … Besides, a person who creates a feeling of serious 
enmity between different sections of the population of the 
territory can be removed from the territory in terms of the 
mentioned section 5. An individual only has agreed rights in as 
far as they have agreed not been limited or removed by an Act.) 
Emphasis added. (Translation JNH). 
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 Both examples in the quotation referred to government action against 
apparent political activism. Here the South African Court missed an important issue: 
the Bill of Rights was included in the Proclamation to end discrimination and to 
prevent history from repeating itself. The mere fact that the rights of the applicant 
had been restricted before was a good reason why the Bill of Rights should have 
been interpreted in a broad, non-restrictive manner. 
The ‘total onslaught’ mind-set of the ruling Nationalist Party in South Africa 
resulted in a series of legislation aimed at restricting the powers of the prosecutorial 
authority and judiciary in SWA/Namibia. The new Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 
1977 is a case in point. Acting Supreme Court of Namibia Judge Leon (as he then 
was) made the following observation regarding the implementation of section 3 of the 
Act to SWA/Namibia: 
It was made applicable by an apartheid government bent on 
domination, no doubt determined to enforce its political will on 
the independence of the prosecuting authority in South West 
Africa. I cannot for one moment believe that that would be in 
accordance with the ethos of the Namibian people.200 
 
There is an irony in the regularly quoted dichotomy between pure legal 
judgments based on the meaning of the words of a text and value judgments, which 
allows political thinking to blur the clear legal approach with political considerations. 
The reliance on political policy comes from the positivist Appellate Division while the 
Supreme Court of SWA/Namibia, despite its clear transformative approach, based its 
judgments on constitutional principles.   
 
3.4    More legal challenges after the Chikane case 
In The Free Press of Namibia (Pty) Ltd v Cabinet for the Interim Government 
of South West Africa,201 the Court set aside an order in terms of section 6 bis of the 
Internal Security Act, Act 44 of 1950, which required the applicant, The Namibian 
newspaper, to deposit an amount of R20,000 as a condition of registration. The 
respondents admitted in their affidavit that the Cabinet had taken issue with the 
editor because she had written critical articles of Cabinet members while working for 
another newspaper. They nevertheless used their power in terms of draconian 
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security legislation since they believed that criticism of Cabinet members would 
eventually endanger state security. 
The Court emphasised the right to freedom of expression in the Bill of Rights 
and found no way in which it perceived the criticism to be a danger for state security. 
It is interesting that the Minister of Home Affairs in South Africa used the same 
tactics against the Afrikaans newspaper, Vrye Weekblad.202 
 
3.5  The Supreme Court of SWA/Namibia and oppressive South African 
legislation 
The South African government often used laws to manipulate prosecutions in 
the territory. A case in point is the well-known brutal murder of SWAPO activist and 
former Robben Island detainee, Immanuel Shifidi.203 
Shifidi was killed at a political rally in Windhoek on 30 November 1986. The 
Attorney-General for SWA instituted criminal proceedings against five members of 
the South African Defence Force. However, the case was stopped when a certificate 
was issued under section 103 ter (4) of the Defence Act, 1957, Act 44 of 1957, by 
the Administrator-General and authorised by State President PW Botha. The section 
in question gave the State President the right to authorise a certificate and stop any 
prosecution against Defence Force members for acts committed in the operational 
area. 
In the Shifidi case, no operational action of the Defence Force was involved 
and the killing took place on a football field in Windhoek. The court held that the 
Minister of Defence or State President, or anyone else, could not exercise their 
discretion to decide where an operational area was located for the purpose of 
section 103 ter. In this case, it could not be said objectively that a football field in 
Windhoek was an operational area. To overcome the shortcomings of the certificate, 
the Administrator-General issued a proclamation declaring Windhoek an operational 
area. 
Section 103 ter empowered the State President to terminate proceedings 
against members of the SADF if – 
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(i) [h]e is satisfied after being informed by the Minister of 
Defence (in South West Africa by the Administrator-General) 
that the members acted in good faith to prevent or suppress acts 
of terrorism in an operational area; and 
(ii) [i]f it is not in the national interest that the proceedings 
before court should continue. 
 
The daughter of the deceased then applied for a court order declaring the 
Administrator-General’s certificate invalid.204 A full bench of the Supreme Court 
considered the case and concluded that the documentation presented to the Court 
did not justify the issuing of the certificate. While Justice Levy said in his judgment 
that the State President had been misled, the then SWA Supreme Court Justice 
Strydom based his judgment on the fact that the discretion exercised by the State 
President was so unreasonable that interference by the Court had been necessary.  
Thus, the Court found the President did not apply his mind when he found that 
the act the accused had committed was a bona fide attempt to combat terrorism. It 
not only withdrew the certificate, but also set aside the decision of the Attorney 
General not to proceed with the prosecution against Vorster.  
This was a brave decision in the period of state oppression and a brutal 
enforcement of security legislation. Bryan O’Linn, a lifelong opponent of apartheid 
and, at the time of the transitional government, an activist advocate critical of the 
Supreme Court Bench, made the following observation:205 
The South West African Supreme Court in this decision upheld 
the high traditions of the Courts. The South African State 
President and Minister of Defence[,] on the other hand, by this 
act betrayed the values of a Christian and civilised people by 
covering up a heinous crime … In doing that they became party 
to murder and public violence by association and collusion. 
 
The members of the Defence Force were never prosecuted. Soon after the 
case had been heard by the Supreme Court, the process of Namibia’s independence 
started. Their deeds were eventually covered by the blanket amnesty that initially 
applied only to returnees of the liberation movements, but was later extended to 
members of the security forces.206 
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Even more blunt and aggressive was the conduct of the South African 
government during the trial of Heita, a SWAPO member, under the vicious section 2 
of the Terrorism Act, 1967 (No. 83 of 1967), which had been repealed in South 
Africa.207 
The defence objected to the indictment on the grounds that section 2 of the 
Terrorism Act208 was not valid in SWA since it was in conflict with the Bill of Rights. 
On 5 September 1987, before the due date of the hearing of the objection but after 
the objection had been filed, the State President of South Africa promulgated 
Proclamation R157 of 1986. The Proclamation prohibited the Courts from enquiring 
into or pronouncing upon the validity of any Act of the South African Parliament that 
had been enacted before or after the Proclamation. 
Despite submissions by the State that the amendment was only procedural 
and therefore could have retrospective application, the Court found that 
Proclamation 157 was a substantive amendment to prevent the SWA/Namibia 
Courts from reviewing the validity of South African Acts, and had no retrospective 
application. Therefore the change in law did not affect the case before the Court. 
The Court found the provisions of section 2 of the Terrorism Act to be in 
conflict with article 4 of Annexure 1 to Proclamation R101 of 1985 (the Bill of 
Fundamental Rights). Although SWA was not a sovereign state, the Court 
nevertheless found that Proclamation R101 ought to be seen as a Constitution, 
holding a place of pride in relation to other legislation:209 
For the reasons set out earlier in this judgment, Proc. R101 of 
1985 is certainly no ordinary enactment and should be accorded 
pride of place amongst existing enactments. It has been enacted 
as a stepping stone towards independence (s 38 of Act 39 of 
1968). The National Assembly is given wide powers, which 
include the power to repeal Acts of the Parliament of South 
Africa and, for the first time in the legislative history of South 
West Africa, the fundamental rights of the inhabitants are spelt 
out and entrenched. This is the existing constitution of 
SWA/Namibia and the fact that certain organs have retained 
legislative rights does not and cannot alter the character and 
importance of the proclamation. 
Consequently, the court found that section 2 of the Terrorism Act was 
repealed by Proclamation R101. While the State President attempted to stop the 
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Supreme Court of SWA from striking down unconstitutional acts of the South African 
Parliament after 5 September 1986, the Heita case confirmed the drastic change in 
the power structures of government in SWA/Namibia with the implementation of a 
“constitution” containing an entrenched Bill of Rights. The Court did not answer the 
question as to whether the State President did indeed close the gap.210 
As far as the Supreme Court of SWA was concerned, a new dispensation had 
begun with the implementation of Proclamation R101. It is understandable that the 
review powers of the Court created tremendous problems for South Africa. If all the 
security laws made applicable in SWA/Namibia could theoretically come under 
scrutiny by the Supreme Court of SWA/Namibia, the chances were good that the 
Court would have declared them unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court of SWA/Namibia did not waver. The constitutionality of 
the Terrorism Act came around again in 1989 when a full bench confirmed a 
judgment of the Supreme Court of SWA ordering the release of six prominent 
internal SWAPO members detained without trial in terms of section 6(1) of the 
Terrorism Act. The Cabinet of the interim government again appealed the 
judgment.211 
Although the applicants did not rely on the Bill of Rights to substantiate their 
application for an interdictum de homine libero et exhibendo, the judgment of the full 
bench followed the constitutional lines of previous decisions. Emphasising the 
importance of a strict compliance with the provisions of the law when the liberty of an 
individual is concerned, Justice Levy comments that – 
… (s)ince time immemorial the safety of the State, social unrest 
and warlike conditions have been invoked by enthusiastic 
executives as reasons for the Courts to overlook the executives' 
non-compliance with the provisions of the law.212 
Even more fascinating is the contribution by Acting Justice Henning, who 
relied primarily on the Rechtsstaat (the rule of law) concept.213 He acknowledged 
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that SWA/Namibia at the time could not be classified as a Rechtsstaat (a state 
governed by law), but still operated as a Wetstaat (a state based on laws) because 
of its captivity by the Appellate Division in South Africa. He quoted the Katofa case214 
to point out that the SWA/Namibian court did not have the power to review Acts of 
the South African Parliament made applicable in SWA/Namibia, even if they 
contradicted the Bill of Rights.215 He nevertheless suggested that, on the road to a 
justice state, power had to be limited by power: le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir.216 
In addition, since it was not possible to strike the Terrorism Act down because 
of its obvious contradiction of section 3 of the Bill of Rights, which prohibited 
detention without trial, the court would nevertheless take the rights of individuals 
seriously by assuring that the procedures of the security legislation were adhered to 
before allowing the loss of liberty.217 
In yet another case218 with strong political undertones, the full bench of the 
Supreme Court of SWA/Namibia declared parts of an Act ironically called the 
Protection of Fundamental Rights Act, 1988, Act 16 of 1988,  unconstitutional since it 
contradicted entrenched rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly. The Court commented, –219 
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[i]t is clear that it creates criminal offences for activities which in 
democratic societies have been perfectly acceptable and legal. 
 
In another brave decision the full bench declared the notorious Proclamation 
AG 8 of 1980 unconstitutional220 The South African-appointed Administrator-General 
had legislative powers to make proclamations. AG 8, as this particular proclamation 
was known, laid the foundation for a segregated future Namibia. It divided the people 
of Namibia into eleven ethnic groups, and created a so-called second-tier 
government for each such group. Every Namibian was obliged to belong to one of 
these groups, even if he or she did not belong to one in an ethnic sense. 
The budget allocation to each group was not based on the numbers of the 
group, but the taxes paid by members of the group. Consequently, the whites – with 
less than 10% of the total population – received a budget substantially higher than 
that for any other group. 
The court took cognisance of the fact that –221 
… articles or provisions laying down fundamental rights were, by 
their very nature, drafted in a broad and ample style which laid 
down principles of width and generality, and ought to be treated 
as sui generis. 
 
Therefore, the interpretation of the said articles or provisions should not be 
subjected to rigid literalism. Consequently, when the Court had to interpret the word 
advantage in the Bill of Rights, they concluded that it should also include material 
advantage, even if the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights were civil and political, 
and not social or economic.222 The court found that AG 8, in its entirety, was in 
conflict with the Bill of Rights. 
The judgment is important not only because it challenged the principle of 
racially separated development in South African-occupied Namibia, but also because 
it laid the foundation of the constitutional pillars for a future independent Namibia. 
While the tenability of a segregated state based on race or ethnicity had been 
rejected by both the SWAPO and SWANU liberation movements, the Supreme Court 
declared that it was also impossible to reconcile an ethnic-based state with a Bill of 
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Fundamental Rights. Alternatively, to use Justice Henning’s terminology in the 
Bessinger case, a Rechtsstaat cannot be built on the pillars of a Wetstaat. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The Supreme Court of SWA/Namibia had a constant battle with both the 
transitional government and the South African Appellate Division. In doing so, the 
judiciary prepared the way for a new dispensation in Namibia, where the Courts 
would play a much more significant role in enforcing constitutional rights against 
oppressive legislation. The interim government, however, opted to take refuge at the 
South African Appellate Division rather than strengthen its Supreme Court in the 
making. 
The judgments of the Appellate Division are typical of the fundamentalist 
approach of Courts in South Africa before 1994. This is a good example of what 
Dyzenhaus calls “the unwillingness of judges to allow any moral sensibilities to have 
an impact on interpretation”.223 
However, the political influence on the judgments cannot be ignored. Justice 
Rabie’s examples in the Eins case are anything but neutral.224 The judge also took it 
for granted that Proclamation R101 of 1985 (including the Bill of Rights) was subject 
to the laws of the South African Parliament.225 
One seeks in vain for any indication in the judgments that the Appellate 
Division had any vision whatsoever of the birth of a nation. The Supreme Court of 
SWA, on the other hand, took the Bill of Rights and the protection of the people of 
Namibia extremely seriously. 
The legal fraternity gave little – if any – attention to the paradigm shift that 
took place in the Supreme Court in Windhoek between 1986 and 1990. Scholars 
often refer to the post-independent 1991 judgment of State v Acheson as the turning 
point in Namibian jurisprudence, ignoring the radical stance of the Supreme Court of 
SWA in the 1980s. 
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In South Africa, Kruger and Curren226 only took notice of the positive 
constitutional interpretations after Namibia’s independence. Nico Steytler took it for 
granted that the white judges of the Namibian High Court would be the protectors of 
the old order.227 
While the judges may not have expressed support for SWAPO during the 
struggle, their relationship with the transitional government was anything but friendly. 
On the contrary, the Supreme Court of SWA bench proved to be a thorn in the flesh 
of the transitional government. Looking at their record of accomplishment in 
protecting the rights of Namibians during the struggle, they can hardly be seen as 
part of the governing elite. 
O’Linn criticised the judges in the interim period for their over-enthusiastic 
evaluation of Proclamation R101 of 1985.228 The criticism is justified. It should have 
been clear at the time that there would be no settlement in Namibia without 
SWAPO’s presence. However, the bench was not a political party and it did not have 
a power base in politics. Even if Proclamation R101 was not a Constitution and 
Namibia was not a sovereign state, the Proclamation gave the court a tool that 
enabled them to take Namibian jurisprudence out of the rigid, oppressive thinking of 
the South African Appellate Division. The fact that Proclamation R101 was so closely 
linked to the transitional government and its lukewarm commitment to the rule of law 
clearly undermined the status of the Bill of Rights. The exclusion of SWAPO from the 
so-called constitutional process also alienated the majority of the people. However, 
despite these shortcomings, the SWA/Namibian Court played an important role in 
laying the foundations of a culture of constitutional supremacy in Namibia. 
One must remember that, before independence, the courts operated under a 
system of Parliamentary supremacy, which limited them in respect of applying 
human rights principles. Moreover, the Administrator-General had legislative powers. 
Successive Administrator-Generals did not hesitate to use these powers to enact 
draconian proclamations during the struggle for liberation. O’Linn justifiably softens 
his criticism of the Supreme Court of SWA by concluding that they maintained a high 
legal standard, especially after the implementation of Proclamation R101.229 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NAMIBIAN CONSTITUTION 
4.1   Introduction 
In this chapter I will look at some internal guidelines in the Constitution and 
some historical landmarks in the development of a specific constitutional format.  
Erasmus230 correctly pointed out that the Namibian Constitution is much more 
than a futuristic document to organize a post-independence Namibia. The document 
itself was an instrument to obtain sustainable peace.  Consequently, the new 
Constitution was not fully negotiated by the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly 
often opted for a compromise rather than enter into bitter debates between former 
military opponents.  
The United Nations, as successor of the League of Nations, was involved in 
settlement talks for many years. Both the General Assembly and the Security 
Council maintained constant pressure on South Africa since the 1960’s. A Namibian 
settlement was extremely important for the international community, not only to bring 
peace to a war-stricken country, but also to stabilize the region. The Namibian 
experiment was used by the South African government to path the way for 
meaningful negotiations and eventually the replacement of the apartheid-based 
society with a democratic dispensation.231 
In this atmosphere the Constituent Assembly completed the huge assigNMent 
of writing a Constitution for a nation ready to be born. The Constitution was to 
replace the oppressive apartheid system with a constitutional, democratic society. 
Moreover, it was done by a theory of inclusion,232 rather than an exclusionary 
shadow.  
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The social democratic dream of a community of equal people sharing 
resources runs like a golden cord throughout the document. This is especially true of 
Chapter 3, called Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms.  The Chapter is clearly 
based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The high value assigned to human rights and social democratic values were 
the result of this negotiated settlement. The demise of communism, the inability of 
Eastern Europe to fund the war in Angola, and especially the Cuban military 
presence, all contributed to a milieu conductive to negotiations. Under these 
circumstances it was undoubtedly necessary for both parties to compromise. But 
since South Africa was in power, one can assume that most of the compromises 
came from a liberation movement, eager to return to Namibia and contest UN 
supervised elections.  
Two important international decisions paved the way for Namibian 
independence, but also had a decisive influence on the content of the Namibian 
Constitution. Firstly, in 1978 the Security Council of the United Nations accepted 
Resolution 435 as a basis for Namibian independence. While Resolution 435 
elaborated into an extensive plan including UN supervised elections, the 
disarmament of the South West African Territorial Force and the confinement to 
base of the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia, it was not implemented for another 
eleven years. 
The reasons for the delay were numerous. While South Africa initially agreed 
to the implementation of Resolution 435, it eventually introduced the controversial 
linkage policy (with the backup of the United States), linking independence of 
Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. However, the deep distrust 
of both the South African government and its Namibian allies, especially the 
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, in SWAPO, was possibly the main reason for the 
failure of negotiations in 1978.233 Back in 1978 SWAPO was still perceived to be a 
communist movement and as such the door for the Soviet Union to enter into 
southern African regional politics234.  
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The DTA remained deeply sceptical of SWAPO throughout the negotiating 
and independence process.235  
The second important international initiative was the drafting of the 
Constitutional Principles by the Western Contact Group or the Eminent Persons 
Group, consisting of the Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain and the United 
States. The Constitutional Principles was an attempt by the western group to ease 
the fears of both South Africa and the internal parties (the DTA and some smaller 
parties who co-operated with South Africa in the Transitional Government for 
National Unity). 
South Africa, the DTA and its allies embraced the Constitutional Principles 
from the outset. The principles also form the basis of a proposed plan for 
independence by the Security Council of the UN.236 SWAPO on the other hand, did 
not accept the Principles immediately and in 1988 still did not see the necessity to 
accept it.237 
 
4.2   The Influence of Namibian Groups in the Development of a Constitution  
The role of the foreign stakeholders is extremely important in 
constitutionalism. If one can establish that the Namibian Constitution is a product of 
the Eminent Persons Group, and international forces such as the Security Council of 
the United Nations, transformative constitutionalism would be a meaningless phrase. 
Why would the executive or the judiciary strive to transform the legal system and 
even society to conform to constitutional principles that were not birthed by the 
Namibians themselves?   
The Zimbabwean experience is a good example. The government could not 
wait for the time restrictions imposed by the Lancaster Agreement to lapse before 
they discarded the independence constitution. Let us presume that a constitution 
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needs a people who can wholeheartedly buy into the principles. The political parties 
and alliances who stood against each other politically for many years, agreed to a 
compromise. The liberation movements wanted to participate in democratic 
elections, and the internal supporters of the South African forces wanted the war to 
end. However, the Constitution must be more than a compromise. Future stability 
demanded a document that will influence political, social and economic life in an 
independent, free Namibia.  
I will first look at the 1982 Principles and its influence on the final Constitution. 
Thereafter I will discuss the constitutional developments in the two major opposing 
factions around the constitutional table in 1990.  Both the exiled liberation 
movements, represented predominantly by the SWAPO Party, and the so-called 
internal parties238, had their own constitutional experiments.  
 
4.2.1   The Constitution and the 1982 Principles 
In January 1981 the UN sponsored a conference in Geneva where a South 
African delegation under the leadership of the Administrator-General for South West 
Africa, Mr Danie Hough, including thirty Namibian leaders from internal parties,   met 
Mr. Sam Nujoma and a SWAPO delegation, the so-called pre-implementation 
conference for Security Council Resolution 435. 
 The conference was aimed at getting the negotiations for Namibian 
independence back on track. At that stage South Africa was no longer convinced 
that an international settlement was possible in Namibia without the participation of 
SWAPO. The election victory of ZANU-PF under Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe in 
March 1980 was a major shock for the South African government.  The fact that the 
moderate compromised leader Abel Muzorewa was politically destroyed by ZANU-
PF, did not strengthen the hopes for a recognised DTA government in Windhoek. 
The conference came to naught because the South African/internal parties’ 
delegation used the opportunity to attack the UN for its partiality. The Western Five 
planned to introduce a three-phase negotiation proposal for the Namibian question, 
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but the process broke down when the DTA presented the UN with a list of demands 
to stop their pro-SWAPO approach.239 
After the Geneva conference, the Western Contact Group started working on 
constitutional principles that will ease the fears of whites and will be acceptable to all 
the parties involved. They released a first draft in October 1981.240  
The Contact Group established minimum guarantees for the constitutional 
process and the eventual Constitution, including a Bill of Rights as part of the 
Constitution, an independent judiciary and a multi-party democracy. Eight 
supplementary points were added to Security Council Resolution 435.  
Although SWAPO initially rejected the Constitutional Principles, they 
eventually agreed that it could become the foundation for the independence process 
and the Namibian Constitution. Since SWAPO has confirmed similar principles back 
in 1976, their rejection was possibly based on the fact that they did not trust the 
Western powers and did not appreciate the idea that North American and European 
states and former colonial powers played such an important role in the future of 
Namibia. 241 
The Principles eventually became the foundation on which the Constitution 
was built. At the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly on 21 November 1989, 
Theo-Ben Gurirab of the SWAPO Party proposed that the Assembly adopted the 
Principles as a framework to draw up a constitution for Namibia. The proposal was 
unanimously adopted.242 
Since the Constitutional Principles became an official annexure to Resolution 
435 in 1982, it was mentioned in the note of the UN Secretary-General to the 
Security Council on 16 March 1990: 
The Constitution is to enter into force on Independence Day. As 
the fundamental law of the sovereign and independent Republic 
of Namibia, the Constitution reflects the "Principles for a 
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Constituent Assembly and for a Constitution of an independent 
Namibia.'' Adopted by all parties concerned in 1982 and set out 
in the annex to document S/15287 of 12 July 1982.243 
 
According to Wiechers the Principles remains part of Namibian and 
international law even after the independence of Namibia and the implementation of 
the Constitution.244  They acquired international law status when they were included 
into Security Council Resolution 435. They are now legally enforceable resolution of 
the Security Council, which can be invoked by interested parties, and State members 
of the United Nations.  
 While the Principles were only guidelines in the pre-independence era, 
Wiechers is of the opinion that it became the pre-conditions upon which the 
Namibian Constitution and the institutions of State were to be founded when the 
Constituent Assembly adopted them the 1982. Wiechers calls it a “fundamental 
"constitutional impediment'' on the Namibian Legislature which prohibits their 
abolition, repeal or amendment”.245 Consequently, Wiechers argues, the 1982 
Principles cannot be changed or amended and any amendment to the Constitution 
that goes against the 1982 Principles will be de facto unconstitutional.  
While Wiechers goes too far in his evaluation of the 1982 Principles, it 
remains an important document for understanding the Foundations of the Namibian 
Constitution.  However, despite the fact that it became a Security Council Resolution, 
it was never intended to have a life of its own.  Once the Namibian Constitution has 
drafted and accepted the Namibian Constitution in compliance with the 1982 
Principles, it had no further role to play.   
In the early years after independence, the status of the 1982 Principles was 
raised on a regular basis. In State  v  Heita, where the preceding judge considered to 
recuse himself mero motu,  the Court did not go into the correctness of Wiechers’ 
position, but nevertheless stated that it “at least serve as the background against 
which, and the context within which, the Namibian Constitution should be interpreted 
and applied”.246 
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In Ex Parte Attorney-General: In Re: The Constitutional Relationship between 
the Attorney-General and the Prosecutor-General247 counsel for the Prosecutor-
General relied strongly on the Principles in his argument in favour of an independent 
Prosecutor-General.  While Justice Leon did not explicitly refer to the Principles in 
his judgment, it is interesting that he referred to the separation of powers as a 
foundation of a Rechtsstaat. In this sense the judge defined the prosecutorial 
authority of Namibia as part of the functions of the judiciary rather than the executive. 
To compromise the independence of the judiciary would be a violation of the 
Constitution248.      
 While the Court did not refer to the 1982 Principle, one of the major tenets, 
the independence of the judiciary, is not only strongly protected, but also interpreted 
broadly to include the prosecutorial authority. In Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 
and Others the High Court again relied on the 1982 Principles, but also stated that 
Wiechers’ position is questionable.249 
Since then the debate on the legal position of the 1982 Principles has died. It 
is doubtful that any Namibian Court will in future rely on Wiechers’ dictum. 
Nevertheless, it will remain a key to understand the foundation of the Constitution. 
Apart from the independence of the judiciary, the protection of land (or 
property rights) also formed part of the 1982 Principles. The SWAPO government 
has often referred to the fact that the struggle was about land and therefore real 
reconciliation can only take place if it goes hand in hand with an aggressive land 
reform programme that will assist the government programme of poverty alleviation. 
The white farmers on the other hand, refer to the negotiations of 1989 and the 
eventual settlement in which South Africa and SWAPO agreed that property would 
be protected. Thus, although they seldom refer to the 1982 Principles, they often 
quote the protection of property rights in Article 16 of the Constitution. 
One of the aims of the 1982 Principles was to ease the fear of the white 
minority community. In that sense, it was part of the settlement agreement between 
the predominantly white Namibian farmers and the SWAPO Party. While the 
SWAPO Party always insisted to negotiate with South Africa and not an internal 
political faction, the 1982 Principles did not protect South African interests.  
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After independence the Constitution became the foundation for property 
rights. The 1982 Principles, however,  will always feature in the background of the 
land issue, either as motivation for the thesis that foreign countries have prevented 
Namibia to deal in a responsible manner with the land issue, or as part of the idea 
that protection of property rights was part of the settlement that lead to 
independence.  
The negotiations with South Africa were moved to the background once both 
the SWAPO Party and the internal parties represented at the Constituent Assembly 
accepted the 1982 Principles as a sine qua non for the Namibian Constitution. The 
Principles created stability and eased the fears of whites for a negotiated settlement 
to succeed. The bold decision by the SWAPO Party to make the 1982 Principles and 
eventually the protection of property rights part of the constitutional foundation of the 
new state changed it from an external international proposal to an agreed negotiated 
principle. 
 
4.2.2   Constitutional developments in SWAPO from 1976 
While no one will deny the role of the Constitutional principles of the Eminent 
Persons Group, the idea of a Bill of Rights as part of a future Namibian Constitution 
did not originate with the Eminent Persons Group. Neither was it an alien idea to the 
two major political powers involved in the drafting of the Constitution. Katjavivi250 
observed that the debate started within SWAPO as early as the early 1970’s.  
In 1975 the South African government started preparations for a national 
conference of internal political parties, to pave the way for an international 
acceptable independence process without negotiating with SWAPO. The initiative 
paved the way for the Turnhalle Conference, which later led to the transitional 
government. At the time the internal SWAPO movement was part of an internal pro-
independence alliance, Namibia National Convention, with SWANU and three 
smaller parties.251 
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In response to the Turnhalle Conference SWAPO released a Discussion 
Paper on the Constitution of an Independent Namibia.252  The document was a draft 
constitution. It closely resembled the draft that SWAPO eventually took to the 
Constituent Assembly after the United Nations supervised elections in 1989. 
In strong reaction to the South African policies, the document opted for a 
unitary state and rejected any notion of Bantustans masquerading as federalism. 
The democratic and human rights stance is the point of departure for the rest of the 
document. 
Our experience of persecution and racialism over many years 
has deepened our unqualified commitment to democratic rule, 
the eradication of racialism, the establishment of the rule of law 
and the entrenchment of human rights.253 
 
All the proposals of the Eminent Persons Group are embedded in this 
document. It opted for a parliamentary democracy, with regular elections, an 
Executive President, a one or two chamber parliament, an impartial public service 
and an independent judiciary, an entrenched Bill of Rights and detailed anti-
discrimination legislation. While no economic policy is spelled out, the document 
included a paragraph protecting vested legal rights and titles in property. It even 
states that the pensions of public servants will be preserved after independence.254  
The only radical aspect of the document was a proposal that the South African 
Roman Dutch law is to be replaced by a new system, incorporating certain elements 
of customary law. 255 
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The document was released in August 1975, shortly before the Turnhalle 
conference assembled in Windhoek.256 In hindsight, it seems almost tragic that 
neither South Africa nor its Namibian partners in the Turnhalle deliberations, or 
SWAPO understood the significance of the moment. SWAPO indirectly extended a 
hand of friendship and co-operation to South Africa, Namibian whites and the 
Turnhalle groupings. The message was clear: SWAPO is not the Marxist/Leninist 
demon they are made out to be by South African propaganda. They were at pains to 
point out that the interests of whites will be respected, that expatriate expertise will 
be welcomed in an independent Namibia – a reference to South Africans in the civil 
service, the police, the defence force, banks and other private enterprises – and that 
national reconciliation will be an integral part of a future constitutional 
dispensation.257 
The document was a clear indication that SWAPO would have been a 
meaningful and responsible negotiating partner, as observed by the South African 
press.258 Unfortunately, some observers, and the South African government were 
still pre-occupied with the harsh separation between east and west during the cold 
war.  
Even the centre left Rand Daily Mail was sceptical, not so much of what the 
discussion paper said, but rather of what it did not say. It argued that SWAPO often 
used the rhetoric of African socialism in their speeches and propaganda.  The 
discussion paper contained nothing that explicitly revoked the pro-communist 
SWAPO image. In other words, despite the positive elements of the document, the 
unwritten ghost behind the letters was a socialist demon.259 
When South Africa and the pro-South African parties ignored the hand of 
negotiations, SWAPO’s attitude hardened. In the years that followed, SWAPO 
radically opposed the Turhalle movement260 and its political and social agenda. 
In August 1976 an enlarged Central Committee of SWAPO adopted a 
Constitution and Political Programme in Zambia. Doubell observed that the 
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document had a predominantly internal purpose, to ease the struggle between the 
old guard and the stream of young people crossing the border to Angola after the fall 
of Portuguese rule. It also served as an instrument of negotiations and reconciliation 
with the then ruling party in Angola, the MPLA. SWAPO was eager to move its 
headquarters from Zambia, which was under immense pressure from South Africa, 
to Angola.261 
Where the Discussion Paper maintained a neutral or non-aligned stance on 
foreign relations, the 1976 SWAPO constitution opted to work with “national 
liberation movements, world socialist, progressive and peace-loving forces in order 
to eliminate all forms of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism”.262 The 
document is highly critical of Western governments and its support of the Turnhalle 
circus, while it stood for building a classless, non-exploitative socialist state.263 
While the Political Programme was never intended to be a proposal for a 
future independent Namibian state, it totally overtook the 1975 Discussion Paper. 
From 1976 onward the Political Programme was seen internationally as a statement 
of SWAPO’s political ideology and perceived as the foundation of an independent 
Namibia. The Political Programme did not include any reference to a Bill of Rights. In 
the international world SWAPO was seen as a hard-core Marxist movement 
intending to transform Namibia into non-democratic socialist state.264 
Doubell asserted that the Political Programme did not harm SWAPO in any 
material way, since it was vague enough to adapt the interpretation to its audience. 
Further, its donors from the Scandinavian countries did not care much about the 
ideological streams within SWAPO, and the West could not afford to ignore SWAPO 
after Zimbabwe and the former Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique,  
were alienated from their influence sphere in southern Africa.265 
SWAPO themselves did not care much about the tags of the cold war. It must 
be remembered that much of the socialist rhetoric was part of a genuine concern for 
the oppressed people in Namibia. It was common for liberation movements in Africa 
and Latin America to look at the oppression of authoritarian states with a 
Marxist/Leninist class struggle perspective. 
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SWAPO, like all liberation movements of its time, received the bulk of 
assistance (both financially and in terms of training and capacity building) from the 
Eastern European communist countries and Cuba.  In the sixties and seventies 
neither the old communist bloc nor the growing number of independent African 
states were over enthusiastic about human rights. 
Klenner,266 an academic from the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany) expressed the view of many Marxists when he claimed that human rights 
are neither universal nor identical everywhere in the world. Human interests, he 
claimed, are determined by position in society under the conditions of the system of 
private ownership of the means of production.  The class struggle was the foundation 
of all abuse and oppression. Taking care of the needs of humankind focused on the 
revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeois state. Individual rights were not a major 
issue. 
At the same time there was a strong feeling amongst African leaders that the 
outgoing colonial powers had a hidden agenda insisting on the inclusion of an 
entrenched human rights bill in the constitutions of newly independent African states. 
The colonial master wanted to protect the property of settlers and companies owned 
by the motherland.267Human Rights Bills - especially if they are entrenched in new 
African constitutions – is seen as an instrument to keep post-colonial Africa 
enslaved. Ironically, Britain, who insisted on an entrenched constitutional bill of rights 
for its former colonies, did not even have a written constitution.268 
History seems to be pointing to a growth in the human rights awareness, 
which made an enshrined Bill of Rights in the Constitution not only acceptable, but 
also desirable. SWAPO provided the working document of the Constituent 
Assembly. It included a Bill of Rights. 
It is however, unfortunate that SWAPO’s commitment to democracy, an 
independent judiciary, national reconciliation and the recognition of property rights 
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was not fully appreciated by the West and especially South Africa and its Namibian 
allies in 1975. Critics of SWAPO will point to the fact that the liberation movement 
never included a Bill of Fundamental Rights in the organization’s own constitution 
during the exile years, neither did they lay emphasis on a Bill of Rights after 1976. 
However, as Katjavivi and Doubell pointed out, SWAPO presented a democratic 
constitutional plan to the world several years before the Eminent Peoples Group 
came with the constitutional principles.  
Without claiming that SWAPO had a worked-out plan on human rights in the 
1970’s, it is clear that discussions in the party started before 1975. This process was 
necessary to pave the way for the recognition of individual rights. It was this process 
lead to the acceptance of a Bill of Rights by SWAPO in 1982.269 That there were 
dissenting voices in SWAPO during the liberation struggle opposing a Bill of Rights, 
is understandable and should be seen in its historical context.  
 
4.2.3  Constitutional Developments in the Turnhalle grouping 
The Windhoek Declaration  
The internal political parties are often seen as mere puppets of the South 
African colonial government. The Transitional Government of National Unity, often 
seen as a South African initiative, was a compromise. The relationship was, however 
much more complicated.  
In the early 80’s the South African Government wanted to create a state 
council similar to the Presidents Council in South Africa. To regain the initiative, 
Moses Katjiuongua of SWANU initiated a Multi-Party Conference (MPC) on 12 
November 1983.270 On 18 April 1984 the MPC accepted and released the Windhoek 
Declaration. The Declaration contained a Bill of Fundamental Rights and Objectives.  
Wiechers pointed out that this was not the first political grouping in Namibia to 
accept a Bill of Rights – SWAPO and the Frontline States accepted the African 
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Charter on People’s and Human Rights in 1982.271 The Windhoek Declaration was a 
typical Western liberal document. It protected political and civil rights vigorously.272 
 In 1985, the State President of South Africa, acting in terms of section 38 of 
the South West Africa Constitution Act, 1968,273 issued Proclamation R101 to 
establish a so-called Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU).  
As I noted in chapter 3, Proclamation R101 included a Bill of Fundamental 
Rights and Objectives as an annexure. The Windhoek Declaration provided South 
Africa with that Bill of Rights and Objectives.  
The Bill of Rights and Objectives were all but an ideal foundation for a fresh 
democratic state.  However, the innovative and brave interpretations of the Supreme 
Court of SWA/Namibia gave credibility to this premature, weak action and helped to 
create a human rights culture amongst the followers of the Democratic Turnhalle 
Alliance and other internal parties. The Bill of Fundamental Rights and Objectives 
played a positive role to further human rights in conservative communities in both 
Namibia and South Africa.274 The Windhoek Declaration, despite severe criticism by 
SWAPO and the international community, contributed to the growth of a human 
rights culture in Namibia. 
 
The Hiemstra Constitution275 
 The MPC only accepted the TGNU on the condition that the South African 
Government create the political forum for Namibians to start writing a constitution for 
a future independent Namibia.276 On 30 August 1985 the Constitutional Council was 
created. PW Botha appointed former Chief Justice of the South African Bantustan 
Bophuthatswana, Victor Hiemstra, as the chairperson. He was known for his 
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constitutional and human rights judgments in the so-called Republic of 
Bophuthatswana.  
 The draft Hiemstra constitution, like the Supreme Court of South West Africa, 
rejected the idea of ethnic second tier governments or territorial ethnic local 
governments. It did not include sections protecting minorities. Consequently, the 
South African government ignored its own creation. It refused to give any legal or 
political status to the draft constitution, despite the money provided for the project, 
and after Judge Hiemstra had spent two years of his life in chairing the council. 
 However, the Hiemstra constitution played an important role in the 
development of Namibian constitutionalism. After the Supreme Court’s judgment 
declaring second tier ethnic governments a violation of the TGNU’s Bill of Rights, 
and the Hiemstra constitution rejecting it as a constitutional principle, the sectarian 
ethnic thinking of the National Party was destroyed. It never played any role in the 
Namibian Constituent Assembly.  
 The Hiemstra constitution also became the official draft of the DTA at the 
Constituent Assembly. The Hiemstra constitution and the SWAPO draft constitution 
were so similar that Mudge proposed the SWAPO draft to be used as the working 
document of the standing committee of the Constituent Assembly.277 Constitutional 
scholars involved in the drafting of the Namibian Constitution are of the opinion that 
as much as 80% of the content of the Hiemstra constitution correlates with the 
Namibian Constitution.278 
 
4.2.4  Conclusion 
Modern critics of the Constitution are possibly correct in asserting that 
SWAPO only accepted the Constitutional Principles to reach their objective: the 
withdrawal of South Africa from the territory and an independent Namibia. They are 
also correct in pointing out that the Constituent Assembly went into the constitutional 
chambers with their hands tied. However, as we have seen, the basic tenets of the 
Constitutional Principles were all part of the SWAPO’s Discussion Paper of 1975. 
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Since SWAPO was extremely critical of the role and objectives of the Western 
powers in southern Africa, it is hardly surprising that they were slow to accept the 
Constitutional Principles of the Eminent People’s Group. 
The Constitutional Principles went much further than describing the 
transitional process, the UN supervised elections and the working rules of the 
Constituent Assembly. It also prescribed elements that had to be included in the 
Namibian Constitution. These included the principle of constitutional democracy and 
an entrenched supreme constitution, the independence of the judiciary, including the 
function of constitutional review and the separation of powers. 
The principle of constitutional supremacy vis-à-vis a parliamentary democracy 
has been a cause of disagreement in many circles. Ramose saw it as a vote of no 
confidence in the new government, which in a sense it was.279 Erasmus correctly 
pointed out that the strong constitution was necessary to ease the fears of the DTA 
and smaller internal parties (and possibly those of South Africa).280 
However, it is also possible to see constitutional democracy as a victory over 
the oppressive parliamentary “democracy” of South African rule where the South 
African Parliament ruled supreme. Okpaluba281 remarked that even attempts by the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court to review one of the racially-based acts, 
was dealt with contempt by the South African Parliament. They simply repealed the 
specific legislation and followed it up with a subsequent strongly worded new 
clause.282 
One cannot deny the role of the Western Contact Group, neither that of the 
UN and the international community in drafting the conditions for Namibian 
independence and the content of the Constitution. However, the Namibian people, 
represented by both internal parties and the SWAPO leadership that came from 
exile, eventually agreed to the inclusion of these principles in the Constitution.  The 
participants to the constitutional process engaged in a real democratic process of 
compromises and exchanges that prevented any of the parties to manipulate the 
process. 
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The mere involvement of the Western Contact Group and the international 
community do not make the Constitution a foreign document. Werner Ustoff’s 
approach to the missionary churches in Africa is helpful to understand the dynamics 
of cultural adaptation283. Since the missionaries have kept the liturgical and dress 
code inheritance of the mission churches long after the missionaries had left, it is 
wrong to assume that they are concepts and codes alien to African culture and 
tradition. Those traditions may have originated in Europe, but when the Anglicans in 
the north of Namibia or the Lutherans in the south, sing the hymns of the 
Reformation, they are expressing the cultural values of the Namibian people. In the 
same way, the Constitutional Principles embodied in the Namibian Constitution 
became Namibian once the people had embraced it. 
Erasmus’s view that the Namibian Constitution should be seen as a process 
rather than a mere document is helpful. If the Constitution is seen as part of an 
important process, its value does not only lie in its post-independent application. 
Without the Constitutional Principles, the negotiation process could not go forward.  
The dynamics of the negotiations, the history of the process and the 
international participation are part of the unwritten texts of the Namibian 
independence. Several constitutional documents of the different parties played a role 
in the process. The Constitutional Principles, the 1976 Discussion Paper of SWAPO, 
the Windhoek Declaration and the Hiemstra draft constitution all paved the way for 
the consensus constitution that gave birth to the Namibian nation. 
While the Constitution wrote a new history, it was only partially the history of 
the conquerors, or to use Foucault’s words, the exclusionary shadow284 of the 
apartheid history.  The preamble clearly defines the Namibian state as the 
conglomerate of a people “emerged victorious in our struggle against colonialism, 
racism and apartheid, the emphasis is on the inherent dignity and the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family”.285  
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The struggle for independence is not defined as a struggle against groups or 
people, but rather a struggle against destructive ideas and ideologies:  
Whereas these rights have for so long been denied to the 
people of Namibia by colonialism, racism and apartheid…. 
The victory over these forces of evil is a victory for all the people 
of Namibia. And the recognition of the inherent dignity and the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family 
is indispensable for freedom, justice and peace.286 
 
Even in dealing with the construction of an independent, post-colonial, post- 
apartheid state, the fathers and mothers of the Constitution approached the demons 
of the past with great caution.  While the Constitution makes provision for affirmative 
action, it does so in a restrained manner. Rather than using racial language, the 
Constitution speaks of “persons within Namibia who have been socially, 
economically or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or 
practices”, and goes on to include all women irrespective of race in the category of 
the disadvantage.287  
The most controversial aspect of the Constitution, the protection of property in 
article 16 was initiated by the 1982 Principles. Despite the strong protective element 
in article 16 (1), article 16 (2) makes provision for expropriation of property in the 
public interest subject to the payment of just compensation. Consequently, the new 
government of an independent Namibia was not left powerless in dealing with the 
huge inequalities op land ownership created by colonialism and apartheid.  
In summary: The Constituent Assembly represented two diametrically 
opposed centres of power. However the settlement between the SWAPO Party and 
the South African Government meant that all members of the Assembly were elected 
by the Namibian people. The 72 members of the Constituent Assembly became the 
mothers and fathers of the Namibian Constitution. No one can deny that the 
Constitution was a compromise between two opposing factions who stood on 
different sides of the war for liberation. But both sides represented Namibians and 
accepted a Namibian Constitution. 
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The first Namibian government chose not to have a truth commission in the 
tradition of Chile or Argentina to deal with the atrocities of the past.288  The only 
political truth289 that existed after March 1990 was the Constitution.  Like Zimbabwe 
ten years earlier, they opted to pursue a policy of national reconciliation.  The most 
visible expression of this policy was seen in the formation of the Namibian Defence 
Force. Members of both the former pro-South African South West African Territorial 
Force and Plan, the military arm of SWAPO, became part of the Namibian Defence 
Force. 
Namibia boasted at the time with possibly the most democratic constitution on 
the continent. The Constitution includes a Bill of Rights based on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and among other things, provided for a division of 
power between the legislative, executive and judicial powers. It also includes an 
independent judiciary and an independent, non-political Prosecutor-General (Article 
88) and prohibits the death penalty. 
 
4.3   The Namibian Constitution as a Transformative Instrument 
One can accept that despite the international influences, the constitution is a 
document by the Namibian people. As a compromise document with an objective to 
stop the war, allow the exiles to come home and to form a government where former 
enemies can work together, the Namibian Constitution had to be transformative to 
succeed. If it did not produce a “new nation”, in other words be transformative, an 
independent Namibia could have been a failed state from the outset. 
In that sense “transformative constitutionalism” needs a somewhat broader 
definition than Klare’s “long term project”.  It also entails a short-term project that will 
end the war and eNMity and creating an immediate platform for former political 
enemies, and warring groups, to work together in the forming of a new nation. To 
reach this objective even the so-called compromise articles carries an element of 
transformation. Article 16 (1) may have been included to protect white interests – the 
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protection of farmland owned by white farmers – but article 16 (2) gives the new 
government enough options to transform the racial uneven distribution of farmland. 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, Klare in his ground-breaking article on 
constitutional democracy understands the South African constitution as a post-liberal 
constitution. In the same vein Woolman and Davis, refer to a Creole liberal 
constitution.290 I agree with Klare’s observation that the reading of the constitution 
from a liberal or Dwokinian perspective does not necessarily exclude a 
transformative constitutional approach. I also agree with Roux and Cockrell that 
positivism does not necessarily equates conservatism and heresy. However, it is 
important to understand the philosophy behind the constitution, as Woolman and 
Davis pointed out in their discussion of Du Plessis v De Klerk.291 
 Transformative constitutionalism is not a jurisprudential or interpretive model. 
It is an a priori point of departure to implement the values of the constitution in the 
lives of the people. With this definition we did not answer the issue of the political or 
ideological framework of the constitution. Woolman and Davis understood this 
exercise to be fundamental in the understanding and interpretation of the 
constitution.   
The Namibian Constitution does not include economical and social rights in 
Bill of Rights (Chapter 3). It forms part of Chapter 11 (Government Policy). Is this not 
a clear indication that the Constitution identifies itself as a typical liberal constitution? 
The Constituent Assembly made it clear that they do not want to be accountable for 
providing economic and social rights. 
One may well conclude that the Namibian Constitution cannot be classified as 
anything but a typical 20th century liberal constitution. There are undoubtedly strong 
liberal elements in it. The differentiation between enforceable civil and political rights 
on the one hand and ‘soft’ economic and social rights that cannot be enforced by a 
court of law,292 are typical liberal traits, as is the exclusion of the latter from the Bill of 
Rights and its special entrenchments.  
The Constituent Assembly followed the strict path of liberal constitutionalism 
in this regard.  However, the inclusion of social and economic rights in chapter 11 of 
the Constitution is not meaningless. It places a burden on the State to be a caring, 
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inclusive society. It may even be possible to enforce some of these rights in a court 
of law.293 Placing social and economic rights in the Bill of Rights, does not 
necessarily guarantee economic and social rights better than the Namibian 
Constitution Access to basic rights is still a challenge in South Africa, despite 
including socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights.  As long as the availability of 
resources is a main consideration in providing economic rights, it will play the same 
role as Art 101 of the Namibian Constitution. 
The emphasis on gender in articles 10 and 23(3), multiculturalism in articles 
10, 19 and 23, enviroNMentalism, transparent and participatory government and the 
extension of democratic principles to the private sphere are all elements of the 
Namibian Constitution. 
One can argue that the Namibian Courts in interpreting the Constitution do not 
emphasise sexual identity, but opt for the more conservative fundamentalist 
Christian approach keeping sodomy as a crime in post-independent Namibia and 
turned down the option to recognise same sex unions as a constitutionally protected 
union. However, Article 10 (2) was meant to give close attention to sexual identity 
and the present conservative views of the Supreme Court294 are the result of 
President Nujoma’s round-about-turn in the mid 1990’s. Until then there were 
indications that the word ‘sex’ in the non-discriminatory clause includes sexual 
orientation. I shall return to this point. 
 Constitutionalism is never rigid. Progressive constitutionalists do not see the 
so-called doctrine of original intent (i.e. seeing the intention of the drafters or 
constitutional mothers and fathers) as the ultimate key to interpretation. I will return 
to attempts by the Namibian bench to use the values of the people as a tool to keep 
the Constitution alive and relevant. What is important at this stage is to accept that 
constitutional principles can lay the foundation for the interpretation of issues that 
was not envisaged by the original drafters and ideologues. 
 Article 95 created the opportunities for the disenfranchised Namibians to 
knock at government’s door for relief. Even the non-enforceable clause, article 101, 
cannot undo the fact that certain economic and social rights have been given to the 
Namibian people. While the Supreme Court has already enforced an article 95 
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right,295 the growing importance of state responsibility under constitutions worldwide 
will place more pressure on the Namibian courts to recognise and enforce social 
rights in future.296 The opportunities created by Art 95 of the Namibian Constitution, 
makes a social democratic reading or even a moderate post-liberal reading as 
defined by Klare a viable proposition, especially since the Constitution explicitly 
stands for a mixed economy.297 
 Taken these factors into account, it is not an over breath to emphasize the 
economic rights of Chapter 11.  Even if one cannot call it a social democratic or 
Creole liberal constitution, transformative constitutional jurisprudence can be the tool 
to develop the responsibilities of the Constitution.  
Without making Klare’s transformative model the alpha and omega for 
southern African constitutional interpretation, and taking full cognisance of the 
criticism of liberal and “soft” positivist interpreters (especially Roux298 and 
Cockrell299), transformative constitutionalism can make a useful contribution to 
constitutional jurisprudence in Namibia. 
The Constitution has definite elements of a caring community. The State is 
more than just a referee or observer. In the typical tradition of social democracy,300 
Chapter XI, Principles of State Policy, declares that “(t)he State shall actively 
promote and maintain the welfare of the people”. It then sets out proposed policies to 
secure equality for women, the health of workers, and the independence of trade 
unions, fair employment practices, right and access to public facilities for all, a 
decent standard of living for the aged, a living wage for all workers, and an 
acceptable level of nutrition and standard of living of the Namibian people.301 
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The last word about chapter 11 has not been said. It remains a contradiction 
of a caring society when social and economic rights are not part of the Bill of Rights. 
While civil and political rights are entrenched in chapter 3, economic and social rights 
are carefully hidden behind state policy. Chapter 11, unlike the Bill of Rights (chapter 
3) can be amended by a 2/3 majority even if it means the removal of rights.  
While any violation of chapter 3 rights can be addressed by an application to 
the High Court in terms of Article 25 of the Constitution, Article 101 explicitly 
excludes legal action as a remedy to enforce so-called Article 95 rights. The “soft” 
rights of Article 95 remain vague policies, always dependent on state resources and 
the goodwill of the politicians.  
Some observers may suggest that the way in which the Constitution deals 
with the two categories of human rights usually personified by the two international 
covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, indicates a choice 
for a liberal democracy rather than a real social democratic option. 
Like any compromise, the constitution did not meet all the expectations of the 
parties. The lack of trust, different parties represented in the Constituent assembly, 
and especially a deep distrust that the DTA had in the new government, led to 
explicitly strict rules for changing the Constitution. A two-third majority is generally 
needed for a constitutional change, while none of the rights protected in the Human 
Rights Charter (Chapter 3) can be limited or taken away.302 
This rigid approach has been criticized by Steytler303 and in by the High Court 
in S v Tcoeib.304 Steytler suggested that this unrealistic protection could threaten the 
future of the Constitution since the rigidity could eventually frustrate the government 
and leads to its dismantling. 
 Judge O’Linn made the following comment on the fact that Article 3 is 
unchangeable: 
To prohibit altogether the repeal or amendment of the provisions 
of Chapter 3 where the amendments diminishes or detract from 
the fundamental rights and freedoms, not only makes the 
Namibian Constitution excessively rigid, but also makes 
nonsense of the provisions of Art. 1(2), which provide: All power 
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shall vest in the people of Namibia who shall exercise their 
sovereignty through the democratic institutions of the State.305 
 
The composition of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) is another area of 
contention in its limitation of the power of the majority party. The JSC is very 
important since the President appoints the judges of the High and Supreme Courts, 
the Prosecutor-General and the Ombudsman at the recommendation of the JSC. 
The JSC consists of the Chief Justice, another judge appointed by the President, the 
Attorney General and two members of the legal profession. It is clear that it will not 
be easy for the government or the majority party to manipulate the body.306 As we 
noted, Steytler criticizes the composition as a strategy to keep the white judges of 
the old order in power and prevent the government through judicial intervention in 
politics to transform the new Namibian society. In practice, the white judges of the 
apartheid dispensation adapted to the new constitutional dispensation during the 
period of the TGNU before independence. Within the first ten years white male 
judges were no longer the majority on the Bench. 
In conclusion: Without being legalistic, one can say the Namibian Constitution 
has enough elements of a caring constitution to be classified as a post-liberal, or if 
the term is not acceptable, a social democratic constitution. 
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CHAPTER 5 
TAKING OWNERSHIP OF THE CONSTITUTION 
5.1   Introduction 
The first government of the Republic of Namibia (1990 –1995) was possibly 
the most successful government in post-colonial Africa. The transition from colonial 
rule307 was the most peaceful transition then known in Africa with a extremely liberal 
Constitution, with some social democratic traits.308 I will use the term liberal era here 
to describe the term of the first government of the Republic of Namibia.  
The Constitution was the cornerstone of the new dispensation and the 
euphoria of independence and power was still high. The Constitution was seen as a 
victory over apartheid and its vicious oppressive structures. 
The lack of black faces on the Bench was initially a cause of disagreement 
and was perceived to be the reason for the conflict between the government and the 
judiciary.309 The on-going insistence that the Bench must be sensitive to the will of 
the people has often been raised when decisions went against government or when 
so-called enemies of the government got the best of a judgment: Two criminal cases 
soon tested the commitment of the Namibian Courts and the Namibian people to the 
Constitution. The one was S v Acheson, dealing with the murder of white SWAPO 
activist, Anton Lubowski,310 and the other, S v Kleynhans and Others dealing with a 
group of white supremacists’ unorganised attempted to overthrow the government.311 
 
5.2   S v Acheson: The First Test for Constitutionalism                                   
The Courts almost immediately established themselves in the new 
constitutional dispensation. The early judgments caught the attention of the 
international community.  
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 The criminal courts were the first to demonstrate a new Constitutional spirit in 
its adjudication. In S v Acheson312  the High Court refused a postponement for the 
State in the highly emotional case against the alleged murderer of SWAPO activist, 
Anton Lubowski. Lubowski was fatally shot in front of his house in Luxury Hill on 12 
September 1998, merely six months before independence.  
 The police suspected Acheson, an Irish citizen, to be the person who killed 
Lubowski or assisted the South African covert Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) to do 
so. The State attempted in vain to get the CCB accessories in Namibia for trial and 
the acting Prosecutor-General, Hans Heyman, did not want to go to trial without CCB 
members Staal Burger and “Chappie” Mare joining  Acheson as accused.313 He also 
wanted to call other CCB members who operated in Namibia at the time of 
Lubowski’s murder, as witnesses. These included convicted murderer Ferdi Barnard 
and two others, Slang van Zyl and Calla Botha.  
 Lubowski joined SWAPO in 1984 and played an important role in the 
mobilisation of the internal struggle against apartheid and the South African 
occupation of Namibia.  He was a key figure in making the necessary preparations 
for the return of the SWAPO leadership from exile. He also spearheaded the election 
campaign with others. 
 The murder of Anton Lubowski was a highly emotional event. It shocked the 
Namibian community, especially the SWAPO Party. Judge Mahomed, later to 
become the second chief justice of Namibia, reflected on the emotional aspects of 
the case:  
Firstly, the murder of Adv Lubowski is a matter of very 
fundamental public importance. It is common cause that Mr 
Lubowski was a prominent public figure who was a member of 
the present governing party and was during his lifetime generally 
perceived to be a vigorous proponent of the right of the 
Namibian people to self-determination and to emancipation from 
colonialism and racism - ideals which are now eloquently 
formalised inter alia in the preamble to the Namibian 
Constitution and arts 10 and 23.  
His cold-blooded murder is a serious matter. The vigorous 
prosecution of whoever might have been responsible for this 
deed is clearly in the public interest and crucial to the 
administration and image of justice in Namibia. 
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That image and that interest might prejudicially be impaired if 
there ever follows a perception in the public (legitimate or 
otherwise) that justice was defeated by procedural complexities, 
by legal stratagems, by tactical manoeuvres or by any improper 
collusion. The general community of Namibia must be able to 
feel that every permissible avenue to pursue the prosecution of 
whoever might be the killer of Mr Lubowski was followed.314 
 
 Referring to the difficult choice between the emotions of a nation and the 
constitutional rights of an accused, Judge Mahomed made the following comments 
on constitutionality:  
The Constitution of a nation is not simply a statute that 
mechanically defines the structures of government and the 
governed. It is a ‘mirror reflecting the national soul’, the 
identification of the ideals and aspirations of a nation; the 
articulation of the values bonding its people and disciplining its 
government. The spirit and the tenor of the constitution must 
therefore preside and permeate the process of the judicial 
interpretation and judicial direction.315 
 
It became clear that the suspected co-accused, Staal Burger and ‘Chappie’ 
Maree, without whom the acting Prosecutor-General did not want to start the 
hearing, were not going to be extradited by the South African authorities soon.  The 
judge was confronted with the possibility to use the case to implement a 
constitutional approach to bail applications, or for that matter, criminal procedure, 
and suffer the consequences, or to toe the populist line.   
 The judge took the first option. He based his decision on a definite emphasis 
on constitutional rights. He made it clear that the law requires him “to exercise a 
proper discretion having regard, not only to all the circumstances of the case and the 
relevant statutory provisions, but against the backdrop of the constitutional values 
now articulated and enshrined by the Namibian Constitution of 1990”.316 
  If the Constitution becomes the foundation of all legal interpretation, 
especially in criminal procedure, the judge pointed out,  no one can be in custody ad 
infinitum. The Constitutional insistence upon the protection of personal liberty in Art 
7, the respect for human dignity in Art 8, the right of an accused to be brought to trial 
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within a reasonable time in art 12(1) (b) and the presumption of innocence in art 
12(1) (d) are crucial to its tenor and spirit.317 
The judge went on to say his judgment “should be influenced by the 
constitutional culture in the interpretation or application of the law or in the exercise 
of a discretion”. While the Court acknowledged the importance of justice, and 
recognised the emotional effects of the Lubowski murder on the psyche of the new 
Namibian nation, he did not close his eyes for the protection the Constitution grants 
to all people within the borders of Namibia – even if he or she is suspected of having 
killed a Namibian hero. 
When Judge Mahomed refused a further postponement on constitutional 
grounds the State withdrew the case and Acheson left the country. The mystery of 
the Lubowski murder was never solved. The Acheson-case is important in the 
development of Constitutional development. If ever there was a case loaded with 
conflicting interests, this was it. Being one of the first high profile cases decided by 
the Namibian High Court, it was a real test for the independence and integrity of the 
Court. Public opinion was not in favour of bail for Acheson. 
The future relationship between South Africa, the former colonial power and 
still under minority rule, and the new Namibian state, was also at stake. While the 
conspirators of the Civil Co-operation Bureau fled Namibia and found refuge in South 
Africa, the case was also a test of the willingness of the Pretoria government to 
extradite para-military units who operated in Namibia immediately before 
independence. However, the judge opted first to interpret the Constitution from the 
perspective of the constitutional values. While the murder it did not affect the 
decision of the Court, government responded by an amendment to the bail 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act.318 The new section 61 makes provision 
that an accused arrested for a serious offence, listed in Schedule 2 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, can be retained in custody. Even if there is no or little possibility that 
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he/she will abscond or interfere with witnesses or the investigation “if it is in the 
public interest or interest of the administration of justice” the Court may refuse bail.. 
The Constitutionality of the vague interest clause was not contested in the 
Namibian courts. A well-known Namibian criminal lawyer, Richard Metcalfe, is of the 
opinion that the clause is often used in the Magistrates Court as an excuse to deny 
accused their constitutional rights.319  
 
5.3   The Effects of the Release of Acheson on the Outcome of the Case 
The early breakthrough of the investigators in arresting Donald Acheson 
shortly after the assassination on Anton Lubowski, was all lost when the State 
withdrew the case against Acheson and the latter left Namibia.  
 After his arrest, all the fingers immediately pointed to this notorious Irishman 
with links to Irish Republican Army. Acheson had the right credentials for an 
assassin: He had links with the IRA, he fought in the Rhodesian war, he was without 
work since the end of the war and he was recruited by convicted murderer Ferdi 
Barnard to work for the covert South African Defence Force Unit, the Civil Co-
Operation Bureau.  
The CCB was already suspected of eliminating anti-apartheid activists and 
opponents of the South African government, in 1989. Acheson was later handled 
and sent to Namibia by another well-known CCB member, “Chappie” Maree.320 
 If his credentials and his reasons for being in Namibia were highly suspicious, 
his conduct before and after the murder was even more so. The manager of the 
place where he stayed saw him leaving her house in a red Corolla shortly before the 
murder. He had something covered in a bag (which she said could have been an AK 
47) with him. 
Several eyewitnesses saw a red Corolla on the crime scene shortly before or 
after the murder.321 There was, however, an exception. A young man living at the 
corner of the street saw a small red sedan, but he was sure that it was a Golf. He 
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stated that he was a car enthusiast and could not have made a mistake. But a former 
German police officer that lived next to Anton Lubowski, had no doubt that it had 
indeed been a Corolla.322 
Even more convincing was the testimony of Inspector William Lloyd, who was 
the first Namibian officer to arrive at the scene. Lloyd found scrap marks on the roof 
of the Corolla Acheson drove. The marks were on the right hand side of the car 
above the driver seat. The marks gave the impression of an object that moved 
around.323 If the assumption is correct that Anton Lubowski was shot with a semi-
automatic rifle from the right side of the car, the marks can easily be explained. The 
assassin took aim with the rifle on the roof of the car. When he pulled the trigger, the 
automatic rifle moved under the intense power of the semi-automatic rifle. That was 
also the assumption of Inspector Lloyd. 
The murder weapon was never found. If Acheson was the murderer, he got rid 
of the rifle before he was arrested. But even that is not strange, bearing in mind that 
he was involved in at least two previous armed conflicts, one in Ireland and one in 
the former Rhodesia.  The High Court never heard any evidence to consider 
Acheson’s guilt. He felt compelled to develop jurisprudence faithful to the values of 
the constitution of the newly independent Namibia rather than allowing the emotional 
arguments to influence the legal issues. 
 Consequently, he rated the rights of an accused high, even if he was 
suspected of murder of a member of the SWAPO Party, who has just won the first 
democratic elections in Namibia. The prosecution, so it seems in hindsight, also had 
their doubts. When Justice Mahomed instructed acting Prosecutor-General Hans 
Heyman either to proceed against Acheson alone if the other CCB conspirators 
cannot be found, or to suffer the consequences, he decided to withdraw the case.  
 
5.4   The Outcome of the Case 
 Acheson made an exculpatory statement to the police in which he not only 
denied having killed Lubowski, but also declared that he went to Namibia to kill 
Gwen Lister, the editor of the Windhoek daily, the Namibian.324 
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 The Office of the Prosecutor-General believed that Acheson was framed.325 
The evidence of the witnesses corroborate each other in one material aspect: the 
assassin or assassins drove up to Lubowski’s house in a small red sedan car and 
the assassination took place either from the car or next to the car.  
 Here the similarities end. Some witnesses, as we have already seen, 
identified the car as a Golf, and others as a Corolla.  
The office of the Prosecutor-General was not at all convinced that there was 
only one car involved in the assassination. They believed that there was a strong 
possibility that Acheson was used as a decoy.326  
 The Prosecutor-General never said that Acheson did not kill Lubowski. His 
argument was a legal one. Acheson denied having killed Lubowski. The only 
evidence at the State’s disposal was circumstantial evidence – the witnesses who 
saw the Corolla at the scene of the murder, the marks on Acheson’s rented car, his 
suspicious conduct in front of the manager of the place where he stayed, etc. 
 Although circumstantial evidence is admissible and not weaker than direct 
evidence,327 it needs to rebut reasonable doubt that the defence could raise.328 
After Acheson left Namibia, he disappeared. Attempts to locate him through 
diplomatic channels, assistance from South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and following up several leads and rumours were futile. For the same 
reasons that the acting Prosecutor-General did not want to prosecute Acheson 
without Maree and Burger, the Prosecutor-General did not want to request South 
Africa to extradite Burger and Maree if he could not get Ferdi Barnard, Abraham 
(Slang) van Zyl and Calla Botha as witnesses and Acheson as a co-accused.329 
 Justice Levy found in the First Lubowski Inquest that there was a prima facie 
case against Ronald Acheson, who probably shot Lubowski, that the Civil Co-
Operation Bureau was involved and that the instruction to kill Lubowski came from 
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senior SADF officers.330 The judge, however, pointed out that test in the case of an 
inquest does not mean beyond reasonable doubt, neither - 
…that the test envisaged by the Inquest Act is whether the 
judicial officer  . . . is of the opinion that there is evidence 
available, which may at a subsequent criminal trial be held to be 
credible and acceptable.331 
 
 Nevertheless, the prima facie test applied by the judge, gave a strong 
message to the Prosecutor-General, that he believed the way in which the 
Prosecutor-General dealt with the case, was incorrect. The judgment did not 
automatically follow that the State had enough prima facie evidence at its disposal to 
lead to a conviction of the people cited in the judgment.332 But even if it did, the 
Prosecutor-General did not share this opinion and never requested the extradition of 
the South African accomplices. 
Looking at the application of the Constitution by Judge Mahomed, the first 
conclusion can be that the legal process was frustrated and justice was not served. 
However, if one bears in mind that the Prosecutor-General never requested the 
extradition of the suspected CCB members, and even if he wanted to do so, chances 
are virtually null that any extradition would have taken place before 1994, the harsh 
insistence of the Court begins to make sense. 
The so-called Outjo Three, which later became the Otjiwarongo Five, is 
another case in point. During the preparations for the United Nations supervised 
elections in 1989, two South Africans, Darrall Stopforth and Leonard Veenendal, and 
a German citizen, Horst Klenz, came to Namibia. The three killed a security guard 
when bombing United Nations offices in Outjo. When they escaped in December 
1989, they killed a police officer. 
Klenz served a sentence in South Africa and was not extraditable. Stopforth 
and Veenendal were declared extraditable on 30 April 1992 by Magistrate Roux in 
Johannesburg. The Minister of Justice in the old South African government never 
surrendered them.  
The new ANC Minister of Justice ordered their surrender to in October 1996. 
They later applied to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for amnesty. While 
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the application was still pending, they launched motion proceedings in the then 
Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa to suspend the 
order of their surrender pending the outcome of the amnesty hearing. The 
application was denied and on 27 September 1999 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
turned down an appeal.333 Yet, fourteen years down the road, they are still free, 
Veenendaal living in the United Kingdom.  
If the South African extradition process became so entangled with side issues 
that even an order of the Minister of Justice of the ANC government has not been 
executed, chances that the State would have been able to get the CCB members to 
stand trial with Acheson, are very small. In hindsight the decision of the High Court 
insisting that the State either proceed with the case against Acheson or withdraw, 
cannot be faulted. 
Consequently, the application of the constitutional principles did not work 
against justice or the legal process in this case. On the other hand, it would have 
been a travesty of justice to keep Acheson in custody while the State attempts to 
build a case. 
American legal philosopher Richard Dworkin speaks of the judges as authors 
and critics.334  Each judge as novelist interprets the novels of previous novelists in 
layers of truth. From these layers the judge searches for an interpretation that best 
fits the bulk of texts. 
The Acheson case was an important step in the creation of a constitutional 
culture in the Namibian legal history. It was so to speak the first novel or first chapter 
of the Namibian legal novel. By the tone of the judgment, the Court set the scene for 
further developments. The Constitutional interpretation that had to be followed 
operated from an emphasis on the Constitution as the foundation of the democratic 
State, the soul of the nation, and a refuge for the individual against nationalistic 
fervour, State abuse of power and prosecutorial indecisiveness.  
 
5.5   Kleynhans and Others, a Different Scenario 
 Shortly after independence a few unorganized white right-wingers were 
arrested while planning a coup d’etat.  They were badly organized and they had no 
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sustainable structures, no support in society and hardly any weapons. While on bail 
the ringleaders fled the country and only a few minor accomplices eventually stood 
trial.335 Although the accused were convicted, the sentences were lenient.  
The Prosecutor-General explained the lenient sentences in the light of the fact 
that the ringleaders managed to escape and were not prosecuted:  
For the most they played a minor and almost insignificant role. 
For instance, the conviction of Tietz was based solely on the fact 
that he did not inform the police of the whereabouts of his own 
brother. For the rest he took no part in the conspiracy 
whatsoever. Montgomery was convicted solely because he did 
not report the existence of the conspiracy to the police. The part 
played by Kleynhans went somewhat further in that he 
attempted to recruit support for the planned conspiracy. This is 
reflected in the sentences imposed. I have no doubt that, had 
the ringleaders stood their trial, severe sentences would have 
been imposed….336 
 
The SWAPO Party and other loyalists were shocked by the moderate 
sentence given to white conspirators against the government. Although the 
interpreters could possibly use several social or political elements as sources for 
deconstructing this judgment, the political interpreters chose the race card. It did not 
matter that Judge O’Linn was appointed in the transitional period with the approval of 
the SWAPO Party, that he had a history of defending Plan fighters and SWAPO 
sympathizers, that SWAPO considered him as an ally when the leadership returned 
from exile337 and that he was entrusted with the commission that monitored violence 
during the Resolution 435 elections.  While he was one of the communists and 
liberals338 of the apartheid regime, he was never a member of the SWAPO Party.339 
And his history added the necessary spice to make ethnic deconstruction work: he 
was a police officer in South Africa before entering the legal profession! 
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 But there is also the emotional element. While Judge O’Linn was a 
progressive politician and a human rights lawyer who fearlessly defended SWAPO 
members and PLAN fighters, he was still part of the old political order.340 Unlike the 
SWAPO members who were constantly subjected to the negative side of the system, 
he worked in it all his life: first as a police officer, then as an advocate and finally as a 
judge. He did not share the distrust former political exiles and dissidents had in all 
the structures of the old order.  
 On the other hand, the non-resident judges of the Supreme Court were more 
critical of political structures of the old apartheid society. The critical approach of the 
non-residential Supreme Court towards the police – which still included traditional 
SWAPO enemies like the security police341, Koevoet and former South African Police 
Force members – was more in line with SWAPO thinking. 
 The criticism of the judgment was severe. Even after the Judge-President and 
the Prosecutor-General issued statements explaining the reasons for the lenient 
sentences, the chief co-ordinator of the SWAPO Party, Moses Garoeb, answered 
with abuses: 
In the past the Namibian judiciary system was an exclusive 
mutual admiration and private club of the white minority. The 
office of the Prosecutor-General was the dispenser of selective 
justice using its legal authority to the detriment of the majority of 
black Namibians. Is it not the best of times for a drastic change 
from old bones to new ones in our judicial system? Thus the 
demonstrators were not in contempt of court as suggested by 
the manipulators of the Namibian Constitution and the vultures 
of justice. How many black Namibian patriots found their way to 
the gallows in the Namibian High Court of colonial times, 
represented at that time by the Prosecutor-General for just being 
in the possession of a revolver?342 
 
The Prosecutor-General threatened to prosecute for contempt of court, and 
Judge O’Linn called it a constitutional crisis.343 O’Linn made his own position clear in 
S v Heita - 
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 Two years ago some people called for my dismissal on the 
grounds of alleged sympathy with SWAPO. Now a SWAPO-
leader and SWAPO-supporters ask for my dismissal, inter alia, 
on the ground of an alleged colonialist and anti-black mentality. 
According to them I have become irrelevant to black thinking in 
Namibia and I should not be on the High Court Bench at all.344 
 
 The Prosecutor-General did not prosecute anyone and the case did not lead 
to total disillusioNMent amongst the people or the government. During this period the 
Constitution reigned supreme. New cases before the High and Supreme Courts 
raised the confidence of the people. The presence of Justice Mahomed, 
complimented by the appointment of the first black Namibian judge, Judge Pio Teek, 
and several acting black judges from Zimbabwe and Zambia, created a spirit of 
ownership amongst the people.  International academics accepted that Namibia was 
a constitutional democracy345 and South African constitutionalists applauded the 
founding fathers and Namibian courts for laying a good foundation to be followed by 
a future democratic South Africa.  
 One question remains unanswered: Why did the people, especially the 
SWAPO Party, protested so vigorously against Judge O’Linn in the Kleynhans-case, 
while the dramatic release of Acheson hardly raised an eyebrow? The politicians 
dealt with their criticism much more orderly in the Acheson-case. They prepared an 
amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act and passed it through Parliament.  
 There is more than one reason for the different approaches. The Kleynhans-
case was probably the opportunity for the people to express their frustration with the 
fact that so little changed in the chambers of the Courts and the offices of the 
prosecutorial authority.  
When several senior South African prosecutors, including the Attorney 
General and his deputy, left Namibia at independence, the office was stuck without 
an obvious candidate to become the first Prosecutor-General in Namibia.  With the 
composition of the Judicial Service Commission at the time,346 it came as no surprise 
that Hans Heyman the most senior prosecutor in the office of the former Attorney 
General, was appointed as Prosecutor-General.  
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 While Heyman played a positive role in establishing the independence of the 
Office, a golden opportunity was missed to begin the Namibian legal history with 
someone who were not involved in so-called terrorism trials and did not prosecute 
under the draconian apartheid laws. 
 As for the judges, in terms of the transitional clauses in the Constitution, all 
serving judges were maintained and those older than 65, were considered to have 
been appointed until the age of seventy.347 Judge O’Linn was the unfortunate symbol 
of a social order that changed too slowly to meet the aspirations of the people and 
the governing party. It is a travesty of fairness that Justice O’Linn, the human rights 
lawyer of the colonial era, was the victim of the frustrations of the politicians.  
 The lay interpretation of the Constitution did not care about new principles of 
fairness and justice and constitutional protection of the individual. They wanted to 
see change and were prepared to shout if the pace of change was slow. The legal 
arguments of a white trial judge, Judge-President and Prosecutor-General did not 
impress them. They wanted to see the will of the people respected by the courts.  
 The general amnesty granted to criminal offenders with political motives 
during the struggle for liberation, also played a role. Even during the sessions of the 
Constituent Assembly, some members hinted that they expected Nuremburg-like 
trials for the old apartheid ideologues.348  The fact that Namibians had to live with 
people from the old dispensation still in leadership positions was possibly the 
unwritten reason for the frustrations during the Kleynhans-trial. 
 
5.6   Acheson, Kleynhans and a Hermeneutic of Justice 
 Given Namibia’s colonial history and the lack of co-operation by the South 
African authorities, transformative constitutionalism can be interpreted in more than 
one way. The first would be the approach of the High Court in the Acheson and 
Kleynhans cases. In the Lubowski case, the Court explained its understanding of 
transformative constitutionalism (without using the term, but with the obvious 
understanding of a Constitution that needs to change the status quo). It referred to 
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the Constitution as a ‘mirror reflecting the national soul’.349 The Constitutional rights 
and freedoms remain intact, irrespective of the character of the persons involved.  
 In both cases the Court chose to embrace the values of the Constitution, more 
specifically article 12 (Fair trial). The approach is clear. The constitutional principle of 
a trial within a reasonable time and the presumption of innocence apply to all people. 
The judgments emphasised the duty of the state to convince the Court that there are 
reasons why an accused should remain in prison. 
Constitutional rights, especially those involving the status of a person, cannot 
be limited by vague possibilities. In the Acheson-case the Court expected the acting 
Prosecutor-General to provide a date as to when the co-accused of Acheson would 
be extradited to Namibia. 
If a transformative constitutional hermeneutic (working from the premise that 
constitutional values is for the benefit of all, even the former oppressors and worst 
criminals) resulted in favouring the defenders of the old apartheid regime, one may 
well ask if constitutionalism has anything to say about justice and fairness. Was it not 
possible to expect of transformative constitutionalism to eradicate all roots of 
apartheid, using a hermeneutic of reconciliation and justice?  
 In other words, why not use the preamble of the Constitution as the point of 
departure and then describe any action attempting to revive any form of apartheid as 
actions demanding extra-ordinary judgments to transform society?  
From there the Court could have decided not to release Acheson immediately, 
and in the Kleynhans case, to impose stiff sentences, even if the attempted coupé 
d’état was badly organised, supported and executed and posed no real security risk? 
 The French defence lawyer Jacques Vergés developed a strategy to attack a 
system of law in his battle for justice after colonialism in France. This strategy of 
rupture (Stratége Judiciare) rather than simply attacking elements of colonial 
legislation raised the question if the old colonial laws can be used as a foundation of 
the new constitutional system.350 While Vergés used the strategy in criminal cases, it 
is not far-fetched to develop his Stratége Judiciare into a transformative 
constitutional interpretive model. Granted, one needs to have a very specific political 
objective. It is also true of Klare and Langa’s understanding of transformative 
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constitutionalism. Think of Klare’s long-term project of constitutional enactment, 
interpretation, and enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a 
historical context of conducive political developments) to transforming a country's 
political and social institutions. If the “long-term project” is to cherish and to protect 
the gains of our long struggle351 one can argue that for the individuals willing to use 
violence to defend apartheid, revenge its demise or attempting to derail the 
independence process, different rules to ensure transformation can be justified. 
 Vergés explained the strategy by referring to Saint-Just’s answer to the 
question if King Louis XVI should stand trial. How, Saint-Just wanted to know, could 
such a trial be conducted within the framework of legal justice? There is no rapport 
de justice between humanity and the King, and concluded: 
Je ne vois pas de milieu: Cet homme doit régner ou mourir. (I 
see no middle point. The man must either rule of die.)352 
 
 The question whether a trial is necessary to get rid of the King is answered by 
looking at two legal systems: the law of the republic vis-à-vis the law of the King. 
Between these two there is no form of justice spanning them both.  Vergés used the 
strategy in his controversial defence of the Nazi Klaus Barbie, the Butcher of Lyon. 
Christodoulidis points out that Vergés avoided the traditional way of defending post-
Nuremberg war criminals – looking for mitigating factors, stressing the sub-ordinary 
role of the French Gestapo, etc. Vergés went to the foundation of the French legal 
system.353 
 How, he asked, can Barbie stand trial for deeds, now defined as crimes 
against humanity, while France commonly implemented similar deeds and actions in 
keeping the French colonies in subordination? Commented Vergés in his closing 
statement: 
Racism, we know what that is. We bow our heads also in form of 
the martyrdom of the children of Izieu because we remember 
the suffering of the children of Algeria.354 
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 Rather than defending Barbie’s action in any way, the defence attacked a 
system where French troops massacred 15 000 Algerians in Setif for joining the 
celebrations of the ally victory on 8 May 1945 and using the opportunity to demand 
their own liberation. Those actions were not even condemned, let alone leading to 
any criminal action in France or Algiers.355 
 While the strategy of rupture was developed by Vergés as a defence strategy 
in political trials, the parallels between post-colonial Europe and independent 
Namibia are striking.  One can easily use Vergés’ argumentation to challenge a 
constitutional call for the release of Acheson.  
Is there any context of justice capable of spanning both the apartheid system 
not only allowing but initiating the assassination of Anton Lubowski?  At the time 
such deed no longer had any political significance or any positive outcome for the 
anti-independents in South Africa. Should Acheson be allowed to stand on the newly 
acquired protection of an accused – the right to be presumed innocent, the right to 
be freed on bail pending the trial, the right to be treated fairly? 
Should the Kleynhans case not have been treated in the same manner the 
apartheid system – for which Kleynhans and his co-accused stood up against the 
new democratic government – treated its dissidents? Granted, the rupture strategy 
was developed in a civil law jurisdiction as a defence strategy and not as an 
instrument for the prosecution.  It is nevertheless possible to see the prosecution 
developing a line of action that based a request to deny Acheson bail on similar 
principles.  
Why can the Court not consider the fact that Lubowski was killed before 
independence with possibly only one objective: to derail the independence process?  
Is it totally insignificant for the application of another postponement that the South 
African government, despite the political speech of President FW de Klerk on 2 
February 1990,356 was still the minority government that illegally occupied Namibia 
before independence? Does it make a different to the State’s case that the South 
African government did not assist in extraditing the South African suspects to 
Namibia? The temptation to the Court was challenging.  The quoted comment of 
Justice Mahomed on the hermeneutical battle between powers of justice and 
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constitutionalism was an indication that the Court considered a transformative 
approach based of the Preamble, yet opted for the ideals, spirit and tenor of the 
Constitution. 
 Koskenniemi, arguing against an emphasis on the historical context of a 
crime, pointed to the difficulty to get closure in any trial if the legal debate has moved 
to the level of historical investigations.  
The evaluation of history by the Court will be only one amongst 
many. The judgment will not provide the only prism through 
which the events…..will be read.357 
 
 He makes the following comment on the Barbie case: 
The defence tactic in the Barbie trial was to accept it as being 
about historical truth. By then choosing an appropriate 
interpretive context – European colonialism – the actions of the 
accused would necessarily be seen as a relatively “normal” 
episode in the flow of racial persecutions and massive suffering 
of which European history has consisted. 
 
 In the framework of Scandinavian realist theorists Carr and Morgenthau, 
Koskenniemi opted for a consideration of the broader contexts rather than an 
individualisation of the past. 
If the court start making assessments of the bigger interest and 
evaluate contextual data, it will move into the area of 
indeterminacy and political conflict.358 
 
 In the Acheson case the approach of Justice Mahomed did not bring justice 
for the Lubowski family, neither did it seize the moment to address the issue of 
apartheid crimes in the courts. Interpreters like Koskenniemi will argue that it 
nevertheless saved the democratic process from indeterminacy and political conflict. 
And it did not totally close the door for a future attempt to address the injustices of 
the past by means of Vergés’ rupture strategy.  
 Koskenniemi’s point is well taken. One may well ask for how long strategies of 
rupture will stay in place? While the immediate need for justice and fairness would 
have been met by drastic sentences in the Kleynhans-case and a refusal to grant 
Acheson bail, the political effects of such actions could have been detrimental.  
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 The reaction of the late Justus Garoeb in the Kleynhans-case, gave the 
constitutional dream of non-racialism a severe blow. O’Linn was treated like a 
hanging judge,359 despite the role he played in opposition to South African 
occupation. A radical anti-constitutional approach in the Acheson and Kleynhans 
cases would have caused serious undermining of the Constitution and taken the 
Namibian judiciary on the route of indeterminacy and political conflict (Koskenniemi). 
  
5.7  Value-Based Judgments: Ex Parte Attorney General: In Re Corporal 
Punishment by Organs of State 
Not all the judges of the High and Supreme Courts of Namibia appreciated the 
new approach. But despite strong opposition,360 the value-based approach followed 
by Justice Mahomed in the Acheson case became an important cornerstone in the 
hermeneutics of constitutional interpretation in Namibia.  
The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and several other statutes made 
provision for whipping of both adult and juvenile male convicts.361  Proclamation 348 
of 1967 gave authority to the Customary Courts to impose corporal punishment “in 
accordance with …. Native law and custom”.362 
The High and Supreme Courts of an independent Namibia, like Justice 
Mahomed in the Acheson case, took a radical different approach to the interpretation 
of constitutional issues. In a case questioning the constitutional validity of corporal 
punishment, the Supreme Court had the first opportunity to express itself on the 
values of the Namibian people.363 The constitutional issue at stake was “whether the 
imposition and infliction of corporal punishment by or on the authority of any organ of 
State contemplated in legislation is in conflict with any of the provisions of chapter 3 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia and more in particular art 8”.364 
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Schools in pre-independent Namibia followed a policy of corporal punishment  
approved by the Department of Education.365 The educational rules were often just a 
smokescreen. Namibian learners, including girls, received indiscriminate corporal 
punishment in the pre-independent era.366 
The Court stated at the outset that the question whether a specific punishment 
is inhumane or degrading is a value judgment: 
It is however a value judgment which requires objectively to be 
articulated and identified, regard being had to the contemporary 
norms, aspirations, expectations and sensitivities of the 
Namibian people as expressed in its national institutions and its 
Constitution, and further having regard to the emerging 
consensus of values in the civilised international community (of 
which Namibia is a part) which Namibians share. This is not a 
static exercise. It is a continually evolving dynamic.367. 
The emphasis on the “norms, aspirations, expectations and sensitivities of the 
Namibian people” is somewhat complicated. How can the Court establish exactly 
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what constitute these aspects of the Namibian soul? The question remained 
unanswered in the judgment. 
The Court evaluated several other jurisdictions with similar provisions in its 
constitutions. It also considered international instruments and some South African 
judgments and comes to the conclusion that corporal punishment is indeed 
degrading and inhumane.368 
Berker, in a short concurring judgment, commented that if norms and values 
are to play a role in the interpretation of Article 8 of the Constitution, it must be the 
norms and values of the Namibian people and not those of people in other 
jurisdictions. Since Namibia has been freed from colonialism only recently, they are 
“now in the position to determine their own values free from such imposed foreign 
values by its former colonial rulers”.369 While Berker does not elaborate on how to 
establish these norms and values, he nevertheless raised some soft criticism to 
Mahomed’s approach. Berker accepted it as a fact that the Namibian people have a 
deep revulsion in such treatment. 
It is not surprising that a deep revulsion in respect of such 
treatment, including corporal punishment, has developed, which 
ultimately became articulated in the Bill of Fundamental Human 
Rights enshrined in the Constitution, and in particular in art 8 
thereof, which protects absolutely the dignity of every person, 
even in the enforcement of a penalty legally imposed, and 
further absolutely prohibits torture or cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment.370 
 
 Berker used the historical context of oppression, which included both 
legislation that provided for cruel and inhumane punishment, and arbitrary torture, to 
explain why the Bill of Rights has included a prohibition on torture, cruel, inhumane 
and degrading punishment. Only within this historical framework can the attitudes 
values of the Namibian people be understood.  
 While juveniles and learners in schools received more protection than 
juveniles in other jurisdictions did, Mohamed and Berger agreed that once certain 
actions of state organs have been branded degrading and inhumane, the Court or 
the legislator could not ignore or allow such punishment for certain categories of 
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people. Even the smallest element of degradation and inhumane conduct are 
enough to rule the application thereof unconstitutional.371 
Judge O’Linn, who was not part of the Bench in this case, opted to comment 
critically on the judgment in two cases where he was the presiding judge.  In the first 
case he pointed out that the Supreme Court did not follow the accepted test in the 
corporal punishment case to determine the norms, values and aspirations of the 
Namibian people and for that reason the Corporal Punishment-case is possibly not 
binding in terms of the stare decisis rule.372 He repeated his sentiment in the Sipula 
case,373 discussed below and again in the Tcoeib case.374 
O’Linn turned to the corporal punishment case in his refusal to grant Tcoeib 
permission to appeal. Since Berker said in his concurring judgment that an enquiry is 
necessary to determine the norms and values of the people, it was mandatory for the 
court to hear all the interested groups in terms of section 15(50) of the Supreme 
Court Act. The judge pointed out that the Court did not adhere to several provisions 
of the Act. He emphasised that the national institutions such as traditional 
authorities, administrators of education, the teachers and parents' associations 
should have had the opportunity to be heard. The judge referred to the necessity of 
objectivity and complained that the term “civilised international community” is not 
defined. 
 He further complained that the test to determine the norms, values, 
expectations, aspirations of the people has not been set out clearly, which makes it 
impossible for inferior courts to follow. He also suspected that the justices took 
judicial notice of what the norms and values of the Namibian people entails. 
O’Linn has a point when he criticises the Court for failing to enter into 
substantive argument on the issue of values. But he does not bring us closer to a 
solution. He does not present an alternative to Mahomed’s lack of substantive law on 
the issues the Supreme Court did not consider - all the complex issues of juvenile 
punishment and the position of traditional authorities, to mention only two. 
A weakness of O’Linn’s criticism is his almost exclusive emphasis on formal 
law and procedure. The wording of legal texts is the foundation of his approach. It is 
doubtful that O’Linn was ever consciously following Herbert Hart’s methodology or 
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his basic approach to interpretation. Yet, his insistence that the words of the texts 
are usually adequate to deal will all issues, he aligned himself with Hartian 
positivism.  
The High Court (Judge O’Linn) refused the accused (Tcoeib) leave to appeal, 
but his petition to the Supreme Court succeeded. When the case came before the 
Supreme Court, Mahomed, who became Chief Justice after the death of Berker, was 
on the Bench with acting Supreme Court judges Dumbutshena and Leon. The new 
Chief Justice missed the opportunity to react to O’Linn’s criticism. Instead, the Court 
looked at the sentence given by O’Linn as if the Constitutional debate never took 
place. His only reaction was a footnote. 
Without referring to the moral values of the Namibian people or the civilised 
international community, he reacted to O’Linn’s criticism that the Court did not 
conduct a proper enquiry by stating that such an enquiry is unnecessary since the 
values, norms, aspirations of the people is known through the Constitution.  
No evidential enquiry is necessary to identify the aspirations, 
norms, expectations and sensitivities of the Namibian people as 
they are expressed in the Namibian Constitution itself and in 
their national institution.375 
 
The argument of Mahomed does not make sense without any further 
explanation. The challenge of the Supreme Court in the corporal punishment case 
was to determine if Article 8 of the Constitution is broad enough to prohibit corporal 
punishment by organs of the State. Or, does Corporal Punishment by organs of the 
state constitute cruel and inhumane treatment? The Constitution does not give a 
direct answer, hence the test determining the values, aspirations and norms of the 
Namibian people. To say that the test is unnecessary leaves us with a circle 
argument. 
 The Court quoted a set of rules generally accepted by the civilised 
international community. By concentrating on rules rather than analysing the 
meaning and expression of norms and values the judgment moved out of the realm 
of substantive argument and right back into formal argumentation. Does Article 8 of 
the Namibian Constitution conform to similar worded articles in the constitutions of 
civilised international community?  How does the civilised community interpret these 
articles? If they found similar actions to be inhuman and degrading, then we have 
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found the norms, values and aspirations of the Namibian people. In short, the 
inclusion of an article in other liberal democratic constitutions prohibiting torture or 
cruel treatment and punishment or inhuman treatment and punishment means ex 
post facto that Namibians share the aspirations, values and norms (and 
interpretations) of those societies.  
The basic problem of judgment is that he does not really break with the old 
formalist approach. He found a new set of rules in comparative constitutional law and 
international law: “the emerging consensus of values in the civilised international 
community which Namibians share”. While the he was willing to break new ground 
and initiate a hermeneutic of values, he seldom managed to make the transition from 
formal law to substantive law. Mahomed’s  judgment was in many ways a failed 
attempt to introduce a modern hermeneutical approach to constitutionalism.  
 Berker came closer to define a core value namely the liberation from colonial 
bondage.376  He also makes the historical context a hermeneutical key. The norms 
and the values, he asserts, is linked to history. 
The historical justification of Berker needs more attention. The majority of the 
tribal authorities (now known as traditional authorities) were supporters of the South 
African colonial structures and opposed to SWAPO and the liberation struggle. 
Consequently, the tribal authorities were often suspected of beating and torturing 
SWAPO members. In Wood and Others  v  Ondangwa Tribal Authority and 
Another377 two bishops and a third person applied for an interdict against the tribal 
authority to prevent them from detaining and inflicting punishment on members of 
SWAPO, and members of another anti-South African party, Demkop. The interdict 
was denied by the Supreme Court of South West Africa, but granted by the Appellate 
Division of South Africa.  
 It emerged in the case that SWAPO and Demkop members were arrested by 
the South African police and handed over to the tribal authorities who unlawfully 
detained the people and inflicted corporal punishment on them, even if they only 
executed legal functions on behalf of SWAPO. 
 It is not necessary to go into the details of this case. Suffice it to say that the 
South African institutions in Namibia used the legal system, the police and the 
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traditional authorities to maintain power. Corporal punishment was an instrument in 
their hands.  
As noted in chapter 2, the metaphor of a constitution as the historical vehicle 
from oppression to liberation has found wide application in the South African 
constitutional jurisprudence and debate, following the late Etienne Mureinik’s 
metaphor of a bridge that took the people from a culture of authority to a culture of 
justification.378 In the same vain De Vos argues for an historical understanding and 
interpretation of the present as a core value from whence constitutional interpretation 
can start.379 
De Vos’ argument is helpful to elaborate on Berker’s understanding of 
constitutional values.  The Constitution is the difference between the old and the 
new.  Independence introduced a new core value.  This core value is embedded in 
the Constitution, hence history is the hermeneutical key to interpret the Constitution. 
Without knowledge and understanding of the role of corporal punishment in 
the oppression of the majority of the people, it may sound like an exaggeration to 
refer to corporal punishment as a form of torture.  However, in the light of its 
application by the traditional authorities (and sometimes the Courts), it is not an over 
breath. 
 Interpreting the corporal punishment case in its historical context, helps to 
understand to why this specific “bridge” was necessary to bring the Namibian nation 
to accept a new morality and new core values.  But it does not answer all the 
questions about value judgments. 
 While the value-based approach was not totally new in Namibia, the corporal 
punishment case moved the goal posts of legal interpretation drastically. One must 
bear in mind that South Africa did not have a constitution with a Bill of Rights at the 
time and no one really knew what would eventually happen at the Codesa 
negotiations. Consequently, the Namibian courts began the new path without 
precedents or simultaneous developments elsewhere.  
Despite all the good that can be said about the corporal punishment case, the 
fact remains that the Supreme Court never explained how it came to the conclusion 
that corporal punishment is against the values, norms and aspirations of the 
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Namibian people. The case never assisted the Namibian people to create a new, 
radical hermeneutic of justice.  If norms and values of the Namibian people are really 
the basic foundation of constitutional interpretation, there is little or no difference 
between constitutionalism and majoritarianism.   
If constitutionalism is all about the norms and values of the people at a given 
time, the ideals of constitutionalism are defeated. The function of entrenched 
constitutional values is to protect society against the swinging moods and influences 
of society. Making the norms, values and aspirations of the nation without 
reservations, the constitutional hermeneutical key can eventually result in a return to 
majoritarianism.  
However, despite the vocabulary of democracy, higher values and 
constitutionalism, the court remained stuck in the traditional way of thinking. We are 
reminded of the constant references in the apartheid past in both South Africa and 
Namibia where separation, white superiority and so-called Christian values were 
made the untested values of the South African people. 
Looking at the judgment from this perspective, Judge O’Linn’s criticism is 
valid. However, both Mahomed and O’Linn are still dealing with questions of form 
rather than substance. At face value the judges seem to agree to the importance of 
norms, values and aspiration as a hermeneutical key for constitutional interpretation. 
O’Linn is not necessarily against the idea of making norms and values the key. He 
eventually used it himself when he wrote a decisive Supreme Court judgment.380 
Yet, there is another way to interpret Mahomed’s judgment, especially if one 
sees the two concurring judgments as one. The norms, values and aspirations of the 
Namibian people are first and foremost found in the Constitution. It is the highest 
expression of the norms and values of the people, poetically referred to as a mirror 
reflecting the soul of the nation, by Mahomed in the Acheson case.   
Looking at the Mahomed judgment from this perspective, the values, norms 
and aspirations of the people are to be found primarily in the Constitution itself. 
Those values do not necessarily conform to the general accepted norms and values 
of the majority. This is especially true of postcolonial Namibia. The history of Namibia 
is flawed by a violent oppressive regime. Interpreting values, norms and aspirations 
in a transformative manner will necessarily have to be the “bridge” (Mureinik) from 
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the old values to a constitutional dispensation where violence is underplayed and 
respect for all is emphasised. This applies especially to vulnerable members of 
society such as children, and the less respectable members of society such as 
convicted criminals. 
It does not help to find out how the majority feels about the necessity of 
corporal punishment to determine if corporal punishment complies with the 
constitutional values, norms and aspirations of the people in terms of article 8. 
Kriegler explained the tension between the values and aspirations vis-à-vis 
constitutional values. In the Makwanyane case he criticised value judgments based 
on the values of the people, commenting the mere fact that the majority of the South 
Africans are in favour of the death penalty cannot make it constitutionally acceptable 
if the process flies against the principles of the South African Constitution.381 
Approaching the judgment from this angle, it makes sense for Mahomed to 
look at how other jurisdictions interpret similar norms and values in their 
constitutions. It is not a matter of giving preference to the norms and values of 
foreign countries as an alternative for conducting a survey of how Namibians think 
about corporal punishment. It is an analytical process to find out how the will of the 
morals of the people embodied in the Constitution needs to be applied to questions 
of the day.  
To suggest that the norms and values of the people can be find by external 
exercises rather than an analysis of the Constitution, would take constitutional 
hermeneutics away from transformative constitutionalism and back to 
majoritarianism. 
 
5.7.1   Reactions 
I discussed the “soft” response to the Acheson judgment and the more 
aggressive response of the politicians to the light sentences given to the Kleynhans 
treason trial accused in the previous chapter. Since the Attorney General forwarded 
the issue of corporal punishment to the Supreme Court in terms of a mandate under 
the Constitution, one can assume that the process was a Cabinet initiative or at least 
approved by them. Consequently, it came as no surprise that the government 
applauded the decision and the Minister of Basic Education at the time, Nahas 
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Angula, stated a few years later in a newspaper interview that he has always been 
opposed to corporal punishment in schools.382 
 The newspapers did not carry stories of annoyed parents, teachers or 
educational bodies at the time. The judgment did, however create some problems in 
the prisons. Namibia did not have enough institutions to keep all juveniles out of the 
prisons, a disadvantage raised by counsel during the trial. Consequently, juvenile 
offenders who could not be placed in a juvenile reformatory, were bound to spend 
time in prison. 
 The backlash against the decision only came in the late 1990’s. In July 1999 
The Namibian carried a story of the return of corporal punishment to some schools in 
the north.383  In March 1998 The Namibian reported on alleged corporal punishment 
and assault of learners at the Baumgartsbrunn Private Junior Secondary School.384 
 In October 2000, the Minister of Women Affairs and Child Welfare, Netumbo 
Nandi-Ndaitwah, blamed “too much human rights” for messing up the country, and 
the abolition of corporal punishment for the indiscipline in schools.385 
However, there has never been an attempt to turn the clock back on corporal 
punishment in the schools or the justice system. 
 
5.7.2   Traditional Authorities 
 Traditional authorities made a strong point against the judgment. They felt 
marginalized after independence. Before independence the South African 
government and especially the army, managed to win the loyalty of most tribal 
councils. They received generous financial assistance and respect from the 
government.  
Several chiefs served in the second tier governments.386 SWAPO saw them 
as traitors at the time.387  
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 Shortly before independence rumours circulated that SWAPO planned to 
abandon traditional authorities because of their suspect role in the colonial era.388 
However, once in government, they realized that the authorities were extremely 
influential and popular amongst the people. The government then introduced a 
system of recognizing authorities with whom they were willing to work. The 
recognized authorities received some compensation from the government, but not 
close to the royal compensation of the colonial era.389 
 The traditional courts received judicial recognition in the Constitution. It 
recognises both common law and customary law as a valid legal system in an 
independent Namibia.390 Consequently, the customary courts maintained their rights 
to hear cases and give judgments on the basis of their own customary law.  
In S v Sipula391 the accused, a tribal policeman, was found guilty of assault 
with the intent to do grievous bodily harm in the Magistrates Court after executing an 
order of a tribal court which had imposed a sentence of corporal punishment. 
The High Court set the judgment and sentence aside. It, however, did not 
make a ruling on the question whether Ex Parte Attorney General, Namibia: In re 
Corporal Punishment by Organs of State392 - founding corporal punishment by state 
organs unconstitutional - was binding on traditional authorities and traditional courts.  
The Court nevertheless discussed the issue. While the Court stated that the 
mentioned case did not necessarily declare corporal punishment in customary law 
unconstitutional, the Court, without deciding, assumed that the case was indeed 
binding on traditional courts and traditional authorities. The Court argued that it is not 
clear that traditional courts or traditional authorities are organs of the state. 
The obiter dictum of the Court is difficult to understand. The corporal 
punishment case dealt with three basic issues: corporal punishment in the judgments 
of the Namibian courts, corporal punishment in prisons, and corporal punishment by 
teachers in Namibian schools. If customary law is a Namibian legal system in terms of 
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Article 66, the community courts or traditional courts cannot be anything but organs of 
the state and part of the corpus of Namibian courts. 
 
5.7.3  Comments 
The initial liaises faire attitude of the Namibian people and the later fierce 
reaction against the Corporal Punishment judgment makes sense if one analyses 
judgment in its historical context. The colonial government and the traditional 
authorities often used force, and more specifically corporal punishment, against its 
political enemies.393 The humiliation of adults receiving corporal punishment in the 
Magistrates Court for minor offences also discredited the application of corporal 
punishment after independence. 
In his consenting judgment, Judge Berker mentioned the possibility that 
corporal punishment may be reconsidered for juvenile offenders. The decay of the 
circumstances in the holding cells of the police and the shortage of correctional 
institutions for juveniles revived the discussion on corporal punishment as an 
alternative for sending juveniles to prison in letters to newspapers and commentary 
on national radio talk shows. However, the government never gave any indication 
during the first fourteen years of nationhood that it considers bringing corporal 
punishment back for juveniles convicted in criminal courts. 
The activism of the traditional authorities lies on a different level. It has to do 
with their understanding of their roles as custodians of their traditions and their 
authority as supreme leaders of their communities. Their requests for the return of 
corporal punishment in the community courts have not lead to any serious debate. 
 
5.8 Interpreting the Independence of the Prosecutor-General in Independent 
Namibia 
The Namibian Constitution introduced a constitutional dispensation where a 
new Office, the Prosecutor-General, is responsible for prosecutions. (Article 88). 
Article 140 (2) states that- 
..any reference to the Attorney-General in legislation in force 
immediately prior to the date of Independence shall be deemed 
to be a reference to the Prosecutor-General, who shall exercise 
his or her functions in accordance with this Constitution. 
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 However, the Constitution did not introduce a mere a name change for an old 
office. It also created a new Office of the Attorney General (AG).394 The AG follows 
the pattern of Britain and Wales. The AG “exercises the final responsibility for the 
office of the PG”395 and is “in principal legal adviser to the President and 
Government.396 He is also responsible for the protection and upholding of the 
Constitution.397  
 There is also a difference between the appointment of the PG and the AG. 
The President appoints the AG in accordance with the provisions of Article 32.398 
Article 32 (3) (1) provides for the appointment of   the Prime Minister, Ministers and 
Deputy-Ministers,  the AG, the Director-General of the Planning Commission “and 
any other person or persons who are required by any other provision of this 
Constitution or any other law to be appointed by the President”. Although the 
Constitution nowhere states that the Attorney General is part of the Cabinet, his/her 
appointment correlates with that of members of cabinet and the Constitution deals 
with the appointment in the same article as that of members of cabinet. 
The “President appoints the PG on the recommendation of the Judicial 
Service Commission,399 similar to the appointment of judges400 and the 
Ombudsman.401 It is clear that the PG is a quasi-judicial appointee, while the AG is a 
political appointee. By creating the two posts, the Constituent Assembly made a 
distinction between the political official and the PG as a free agent.  
In 1997 after the death of the first Ombudsman, the President appointed the 
then acting Ombudsman, Adv. Kasutu, as Ombudsman without waiting for a 
recommendation from the Judicial Service Commission. After a massive uproar from 
both the public and the judicial profession, the President withdrew the appointment 
and later appointed Adv. Bience Gawannas at the recommendation of the Judicial 
Service Commission.  
 In terms of Article 85 of the Constitution the  Judicial Service Commission 
shall consist of the Chief Justice, a judge appointed by the President (not necessary 
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the Judge President of the High Court), the AG and two representatives  from the 
legal profession. The only political figure on the Judicial Service Commission is the 
AG. Political manoeuvring will be extremely difficult, especially since two different 
organisations, the Law Society and the Namibia Law Association nominates the 
representatives of the profession.  
 Thus, unlike South Africa, where the majority of the members of the Judicial 
Service Commission are members of Parliament, the Namibian Judicial Service 
Commission has only one politician in its ranks. Where politicians are the majority in 
the JSC and the ruling party has a substantial majority, the appointments of the 
committee can be compromised by political bias appointments. This is highly unlikely 
in Namibia.402 
 
5.8.1  The Historical Independence of the Prosecutor-General 
Until 1977, the South West African legal system maintained an element of 
independence and self-determination. Statutes of the South African Parliament did 
not become effective in South West Africa if it was not explicitly made applicable in 
the Act itself. Further, the Legislative Assembly of South West Africa and after 1978, 
the Transitional Government of National Unity had some legislative powers, though 
subjected to South African control.403 
The implementation of criminal procedure legislation is a point in case of 
South West Africa maintaining an element of peculiarity and independence from 
South Africa. When South Africa took over the administration of South West Africa in 
1918, the prevailing South African common law was made applicable in South West 
Africa. From then the greatest majority of South African laws were also made 
applicable to South West Africa over a period.  
                                            
402
This does not mean that no one can manipulate the Judicial Service Commission for political gain. 
However, the composition of the Commission makes it difficult. The fact that two members are judges 
and two others nominated by the profession creates checks that will make manipulation by the only 
political appointee, the Attorney General, very difficult.     
403
After 1978 South Africa accepted Resolution 345 in principle, it introduced two new structures of 
Government in South West Africa/Namibia, a South African Administrator-General (AG) with 
executive powers and later, in June 1985, a transitional government of national unity. Between 1985 
and 1989, the RSA government transferred several ministries from the South African authority to the 
authority of the Transitional Government and the AG. The transferred powers took away the 
legislative powers of the South African Parliament.   
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 Prior to the formation of the Union of South Africa, the prosecuting authority, 
at least in Transvaal, vested absolutely in the Attorney General.404  With the 
formation of the Union of South Africa section 139 of the South African Act of 1909 
confirmed the independence of the prosecuting authorities. 
Prosecutions in South West Africa were in the hands of the Attorney General 
of South West Africa. Like his South African counterpart, the South West African AG 
was independent and free from political oversight. The Administrator of South West 
Africa issued Proclamation 5 of 1918 to make the Criminal Procedure and Evidence 
Act of 1917 effective in the Protectorate of South West Africa, with minor special 
conditions. The special conditions of the Proclamation did not affect the 
independence of the office. 
Thus, initially the prosecuting authorities in both South Africa and South West 
Africa had absolute autonomy and were free from political control. However, in 1926 
the paths parted.  The South African Criminal and Magistrates’ Courts Procedure 
Amendment Act405 placed the AG’s under the control and directions of the minister. 
For the next fifty-one years, the South African prosecutorial authority was under 
executive control, while the South West African authority remained autonomous. 
On 22 July 1977, the AG of South West Africa lost his/her autonomy when the 
new Criminal Procedure Act,406 was made applicable in South West Africa. Section 
3(5) of the said Act made political control mandatory.  From 22 July 1977, the AG of 
South West Africa was in the same subservient position than his/her South African 
counterparts. Although the consecutive South African governments seldom 
respected the political integrity of South West Africa, the legislature acknowledged 
the integrity of the prosecuting authority until 1977.  
 The philosophy underlying the previous distinction between South Africa and 
South West Africa was bases on an acknowledgment that South West Africa 
(Namibia) is not part of South Africa. As a Mandate C territory, a South African 
minister could not control the AG.  With Act 51 of 1977, the last bastion of judicial 
independence was taken away from the people of Namibia or. In the period following 
the implementation of political authority and control from South Africa over the South 
West African AG, the minister of justice did not hesitate to use his authority when he 
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deemed it necessary. With the escalation of the liberation struggle, and the growing 
presence of the Defence Force in Namibia, the control of the prosecuting authority 
was part of a process of South African control. 
  
5.8.2  The Independence of the Prosecutor-General vis-à-vis the                       
Attorney-General 
 The fact that the AG and PG were vaguely based on the English system 
without the specific boundaries of the two positions being spelled out, soon lead to 
intense conflict between the two Offices, which was eventually settled by the 
Supreme Court.407 The conflict centred on the function of the AG to “exercise the 
final responsibility for the office of the Prosecutor-General”. The conflict had a strong 
social dimension.  At independence there were no black prosecutors in managerial 
positions, the AG – the equivalent of the PG in a democratic Namibia – and his 
deputy were seconded South Africans who left the country, all the judges were white 
and male and there were two black legal practitioners, one lawyer and one advocate. 
Transformation of the judiciary was high on the government’s priority list, but with 
little chance to bring about immediate change.  
Even the hands of the President were tied. As noted above, the PG is 
appointed by the President at the recommendation of the Judicial Service 
Commission (JTC). Without questioning the integrity of anyone serving on the JTC at 
the time, the racial demographics tell it all. The Constitution did not leave much 
leeway for the JTC or the President to make a transformative appointment. In terms 
of the constitutionally prerequisites the PG must: 
88(1)(a) possesses  legal qualifications that would entitle him or 
her to practise in all Courts of Namibia: 
(b)... by virtue of his or her experience, conscientiousness and 
integrity a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the 
responsibilities of the Office of the Prosecutor-General 
 
As we noted, black lawyers were almost non-existent and there were not 
many black prosecutors – none in managerial positions. The Office of the 
Prosecutor-General has been a contentious issue from the outset and the 
appointment of the first PG was a cause of disagreement. The last AG of South West 
Africa/Namibia, Estienne Pretorius and his senior deputy, Tielman Roos, were both 
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Ex Parte: Attorney-General. In re: The Constitutional Relationship Between The Attorney-General 
And The Prosecutor-General.1998 NR 282 (SC) (1). 
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South Africans seconded to Namibia. At independence, they both opted to return to 
South Africa.  
The President appointed the only Namibian in the top management of the 
prosecutorial authority, Hans Heyman, Acting Prosecutor-General almost by default.  
For the sake of stability of the legal system, the President opted for an acting 
Prosecutor-General possibly to give the JTC time to consider a permanent 
appointment.408 Given the staff component of the Office of the Prosecutor-General, 
the absence of black lawyers in Namibia at the time and the composition of the JSC, 
the eventual appointment of Heyman as the first Prosecutor-General of Namibia was 
expected. Although he was not the exact role model for the post (middle-aged white 
male, conservative, part of the management of the pre-independent dispensation) 
the appointment was generally accepted.  The government had the consolation that 
the AG had final responsibility over the Office and as such at least some authority 
over the deliberations thereof.  
The government obviously expected the Office of the AG to drive 
transformation. The AG is, as noted above, a political appointee and member of the 
cabinet. The first AG, Mr. Hartmut Ruppel, was a member of the SWAPO Party 
Central Committee and before 1990, a prominent member of the internal wing of the 
Party. He was also a respected member of the legal fraternity. 
The AG took his role as the final responsibility of the Office of the PG serious. 
He appointed members of the PG’s office to sit on several commissions, requested 
the PG to provide him with police dockets of pending cases and eventually took 
control of the decision to prosecute or not. 409  In a dragging case of Racial 
Discrimination against the public broadcaster, the Namibian Broadcasting 
Corporation (NBC), the conflict came to a clash.   The AG informed the PG that he 
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The deliberations of the Judicial Service Commission took place behind closed doors and the 
minutes of the Commission is not accessible by the public. Consequently, one can only guess why 
the President appointed an acting Prosecutor-General, why the Commission did not advertise the 
post or head hunted a PG from the ranks of practising lawyers and advocates.  
409
In the Heads of Argument on Behalf of the Prosecutor-General (p. 119 ff.),  counsel quotes a letter 
of the PG to the JSC on 27 March 1992, after the AG has laid a complaint of insubordination against 
the Prosecutor-General. The PG complains among other things that his staff receive instructions from 
the Office of the Attorney-General without his knowledge, that advocates in his office are appointed as 
investigators, which he considers to be undesirable and that he considers an instruction from the AG 
to withdraw a specific case as an attempt to defeat the ends of justice. (Heads of Argument, p.120 ff.) 
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has decided that prosecution should be withdrawn.410 The PG informed the AG on 
the same day that he did not regard himself bound by the instruction.411 
 After deliberations in the High Court, the AG brought a petition to the 
Supreme Court in terms of Section 15(1) of the Supreme Court Act412 to determine 
the essence of prosecutorial independence and the relationship between the two 
offices. 
If transformative constitutionalism is the objective and one considers the pre-
independent history of the prosecutorial authority, or the ideological framework under 
which it operated, it seems as if strong leadership from the AG’s office was a 
prerequisite for change. The colonial authority operated under apartheid laws, was 
stigmatised by so-called anti-terrorist legislation. To make sure that the prosecutorial 
authority conforms, the Criminal Procedure Act413 allowed the minister of justice to 
take over prosecutions if he/she is not satisfied with the prosecutor’s “independent 
decision”. If the minister missed something, the Defence Act allowed the State 
President to intervene and stop any prosecution against a member of the police or 
defence force for acts committed in the operational area,414 and if some sinister 
murder was committed outside the operational area, the President could 
retrospectively declare that area by proclamation part of the operational area.415 
As a practical consideration, one may well ask if it is logical to allow the 
prosecutors of the old order or the whites-only JSC to take the final decision in a new 
era.416 Considering the role of personalities in legal processes, as the American 
Realists417 has pointed out, one may well ask which of the incumbents will be able to 
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Whether the Attorney-General, in pursuance of Article 87 of the Constitution and in the exercise of the 
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foster transformation from the handmaiden of an oppressive regime to an 
independent prosecutorial authority with a human face: A Namibian state advocate 
who worked all is life for the South African ministry of justice and prosecuted under 
the offensive and oppressive states of emergencies or a human rights lawyer who 
himself was detained under the oppressive legislation for fighting for an independent 
Namibia?   
Looking from this perspective Ruppel’s action to get a firm grip on the office of 
the PG seems to be in line with his function.418 However, instead of keeping the 
moral high ground in the arguments, the AG’s legal team opted to claim the powers 
of the apartheid minister of justice as proclaimed in section 5(5) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, for the AG in a constitutional democracy.419 The PG adopted the 
stance that the real question that needs to be answered is: Is the Prosecutor-
General truly independent under the Constitution? His legal team then made the 
question a rule of law issue. 
The judgment was written by Acting Supreme Court Judge Leon, from South 
Africa and concurred by Judges Mohamed and Acting Judge Dumbutshena. The 
Supreme Court weighed question of the PG against the two presumptions of the AG: 
- That Section 3 of the CPA still applies to Namibia; and  
- that the words final responsibility also implies final authority to make final 
decisions on prosecutions. 
The Court quoted the well-known S v Acheson420 and S v Van Wyk approvingly: 
I know of no other Constitution in the world that seeks to identify 
a legal ethos against apartheid with greater vigour and 
intensity.421 
 
The Court also approved the method of interpretation followed in the Minister 
of Defence, Namibia v Mwandinghi and Ex Parte: Attorney General. In re: Corporal 
Punishment.  In the light of the above and in the light of the fact that the Namibian 
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constitution contains a declaration of Fundamental Human Rights that must be 
protected, the Court made the following observation: 
 I do not believe that allowing a political appointee to dictate 
what prosecutions may be initiated, which should be terminated 
or how they should be conducted can protect those rights and 
freedoms. Nor do I believe that that would be in accordance with 
the ideals and aspirations of the Namibian people or in any way 
represent an articulation of its values.422 
 
The Court also concluded that there is no reason for a conflict between an 
independent PG and an AG that has final responsibility. Final responsibility means 
more than financial responsibility, and includes his duty to keep to the President, the 
Executive and the Legislature informed on work of the PG.423 
The Court discussed the whole issue of a Rechtsstaat and concluded that 
Namibia with its new constitution and its fundamental adherence to the Declaration 
of Human Rights complies with a modern Rectsstaat where state authority commits 
itself to a set of higher juridical norms (Grundsätze).424 In the same way, the South 
African apartheid regime was not a Rechtsstaat. 
The judgment was a big blow for the government. Firstly, the PG, who was not 
a politician and accountable to the judicial service commission, now had enough 
power to prevent the government from radically change the prosecutorial approach 
of the former regime. 
In its own presentation before the Court, the AG emphasized the fact that only 
the government had the political will and the moral high ground to introduce a 
prosecutorial approach that will end the inequalities of the past and restore the 
people’s trust in the judicial process.  
The Prosecutor-General could use his constitutional victory in the Supreme 
Court, to portray his struggle as a legitimate struggle for a constitutional state (or a 
Rechtsstaat) where the people are governed by a constitution and human rights 
principles rather than by humans in a parliamentarian democracy where the people 
are governed by the whims and moods of humans. However, the Rechtsstaat-
approach was never visible in the prosecutorial philosophy (or approach in so far as 
there was an identifiable philosophy).  
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While one has to applaud the young Namibia for taking prosecutions out of 
the political arena, it also had its negative side: The result was that the government, 
and especially the AG, had no power to implement a prosecuting philosophy with a 
human face. The Supreme Court  ensured that the Constitutional values and spirit 
was protected, even if it benefitted the enemies of the state (Acheson) or a stubborn 
middle-aged white male from the previous dispensation (the newly appointed 
PG).Yet the reactions of the populist SWAPO Party cadres were reasonably mild in 
comparison with the later actions against the PG.  
 
5.8.3  A Different Approach: The Supreme Court was wrong425 
 Not everyone in the legal fraternity agreed with the Supreme Court judgment. 
Despite the conclusion of the Court that there is no uniformity in the Commonwealth, 
the dissenters believe that the AG has final responsibility in deciding on 
prosecutions.  
 It is possible that the South African situation, especially the interference of the 
state in prosecution influenced the thinking of the Court. This historical reality may be 
important in interpretation, but it should not contradict the clear wording of a 
constitution. While the Court took cognisance of the historical enviroNMent of the 
Constitution, it went too far. 
 It is not possible to have final responsibility for the office of the PG and 
exclude one of the main functions of the office:  The decision to prosecute or decline 
to prosecute. To prevent the AG to execute such function, the PG becomes the only 
constitutional office that is not accountable to Parliament. 
 Uuanivi also raised this issue in a different context in a LLM thesis at the 
University of Namibia. Uuanivi pointed out that the PG is the only functionary of the 
State that is not subjected to judicial review.426  The first PG, Hans Heymann, was of 
the opinion that the right to a fair trial and the right of appeal are sufficient checks 
and balances in cases where the PG decides to prosecute. The right to institute 
private prosecutions once the PG declines to prosecute, is another check to the 
powers of the prosecutorial authority. 
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 There are, however, several problems with what Uuanivi called authoritarian 
prosecution.  For one, the PG does not give reasons for his/her decisions to decline 
prosecutions.  This makes it extremely difficult for the professional legal practitioners 
to determine if there is a prima face case.  Secondly, the PG may take over the 
private prosecution at any stage.  
Financial considerations are however, the main reason for placing private 
prosecutions outside the reach of most aggrieved complaints. The Criminal 
Procedure Act provides that a private prosecutor must provide security before he/she 
can start a prosecution. 
 Constitutional experts generally see prosecution as an executive function. The 
Ex Parte AG/PG case places prosecution outside the functions of the executive and 
not under the authority of the Chief Justice.  Consequently, it is neither an executive 
nor a judicial function.  This leaves the office accountable to no one. The solution 
can be found in the other constitutional office, the Ombudsman.  The Ombudsperson 
is not accountable to any Ministry, although it falls under The Ministry of Justice for 
administrative purposes, mainly because the AG’s office did not have its own 
administrative officers.  The Ombudsperson presents his/her reports directly to 
Parliament. The Ombudsperson and the PG can be seen as sui generis 
Constitutional Offices. If the PG complies with the suggestion of the Court and keeps 
the AG informed of all sensitive cases, the AG can develop a process of 
accountability. 
 The battle between the AG and the PG raises the question as to where 
transformative constitutionalism is to be found.  Is the Supreme Court judgment an 
example of transformative constitutionalism?  Did it establish a strong foundation for 
an independent prosecutorial authority based on the expectation of the Rule of Law 
or did it prevent a progressive new government from transforming the old 
prosecutorial authority closely related to the authoritarian state? 
 Proponents on both sides of the debate claim that their positions were based 
on the ideals of transformative constitutionalism. The personalities involved made 
the issue even more difficult to evaluate.  Hans Heyman was a prosecutor from the 
old dispensation.  He had no history of being sensitive to human rights issue.  When 
the activists and practitioners started taking constitutional issues to court, the PG 
vigorously opposed it. 
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 Mr Ruppel, on the other hand was an elected member of the Constituent 
Assembly and the National Assembly of Namibia.  He had a history as a human 
rights activist.  His motives and seriousness in wanting to transform prosecutions are 
beyond reproach.  If anyone, Mr. Ruppel had the credentials and background to 
transform prosecution. The problem with the AG’s argument in court was possibly his 
reliance on the powers of the South African minister of justice in the pre-
independence period. The abuse of the South African government and specifically 
that of the minister of justice is well documented. The Supreme Court saw the 
necessity to delink the prosecutorial authority from political control.  The judgment 
possibly served transformative constitutionalism in the long run.   
5.8.4  The Prosecutor-General as an Independent Office 
               The judgment in the Ex Parte AG/PG case was not good news for the 
government.  The approach of the first AG was a clear indication that government 
wanted a strong member of Cabinet who could transform the prosecutorial policies of 
the past. Mr. Ruppel was the right person to be in control of such a process. 
There is no reason to question the bona fides of Mr Ruppel or the 
government, for that matter. The PG was a senior official in the Office of the Attorney 
General (the equivalent of the post-independence PG), he prosecuted several 
members of government under the notorious security legislation of the colonial 
regime and most of his staff members served in the old dispensation, as did the vast 
majority of  the investigation officers in the Namibian Police. 
One of the means open for the AG to execute change was to make sure that 
the right people are appointed. However, as I will point out, the PG believed that the 
Office could only be independent if the prosecutors are not public servants. The AG 
never confronted Heyman on this issue.  
A mutual understanding developed between the PG and the administrative 
functionary of the AG, the Permanent Secretary of Justice. The PG appointed staff 
members de facto and the Permanent Secretary performed the administrative duties 
(giving the new staff members contracts, arranging for medical insurance, etc.). Even 
when staff members complained about transfers, the Permanent Secretary 
answered letters, but always written by the PG.427 
                                            
427
The author worked in the office for several years. Confidentiality prevents me from quoting 
examples. However, I was appointed after an interview with the Prosecutor-General, and I believe 
 144 
While the criticism of Heyman abounded throughout his term of office, he 
managed to strike a balance between male and female prosecutors. He appointed 
several blacks. He was nevertheless criticised for maintaining a predominant white 
staff, deploying only a few junior black female prosecutors as tokens in the High 
Court.428 
One of the underlying problems is the relationship between the Office of the 
AG and the Ministry of Justice. While the AG was a new constitutional office, the 
Ministry was an inheritance of the previous dispensation.  However, the division of 
labour between the offices were blurred. Initially the Office of the AG did not have its 
own administrative staff. At the beginning of the term of President Pohamba, the 
same person occupied the Offices of AG and Minister of Justice. In the last year of 
the President’s first term  he assigned ministerial positions to two persons. 
One of the unanswered questions is the position of prosecutions in the 
framework of the separation of powers. The Court did not specifically address the 
issue of the place of prosecutions as such. Yet it linked the Office of the Prosecutor-
General closely to the judiciary.  The PG, like the judiciary, derives his/her 
independence from the same basic understanding of their offices and independent 
entities.  
While the Supreme Court did not say the prosecutorial office is part of the 
judiciary, it nevertheless is closer to the judiciary. The legal fraternity does not accept 
this interpretation. Neither is the emphasis on independence shared by all. Even the 
Namibian Constitution does not use the word independence as such. 
 
5.8.5 South Africa: a short comparison 
South Africa took a very different approach. The final constitution is somewhat 
ambiguous. On the one hand, it dictates “[n]ational legislation must ensure that the 
prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice,”429 
while on the other, it regulates that the “Cabinet member responsible for the 
                                                                                                                                       
without going through the procedures of the Public Service Commission. When the Prosecutor-
General transferred me to Katima Mulilo, my letter of complaint was answered by the Permanent 
Secretary. The language and style was clearly that of the Prosecutor-General. Similar cases abound 
in the office during my time of my employment. 
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males. The number of white and black prosecutors in the High Court was always fairly balanced. 
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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996), section 179(4). 
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administration of justice must exercise final responsibility over the prosecuting 
authority”.430 
There is a subtle yet important difference between the wording in section 
179(6) of the South African Constitution and Article 87(a) of the Namibian 
Constitution. The South African minister executes final responsibility over the 
prosecuting authority, while the Namibian AG exercises the final responsibility for the 
office of the Prosecutor-General. The synonyms of the authoritative preposition over 
do not include the preposition for. Instead, most standard Thesauri use  phrases 
such as in excess of and on top of, and more than, greater than, larger than, above, 
more and on. Synonyms of the preposition for include:  
- intended for,  
- in favour of,  
- on behalf of,  
- in lieu of,  
- in place of,  
- instead of,  
- representing,  
- in support of, and pro. 
None of the synonyms of for carries the authoritative, commanding meaning of 
the preposition over. 
Since the South African Constitution was written after the Namibian Supreme 
Court case, one can assume that the drafters considered the Namibian option, but 
decided to stay closer to the wording of the notorious section 3(5) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1977, Act 51 of 1977: 
An Attorney-General shall exercise his authority and perform his 
functions under this Act or under any other law subject to the 
control and directions of the Minister, who may reverse any 
decision arrived at by an Attorney-General and may himself in 
general or in any specific matter exercise any part of such 
authority and perform any of such functions. 
 
While South Africa repealed section 3(5), and although the words control and 
direction do not appear in the Constitution, the element of political control remained 
in the Constitution. The Constitution did away with the minister’s right to take over 
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the functions of the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), but the minister 
maintained strong control over the prosecutorial authority.  
The broken relationship between President Mbeki and the first NDPP, Adv. 
Pikoli, became a test for the NDPP’s independence. When Adv. Wim Trengrove, 
advocate for suspended National Director of Public Prosecutions, cross-examined 
the then Deputy Minister of Justice, Johnny de Lange, the latter stated that political 
control was indeed built into subsection 179(6).431 De Lange called the South African 
minister of justice and constitutional development agree the “champion” of the 
NDPP, adding that – 
 [w]e tried to create a structure where the NPA and the 
executive work closely together, with, of course, a degree of 
autonomy.432 
 
The independence further differs from the Namibian PG in that the President 
appoints the NDPP. As noted above, in the Ex Parte: Attorney-General case, the 
Namibian Supreme Court pointed out that direct presidential appointments were an 
indication of executive functionality. This is also true of the South African 
Constitution. The South African president without consultation or recommendation 
from any constitutional body appoints the deputy president, ministers and deputy 
ministers.433 
The president, however, appoints judges in South Africa, after consultation, 
upon recommendation, or on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission or the 
political parties represented in the National Assembly, depending on the specific 
court.434 The South African president appoints the Public Protector and Auditor-
General as well as members of the South African Human Rights Commission, the 
Commission for Gender Equality, and the Electoral Commission at the 
recommendation of the National Assembly.435 Thus, in the South African 
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Constitution, the NDPP finds him-/herself categorised with the cabinet and deputy 
ministers, rather than with the judges and the section 193 constitutional bodies. 
The South African position is not exceptional. In the Commonwealth, the AG 
often wears two hats. It is not exceptional for the AG to have the final say in 
prosecutions and to serve in cabinet as well.436 
 At the certification of the constitution of South Africa was certified, someone 
complained that the independence of the NDPP is compromised since the president 
as head of the executive appoints him/her.437  It was argued that –438 
… the provisions of NT 179 do not comply with CP VI, which 
requires a separation of powers between the Legislature, 
Executive and Judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances 
to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. 
 
The Constitutional Court was not impressed with the argument, however:439 
There is no substance in this contention. The prosecuting 
authority is not part of the Judiciary and CP VI has no 
application to it. In any event, even if it were part of the 
Judiciary, the mere fact that the appointment of the head of the 
national prosecuting authority is made by the President does not 
in itself contravene the doctrine of separation of powers. 
 
The position of the Constitutional Court on this point is clear: Public 
prosecutions are not a judicial function. If the prosecutorial function of the state is not 
part of the judicial functions, and the South African president appoints the NDPP as 
head of the national executive, there can be no doubt, where the prosecutorial 
function of the state fits into the puzzle of the three powers of the state: prosecution 
is part of the executive functions. 
This contention is strengthened by the fact that the NDPP is obliged to 
determine prosecution policy “with the concurrence of the Cabinet member 
responsible for the administration of justice,”440 and the minister of justice and 
constitutional development “must exercise final responsibility over the prosecuting 
authority.”441 
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 During 2007/2008, the South African prosecutorial authority went through two 
crises. The detail of the crises falls outside the spectre of this study. A short 
summary of the outcome demonstrates the consequences of a prosecutorial 
authority operating as part of the executive functions of the State. 
 
5.8.6 The Pikoli and Simelane saga  
The Pikoli saga is a good example of the vulnerability of the South African 
NDPP. His/her Namibian counterpart can only be suspended on the 
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. The South African president 
may provisionally suspend the NDPP pending a final decision by that country’s 
Parliament.442 The then South African President Thabo Mbeki suspended NDPP 
Adv. Vusi Pikoli and appointed his deputy, Mokotedi Mpshe, as acting NDPP. 
According to the official communiqué of the President’s office, the president 
suspended Pikoli was because of “an irretrievable breakdown in the working 
relationship” between the National Prosecuting Authority chief and the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development, Brigitte Mabandla.443 
Neither the Constitution nor the National Prosecuting Authority Act,444 mention 
a prerequisite relationship of trust between the minister and the NDPP for the 
functioning of the National Prosecuting Authority. Further, a breakdown of 
relationships is not listed in the said Act as a ground for suspension. Consequently, 
the government submitted new allegations and reasons to the Ginwala Commission, 
appointed to decide on the matter of the National Director’s suspension. 
Dr. Frank Chikane, Director-General in the presidency, alleged that Pikoli’s 
bad management of politically sensitive cases was the reason for his suspension. 
The Director-General of the Department of Justice, Menzi Simelane alleged that the 
NDPP had failed to report to him. In a strange interpretation of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act and the Constitution, Simelane believed that the final 
responsibility for the National Prosecuting Authority lay with the Director-General.  
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He maintained this view before the Ginwala Commission, despite having 
received a legal opinion to the effect that his responsibility was restricted to financial 
matters.445 Deputy Minister De Lange raised the issue of plea bargains as the reason 
for the suspension,446 while the National Intelligence Agency Director-General 
Manala Manzini maintained it was Pikoli’s handling of the intelligence clearance of 
his staff  and other aspects of national security that made the incumbent National 
Director incompetent and, therefore, unsuitable for the position.447 
Pikoli believed that the real reason for his suspension was to protect the 
Police Commissioner, Jackie Selebi. During the Ginwala inquiry, it transpired that the 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development had written a letter to Pikoli only 
four days before his suspension. In the letter, the Minister had instructed the NDPP 
not to arrest Selebi until she had seen all the evidence against Selebi and was 
satisfied with it. Pikoli’s lawyers, however, said he could not obey an unlawful and 
unconstitutional instruction: only the NDPP could decide on prosecutions, Pikoli 
maintained.448 
While the Ginwala Commission exonerated Pokoli of any wrongdoing, the new 
president removed Pikoli from office. The Ginwala Report is extremely critical of the 
evidence given on behalf of the then President Mbeki. Adv Simelane, the 
Commission found, was untrustworthy and openly lied in his evidence. 
The judgment of the Constitutional Court, stating that the presidential 
appointment of the NDPP did not undermine the independence of the judiciary and 
that the NDPP did not have to be independent since prosecution was an executive 
function, is the underlying reason for the confusion in the Pikoli case. The minister 
and even the director-general of the Justice Department believed they could control 
the National Prosecuting Authority. 
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Even more dramatic was the obiter dictum of Justice Nicholson to an 
application by ANC president Jacob Zuma in the High Court of Kwazulu-Natal.449  
Zuma stood accused of corruption in a case that was about to start. In an application 
before the said court, Zuma asked the court to declare the decisions by the NDPP to 
prosecute him and the indictment against him invalid, and to set the indictment 
aside. 
Zuma’s application was based on technical errors by the prosecution, 
particularly their failure to comply with a provision in the Constitution450 to give the 
suspect an opportunity to make submissions before a decision is taken to prosecute. 
Zuma nevertheless submitted that there was a conspiracy in government to prevent 
him from becoming the next president of South Africa and, consequently, irregular 
political pressure on three consequent successive National Directors to prosecute 
him.451 
The NDPP requested the High Court to strike out the allegations of political 
interference in the case. Referring to the questionable role of the minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development throughout the Zuma case and in the suspension of 
Pikoli, the court found that there was indeed political interference. In this regard, the 
court made the following comment:452 
There is a distressing pattern in the behaviour which I have set 
out above, that is indicative of political interference, pressure or 
influence. 
 
The court was extremely suspicious of the role played by the minister of 
justice and constitutional development in the whole process. While quoting the 
Constitutional Court’s reference to Ex Parte: Attorney-General In re: The 
Constitutional Relationship between the Attorney-General and the Prosecutor-
General,453 the court did not go into different approaches of the Constitutional 
Court’s statement, but found the presidential appointment of the NDPP 
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unacceptable. Neither did the court comment on the Constitutional Court’s assertion 
that prosecution is an executive function of government. 
However, the criticism of the role played by the executive in the Pikoli and 
Zuma cases is a clear and unequivocal indictment of the relationship between the 
president and the NDPP, created by the Constitution and approved by the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa. In a dramatic turn of events, the ANC leadership 
forced President Mbeki to resign because of the judgment.454 
The saga of the NDPP did not end there. Once in power President Zuma 
appointed the director-general of justice, Adv. Menzi Simelane, as the NDPP. Given 
the negative comments of the Ginwala Commission and his lack of experience, the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) launched an application in Constitutional Court, 
questioning the constitutional correctness of his appointment. The Constitutional 
Court found in favour of the DA. Simelane, they found, was not a fit and proper 
person in terms of the Constitution. 
Looking at the negative results of the political influence on the prosecutorial 
authority in the appointment of Adv. Simelane and other obnoxious cases, De Vos 
commented- 
Remember the firing of Vusi Pikoli on spurious grounds and the 
appointment of Menzi Simelane as new NDPP, despite the fact 
that the latter had an adventurous relationship to the truth, 
having previously been found to have misled not only our courts 
but also a formal inquiry appointed by the President? Remember 
the mysterious dropping of charges of fraud and corruption 
against ANC high flyers... 
Would any of these decisions have been made if the NPA had 
not been captured politically and if some appointments to the 
NPA had not been made on the basis of political loyalty instead 
of on the basis of suitability for the job?455 
 
5.8.7  Concluding Remarks on the Case 
There are several differences between South African and Namibia. South 
Africa has a minister of justice with a defined function and a powerful director-
general, but no office of an attorney-general. The role of the minister of justice in 
Namibia is undefined. The AG takes administrative responsibility for the PG’s office, 
                                            
454
The President offered his resignation on 21 September 2008, and the ANC structures elected an 
interim State President on 25 September 2008. President Mbeki did not appeal.  
455
De Vos, P. 2012 NPA Problems Part of Larger One Party Dominant Pathology, Constitutionally 
Speaking, blog of Pierre de Vos, 5 September 2012. 
 
 152 
the Chief Justice controls the functions of the superior courts (with assistance from 
the judge president in the High Court), the Magistrates Commission controls the 
activities of magistrates in the lower courts and the Ministry of Local Government 
and Housing takes responsibility for the community courts. In South Africa, the 
administrative responsibility for the NDPP lays with the minister of justice and a 
powerful director, in Namibia the Permanent Secretary of Justice acts as the 
functionary of the AG and the Minister and Ministry of Justice have no legal link with 
the PG.  
The big difference between the two seems to lie in the procedure of 
appointment. The Democratic Alliance case corrected the misunderstanding of the 
Certification case that the NDPP does not have to be independent. However, the fact 
that the President alone appoints the NDPP will remain a thorn in the flesh of an 
independent prosecutorial authority. There is logic in the argument that ‘final 
responsibility’ cannot linguistically be limited to administrative responsibility and a 
good relationship, especially if one operates from a hard positivist approach. 
However, the Supreme Court realised that an independent appointment procedure 
does not political exclude manipulation, if a political functionary has the final say to 
prosecute or not to prosecute. 
Taking cognisance of the personalities of the PG and the AG, their political 
history, sensitivities and human rights record into consideration the judgment of the 
Supreme Court did not assist transformation in the short term. If the AG had the 
powers to appoint the staff of the PG, develop a prosecutorial philosophy of change 
and firmly ground the office in a human rights approach, he would possibly have 
placed the transformation of the office on a fast track. Progressive legal practitioners 
could have been encouraged to join the Office, women and young black lawyers 
might have been part of management of the Office in bigger numbers and 
prosecutors would not have opposed all applications to declare obvious 
unconstitutional laws and sections of the Criminal Procedure Act unconstitutional. 
However, the developments in South Africa, and other jurisdictions456 in Africa 
are examples of the risks involved in a compromised judiciary or prosecutorial 
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authority. The narrow interpretation of final responsibility by the Supreme Court was 
a long-term guarantee against political interference. 
Two things seem clear from the discussion of the provisions of the South 
African NDPP: 
- While the South African Constitution repealed the notorious section 3(5) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, the influence of politicians – both the president 
and the minister of justice and constitutional development - have not been 
removed. The Constitution states that the prosecutorial function must be 
executed without prejudice, fear or favour. Yet, deputy minister Johnny de 
Lange was correct that the emphasis was on cooperation between the 
NDPP and the ministry of justice and Constitutional Development with a 
degree of autonomy given to the NDPP. Prosecution, according to the 
Constitutional Court, remains an executive function. 
- The Namibian Constitution provides for a fully independent functionary. 
The responsibility that the AG exercises expects nothing more of the PG 
than to inform the AG of sensitive cases and assigns the financial and 
administrative duties of the office to the political administration of the AG. 
The strong emphasis in Namibia on the independence of the PG since the Ex 
Parte: Attorney-General case will make it highly impossible for the President or the 
executive to interfere in prosecutorial decisions. This is not to say that government 
has attempted to influence the PG’s decisions, or that no such attempts will be made 
in future. It also does not guarantee politically free, objective legal decisions by the 
Office of the PG in future. Even the best system is dependent on people – and 
people are fallible. 
However, the Namibian Constitution and the Supreme Court jurisprudence 
have given the PG the power and authority to operate independently from executive 
interference. In this regard, the independence of the judiciary and the PG is 
guaranteed to make the final decision in all matters of law. This independence 
entails the heart of the transformation from a prosecutorial authority subordinated to 
the colonial government to an independent authority accountable only to the 
Constitution. 
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5.8.8 The Ongoing Issue of Independence: Are the Employees of the Office 
Prosecutor-General Public Servants? 
 Although the decision of the Supreme Court on the independence of the PG, 
removed the first uncertainty regarding the independence of the PG, it did not 
answer all the questions.  The PG does not have his own law in Namibia. Thus, the 
only sources of his/her functions are the Constitution, the Criminal Procedure Act, 
which is colonial South African legislation, and recent case law. 
 The President appoints the PG in the same manner as judges and the 
Ombudsman, and shares their salary scale and benefits.  The PG does not fall under 
the auspices of the Public Service Commission, but like judges and the 
Ombudsman, under the Judicial Service Commission.  
 However, whereas the Constitution clearly provides for the retirement age, 
removal from office, of the judges and the Ombudsman, it is quiet on the position of 
the Prosecutor-General. From the above it seems clear from both the Constitution 
and the judgment of the Court in Ex Parte: Attorney-General and Prosecutor-General 
that the PG is not a public servant.  This is also in line with his/her independence. 
Even if the independence of the PG is clear, the same is not true of his/her 
staff. It is not clear if Section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act is still valid in Namibia. 
Although the Supreme Court only dealt with Section 3(5) (the power of the minister 
over the PG) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the Prosecutor-General makes a case 
that the whole of sections 3 and 4 forms part of one corpus. Since section 3(5) was 
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court because its foundation lies in the old 
parliamentary order, and does not form part of the basic principles of a Rechtsstaat, 
the  rest of sections 3 and 4 are also unconstitutional and no longer binding. The 
Constitution elaborates extensively on the functions of the Prosecutor-General in 
Article 88 (2).457 Section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act regulates the delegation of 
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local public prosecutors.458 The first PG, Adv. Heyman, held the opinion that 
whereas sections 3 and 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act ruled and regulated the 
actions of the prosecuting authority in Namibia before independence, Article 88 of 
the Constitution repealed both sections.459 
 The Court explicitly stated Ex Parte AG. In Re: The Constitutional 
Relationship between the AG and the PG that the Constitution repealed section 3 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act. One cannot but conclude that it implicitly also includes 
section 4.  
 The PG refers to the American decision Gorham v Luckett, quoted in New 
Modderfontein Gold Mining Company v Transvaal Provincial Administration.460 
And if this last Act professes, or manifestly intends, to regulate 
the whole subject to which it relates, it necessarily supersedes 
and repeals all former Acts, so far as it differs from them in 
prescriptions. The great object, then, is to ascertain the true 
interpretation of the last Act. That being ascertained, the 
necessary consequence is that the legislative intention thus 
deduced from it must prevail over any prior inconsistent intention 
to be deduced from a previous Act. 
 
 Applying this case, the PG concluded that the discrepancies between sections 
3 and 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act and Article 88 of the Constitution, makes it 
impossible for sections 3 and 4 to remain in force.461 Section 4(a) gives the PG 
authority to delegate “any person to conduct any prosecution”, while section 4(b) 
gives him/her authority to appoint any “officer of the State” to act as public 
prosecutor to any lower court to institute and conduct any state prosecution on his 
behalf. 
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 The PG maintains that section 4 (a) refers to the High Court where the PG 
institutes prosecutions in his/her own name. Those delegated to appear on his/her 
behalf only need to be authorised to conduct proceedings.  Since the PG cannot be 
physically present in the lower courts across the country, he/she has to delegate 
lower court prosecutors to institute and conduct prosecutions in terms of section 4 
(b). 
 Article 88 (2) (d) of the Constitution which authorises the PG to “delegate 
other officials...... to conduct criminal proceedings in any court”, repeals section 4(a), 
but not 4(b), since it does not refer to the function of the lower court prosecutors to 
institute criminal proceedings. 
 The authority of the PG to delegate persons to institute and conduct criminal 
proceedings in the lower courts is according to this interpretation given by Article 
88(2) (c): “... to perform all functions relating to the exercise of such powers...” This 
Article, according to the PG, has replaced section 4 (b) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act. Thus, Prollius made the following observation concerning the appointment of 
public prosecutors: 
It is important to understand that once a person is appointed as 
a public prosecutor by the Prosecutor-General, authority to 
institute and/or conduct criminal proceedings is immediately 
delegated to that specific public prosecutor, hence the principal 
that delegation of such authority is inherent in an appointment 
as public prosecutor. 
..once the (Prosecutor-General) has appointed an officer of the 
State as public prosecutor, that officer becomes vested with the 
powers and duties appertaining to his post as public prosecutor 
in different statutory capacities.462 
 
 Further, Prollius pointed out that if the PG is independent and if the 
appointment of public prosecutors is an essential function of the Prosecutor-General, 
it follows that public prosecutors and deputy prosecutors-general cannot be public 
servants. Thus, section 5(1)  the Public Service Act463 giving the Prime Minister the 
authority to appoint, promote, transfer or discharge public servants on the 
recommendation of the Commission, does not apply to public prosecutors.464 
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 Since section 3(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act gives the Minister of 
Justice (possibly the AG in Namibia) the authority to appoint deputy prosecutors-
general, this section was also repealed by the Constitution. 
If a ‘political appointee cannot be allowed to dictate what 
prosecutions may be initiated, which should be terminated or 
how they should be conducted...” (Ex Parte Attorney-General, 
supra at p. 14), how can the appointment of those who 
prosecute under the direction of the Prosecutor-General, by a 
political appointee be justified?465 
 
 Not every observer or scholar agree with the interpretation of the late PG.  If 
the PG was correct in his interpretation, the powers and functions that go with the 
duties of the PG are all attributed to one person without any checks or balances.  
 The interpretation of the PG can be challenged on two points: 
1. The need for checks and balances; 
2. The explicit use of the word “official” in the Constitution. 
 
 The Minister of Justice made the following comment on the Offices of the PG 
and AG during the debates in the Constituent Assembly on 31 January 1990: 
The question of subordination comes in here. Traditionally under 
the system of Commonwealth countries the Prosecutor-General 
is within the Office of the Attorney-General for subordination 
reasons, but when he does his work, he is independent............. 
 ...when it comes to his work to prosecute, he is absolutely 
independent, he does not get his instructions from the Attorney-
General. But there must be a certain kind of subordination within 
the system.466 
 
 The argument of the Minister did not carry much weight with the Supreme 
Court, as we have seen. However, there can be no doubt that unchecked power in 
the hands of one person is never the ideal. Yet, in the absence of legislation to 
regulate the functions and powers of the Office of the PG, it is not good enough to 
refer to a desirable situation. It is possible that the Supreme Court will opt for a 
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different interpretation based on the values of the Constitution. We have already 
seen that the Supreme Court laid emphasis on the kernel values entrenched in the 
Constitution. The whole philosophy of the separation of powers is based on the 
limitation of power. 
One will only know if the late PG’s interpretation is correct once the Supreme 
Court gets the opportunity to adjudicate on the issue. If the Supreme Court is 
convinced that Article 88 of the Constitution did not repeal section 3(3) and section 4 
of the Criminal Procedure Act, the staff members of the Office are public servants. 
Then only the PG is independent and not his staff.  
According to Article 88 (2) (d) the Prosecutor-General delegates other 
officials, subject to his or her control and direction, authority to conduct criminal 
proceedings in any Court. 
 There is a long history of using the word official as meaning a state official or 
civil servant.  However, the only definition for official in the Constitution is found in 
Chapter X: 
 
Chapter X The Ombudsman 
Article 93 
For the purposes of this chapter the word "official" shall, unless the 
context otherwise indicate, include any elected or appointed official 
or employee of any organ of the central or local Government, any 
official of a para-statal enterprise owned or managed or controlled by 
the State, or in which the State or the Government has substantial 
interest, or any officer of the defence force, the police force or the 
prison service, but shall not include a Judge of the Supreme Court or 
the High Court or, in so far as a complaint concerns the performance 
of a judicial function, any other judicial officer. 
 
 Although Article 93 refers explicitly to Chapter X, dealing with the 
Ombudsman, in the absence of any definition for official in Article 88, the word 
should bear the same meaning as elsewhere in Constitution (Article 93). 
 The exclusion judges and any other judicial officer as officials gives credence 
to an interpretation where the PG, like a judge is considered to be independent of 
government, while his subordinates who are called officials in Article 88 (2) (d) do not 
have the same level of independence.  
 If this interpretation is accepted, the Constitution is on this point a continuation 
of the practices by the South African government under the Criminal Procedure Act 
of 1977. However, it does not explain why the Constituent Assembly did not include 
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the instituting of criminal proceedings, together with conducting criminal proceedings, 
under the functions of the officials delegated by the PG.  
Until the Office of the PG is regulated by legislation, the position of sections 3 
and 4, with the exception of section 3 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Act will remain 
unclear.  
 The foundation for a transformative prosecutorial authority was laid in the Ex 
Parte AG: In re AG/PG judgment of the Supreme Court. Despite the uncertainty of 
effect of the judgment, the most logic and acceptable interpretation is that Article 88 
of the Namibian Constitution has repealed sections 3 and 4 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. The spirit of the Namibian Constitution, as ably interpreted by the 
honourable Justice Leon, and understood by the PG, seems the way to prevent 
political intervention in the prosecuting endeavours of the country. 
 Further transformative developments can begin with an Act to clarify the 
uncertainties. The problems that might arise out of the uncontrolled and untested 
authority and power of the PG can be encountered by legislation. Such legislation 
can provide for a committee consisting of the PG and his/her senior deputies to 
handle appointments, transfers, promotion and other administrative issues. Like any 
other administrative actions of government, the decisions of the PG should be 
reviewable by the High Court. The legislation should also confirm the independence 
of all prosecutors, with legal protection of their term of office, their salaries, etc. to 
warrant their independence. The judgment of the Supreme Court turned out to be a 
good example of transformative constitutionalism despite initial misgivings.  
 
5.9   Due Process and the Constitution  
 Article 12 of the Namibian Constitution guarantees a fair trial.  Over the years 
South African government introduced amendments to the Criminal Procedure Act, 
and other legislation to assist the State in its prosecutorial effort. The amendments 
and other legislation created presumptions, reversed the onus of proof, limited 
access by the defence to evidential material before the trial (maintaining that the 
police docket is privileged), and allowing inadmissible evidence under certain 
circumstances. 
The adversarial legal system added to the vulnerability of accused persons. If 
one bears in mind that the new Criminal Procedure Act was promulgated in 1977, 
the political agenda becomes clearer. It was the time of the so-called total onslaught, 
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a term the then State President, PW Botha, used to emphasise the international 
“communist” attack on South Africa and its policies.  
The enemies of the state, which included all opponents of the apartheid 
ideology, posed a communist threat to South Africa. The draconian security and anti-
terrorist legislation could not secure convictions if certain procedural aspects 
(conservative as they were being an inheritance of the British colonial rule in South 
Africa) limited the State.  Consequently, the State used even procedural law to 
secure convictions, especially in cases with political undertones.  
Before 1977 South West Africa had a Criminal Ordinance under which 
criminal prosecutions took place. While the ordinance and the CPA were similar, 
there were a few substantial differences. The most import being the fact that the 
independence of the SWA/Namibian AG467 (then the head of prosecutions).  
It was inevitable that the new emphasis on rights and the powers of judicial 
review would move Criminal Procedure to the main arena of constitutional 
jurisprudence. The court was the place where people experienced the power of the 
State. It is not surprising that most of the constitutional cases in Namibia involved the 
rights of convicted criminals, and alleged foul play in the course of the criminal 
investigation or the early stages of the trial. 
In the courts accused people felt the effects of a reverse onus, or a 
presumption aiming at preventing the accused to exercise some of his/her most 
fundamental due process rights such as the right to remain silent, the right not to 
incriminate oneself or the right to know the full spectre of the State’s case against 
you.  
While the Constitution did not necessarily introduce rights unknown before 
independence, they lifted due process rights to a new level. Since the competent 
courts could review laws and strike them down if they were unconstitutional, the 
legislator could no longer take away fundamental rights and maintain a false image 
of legality.  
Consequently, the Bill of Rights became an important instrument in the hands 
of criminal defence lawyers to ensure a fair trial for their clients. The courts became 
champions of human rights. However, there was also a backlash. Victims of crime, 
the police and the prosecutorial authority experienced the new dispensation as 
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criminal-friendly. Criminals got off the hook because of what they perceived to be 
technical constitutional issues. The escalation of crime did not help to create a spirit 
of understanding and appreciation for the Bill of Rights amongst ordinary Namibians. 
The politicians were not helpful either. After every high profile criminal case they 
called for the death penalty or made statements like criminals have given up their 
human rights by doing crime. 
The prosecutorial authority took a while to make peace with the Bill of Rights. 
Initially, the State vigorously opposed all applications of a constitutional nature. 
However, in 1999 at the Annual Conference of the International Association of 
Prosecutors in Beijing, China, the Namibian delegation signed the Human Rights 
Charter for Prosecutors.468 
Several elements of a fair trial were argued before the High and Supreme 
Courts in the first five years of independence. There were, however, issues that only 
came on the agenda of the Namibian Courts after it has been resolved in favour of 
accused persons in South African courts. A case in point is the right to be warned of 
the right to legal representation.  
While the issue of legal representation was raised in several cases before 
1997, only in the S v Kapika and Others469 the Court in following a South African 
judgment seriously looked at the right of an accused to be warned that he has a right 
to legal representation. I shall return to this issue below.470 
  In one of the first cases concerning a reversed onus, S v. Titus471 a full 
bench of the High Court concluded that the mere reversal of onus does not negate 
the presumption of innocence and the right not to testify against oneself. The Court 
used the so-called rational connection test, and quoted the American case Tut v the 
United States of America.472 The Supreme Court overturned the decision in S v. 
Shikunga and Another.473   
The argument of the Court in S v Titus fails to address the real issue, namely 
the question if the reverse onus demands of the accused to de facto proof his/her 
innocence. However, as the Court pointed out in the Pineiro case, the American test 
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that the Court relied on, deals with a somewhat different scenario, namely where 
evidence has already been lead, and the Court has to decide if the evidence can be 
allowed despite the fact that the onus of proof shifted.474 
The High Court was quick in S v Pineiro475 to make a better choice from the 
jurisprudential novel of Namibia. The rigid approach in the Titus case was 
abandoned after a constitutional test. The test as set out by the Court is a simple 
one. To put it in my own words: Who is obliged to carry the final burden of guilt, the 
presumption or the State?  Consequently, the Court ruled that the presumption of 
guilt in the Sea Fisheries Act,476 contradicts the presumption of innocence contained 
in Art. 12(1) (d) of the Constitution. 
The old question concerning the conclusions that a court can make from the 
decision of an accused who fails to testify came up in S v Haikele and Others477 and 
S v. Kamajame and Others.478   In the latter case, which was specifically overturned 
by S v. Shikunga and Another,479  the High Court still held that that silence by the 
accused person where an innocent man would have spoken, could amount to an 
admission. More sound and in line with the developments since 1990, the Court 
ruled in the Haikele case that the privilege of an accused against self-incrimination 
means that the State has to prove all the elements of the crime.   The mere fact that 
an accused does not give evidence, cannot remedy deficiencies in the State’s case.  
The High Court stated in an obiter dictum In S v D and Another480 that the 
cautionary rule for single female witness in sexual offences could be contrary to the 
non-discriminatory clause.  The presumption accepted that female complainants are 
likely to lie and lay false charges. The presumption was however only declared 
unconstitutional in S v Katamba481 eight years later. 
Not all attempts to adapt the common law went the way of the defence. In S v 
De Bruyn482  the High Court was invited to accept the defence of entrapment, 
developed in the United States, and declare evidence so obtained inadmissible. The 
defence of entrapment does not deal with all police traps, but only those of a person 
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not otherwise predisposed to commit an offence by government official who then 
instigates prosecution against such person. While the Court stated that such action 
would be intrinsically unfair, it assumed (without deciding) that such conduct is so 
unfair that evidence so gathered should be excluded. The Court stated it was 
prejudicial to the right of the accused to a fair trial as intended in Article 12(a) of 
Constitution. Yet, the Court decided that not all police traps are illegal. 
In other cases the common law obligation of a presiding officer to assist an 
accused, especially if he/she is undefended, were placed within a constitutional 
framework. In S v KhoeiNMab483 the Court held that it is a gross irregularity not to 
allow an accused person to address the Court. Since it affects the fairness of the 
trial, it cannot be remedied.  
While the results of constitutional issues in criminal cases were thoroughly 
reported in the press, its effect on the outcome of criminal cases was not as big as 
the public believed. The perception that the Constitution is criminal friendly is not 
supported by the facts. One must remember that the concept of a fair trial was not 
created by the Constitution, but is a heritage from both the Roman-Dutch common 
law and the procedural law inherited from the English law. 
This does not mean that the Constitution did not play a role at all. The South 
African legislator was extremely political since the mid 1970’s. Many of the changes 
to the Criminal Procedure Act (including making it applicable in Namibia) had a 
political pretext. The Constitution assured that the apartheid laws and practices in 
particular, but also older laws and common law practices did not make it possible for 
accused people to be convicted without the State proving the case. The Constitution 
fulfilled the expectation of the people to rid the criminal process from political abuse. 
This does not mean that all the needs of the Namibian people related to due 
process were met. The crucial right to legal representation was never met in the first 
fourteen years, although the necessity in serious, complicated cases were 
recognised and enforced in 2002.484  
Criminal justice in Namibia had some transformative instances, especially 
after the Office of the PG has signed the Human Rights Charter for Prosecutors in 
1999. The human rights friendly approach of the Office, linked to a number of cases 
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of the South African Constitutional Court, brought a new appreciation for fair trial 
rights to both defence lawyers and the Bench.  
 
5.10 A Clash of Theories and a Hierarchy of Rights: The Kauesa Cases 
One of the first clashes between two diametrically opposed methods of 
interpreting constitutions occurred in the epoch-making Kauesa cases.485 The 
Supreme Court did not only overturn the High Court judgment, but also severely 
criticized it. 
The case had all the elements of a high drama post independent case with 
allegations of racism and a disloyal white police force leadership supporting the 
accused in the Kleynhans486 treason trial. Kauesa, a warrant officer in the police, 
made all these allegations on a television talk show. The police charged him 
internally with misconduct in terms of Police Regulation.487  They alleged that he 
undermined the authority of the police leadership structures by alleging that “the 
command structure of the Namibian Police Force is determined to undermine the 
government's policy of national reconciliation and if possible to cripple the 
government through corruptions and other irregularities”. Kauesa further accused the 
leadership of supporting the accused in the Kleynhans case and supplied them with 
weapons and ammunition. 
Before Kauesa could be prosecuted, he applied on notice of motion for a 
declaratory order declaring the said regulation 58(32), to be invalid and without force 
and effect. The applicant’s legal basis was that the regulation restricts his 
constitutional right to freedom of speech. He alleged that he was the chairperson of a 
committee in the Namibian Police (Nampol) responsible to implement affirmative 
action and transformation in the force – an allegation denied by the Namibian Police 
–  and that he is an aggrieved person as contemplated by Art 25 of the 
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Constitution.488 The High Court went far beyond the application and considered 
several other issues.489 
The Court dismissed the application on the premise that there is a specific 
difference between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms. Fundamental 
rights form part of 'the law of Namibia”, while fundamental freedoms are exercised, 
subject to or limited by the fundamental rights whenever they may be in conflict. The 
Court then made the following conclusion: 
Freedom of speech and expression, including that of the press 
and the media, are therefore also subject to or limited by, inter 
alia, fundamental rights such as those provided, for example, in 
arts 8(1) and 10 relating respectively to the inviolability of the 
dignity of persons, the guarantee of equality before the law and 
non-discrimination. It is    important to note here that equality 
before the law also includes equal protection by the law. 
The converse, however, is not true. Fundamental rights, such as 
those aforesaid, are not subject to or limited by the fundamental 
freedom of speech and expression.490   
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Consequently, freedom of speech is subject to fundamental freedoms such as 
dignity, which the Court classified as the all-embracing constitutional right. The Court 
stayed clear of the trends in earlier cases where rights of individuals were concerned 
and where the Namibian Courts opted for a broad, purposive interpretation of the 
rights. Rather than beginning with the meaning of the specific right at stake, the 
Court went extensively into the question of limitations that might affect the 
application of freedom of speech. 
A supposed hierarchy of rights and freedoms, where the freedoms are 
subjected to fundamental rights, forms the heart of the Court’s reasoning. However, 
it is by no means clear that the Constituent Assembly intended to create such 
hierarchy. The argument is based on a formalistic interpretation of the Constitution. 
The lists of rights in Articles 5 to 20 and fundamental freedoms in Article 21 are 
interpreted as two definite and different groups, listed in order of priority. In other 
words, the fundamental freedoms become subordinate rights, or less important 
rights.  
While the drafters of the Constitution made a difference between fundamental 
rights and fundamental freedoms, there is no indication that they wanted to put 
freedoms and rights on different levels. It seems more likely to be a practical 
differentiation between positive and negative rights. This interpretation is confirmed 
by the fact that there is only one limitation clause in the Constitution and it covers 
both freedoms and rights.491 
The interpretation of the Court is suspect. The idea that certain rights 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights are subjected to the general laws of the country does 
not make legal sense. Article 25 prohibits the abolition or abridgment of both 
freedoms and rights by Parliament or subordinate legislative authorities.   The 
statement of the judge, “In Namibia, the highest legislative body, namely the National 
Assembly, as well as other legislatures may make laws in terms of art 21(2) to 
abridge freedom of speech”, is a contradiction of Article 25 (1).  
The argument of the Court then went in circles. Dignity is not explicitly 
mentioned as one of the fundamental rights – which the Court saw as an emulated 
list. However, since dignity restricted freedom of speech under the common law, it 
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calls for protection.  Since these restrictions are fair and in the interest of national 
security, it is not unreasonable.  
The right to dignity, in Article 8, becomes a filter for freedom of expression. 
Once one has opted for such a hierarchical scheme, it is inevitable that the second 
class right or freedom will become less important. In this case the Court created the 
hierarchy and found that freedom of speech, like other freedoms, are subjected to 
the laws of Namibia – including pre-independent laws – despite the fact that that the 
historical context of those laws are not in line with the Namibian Constitution or the 
new democratic society.  
Yet, the Court is not comfortable to make a judgment based on its own 
categories. It then went into issues that the parties did not raise. Without going into 
the elements of the crimes of criminal defamation and a contravention of the 
Prohibition of Racial Discrimination Act 26 of 1991 (which the Court also found is 
constitutional), the Court concluded that the applicant is prima facie guilty of these 
crimes. The Court then assumed that Kauesa claimed his right to a fair trial in the 
application – although such claim is not in the written or viva voce submissions.492 
The Court only referred to foreign jurisdictions, notably the United States and 
Canada,493 to point out why their standards are not applicable to the Namibian 
situation and Constitution.  When the Court referred to international treaties as part 
of Namibian Law in terms of the Constitution, it opted for the notorious Article 10 of 
the European Charter on Human Rights, which is not a treaty that Namibia is entitled 
to ratify.494 
As for the facts of the case, Kauesa agreed to submit to reg. 53(38) when he 
joined the police. The Court missed the point that he joined the force in a time before 
Namibia was independent and before he had the protection of the Constitution. Had 
he refused to sign the regulations, the old South West African Police Force would 
have turned him down.  
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What seemed to be a straightforward question - whether Regulation 53(38) is 
unconstitutional – was only addressed by the Court after it had answered several 
unrelated questions. It is important to understand the Kauesa case within its 
historical context. If it is possible to cut through the over breath of the High Court 
judgment, the result seems to be reasonable and fair in a democratic society. In 
military and police disciplinary codes, junior officers are demanded to submit to 
instructions of commissioned officers. Few, if any democratic society will fault the 
decision of the High Court. When a junior officer criticises the senior command and 
accuses them of racism, it will undoubtedly lead to disciplinary action in most 
democratic societies.  
The Supreme Court took a different approach. Although the term 
transformative constitutionalism and post-modern models of constitutional 
interpretations were hardly known in southern Africa then, the Court clearly 
understood the principles, albeit not as an academic model. Karl Klare’s article in 
which he popularised the term, only appeared in 1998.495 And Woolman/Davis’ 
article on Creole liberalism appeared in 1996, but possibly too late for the Supreme 
Court to take cognisance of it.496  
However, the bench did not address constitutional issues with the usual 
reliance on technical and textual issues alone. The Supreme Court opted to 
approach the problem from the demands of transforming the oppressive colonial 
society, even if it meant a radical new understanding of the rights of the individual. 
Or to use Klare and Woolman/Davis’ terminology, a post-modern or Creole liberal 
constitution cannot be interpreted as if it is a typical liberal document of the 1960’s. 
The Namibian and South African constitutions introduced a dispensation where 
constitutional interpreters have to interpret documents intended not merely as rules 
and principles, as the liberal models of Hart and Dworkin suggested. The 
transformation of society is an important focus of both. In emphasising the need for 
transformation, the Supreme Court shared a post-modern interpretive approach with 
the likes of Klare and Woolman/Davis. 
The Court pointed out that it was inappropriate for the court a quo to rely for 
the decision on matters not put before them by litigants. If the judge wanted to 
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consider issues not argued before him, he was compelled to give both parties the 
opportunity to submit arguments.  It is undesirable for Court to deliver judgment while 
the litigants never canvassed some important issues.497  
The Supreme Court then turned the focus away from the Namibian Police to 
the rights of Kauesa. What does the Constitution have to say about legislation that 
will not only prevent  a previously disadvantaged police officer to speak his mind 
about the necessity of transformation in the police force, but may even suffer criminal 
prosecution for doing so? When and under what circumstances will a limitation of the 
right to free speech be a reasonable restriction? Or, to use the language of the  
Constitution: When is it “necessary in a democratic society and ... required in the 
interests of the sovereignty and integrity of Namibia, national security, public order, 
decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to 
an offence” to limit or restrict free speech?498  Are the restrictions imposed by section 
52 of the police regulations reasonable? 
Section 52(38) of the regulation reads as follows: 
58. A member shall be guilty of an offence and may be dealt 
with in accordance with the provisions of chap 11 of the Act and 
these regulations if he – 
… (38) comments unfavourably in public upon the administration   
of the force or any other government department.' 
 
The Court took extensive notice of the approach to the limitation on freedom 
of expression in the USA, India and specifically the Canadian Charter and the 
benchmark case of R v Oakes.499 In the Oakes case the Canadian Supreme Court 
suggested that in order to determine if a restriction is reasonable, a sufficiently 
significant objective for the restriction ought to be identified. In other words, the 
objective with the limitation should not be trivial or irrelevant.  
                                            
497
Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1996 (4) SA (NSC) p. 965, on p. 974. 
498
See Article 21(1)(a) and (2): 
(1) All persons shall have the right to: 
(a) freedom of speech and expression, which shall include freedom of the press and other media… 
(2) The fundamental freedoms referred to in sub art (1) hereof shall be exercised subject to the law of 
Namibia, insofar as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights and 
freedoms conferred by the said sub article, which are necessary in a democratic society and are 
required in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of Namibia, national security, public order, 
decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. 
499
1986 26 DLR (4th) 200. 
 170 
Once the Court has established the objective, the Court ought to apply a 
proportionality test to determine if the means to obtain the objective is reasonable. 
The test, while it may vary from time to time, will usually consider three aspects: 
-   The measures adopted must not be arbitrary, unfair or irrational; 
- The restriction should impair as little as possible of the right or freedom 
in question; and 
- There must be proportionality between the effects of the limitation and 
the identified objective.500 
Article 22 of the Namibian Constitution laid down the following prerequisites 
for a reasonable limitation of freedoms: 
Whenever or wherever in terms of this Constitution the limitation 
of and fundamental rights or freedoms contemplated by this 
chapter is authorised, any law providing for such limitation shall: 
(a) be of general application, shall not negate the essential 
content thereof, and shall not be aimed at a particular individual; 
(b) specify the ascertainable extent of such limitation and 
identify the article or articles hereof on which authority to enact 
such limitation is claimed to rest. 
 
 Section 52(38) of the regulations failed all these tests, the Supreme Court 
found- 
Does reg. 58(32) specify the ascertainable extent of the 
limitations it imposes? It does not. All comments which are 
unfavourable to the administration of the force restrict the    
exercise of a right or freedom. Any comment in public, which is 
unfavourable, about any government department equally 
restricts the exercise of a right or freedom. There is no 
ascertainable extent of the limitation.501 
 
The Supreme Court rejected the position of the court a quo that whenever 
there is an infringement of a fundamental right the freedom ought to be interpreted 
restrictively. Instead, the Court opted “to be strict in interpreting limitations to rights 
so that individuals are not unnecessarily deprived of the enjoyment of their rights.”502 
 With reference to the reasonability and proportionality of the Oakes test, the 
Court contended that in this case there is no rational connection between the 
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limitations and the object. Reg. 52(38) is arbitrary and unfair and the objective is 
almost unidentifiable because of the over breath.503 
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court only referred indirectly to the 
important statement of the court a quo that dignity is the most important right in 
Chapter 3. Referring to the German Basic Law the Court a quo commented that 
freedom of expression “must be interpreted subject to the fundamental right to the 
dignity of man”.504 The Supreme Court merely referred to the importance of freedom 
of speech as a right. It accepted that the statements of Kauesa on national television 
might have been slanderous. However, it went on to say that the indiscretion of a 
speaker cannot frustrate such an important right as freedom of expression. The 
Constitution does not only protect speeches that are favourable to the government, 
“but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the 
population”.505 
The Supreme Court made an important comment regarding the context of the 
applicant’s speech: 
In the context of Namibia freedom of speech is essential to the 
evolutionary process set up at the time of independence in order 
to rid the country of apartheid and its attendant consequences. 
In order to live in and maintain a democratic State the citizens 
must be free to speak, criticise and praise where praise is due. 
Muted silence is not an ingredient of democracy, because the 
exchange of ideas is essential to the development of 
democracy.506 
 
 Consequently, the question of the limitations of freedom of speech needs to 
be answered not by finding a hierarchy of rights and freedoms or to consider the 
possibility that some legislation may limit freedom of speech. Rather, within the 
context of an independent Namibia, the question is more restrictive: Does society 
need the interactions that lead to the appellant being disciplined?  While it may be 
true that some of the utterances of the appellant was indeed offensive, the necessity 
to deal with “the practice of racial discrimination and the ideology of apartheid 
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….expressly prohibited by art 23(1) of the Constitution”, are more important.507   
Further, Article 23(2) protects affirmative action as a constitutional principle.  
The milieu where the discussion on transformation in the police took place 
was conducive for freedom of speech and interaction of ideas. The Supreme Court 
pointed out that Inspector Shawn Geyser, the spokesperson of the Namibian Police, 
was part of the panel. Since Geyser was on the panel, the police command was part 
of the television debate.508 
The approach of the Court fits perfectly in the definition of transformative 
constitutionalism that Klare used: “…“a long-term project of constitutional enactment, 
interpretation, and enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a 
historical context of conducive (sic) political developments) to transforming a 
country's political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, 
participatory, and egalitarian direction”.509 The Namibian Constitution is more than a 
rule book. It intends to break the principles and resulted practices of the oppressive 
apartheid regime. If the Supreme Court has to make a choice between the dignity of 
senior police officers and freedom of speech, the transformative need to break the 
historical “silence” of the majority of the Namibian people turns the scale in favour of 
freedom of speech. Consequently, the emphasis on transformation rather than the 
categorising of rights forms the heart of the Supreme Court judgment.  
The Supreme Court took cognisance of the fact that the practice of racial 
discrimination and the ideology of apartheid are prohibited by the Constitution, while 
the practice of affirmative action is protected.510 It confirmed the right of the appellant 
to participate uninhibited and robust in a debate of public concern such as the lack of 
transformation and affirmative action in the police.  Debates such as these, the Court 
commented, are the essence of democracy. 
The Court rejected the request of the respondent to preserve the good parts 
of the regulation from the bad ones and retain only the limitation “…comment 
unfavourably in public upon the administration of the force”. Even that section, the 
Court found, is vague and overbroad. It also rejected the request to read down the 
section by including the words “in a manner calculated to prejudice discipline within 
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the force” following the phrase “comment unfavourably in public upon the 
administration of the force”.   
Respondents are inviting the Court to legislate, that is, to 
perform the constitutional function of the Legislature.511 
 
 The Kauesa judgment of the Supreme Court managed to move away from 
formal argument to solid substantive argument. Following the corporal punishment 
case, the Court based its judgment on values. However, the values are clearly 
defined and the foundation of the values comes from the Constitution. 
The last word on the Kauesa case has not been spoken. Shortly after the 
Supreme Court judgment, the High Court judge, Justice O’Linn, wrote a 
memorandum to the Chief Justice explaining his discomfort with the Supreme 
Court’s approach.512 He felt offended by the Supreme Court judgment, which he 
stated “lacked constitutional legality”.513  O’Linn criticised the Supreme Court for not 
taking the position of the senior officers, who were defamed, into consideration. 
Important for this study, is his discomfort with the Supreme Court’s broad 
interpretation of freedom of speech.  He found the hierarchical reverse of the Court 
illogical and out of line with both the clear wording of the Constitution and the 
interpretation of foreign courts, notably India.514 
 In an article in 2001 University of Cape Town constitutional scholar Pierre de 
Vos,  using  Mureinik’s metaphor of the South African constitution being a bridge 
from oppression to democracy, wondered if the development in transformative 
constitutionalism is not a bridge too far. 
…the judges of the Constitutional Court often turn to South 
Africa's history and use it as a 'grand narrative' — a universally 
accepted, meaning-giving story about the origins and purpose of 
the Constitution. This 'grand narrative' or 'super context' purports 
to limit the discretion of judges by providing the context within 
which the various provisions of the Constitution can be 
understood without recourse to the personal, political or 
philosophical views of judges. This attempt to deploy South 
Africa's recent history cannot be successful, however, because it 
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ignores the emerging view of history as a profoundly subjective 
account of selected events in the past.515 
  
 De Vos’s article attempts to answer the difficult question of constitutional 
interpretation. O’Linn’s letter to the Chief Justice of Namibia is an example of the 
discomfort South African and Namibian legal practitioners had in treating a 
constitution different from any other legislation.  South African trained legal 
practitioners were trained to follow a positivist interpretive approach by follow the 
known meaning of words and phrases in legal texts. The idea of treating a 
constitution differently, challenged their basic understanding of the law. De Vos 
explained the dilemma as follows:  
Most judges, lawyers and legal academics in South Africa, 
however, seem profoundly uncomfortable with the notion that 
judicial decision-making in the constitutional sphere is not 
(always) aimed merely at discovering a 'true', 'objective' or 
'original' meaning of the text and is hence not based (solely) on 
predictable and neutral principle… The dilemma of constitutional 
adjudication within this traditional liberal paradigm is that it 
threatens to blur this purported boundary between subjective 
and partisan politics, and 'neutral' and 'objective' legal 
interpretation.516 
  
De Vos points out that the mere idea that a constitutional text “does not have one 
objectively determinable meaning” may remove all the traditional constraints on 
judges preventing them to be guided by subjective opinions and “will open up the 
judicial process to criticism of arbitrariness, politicisation and even bias”.517 
 The nature of constitutional language makes the traditional liberal reading 
complicated. Constitutions generally give guidelines and unlike statute law do not 
elaborate on acts violating it. In South Africa the Constitutional Court struggled with 
the issue of values as an interpretive key from the outset. The judges were 
constantly defending their own objectivity and the centrality of the constitutional 
text,  while at the same time justifying their reliance on extra-textual sources.518  
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 The Constitutional Court, De Vos concludes, while not uniform in its 
interpretive modules came up with what he calls a ‘contextual approach’ to the 
interpretation of the South African constitution. By constantly referring back to the 
social and political context of the constitution, De Vos asserts that Constitutional 
Court developed what he called a ‘grand narrative’ that places the constitutional text 
within the context of a universally accepted structuring, meaning-giving story about 
the origins and purpose of the interim and 1996 Constitutions.519 
 The South African grand narrative derived from the text of the constitution. De 
Vos points out that the late Etienne Mureinik got his inspiration for the bridge 
metaphor of the constitution from the post-amble of the 1993 Interim Constitution of 
South Africa. The constitution was a bridge from a culture of authority to a culture of 
justification.  Since the metaphor relies on the constitutional text itself, the 
Constitutional Court, beginning in the Makwanyane case, developed the grand 
narrative around the end of the oppressive apartheid system and the dawning of a 
democratic dispensation.  
 In developing the grand narrative the negotiations between the ‘old’ 
government and the democratic forces which eventually led to the drafting of the 
interim constitution, took centre stage. De Vos, points out that historians and interest 
groups do not necessarily view the ‘old’ and ‘new’ South Africa, and the change from 
apartheid to democracy in the same light. However, the metaphor of Mureinik, and 
the grand narrative developed by the Constitutional Court, is the only narrative that 
relies on both the interim and final South African constitutions. Despite all it 
shortcomings, the grand narrative gave clear direction in constitutional interpretation, 
as De Vos puts it: 
The constitutional texts may be vague and must be interpreted, 
yes, but the grand narrative as set out in the Constitutions 
closely and irrevocably binds the Court into a fairly fixed 
interpretation of their provisions. Although this version of South 
Africa's recent past is not shared by all South Africans, it is the 
one thrust upon any interpreter of the Constitutions by the 
constitutional texts themselves.520 
  
                                            
519
Ibid, pp. 8 – 9. 
520
Ibid, p. 15. 
 176 
However, despite the entire positive that the grand narrative holds for 
constitutional interpretation, one cannot but agree with De Vos that it also holds 
profound dangers for future interpretation. It closes the door of discovering new 
meanings of the constitutional text in changing circumstances. It is not necessary for 
this study to go into De Vos’ criticism of making historical events the permanent focal 
point of understanding a constitution. Suffice it to say that history, like law, is never 
an absolute description of truth. It needs to be interpreted in the context of available 
knowledge. The grand narrative based on an historical reconciliation and a metaphor 
of a bridge from hell to wonderland is too narrow to prescribe one infallible 
interpretive key. 
De Vos refers briefly to Karl Klare’s reference to the constitution as a 
transformative document. Klare, as we have noted above, defines transformative 
constitutionalism as “a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, 
and enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of 
conducive political developments) to transforming a country's political and social 
institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian 
direction”.521 This definition makes it impossible to link constitutional interpretation to 
a single historical event, as if transformation was set and done with the drafting of 
the interim constitution in South Africa or the finalisation of the Namibian Constitution 
by the Constituent Assembly in 1990. 
The development of a grand narrative of constitutional interpretation in South 
Africa assisted the Constitutional Court to move away from the static liberal 
approach looking for an absolute objective and clear understanding of constitutional 
texts.  Transformative constitutionalism reminds the interpreter that the constitution is 
a living document that needs to be interpreted in the light of new questions not 
necessarily linked to the historical context of the initial drafting process.  
The Kauesa judgment of the Namibian Supreme Court should be read in that 
light. The judgment to prioritise freedom of expression does not set a new rule that 
freedom of expression is the most important right or freedom of the Namibian 
Constitution. It is what Klare calls ‘interpretation and enforcement committed (not in 
isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive political developments) to 
transforming a country's political and social institutions and power relationships’. The 
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criticism of O’Linn that the police officers who were defamed by Kauesa is fair if one 
does not take notice of the context of silencing opposing voices, more specific black 
voices, in the colonial apartheid era. A junior officer will probably not be as fortunate 
as Kauesa if he repeats the allegations twenty years into democracy and 
independence. The new dispensation has opened the door for aggrieved citizens, 
including police officers, to make their grievances known.  The Kauesa judgment 
played no small role in this transformation of society.  
A transformative approach to constitutionalism will not be static. It will take 
cognisance of the historical context of both the constitution and the time of 
adjudication. 
It is unlikely that the transformative interpretive model was known to the 
Supreme Court bench of the Kauesa case. However, the Supreme Court judgment 
will remain a school book example of the role the highest court played in normalising 
the Namibian society. 
 
5.10.1  The Process of Deconstruction in Kauesa 
5.10.1.1  Understanding Deconstruction 
If one accepts that the Supreme Court jurisprudence in the Kauesa case fits a 
post-liberal approach to interpretation – even if the bench did not intentionally used 
critical legal methodology to come to its conclusion, -  it should be possible to read 
the judgment as a post-modern example of deconstruction as a legal tool.   It  
provides an opportunity to compare two approaches, the positivist approach of the 
High Court and the value-based approach, using the post-modernist insight of the 
French philosopher, Jacques Derrida.522  The apartheid regime with its suppressive 
legal system did not leave much place for freedom of speech. The new Namibia, in 
its transitional stage, needed a culture of free speech. It needed a radical approach 
to the Bill of Rights to break down the limitations that apartheid and the South African 
legal system placed on the fundamental rights of the individual. 
The Kauesa judgment of the Supreme Court did not answer a universal 
question on the rights of a junior officer to criticise the senior command on national 
television. The issue is the role of Regulation 53(38) of the Police Regulation in the 
new Namibian society in the light of the Namibian Constitution.  
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While discipline is an important element of effective policing, overcoming the 
racist past is a constitutional principle. The Constitution is, as Mahomed called it, a 
radical break with the apartheid past. In this context, the Supreme Court opted for 
freedom of speech as a preferential human right, since it has the potential to and is 
necessary to bridge the divide of the past. It falls outside the objective of this thesis 
to do an intensive study of new hermeneutical experiments in law. However, the 
Kauesa case is a textbook example of deconstruction where an interpreter can turn a 
classical interpretation upside down. 
Critical legal thinkers such as the Marxists523 and feminists524 have challenged 
the justice of law or the legal systems over the years. They have argued that there is 
no neutral ground in law and even the assumed neutral structures serve some 
interests.  
Deconstruction is a hermeneutical key developed by the French philosopher 
Jacques Derrida, for the critical reading of texts, or more correctly, listening to 
language.525 Deconstruction provides a method for analyzing and reviewing existing 
old doctrines and theories.  In that sense deconstruction is a neutral hermeneutical 
tool. Although Derrida at times equated deconstruction with justice, some of the early 
proponents came from a racist right wing background.526 
Deconstruction is mainly developed and tested in the field of literary criticism 
and hermeneutics. It also found its way into the interpretation of legal texts. For the 
so-called Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement in the USA, economic legal 
sceptics and feminists, deconstruction became a way to expose the racial, capitalist 
and male bias in legal theory and legal structures 
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Harvard scholar Jack Balkan, while critical of the leftist application of 
deconstruction in the USA, has written extensively on the possibilities of 
deconstruction in dialogue.527  It is within this context that I want to look at the 
dialogue between the High and Supreme Courts in the Kauesa cases. 
 Deconstruction, as pointed out above, has no ideological bias or consistency. 
Neither can it guide the interpreter to the “truth”, which does not mean that it has no 
meaning at all, or that it is essentially a nihilistic approach. It is important to 
understand that legal texts (including Constitutions) have several possible 
interpretations. 
 A precondition for applying the insights of deconstruction would be what 
Kennedy calls an atheistic approach to the Constitution, or constitutionalism.528  
Since the USA constitution is not only seen as an analogy of religion, and since 
many Americans see the constitution and constitutionalism as a civil religion, the 
constitution operates as a holy writ and the courts as custodians of the truth.529 
 The Supreme Court acts as the Papal authority that can make ex cathedra 
pronouncements of truth that is binding on all. Since the Supreme Court decisions 
are backed up by state force, even the USA bears traits of a theocracy. There are, 
off course better examples of legal systems functioning in theocracies  such as 
Khomeini’s  Iran.530  We find an even better analogy of the deification of nature in 
Greek mythology where natural events like the wind that preventing the Greek fleet 
to go to Troy, gets legal significance..  
 If faith in the religious truth falls, the explanations and the structures go down 
with it. Since modern humans do not believe that the gods stopped the wind, they 
have to reject the interpretation that the gods were angry. Sacrificing Ipighenia would 
have made no difference.531 The priests and the gods lose their authority and power 
over humans. While Americans still believe strongly that the original framers of the 
Constitution determined the destiny of the nation, most interpreters are no longer 
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sure interpretative methods can reveal the original intent of the framers in every 
possible scenario.532 
 Although somewhat overstated, the satirical analogy of Kennedy makes 
sense.  All constitutions are overloaded and Namibia is not an exception. The Bill of 
Rights becomes a “religious document” that should not only organize the Namibian 
society, but also epitomize national reconciliation, and reflects the soul of the 
nation.533  In this sacrilegious context, it becomes indicative to think of the 
Constitution as a Holy Writ with one meaning, one interpretation and all other 
possibilities as heresy. The legal conflict of the first fourteen years of jurisprudence in 
Namibia was typical of the development of a civil religious culture. 
 The problem, however, lies in the fact that the competent courts, the High and 
Supreme Court, did not speak with one voice.  
 
5.10.1.2  Deconstruction in Kauesa 
 French philosopher Jacques Derrida developed his theory of deconstruction 
because of his disillusioNMent with Western philosophy.534Derrida attacked one of 
the most basic elements of Western philosophy, namely the central place of identity. 
For Derrida identity is only possible if one takes the notion of difference into account. 
Something can only be identical to itself if it has already been established that it is, at 
the same time different from something else. Identity can only be understood in 
terms of difference, and vice versa. 
 While identity took preference in philosophy, Derrida turns it around. Identity 
and self-identity are dependent on difference.  Which brings us to the basic element 
of deconstruction: to identify hierarchies and hierarchical opposition. Once these 
hierarchies have been identified, it can be reversed in the same way as Derrida 
reversed the identity/difference hierarchy, or one of his favourite examples, to 
reverse the hierarchy of speech/writing to writing/speech. 
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 Hierarchies are part of the basic structures of society. Sometimes they are 
structured in principles such as rules and exceptions, or as generalities and 
specifics. Alternatively, one can base it on logical conclusions:  perceived facts and 
conclusions, or a typical legal hierarchy, direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. 
In all these examples, the first mentioned aspect takes precedence over the second 
indicates hierarchy. 
 Consequently, every hierarchy is an opportunity to do reversal deconstruction. 
The deconstruction is never permanent and can always be deconstructed again by 
reversing the new hierarchy, or even using a third component as the new primary in 
the hierarchical pyramid of components. Once reversed, the exception will stand in 
relation to the rule just as the rule stood in relation to the exception before the 
deconstruction.535 
 This is by no means a full description of Derrida’s ideas.  It will nevertheless 
make it possible to look at the application of deconstruction in Namibian 
constitutional jurisprudence.  
 We can now look at the hierarchies in the Kauesa case. For the High Court 
dignity is the most important right, not only in the German Basic Law, but also in the 
Namibian Constitution. Consequently, on top of his list of protected rights stands the 
right to dignity. The Court acknowledged and gave preferential status to the need for 
discipline in the police as a necessity in a democratic state. It also found a 
hierarchical structure between rights and freedoms in the Namibian Constitution 
where in terms of the wording of the Constitution, freedoms ought to be exercised 
subject to the Namibian laws, while no such a limitation is placed on rights.  
 While Chapter 3 of the Constitution does not create a hierarchical order of 
rights, the High Court derived its preference for dignity from the German Basic Law, 
and possibly by drawing logical conclusions.536 If a constitution is a document 
defending the rights of citizens and protecting it against violations by the state and 
other citizens, it makes sense to see dignity as the foundational right in the 
Constitution.  Every other right and fundamental freedom in Chapter 3 ensures that 
the dignity of all is respected. Even the perceived criminal (article 12) or the 
convicted murderer (article 6) are treated with dignity. It is common in democracies 
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all over the world that police and military discipline are necessary limitations of the 
right to freedom of speech. 
 For most observers, even legal critics, the High Court’s hierarchical structure 
will be acceptable. However, the deconstructionist will look at opposite and 
competing rights and interests as an opportunity to reverse the hierarchical order. 
Deconstruction will give the interpreter the opportunity to look at the hierarchical 
order, but also the components in the order from a different perspective. 
 The Supreme Court did not refer to Derrida or any of the Critical Legal Studies 
authors. It is doubtful that Judge Dumbutshena even consciously deconstructed the 
hierarchies used by the High Court. However, what emanates from the judgment is a 
well-defined deconstruction of the earlier judgment.  
 While Derrida did not intend to develop a tool for critical leftist use, and while 
there is nothing specifically leftist in deconstruction, it found its legal life in the circle 
of the CLS movement in the United States and its sympathisers in the United 
Kingdom and Europe. The agenda of CLS in the United States is almost without 
exception leftist with a bias for the oppressed, gender equality and justice. 
Consequently, it is a challenge of the generally accepted ground rules of the legal 
system in a liberal democracy. It also questions the older liberal jurisprudential 
schools such as legal positivism, legal realism and Dworkin’s Reconstruction.  
The Supreme Court turned the first hierarchical order of the High Court 
around by using a different lens. The Court considers the apartheid history of 
Namibia and the need for affirmative action and open debate. In that context, the 
Supreme Court opted for freedom of speech to be more important than dignity. It 
then reversed the logical hierarchy of first dignity then all other rights used by the 
High Court. The hierarchy can always be reversed again once the constitutional 
State has overcome the impediments of the past. 
For the Supreme Court judgment, freedom of speech takes precedence over 
dignity. The senior white police officers were possibly defamed, but the need for free 
speech and transformation (catered for in the Constitution) overrides the importance 
of dignity, said the Court. 
In the same way, by applying the test of the Oakes case, the Supreme Court 
reversed the hierarchy to give freedom of speech precedence over police discipline. 
The regulations are simply too broad to be seen as protecting the values and 
discipline of the Namibian Police.  
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Finally, the Court ignored the strong reliance of the High Court on the words 
of the Constitution for creating (or acknowledging) a hierarchical relationship 
between rights and fundamental freedoms. It is no wonder that the Supreme Court 
came to a diametrical different conclusion than the High Court. They reversed every 
hierarchical structure.  Moreover, in every instance the insignificant subordinate 
component became the superior and changed the foundation of the judgment.  
The Kauesa judgments are a clear indication that different approaches to 
interpretation can result in very different conclusions. Political positioning plays a role 
in the process. Or to put it differently, to link with the theme of this thesis: The 
Supreme Court, conscience of the need for transformation, rather than taking the 
safe route of the clear meaning of the text, opted for an interpretation that breaks 
rank with the colonial bias for the powerful, an interpretation that empower the 
previously oppressed Namibians. 
However, one needs to bear in mind that transformative constitutionalism 
requires a very different approach to the text than the traditional positivist approach. 
The Kauesa cases are examples of the difficulties for the legal fraternity schooled in 
a presumption of a-political adjudication to accept what they perceive as political 
rather than legal hermeneutics.  
Shortly after the Supreme Court judgment, the High Court judge, Justice 
O’Linn, wrote a memorandum to the Chief Justice explaining his discomfort with the 
Supreme Court’s approach.537 O’Linn’s discomfort with the Supreme Court’s broad 
interpretation of freedom of speech is relevant for this study.  To put it in the 
framework of deconstruction, he found the hierarchical reverse of the Court illogical 
and out of line with both the clear wording of the Constitution and the interpretation 
of foreign courts, notably India.538 
O’Linn’s comments underline the difficulty of interpreters to determine the 
right or wrong of contradicting High and Supreme Court judgments.  For Derrida the 
answer would possibly be whatever the interpreter wants to be right and wrong, or if 
he/she is not sure, the interpreter can reject both and deconstruct again. I will 
elaborate on the question in the next sub-chapter. 
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5.10.2   Concluding Remarks 
It will be wrong to see the Kauesa judgment of the High Court as a 
continuation of the literalist positivist approach of the apartheid courts. While the 
High Court thinking clearly fits the typical positivist approach of Hart, it did not follow 
Hart’s dictum that law has nothing to do with morality or that immoral laws are still 
law. On the contrary, Judge O’Linn never opposed value judgments per se. His 
understanding of the Constitution was that its basic tenure was to protect the dignity 
of all people. O’Linn was not the first interpreter to start with dignity. In the Corporal 
Punishment case, the Supreme Court had the following to say about dignity: 
The Namibian Constitution seeks to articulate the aspirations 
and values of the new Namibian nation following upon 
independence. It expresses the commitment of the Namibian 
people to the creation of a democratic society based on respect 
for human dignity, protection of   liberty and the rule of law.539 
 
Dignity was the unseen right in the background of all the arguments. This is 
not surprising since Article 8 deals with violations of dignity. However, Judges 
Mahomed and Berger did not define dignity and did not explain how it sits with the 
other rights and freedoms listed in Chapter 3 of the Namibian Constitution. 
In the Kauesa case, the High Court interpreted freedom of expression in the 
light of and subjected to the right to dignity. Quoting Eric Barendt stating that in 
Germany, “freedom of expression must be interpreted subject to the fundamental 
right to the dignity of man”, the Court stated “these words are mutatis mutandis 
applicable to the interpretation of the provisions of the Namibian Constitution”.540 
The High Court did not work without a constitutional perspective.  He makes 
an effort to work with the Constitution.  Its point of departure is dignity.  The Court’s 
choice can even be justified in terms of moving away from the colonial dispensation 
towards a free and democratic society. The bridge must take Namibia from 
colonialism where the dignity of the majority of the people was not honoured to an 
appreciation of the dignity of all people.   
 To come to his a priori point of departure, the judge works with a pyramid of 
rights and a differentiation between rights and freedoms.  In his interpretation of the 
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two, he concluded that freedoms ought to be exercised subject to the laws of 
Namibia, while rights are not subjected to the other laws of Namibia. 
 In other words, the High Court created a pyramid of rights with dignity on top.  
Woolman and Davis will possibly call this a typical liberal approach.   
 In this case, the protagonist of reform (Kauesa) is punished for speaking out 
in the interest of debate and transformation.  While The Supreme Court, in 
overturning the High Court judgment did not work with the categories of previously 
advantaged and disadvantaged, it emphasized different rights, more specifically 
freedom of speech vis-à-vis the dignity of the white police officers. 
 The Supreme Court worked with a different pyramid structure than the High 
Court. In the light of Article 81 of the Constitution and the stare decesis rule, the 
Supreme Court interpretation needs to be followed by all courts.541 But that does not 
answer the substantive legal question: Which one is the best novel (Dworkin 
If we are willing to accept the Hartian notion that in the case of the penumbra 
judges make law, the O’Linn/Dumbutshena contradictions in Kauesa pose no legal 
problem. The relationship between Chapter 3 rights of the Constitution is a difficult 
case which demands judicial activism. While both the High and Supreme Courts 
created law here, in terms of the stare decesis rule determines the Supreme Court 
judgment is the final authority and thus the correct interpretation. 
The Dworkinian School on the other hand, will insist that the judges do not 
create law. Taking all the facts into consideration, there is a correct interpretation.  
In South Africa Woolman and Davis used an analysis of the ideological 
framework of the constitution to determine the relationship between dignity and 
freedom of speech. I shall now apply the Woolman/Davis approach to the Kauesa 
cases. 
As we have noticed, Woolman and Davis work with an ideological 
understanding of the different approaches to constitutional interpretation. The 
insights of Woolman and Davis can assist the analyst to discover the real frustrations 
of the lay interpreters, specifically the politicians of the ruling party. It is bad enough 
when the application of Constitutional principles frustrates the clear will of the 
majority party, or the democratic process. When the judgments of the Courts are 
based on political theory that is not to be found in the Constitution, or when the 
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Constitutional principles are not what the Party perceived them to be at the sittings of 
the Constituent Assembly,542 the politicians and the people feel they are cheated by 
the system.543 
If confronted with the Namibian Constitution, Woolman and Davis will probably 
invite the courts to see the Constitution as a Creole liberal document. However, while 
the Namibian Constitution has several Creole traits, it also has some very distinct 
classical liberal features. The classical liberal approach includes: 
- A Bill of rights concentrating almost exclusively on civil and political rights; 
- Seeing economic, social and cultural rights as part of state policy rather than 
entrenched rights; 
- Excluding the enforcement of social and economic rights from the provisions 
of article 25 which provides remedies for aggrieved citizens; 
- The recognition and entrenchment of property rights; 
- The total silence of minority rights and group protection, to mention a few. 
Creole traits include: 
- The recognition of both common and customary law as valid legal systems; 
- The provision for affirmative action; 
- The provision for expropriation of private property in the interest of the State; 
- The recognition of a mixed economy for Namibia; 
- The abolishment of the death penalty; 
- The recognition of economic and social rights in article 95. Although the 
enforcement of these rights is limited by article 101, the Courts can still 
enforce it.544 
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 If the ideological foundation of the Namibian Constitution is classical 
liberalism, Judge O’Linn was correct to emphasise dignity, if one follows the 
Woolman/Davis approach. However, if the Constitution got its inspiration from Creole 
liberalism, then the deconstruction of the Supreme Court makes sense. If the 
emphasis of interpretation is on transformative constitutionalism, Dworkin’s Hercules 
judge may just decide in favour of Judge Dumbutshena’s Supreme Court judgment 
as the best Namibian novel. While the Supreme Court did not explicitly refer to 
political ideology, it clearly opted for a transformative interpretation. While the white 
police officer’s dignity was indeed impaired, the necessity to engage in debate over 
the restoration of the Namibian society was more important in the view of the Court. 
 In this case, the result of a Dworkinian interpretation does not necessarily 
differ from a Hartian approach, since the best moral option should be followed in 
cases on the penumbra.  However, it does not close the debate. Positivists will argue 
that external factors which are difficult to evaluate, should not burden the legal text, 
while the post-modernist interpreters such as Klare will say the positivist exegete  
also brings his ideology to the table, be it consciously or sub-consciously. Judge 
O’Linn and other positivists will emphatically deny that they created law or that the 
Supreme Court judgment is the better Namibian novel.545  
 Without making a fundamentalist quasi-religious statement, one can conclude 
that the Kauesa judgment made transformative sense at the time.  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE END OF EUPHORIA: CRITICAL CHALLENGES 
6.1   Introduction 
In the mid 1990’s the political debate moved away from national reconciliation 
to transformation. The victories of the liberation struggle and the UN supervised 
elections were the foundations of a transformed society. However, the first 
constitutional challenge – the limitation of two presidential terms - raised its head 
soon after the ruling SWAPO Party gained a two-thirds majority in the second 
national elections in 1994. It was not an outright attack on the Constitution, rather a 
call for “responsible interpretations” of the Constitution. In Foucaultian terms, one 
can speak of a changing myth.546  
In the legal fraternity, this should have been a time of consolidation. The 
South African Constitutional Court was operating parallel to the Namibian superior 
courts and the bigger neighbour gave the Namibian courts inspiration to develop its 
human rights jurisprudence.  The active South African courts played an important 
role in the Namibian constitutional and human rights jurisprudence.  
In the late 1990’s the President decided not to extend the term of Chief 
Justice Mahomed. Judge Johan Strydom, the then Judge-President of the High 
Court of Namibia, replaced Justice Mahomed, as Chief Justice.  No one expected 
much change.  While he was diplomatic and careful not to offend anyone, his 
constitutional approach and human rights interpretation shared the same principles 
and values held by his predecessor and the Supreme Court judges “borrowed” from 
the South African and Zimbabwean benches.   
The maverick on the Namibian High Court Bench, Justice O’Linn, had retired 
and the scene was set for a smooth transition of power and the development of 
Constitutional jurisprudence on the lines set out by the Namibian Supreme Court 
under the leadership of Chief Justice Mahomed. 
The third term debate was short, but ended in a small split in the ruling party. 
A former Deputy Minister and Member of Parliament, the Namibian High 
Commissioner in London, Ben Ulenga, a former permanent secretary and other 
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frustrated party members left the SWAPO Party to form the Congress of 
Democrats.547 
The third term debate ended by interpreting the Constitution in such a way 
that it made constitutional sense. The President was not directly elected in the UN 
elections. He is constitutionally entitled to a second election.  
While the attitude towards the Constitution was gradually changing, there was 
no sign of abandoning it. It was still an important document. It was, however, also a 
time when government officials for the first time clashed openly with the judiciary. 
Yet, at a conference to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Constitution in 
September 2000, the Chief Justice stated that even in the conflict the Constitution 
came out as the winner.548 
The majoritarian argument became more vigorous. The clearest landmark of a 
new approach was the explicit anti-gay rhetoric that marked the third republic. The 
argument  against homosexuality, was not an attack on the Constitution per se, but a 
an issue with the interpretation of Article 10(2):  
- Homosexuals are only protected as individuals. (Unlike the South African 
Constitution, the Namibian Constitution does not refer to sexual 
orientation, but only states that no one shall be discriminated against on 
the grounds of sex.)  
- Another tool for deconstruction is brought in – African culture. Certain 
issues of liberalism, including the modern concepts of democracy and 
individual freedoms ought to be seen as European or Western concepts. It 
does not necessarily comply with African concepts of morality and respect 
for elders. 
Constitutional thinking by the politicians was deeply influenced by the 
atmosphere of transition prevalent in the country at the time. While the 
interpretations of the Courts frustrated Parliament and the executive, the frustrations 
inevitably also lead to new ideas to counter the powers of the courts. 
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In the field of criminal justice, and especially due process, the South African 
influence was felt. The right to legal representation and especially the right to be 
warned of your right to legal representation became an entrenched part of Namibian 
criminal procedural law – despite prosecutorial arguments that unlike South Africa, 
the Namibian Constitution, does not explicitly give an accused the right to be warned 
of his/her right to legal representation.549 
Judgments dealing with the rights of suspects in criminal cases had a 
negative effect on the Namibian people. For some human rights were working 
against law-abiding citizens. Politicians often fuelled the perception. For a small, but 
aggressive group, the Constitution was no longer the vehicle to take the nation to a 
new, liberal, democratic society, but a western document alien to the values and 
norms of Africa. 
 
6.2 The Police Docket: A Break with The Past 
 In S v Scholtz550 the Supreme Court ruled that the State was obliged to 
disclose the content of the police docket.  In the pre-constitutional era the docket 
was considered privileged.551 
 Foreign case law, especially Canadian and the United States of America 
jurisprudence, played an important role in this process. The judgment of the 
honourable Justice Dumbutshena in S v Scholtz illustrates the way in which the 
courts dealt with jurisprudence from other jurisdictions:    
Any system of justice that tolerates procedures and rules that 
put accused persons appearing before the courts at a 
disadvantage by allowing the prosecution to keep relevant 
materials close to its chest in order to spring a trap in the 
process of cross-examining the accused and thereby secure a 
conviction cannot be said to be fair and just. Full disclosure is in 
accord with articles 7 and 12 of the Constitution. It would be 
wrong to maintain a system of justice known to be, in some 
respects, unfair to the accused. The right to disclose has 
acquired a new vigour and protection under the provisions of 
articles 7 and 12 of the Constitution. English cases cited above 
are proof beyond doubt that non disclosure leads to the denial of 
justice.552 
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Scholtz v S, p. 447. 
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The major feature of the judgment is the common custom of disclosure that 
developed in the England and Wales and Canada. In terms of constitutional 
interpretation, the judgment is somewhat of an embarrassment. It relies primarily on 
the development in England and Wales, which jurisdiction had the same privileged 
rules until 1961. However, the jurisdiction has no written Constitution, a fact that the 
judge acknowledged: 
But what is significant for our purposes is that these developments 
have taken place in England and Wales without a Bill of Rights and 
without the benefit of a written Constitution. England has in a very 
significant way moved away from the law in force on 31 May 1961, 
which in terms of our Criminal Procedure Act we still follow and 
enforce.553 
 
 The Scholtz judgment was preceded by a High Court judgment S v Nassar 554 
where the latter has already established that while some aspects of the police docket 
may still contain privileged material.  
The Scholtz judgment was an important transformative approach in criminal 
jurisprudence. Within the framework of article 12 dealing with a fair trial, the 
adversarial process can no longer be seen as a trial between two adversaries, the 
State and the accused. The State, in this case represented by the Office of The 
Prosecutor-General and supported by the Namibian Police, stands in the service of 
the people personified in the Constitution.  
In S v. Kandovazu555 the Supreme Court raised the issue of conflicting 
interests whenever a constitutional irregularity occurs. In this particular case, the 
magistrate affirmed the refusal of the State to disclose the content of a police docket. 
Both the State and the magistrate misinterpreted Art. 140 of the Constitution to 
mean that the South African Appellate Division case of S v. Steyn556  is still binding 
despite the fact that the Supreme Court has declared docket privilege 
unconstitutional. 
After Scholtz the criminal justice system no longer demands technical 
fairness. The Scholtz case ensured that substantive fairness is an imperative from 
the moment a criminal case is registered and not only when the case starts or the 
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accused appears before a magistrate. However, even after 1999 when the Office of 
the PG signed the Human Rights Declaration for Prosecutors, and after the Scholtz 
case, the superior courts still struggled to develop a transformative jurisprudence 
that balance the rights of suspects and victims. While the Silunga and Shikunga 
cases do not contradict each other, the Court worked with opposite hierarchies and 
different fundamental approaches. The transformative challenge need to take 
cognisance of the need of the public to feel safe and to trust the justice system. Yet, 
public opinion may not negate the fair trial jurisprudence of the first fourteen years of 
constitutionalism.  
 
6.3 Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech 
The Kauesa case was in a benchmark decision for Namibia, both in terms of 
the stare decisis rule and the influence it had on later cases dealing with the 
limitation of constitutional rights. The first cases after Kauesa dealt with the 
restriction of freedom of speech to prohibit hate speech.557 Kauesa also set the 
guidelines used in determining the constitutional position on prostitution and other 
immoral practices558 and a limitation of the freedom of expression is cases of 
pornography and explicit sexual objects.559 
The Kauesa case made a firm statement on freedom of expression. In the 
process, the Namibian Supreme Court followed the Canadian example, staying free 
of the egalitarian liberal approach of an almost non-derogated right to freedom of 
speech, but also limited the grounds for derogation extensively.  
The content of freedom of speech has always been a cause of disagreement, 
especially in the United States. Is it absolute or can there be derogations? The 
egalitarian liberals such as Dworkin560 have always insisted that freedom of speech 
is absolute. Anti-Nazi legislation in West Germany influenced Western European 
countries after World War II. It became practice in many states to limit the scope of 
freedom of speech by enacting anti-hate speech legislation.   
The German Penal Code is the extreme example of derogative measures 
limiting free speech. It makes a denial of the Holocaust a crime, prohibits even a 
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debate about the values of Nazism and includes a clear prohibition of racial hate 
speech.561 
With the growth of the pornographic industry in the 1960’s, voices went up in 
the United States to restrict the publishing and distribution of hard-core violent 
pornographic material. The discussion is on-going.  
Kateb argued that pornography and racial hate speech may offend, but it does 
much lees harm than political speeches and religious sermons. Political speeches 
are often just spinning and the politicians have no intention to fulfil their election 
promises. They can humiliate their opponents and create unrealistic expectations. 
Yet, no one will argue that political speeches should be prohibited.  The same, he 
says, goes for religious sermons. It is often authoritarian, fundamentalist and without 
any scientific foundation. It can have extremely negative effects on its listeners. He 
doubted that pornography of hate speech could create nearly as much harm.562 
Feminists on the other hand, have argued that the objectification of the female 
body is enough reason to limit the distribution of pornographic material legally. 
Langton argued that egalitarian liberals such as Dworkin should be in favour of the 
action against pornography. It is destructive because of the degrading and inferior 
attitude towards women.563 
Brugger pointed out that neither constitutional law nor international law 
explicitly and consistently permits or prohibits hate speech.564   He identified two 
possibilities to look at hate speech from an a priori acceptance of the basic principles 
of freedom of speech. The one is the radical American view seeing freedom of 
speech and expression as an almost non-derogable right. These countries prioritise 
freedom of speech over interests such as privacy. On the other hand, several 
western European countries followed Germany and developed anti-hate speech 
legislation. 
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The opposing view, shared by Germany, the member states of 
the Council of Europe, Canada, international law, and a minority 
of U.S. authors, views hate-filled speech as forfeiting some or all 
of its free-speech protection. This group of nations assigns a 
higher degree of protection to the dignity or equality of those 
who are attacked by hate speech than to the verbally aggressive 
speech used to attack them. Under this system, hate speech is 
not only unprotected, it is frequently punishable under criminal 
law, and individuals or groups who are the victims of hate 
speech frequently prevail in court.565 
 
Brugger shows that this development is closely linked to the post-World War II 
experience of the Federal Republic of Germany. The new government and nation 
wanted to distinguish themselves from the previous regime and its hate speech and 
hate crimes.  The Penal Code contains several sections concerning hate speech.566 
The courts allow groups to launch complaints if they can be targets of defamation, if 
one can clearly identify them as a separate group and if every member of the group 
is clearly included in the insults or defamation. It does not have to be a public act, it 
only needs to be in the presence of a third person.567  
Similarly, sections 84 - 91 deals with collective defamation, including 
propaganda by unconstitutional and National Socialist organisation, the display of 
Nazi symbols, including the Nazi salute and the swastika.  
The prohibition of hate speech became the vehicle to get away from the sad 
history of the past. The hate speech provisions are not seen as contradicting the 
freedom of expression clause in the post-war constitution or Grundgesetz (Basic 
Law).568 
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The Kauesa case569 did not deal with hate speech, but with personal 
defamation of senior police officers by a junior staff member of the Namibian police. 
The Supreme Court took an unequivocal decision in favour of the freedom of 
expression. Kauesa did not address the issue of harmful and hate speech in general. 
It dealt with a special case and a specific Act, which the Court felt would limit future 
discussions and debate on issues such as affirmative action and pro-active 
programmes to redress the past. 
After the Kauesa case, Namibian courts were confronted with constitutional 
challenges based on anti-racial discrimination and anti-pornographic legislation, the 
first a product of the independent post-apartheid Parliament, the second based on 
the Calvinist moral legislation dated back to the colonial era.  
In the case of State v Smith and Others570  the constitutionality of yet another 
Act limiting freedom of speech was tested.571 This time it was section 11 of the 
Racial Discrimination Prohibition Act 26 of 1991.  The specific section reads as 
follows:  
(1) No person shall publicly use any language or publish or 
distribute any written matter or display any article or do any act 
or thing with intent to  
 (a) threaten, ridicule or insult any person or group of persons 
on the ground that such person belongs or such group of 
persons belong to a particular racial group; or 
  (b) cause, encourage or incite disharmony or feelings of 
hostility, hatred or ill-will between different racial groups or 
persons belonging to different racial groups;  disseminate ideas 
based on racial superiority’  
 
The case emanated from an advertisement in a Windhoek newspaper 
congratulating the Nazi Rudolph Hess on his birthday. In an obiter dictum in Kauesa 
v Minister of Home Affairs and Others, a full bench of the High Court found section 
11 to be constitutional. However, the Supreme Court overturned the judgment.  
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After defining the sufficiently significant object of the Act, the Court applied the 
tests of the Canadian benchmark case of Rex v Oakes,572 (also applied in the 
Supreme Court Kauesa case). The test needs to determine if the derogations from 
Article 21 (1) and (2) of the Constitution are reasonable and rationally connected to 
the objective. It also established if the right to freedom of expression is impaired as 
little as possible. Lastly the Court looked at the reasonability of the derogation in a 
democratic society.573  
The Court then went on and failed the Act on every requirement. The Court 
clearly saw the Act as a bridge from the old apartheid order to the new democratic, 
constitutional era.574 The significant objective of the Act is the prevention of a 
recurrence of the type of racism and its concomitant practices that prevailed prior to 
independence in this country.  The Act is the bridge to take a racist society from the 
apartheid-based values and morals to a new democratic, constitutional era where 
people are respected, irrespective of the race of ethnic origin.  
Consequently, the Court concluded that groups of persons who never 
featured in the pre-independence of this country and were never part of or a part to 
the social pressure amongst the different peoples cannot not be seen as objects 
justifying the restrictions of freedom of speech described in Article 21 (a) and (b) of 
the Constitution.  The definition of a racial group goes beyond what is required.  In 
this specific case the insult to the Jewish people by the heroic treatment of a Nazi 
war criminal and the sensitivities of the Jewish people are not justification enough to 
derogate from a broad interpretation of the constitutional freedom of speech.  
It is not clear exactly what the Court has in mind when it excludes groups of 
persons – 
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 …who never featured in the pre-independence of this country 
and were never part of or party to the social pressure amongst 
the different people…making up the population that was 
occasioned by the erstwhile racist policies.575  
 
Does it mean that only previous disadvantaged groups can expect the Act to 
protect them from a continuation of the humiliation of the apartheid era? 
Alternatively, does it mean that the Act and its implementation are reserved for all 
the groups who represented different interests before independence?  
In both these instances, the interpretation of the Court seems too narrow. 
While the sad colonial history of Namibia was undoubtedly the inspiration for and 
background to the Act, its objectives seem to be more than just redressing the past. 
It includes a preventative element, something like the slogan of the Jewish people 
after the Holocaust: Never again! In other words, the sufficiently significant objective 
of the Act also includes the prevention of discrimination against all groups, racial and 
ethnic, irrespective of their place and role in pre-independent Namibia.  
The illustrations of the Court revealed the folly of its argument. The animosity 
that Namibians feel towards the Spanish pirating of Namibian fishing resources and 
negative feelings towards the Batswana people as a result of the island dispute 
between Botswana and Namibia,576  should not be protected by the Act. Protecting 
these two groups can clearly not be related to the prevention of racism or social 
pressure between groups of people within Namibia.   
However, since these animosities can easily change into xenophobia and 
discrimination against all Batswana living in Namibia, or worst, including Tswana-
speaking Namibians, a broad interpretation of the term racial group is necessary to 
cross the bridge from a racist to a non-racial society.   
The Jewish community, once a major role player in the Namibian society, 
have dwindled to a very small, yet influential group in Namibia. Taken the Namibian 
history, including the strong National Socialist Party that operated in Namibia before 
and during World War II, as well as the fact that they are a very small minority, their 
sensitivities to the advertisement was not taken into account.577 
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When the South African version of this Act, the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, was discussed in an open forum of the Joint 
Committee of Parliament, the Jewish Board of Deputies in South Africa, requested 
that hate speech be criminalised,578 a clear indication that the Jewish community still 
experience abuse in South Africa.  
Following the Oakes case, the Court criticized the Act for not allowing 
language or publications that may be offensive to certain groups, if the facts contain 
therein are true. Offensive language or even views shocking and disturbing to the 
State or sectors of the population are needed to build a democratic society.     
The Namibian Act, unlike the Canadian Criminal Code,579 does not make 
provision for statements that may cause disharmony, but are intended to oppose and 
remove racist practices. Consequently, the Court found that the Act as it stands does 
not impair as little as possible freedom of expression in that it inhibits and stifles 
public debate on important issues such as affirmative action and historical 
assessments. Section 11(1) is overbroad and unconstitutional. 
The State did not appeal against the judgment and Parliament opted to 
amend the Act. The amendments followed the case almost to the letter.580    The 
new section 14 (2) exonerates racist language and publication envisage in section 
11(1) if it a subject of public interest, part of a public debate and the truth or on 
reasonable grounds believed to be true. It also excludes prosecution if someone 
contravenes section 11(1) with the intention to improve race relations and to remove 
racial insult, tension and hatred.581 
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different racial groups; or  
(c) Disseminate ideas based on racial superiority. 
(2) No person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (1) of section 11: 
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The exclusions are extremely broad. It is no surprise that no prosecutions took 
place under section 11(1) since the Smith case. Even in cases where prosecution 
should at least be considered, neither the public nor the authorities even mentioned 
prosecution under the Act. 
A case in point is the outburst of SWAPO councillor Mandume Pohamba 
against the Oukanyama Traditional Authority.582 Pohamba called them sell-outs and 
traitors, having betrayed the liberation struggle. He added that they are working 
against the wishes of the majority.   He also threatened that SWAPO will act against 
teachers and public servants who join the new political party, RDP.  
The chair of the Traditional Authority, George Nelulu, complained in a letter 
addressed to the governor. Mr. Nelulu used the words of section 11(1) in his petition: 
People like Pohamba are sowing seeds of hatred, ethnic division and tension, and 
engage in hate speech that stirs political tensions.583 
The background to the attack is the border tensions between the two major 
Ovambo tribes, the Ovakwanyama and the Aandongas, as well as a growing tension 
between a new political party of former SWAPO leader Hidipo Hamutenya, Rally for 
Development and Progress and the ruling party.  
Human rights activist Phil Ya Nangolo saw it as part of a systematic 
marginalisation of the Oukwanyama people.584  While several people, including the 
Traditional Authority, took offense to the statements of Mr. Pohamba, no one even 
mentioned the possibility of prosecution under section 11(1) of the Act. Neither the 
police nor the Office of the Prosecutor-General made any effort to take the matter 
further.  Did the Namibian public lose faith in the Act after it had been amended? 
Alternatively, did the narrow understanding of the objectives of the Act by the 
bench in the Smith case play a role? Do the public and law enforcement agencies 
limit the Act to white on black hate speech? Do the historical disparity and the 
                                                                                                                                       
(a) If the act complained of was, at the time of the commission thereof, relevant to any subject of 
public interest, the discussion of which was for public benefit, and if on reasonable grounds 
such person believed the statement or statements concerned to be true; or 
(b) If such person, in good faith and with the intention of removing matters tending - 
(i) To threaten or to insult any racial group or any person belonging to such racial group; or  
(ii) To cause, encourage or incite hatred between different racial groups or between persons 
belonging to different racial groups, pointed out such matters; or 
(c) If it is established that the language, publication or distribution complained of communicated 
the truth and that the main purpose thereof was to so communicate the truth and not to cause 
any of the acts referred to in that subsection. 
582
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apartheid society determine what racism in Namibia is?  While the Court’s view that 
the Act should only deal with discrimination against previously disadvantaged 
Namibians did not find its way to the amendment of the Act, it seems to be an 
interpretive tool in deciding on prosecution.  
In 2005 activist Methusal Matunda or Malcolm X Matutanda, carried a placard 
during a public demonstration in Windhoek saying: Kill all whites. He stated the 
reason for his placard at the court (after his first appearance)-585 
The intention was to solicit the support of black people to 
employ that strategy, because the Mau Mau school of thought, 
of which I’m the head, believes that killing all white people is the 
only way that we will get people to take black people seriously.  
  
While the facts seem to be clear, the case was postponed several times and 
eventually withdrawn to give the police more time for investigation. It is unlikely that 
the Prosecutor-General considered the facts of the case to be one of the exceptions 
of Art 14 of the Act that will make prosecution impossible. Mr. Matutanda can hardly 
be said to believe on reasonable grounds that the killing of whites is a practical 
necessity in Namibia. Neither can his harsh position be an invitation to meaningful 
debate, for his outrages position obviously excludes debate. The only logical 
conclusion one can draw from the withdrawal of the case is that the unfortunate 
narrow perception of the objectives has limited the application of the Act to such an 
extent that aggrieved Namibians opted rely on the old common law remedy of crimen 
injuria.  
In preparation for their eighth states report to Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the treaty body requested Namibia to 
explain why no prosecutions took place under the Racial Discrimination Prevention 
Act.586  In response, Namibia blamed the amendments to the Act.587  The report 
goes on to point out that it is no longer an offence to ridicule anyone on the grounds 
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that such person belongs or such persons belong to a particular racial group as 
originally provided for in section 11 (1) (a) of the act. Neither is it an offence to 
cause, encourage and incite disharmony or feelings of hostility or ill will between 
different racial groups or persons belonging to different racial groups as originally 
provided for in section 11 (1) (b).588 
Aggrieved people who were insulted and humiliated on the grounds of their 
race or belonging to a specific group lost the remedy of section 11 of the Racial 
Discrimination Amendment Act. The Prosecutor-General had to go back to the 
common law crime of crimen injuria to be able to prosecute in cases of hate speech, 
racial or group humiliation or offensive actions. The alternative was to follow the 
egalitarian position and see freedom of speech as an absolute right.  
The existence of the Racial Discrimination Prohibition Act is a clear indication 
that government did not want to go that way. Both the Kauesa Supreme Court case 
and the Smith case agreed that freedom of speech is not absolute. However, the 
amendment of the Act almost closed the door on derogations in cases of hate 
speech and cases of racial or group ridicule or humiliation. 
The Smith case, while following Kauesa in its broad interpretation of freedom 
of expression, made some crucial legal errors. The understanding of the Act as a 
mere bridge to take Namibia from its apartheid past to a democratic society is but 
one of the intentional objectives of the Act. Not only the oppressed of the previous 
dispensation need protection against racial discrimination. Examples of oppressed 
turned oppressor abound. Those groups who were not part of the Namibian scene in 
the pre-independent era – the economic refugees from other African countries, 
political refugees  and foreigners working in Namibia, are all vulnerable and in need 
of protection against racial discrimination. Even the big Oukwanyama tribe may 
become vulnerable if political opponents attack them.589   
It makes no legal sense to limit the application of the Racial Discrimination Act 
to the pre-1990 context. The Act itself needs a thorough redraft. To make truth an 
exception to the violations of Section 11(1) does not make sense either. In which 
form can the truth be justification for insulting a group or for creating disharmony, 
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hostility or hatred between groups? Was the judge thinking of references to the 
historical oppression of the majority of the people by the white minority?  
If so, why do we need the truth test? The mere fact that something is true 
does not mean that it cannot stir emotions and eventually result in abuse of people 
on the ground of their race or ethnic origin. Think of the mentioned Kill all whites 
placard. Would the placard be more acceptable if the author added, “Because they 
committed genocide against us during the German Herero War and oppressed us 
during the apartheid era”? Alternatively, if a public speaker claims that that whites 
can never be trusted because of the colonial and apartheid histories, will the 
utterance escape prosecution because of the historical truth of an oppressive pre-
independent society?   
The fact that the Act demands a public statement or publication (an 
expression of his constitutional right…..), also made it difficult to prosecute offenders. 
It seems as the Office of the Prosecutor-General interprets this section extremely 
narrow. The Namibian State Report comments that the public element of section 
11(1) is also problematic for prosecutors and one of the reasons why no 
prosecutions were instituted.590 
The problem lies in the interpretation of the word “publicly”. During the 
author’s period of employment in the Office of the PG, the police forwarded a docket 
to the Office for decision concerning racial remarks by headmaster of a school to a 
teacher.591 The suspect’s lawyer submitted a request for withdrawal. He argued that 
the only way to give meaning to the word “publicly” is to interpret it as a statement in 
an open forum or publication accessible to the public.  
In terms of this interpretation, a staff room of a high school does not qualify to 
be a public place. It is a closed meeting only for staff members. Publicly demands 
something more - a public lecture, speaking at a rally, etc. The prosecutorial 
authority possibly accepted this narrow interpretation, hence the comment in the 
state report. Usually speech legislation goes further than that.  The Canadian 
Criminal Code uses the words statements other than in private conversations.592 The 
German Penal Code makes provision for a heavier sentence if a conviction 
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emanates from a public statement, but also criminalises private statements.593 The 
South African Act also excludes the word publicly.594 
Since the Act only applies to public utterances, the most vulnerable people 
are not assisted in their quest for self-worth and the eradication of racist and 
discriminatory language used against them.  The workers on a building site, or a 
farm, or in a factory, are extremely vulnerable. Yet, the Act does not help them. Their 
only remedy remains the common law crime of criminal injuria, as the Namibian 
State Report to CERD has indicated. 
 
6.4 Reaction from the Government 
 Given the time of the judgment, it is surprising that the State did not appeal. 
The best explanation for their decision is possibly the fact that the Smith decision 
seems to be in line with the strong defence of freedom of expression in the Kauesa 
case. However, the Kauesa case never intended to be an egalitarian option for 
unrestricted freedom of expression. The proportionality test of the Oakes case was 
used and within the historical context of post-apartheid Namibia the Supreme Court 
decided that Regulation 58(32) was an over breath, its objective is obscured by its 
over breadth and … there is no rational connection between the restriction and the 
objective.595 
The Court made it clear that an unfavourable report, which is true, cannot be 
seen in the same light as an untruthful unfavourable report. In terms of section 
58(32) of the Police Regulation 58(32), however, any unfavourable report by a police 
officer constitutes a breach of the Regulation.596  As pointed out above, this should 
not apply to the Racial Discrimination Prohibition Act.  
 A better way to approach the Racial Discrimination Prohibition Act would have 
been to make the objectives clear in the amendment, which did not happen. The 
South African Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 4 of 2000, did not only include 
a long preamble, but also a section explaining the objectives.597 
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 A preamble, similar to the South African one, could have helped to clarify the 
differences between the Kauesa judgment and the Act. The first paragraph of the 
South African Act refers to the historical inequalities, the second points to the fact 
that progress has been made in restructuring and transforming society, systemic 
inequalities and unfair discrimination remain deeply embedded in social structures, 
practices and attitudes, undermining the aspirations of our constitutional 
democracy.598  The last paragraph of the Preamble expresses the need caring and 
compassionate relationships and guiding principles: 
This Act endeavours to facilitate the transition to a democratic 
society, united in its diversity, marked by human relations that 
are caring and compassionate, and guided by the principles of 
equality, fairness, equity, social progress, justice, human dignity 
and freedom. 
 
If a Preamble similar to the South African Act and its objectives were made 
part of the Act, most of the amendments might have been unnecessary. While a 
democratic society needs an open interaction on ideas and ideology, and especially 
issues relevant to the restructuring and transformation of the post-apartheid society, 
it also needs to take cognizance of the importance of relationships built on equality, 
fairness, human dignity and freedom. In that sense the emphasis on a free and 
aggressive right to debate all aspects of a transforming process, and the 
simultaneous emphasis on the equality and dignity of the debating partners do not 
contradict each other.  
In South Africa, the anti-hate speech sections of the Act survived an 
amendment in 2002. The academic debate moved away from the mere question on 
how to minimize the application of the restrictions on freedom of speech. It now 
deals with more substantive issues such as the question if the word “harm” in the Act 
refers to physical harm only or includes psychological harm as well, whether hate 
                                                                                                                                       
(c) to provide for measures to facilitate the eradication of unfair discrimination, hate speech and 
harassment. particularly on the grounds of race, gender and disability; 
(d) to provide for procedures for the determination of circumstances under which discrimination is 
unfair: 
(e) to provide for measures to educate the public and raise public awareness on the importance of 
promoting equality and overcoming unfair discrimination, hate speech and harassment; 
(f) to provide remedies for victims of unfair discrimination, hate speech and harassment and persons 
whose right to equality has been infringed. 
598
Preamble to South African Act 4 of 2000. 
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speech can advice freedom of expression.599 These issues have, unfortunately never 
been discussed in Namibia.  
Another reason for the reluctance of Parliament or the executive to improve 
the Act and to make it a workable instrument in combating racism and ethnic 
prejudice may be the growing intolerance in the SWAPO Party at the time. From 
1997 Namibian politicians often used language against homosexuals. At the opening 
of the third SWAPO Women's Council Congress at Gobabis in December 1996 Pres. 
Nujoma accused homosexuals of exploiting the country's democracy. He 
encouraged the Women's Council to condemn and reject what he described as 
foreign influences and corrupt ideologies.600 
 The attack of the President came as a surprise to many. Before this speech, 
most Namibians took it for granted that sexual orientation is protected by the non-
discriminatory clause of the Namibian Constitution. It only later turned out in the 
Frank case that the Supreme Court thought otherwise.601 
Other ministers and prominent party members later joined Pres. Nujoma in 
regular attacks.602 The verbal attacks against homosexuals and lesbians went on 
well into the 21st century.603 
 The possibility that senior politicians may find themselves on the wrong side 
of the law was a real threat if the Act was implemented aggressively. On the other 
hand, would the Courts go along with the obiter dictum of Judge Frank that the 
wording “a group of persons” is too broad? Would a case against Parliamentarians 
have failed because homosexuals and lesbians were not part of the previously 
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disadvantaged groups? Alternatively, can one make out a case for the fact that many 
discriminatory laws existed in the colonial era and therefore the homosexuals should 
be allowed (unlike the Jewish community) to use the remedies of the Act? 
 The real question that needs an answer is if the outcome of the case 
strengthened the principles embedded in the Constitution. To use the ideological 
symbolism of Woolman and Davis: Is the ideology of the Smith case also the 
ideology of the Namibian Constitution? 
As we have seen, Woolman and Davis identified the ideology of the South 
African constitution as Creole liberalism, in other words a liberalism embedded in the 
ideals and dreams of the majority. In the Kauesa case, the Supreme Court moved 
away from the individualistic morality of the High Court. In the High Court, liberal 
morality makes the unenumerated right of dignity the pinnacle of the pyramid of 
rights. The dignity of the police officers becomes the issue to be decided on. As the 
High Court put it in the earlier case of (Col. Jumbo) Smit v Windhoek Observer and 
Others: 
A (sic) organisation which, it is alleged, is the organisation 
responsible for a murder which that very same police officer was 
charged with investigating. If there is anything more damaging 
then it is to allege that that police officer, in the course of his 
investigation, was also responsible for charging an innocent 
man with the murder so as to enable the real culprits to evade 
punishment.604 
 
 In this 1991 case, the Court did not even look at the political significance of 
the report in the Windhoek Observer. Acheson, the recently released Irish citizen 
suspected of killing SWAPO activist Anton Lubowski only a few months before 
independence, claimed in a South African newspaper that the investigating officer in 
the case, the late Col. Jumbo Smit was a member of the covert paramilitary 
organisation, the Central Cooperative Bureau (CCB).  It emanated in the Acheson 
case that the Prosecutor-General could not go on with the case against Acheson 
without joining several members of the CCB. Since the South African government 
was not willing to extradite them, the Prosecutor-General withdrew the case.  
If the Court followed the ideological approach of the Supreme Court in the 
Kauesa case, preference should have been given to open debate and a free flow of 
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information for the benefit of the truth. Many of the other statements made by 
Acheson turned out to be possibly true - especially that he did not kill Lubowski.605 
Yet, because of the dignity of the police officer and the harm that the 
publication of the article may do to his career and his person, the Court decided not 
to go into the basic constitutional issues. The fact that both respondents opted not to 
defend the case also had an influence on the outcome. Since the defence did not 
raise the issue of constitutionality, the court was entitled to grant summary judgment. 
It is unfortunate for a jurisprudence of constitutional hate speech and defamation that 
the case did not go on trial. It could have given the Namibian people some guidelines 
on the legal position on freedom of expression after the first Smith case. It is, 
however an indication that the public will be reluctant to lay charges under the 
Prohibition of Racial Discrimination Act. Instead, they will retrieve to traditional 
remedies such as crimen injuria and civil defamation. 
The Smith case closed the door on the hate speech section of the Prohibition 
of Racial Discrimination Act. If the intention of the Act was to create a non-racial 
society, it failed dismally. Even if the bar was set much lower and the intention was 
just to protect vulnerable people from racial abuse, the judgment is a 
disappointment. Instead of a transformative judgment, the Namibian people received 
an amended Act with limited scope to prevent verbal racial abuse.    
 
6.5 Constitutional issues that did not end in Court 
 The late nineties can be described as a rising storm that passed by. Three 
major constitutional issues were solved outside the Courts:  
- The third term for President Nujoma;  
- The homosexual issue; and 
- The proposed Abortion Bill.  
 
6.5.1 The Third Term 
The debate on the third term of the founding President resulted in a 
constitutional amendment without any real constitutional challenge. The reason the 
SWAPO Party presented to the people, made constitutional sense. While the 
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Constitution restricts the terms of the President to two terms, the founding President 
was in a unique position. The people directly elect the President of the Republic of 
Namibia.  
The majority of the people accepted the explanation that the people did not 
elect President Nujoma as the first president. As a transitional arrangement, the 
Constituent Assembly became the first National Assembly of Namibia and the leader 
of the majority party became the first President. Consequently, since the people of 
Namibia did not elect President Nujoma twice, he deserved the opportunity to make 
himself available for election a second election.  The Congress of Democrats, an 
offshoot from SWAPO, used it as campaign tool without significant success.606 
 
6.5.2  The Homosexual Issue 
It is not clear why President Nujoma and others started an aggressive verbal 
campaign against homosexuals in the mid 1990’s. The judgments of the High and 
Supreme Courts regarding the homosexual issue will be discussed below. Two 
issues in the region possibly resulted in the change of attitude towards homosexuals 
and lesbians: 
- President Mugabe’s aggression against homosexuals went off well in 
Zimbabwe (and the rest of Africa) after the disgust of the nation seeing 
their first president prosecuted for sodomy;607 
- The South African approach to matters such as gay marriages, financial 
rights to gay partners of public servants and adoption rights by 
cohabitating gay couples, were just too liberal for the SWAPO lead 
government. Bearing in mind the influence of the South African 
Constitutional Court and other superior courts in South Africa on the 
Namibian jurisprudence, the sudden homophobic statements might have 
been an explicit attempt to stop a liberal approach in the Namibian 
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courts.608 As we shall see, if it was a strategy of the ruling party, it turned 
out to be successful.  
Robson quoted the generally accepted neo-liberal concept of sexual freedom 
as the protection of sex between two persons who are consenting adults committed 
in the privacy of the home and thus causing no harm to others. This definition, she 
asserts, should exclude the criminalisation of adultery, miscegenation, and 
sodomy.609 
The Namibian politicians managed to keep the contradiction between sexual 
freedom and not challenging the constitutionality of sodomy in balance during the 
nineties. The police did not arrest adult same sex partners for committing the crime 
of sodomy, as long as it happened in the privacy of the home. Although President 
Nujoma and several other senior ministers made derogatory statements against 
homosexuals, there was never a public debate on the necessity for legal action 
against homosexuals. Sodomy was still a common law crime in Namibia, but seldom 
enforced. While South Africans debated the constitutionality of the common law 
crime of sodomy, the issue came to the legal fraternity in Namibia as a secondary 
concern. The Legal Assistance Centre (LAC) wanted to distribute condoms in the 
male sections of Namibian prisons, but needed permission from the Office of the 
Prosecutor-General to do so. Public opinion was divided on the issue. The LAC and 
AIDS activists saw the distributions of condoms as an imperative to save lives. Since 
Namibia has been following South Africa in most constitutional issues, some 
members of the legal fraternity believed that it was only a matter of time before the 
crime of sodomy will also be declared unconstitutional.  
The Windhoek Central Prison requested the Office of the Prosecutor-General 
to provide them with a legal opinion. The Prosecutor-General, against the advice of 
the majority of his staff,610 decided against allowing the LAC to distribute condoms in 
the prisons. His motivation was clear: The Prosecutor-General cannot assist people 
committing a crime while serving a prison sentence. 
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The reluctance of the Prosecutor-General had two sides: He possibly 
suspected that that the Supreme Court may eventually find that the word sex in the 
non-discriminatory clause of the Constitution did not mean sexual orientation, but 
only gender (male female). A stronger motivation for taking the conservative option 
was possibly because the common law crime of rape is gender exclusive. In other 
words, males could not be raped. Consequently, until the Combating of Rape Act,611 
a male raping another male would not stand trial for rape. In those cases prosecutors 
preferred to prosecute the accused for committing the crime of sodomy rather than 
indecent assault, since sodomy was seen by the courts as a more serious crime. 
However, the anti-gay rhetoric was not without legal and jurisprudential 
consequences. The fact that politicians used hate speech as a weapon against 
homosexual practices may have had some consequences for the Namibian 
legislation.  The State did not appeal against the judgment of S v Smith, although 
there were good legal and moral reasons to do so. As I have pointed out, the 
limitations on criminal liability, set by the Smith case, suited the government well. If 
the High Court did not limit the application of the Racial Discrimination Prohibition 
Act, some politicians may have found themselves on the wrong side of the law. 
In an ironic way, the anti-gay rhetoric of this period paved the way for the 
jurisprudence of the Frank case.612 When the Supreme Court had to determine the 
norms and values of the Namibian people in relation to same sex relationships, the 
Court made the following comment: 
In contrast, as alleged by the respondents, the President of 
Namibia as well as the Minister of Home Affairs, have expressed 
themselves repeatedly in public against the recognition and 
encouragement of homosexual relationships.  As far as they are 
concerned, homosexual relationships should not be encouraged 
because that would be against the traditions and values of the 
Namibian people and would undermine those traditions and 
values.  It is a notorious fact of which this Court can take judicial 
notice that when the issue was brought up in Parliament, 
nobody on the Government benches, which represent 77 
percent of the Namibian electorate, made any comment to the 
contrary.613 
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 Thus, while the initial hate speech and anti-gay rhetoric had no immediate 
legal consequences, it laid the foundation for the later interpretation of Article 10 (2) 
of the Constitution. 
 
6.5.3 The Abortion Issue 
 When Namibia became independent, the South African Abortion and 
Sterilization Act (1975) dealt with legal issues of abortion. The basic rule amounted to 
the illegality of abortion, allowing specified exceptions. Exceptions were strictly 
monitored and limited to the following circumstances: 
(i)  When a pregnancy endangers a mother’s life or constitutes a 
permanent threat to her physical health;  
(ii) When the continued pregnancy constitutes a serious threat to the 
mother’s mental health; 
(iii) When there exists a serious risk that the child will be born with an 
irreparably seriously handicapped (physical or mental); 
(iv)  When the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest);  
(v) When the mother suffers from a permanent mental handicap that 
makes her unable to comprehend the implications of the 
pregnancy or bear the parental responsibility. 
 
In 1996, government released a draft Abortion and Sterilization Bill for 
discussion. The Minister of Health and Social Services, Dr Libertine Amathila, and 
the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, Dr Kalumbi Shangula, campaigned for 
three years to convince the Namibian people that the Bill – following a strong liberal, 
pro-choice approach – was the way forward for Namibia.614  
The churches reacted immediately. The opposition to the Bill was 
overwhelming across denominational and confessional lines.  In the North, the 
respected pro-SWAPO Bishop Kleopas Dumeni of the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
in Namibia supported the opposition, as did Former Secretary General for the 
Council of Churches of Namibia and respected Lutheran pastor, Dr Ngeno 
Nakamhela.615 
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In April 1999, the Minister set out on a countrywide tour to address public 
meetings on the Bill. She only visited Otjiwarongo. The opposition was so strong that 
she cancelled her tour and dropped the Bill because she felt that 99% of the 
population was against it.616  Women groups objected to the tabulation of 99%, 
which was an overestimation of the numbers of the pro-life group. The opposition to 
the Bill was nevertheless overwhelming.  
In an editorial, the Namibian admitted that the vast majority of the population 
opposed the Bill, but blamed middle-aged male church leaders for the populist 
campaign against the legislation. The newspaper suggested that the abortion issue 
could compare with the South African Constitutional Court case of State v 
Makwanyane,617 where the Court abolished the death penalty despite strong public 
support for it.618 In November 2002, the Minister stated again that abortion will not be 
legalised in Namibia for at least the next ten years, because of the strong opposition 
against it.619 
The abortion issue was the first serious clash between government and the 
churches. The churches that supported the struggle and those who were conspiring 
with the South African occupational forces, stood together. It was clear for the outset 
that the Catholic Church cannot go against the Vatican’s opposition to abortion. Yet, 
government hoped for the support of the leaders of the black Lutheran churches and 
the Anglican Church. Had they supported the Bill, government could have pushed 
the legislation through.  
The strong values of the majority of the churches on abortion were never 
tested in court. The churches were willing to challenge constitutionality of the 
Abortion Bill in the light of Article 6 of the Constitution. The wording of Article 6 differs 
substantially from the South Africa protection of life section: 
                Namibia:           South Africa: 
 The right to life shall be protected.                 Everyone has the right to life. 
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 The differences are obvious. The Namibian Constitution gives an idea of a 
future right that is protected. For the moment, it is not necessary for the Courts to 
make a decision on the meaning of the words. Until the churches either changed 
their position or lost their influence, it is unlikely that the government will proceed 
with the Bill. 
 
6.6   Conflict in the House: Government and the Judiciary 
The first serious Constitutional conflict between the judiciary and the 
government erupted in Ngoma v Minister of Home Affairs.620 The accused were 
asylum seekers who played in a band, the Osire Stars, and appeared at a rally of the 
Congress of Democrats. The police obtained an arrest warrant and upon a motion 
application, Justice Shilungwe interdicted the Minister of Home Affairs from arresting 
the asylum seekers or removing them from the Osire refugee camp. 
The Minister of Home Affairs reacted to the judgment by stating that he would 
withdraw the work permits of some foreign judges he perceived to be "working 
against the best intentions of the government".621  A statement by the Minister of 
Justice, Dr N Tjiriange, that a judge performs his/her judicial functions based on a 
presidential appointment and not a work permit, soon followed his statement.  Dr 
Tjiriange further said that the Minister reacted upon a factual incorrect report that he 
received from an official. He also stated that the minister apologized to the judges, a 
fact that the Chief Justice Strydom confirmed.622  
The so-called Sikunda case623 was even more dramatic. Sikunda was one of 
a group of alleged UNITA members who were in police custody in Dordabis. On 10 
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October 2000, the Minister of Home Affairs informed José Domingo Sikunda that his 
“activities and presence in the Republic of Namibia endanger the security of the state 
and that he was declared a prohibited immigrant” and his “removal from the Republic 
of Namibia” was ordered.  A week later, the Minister issued a warrant of detention on 
his letterhead stamped by the Inspector-General.  
On 24 October 2000 Sikunda’s son brought an urgent application for his 
release to the High Court of Namibia, which the High Court granted. The State did 
not defend the application. Despite the court order, Sikunda remained in detention.  
Sikunda’s son brought a new application for his father’s release. Judge 
President Teek postponed the case in November without taking any action 
whatsoever. He was severely criticised by the Society of Advocates of Namibia and 
several newspaper editorials, which led him to withdraw from the case mero motu, 
claiming that his credibility as a Judge had been tainted.   
On 9 February 2001, two junior judges of the High Court found the Minister 
guilty of contempt of court and ordered the immediate release of Sikunda. Sikunda 
was freed 108 days after Justice Manyarara initially ordered his release. 
In giving his judgment, Justice Mainga made the following comment: 
I have no doubt that he wilfully and contemptuously refused to 
comply with the court order. There is no authority, none 
whatsoever, for the proposition that an order which is wrongly 
granted by this court can be lawfully defied for whatever 
laudable motive.  
All orders of this court, whether correctly or incorrectly granted, 
have to be obeyed until they are properly set aside… 
Judgments, orders, are what the courts are all about.  The 
effectiveness of a court lies in execution of its judgments and 
orders. You frustrate or disobey a court order, you strike at one 
of the foundations that established and founded the State of 
Namibia. The collapse of rule of law in any country is the birth of 
anarchy. The rule of law is a cornerstone of the existence of any 
democratic government and should be proudly guarded and 
protected.624 
 
Referring to international law, the Court rejected Ekandjo's claims that he had 
no choice but to disobey the court order because Namibia must first comply with its 
obligations under United Nations sanctions against UNITA. The UN resolutions or 
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any international obligation that the State may have is still subservient to the 
Namibian Constitution, the Court ruled. 
The Court quoted the late Chief Justice Mahomed with regard to the 
importance of the rule of law and constitutionalism. The government appealed 
against the judgment of Judge Manjarara (Judges Mainga and Hoff did not go into 
the merits of the case). On 21 February 2002 the Supreme Court confirmed the 
judgment of the High Court.  
In a further blow, the court ordered Government to pay Sikunda's legal costs 
on an attorney and own client scale. The Sikunda case is an ironic repetition of the 
Katofa saga of the 1980’s. Although the remedy that the Sikunda family asked for 
was never referred to as a habeas corpus writ, this is almost a textbook example of 
the writ. Unlike the previous Namibian cases, the Court did not concentrate on the 
form or structure of the application. The issue in the Katofa case, whether the 
application should be the English law remedy or the Roman Dutch homine libero et 
exhibendo did not feature at all. 
While the political landscape has changed dramatically, the similarities 
between the two cases are obvious: An enemy of the state is identified and detained 
under special legislation – a security proclamation in the first instance and a United 
Nations Resolution in the second. In both cases, the special circumstances are 
supposed to justify the unconstitutional detention of someone perceived to be an 
enemy of the State. In both cases, the government based its refusal on procedural 
aspects rather than the one basic relevant question in a habeas corpus application: 
Is the prisoner in legal custody that complies with the Constitution? 
In both cases, counsel for the applicants emphasised the importance of 
speedy procedures to limit the incarceration of the person. In both cases, the State 
claimed that there are procedural reasons why they cannot release the prisoner – 
even if the State cannot guarantee a trial in a reasonable time.  
The insistence of the State to keep Sikunda in custody seems even more 
ridiculous than the Katofa case. At the time of the arrest, UNITA was no longer a 
threat to Namibia, and Sikunda had been in the country since the early 1970’s. The 
insistence of the Minister that international law forces the government to keep 
Sikunda in prison, makes no legal sense either. Sikunda was not an insurgent. He 
was a legal Namibian resident and the Minister did not explain the exact threat that 
he posed to Namibia. Since the State did not file to defend the application, the Court 
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was compelled to give summary judgment in the initial application before Justice 
Manyarara. 
While the Judge-President made a big issue about his meru motu withdrawal, 
Judges Hoff and Mainga ignored the issues that could blur the real question: Was 
Sikunda in legal custody? It was immaterial to the position of Sikunda whether the 
newspapers and the Society of Advocates who criticised Judge Teek were in 
contempt of court or not. More important was the question: Is the Minister in 
contempt? 
The fact that the Judge-President was reluctant to release Sikunda, is a clear 
indication that it was a sensitive issue. While the High Court rejected the 
international law issue, there are indications that the African Commission was at 
least willing to give the issue a hearing had the Namibian government decided to go 
to the Commission for relief.625 However, before approaching the Commission, the 
Minister still had to exhaust all local remedies, including appealing to the Supreme 
Court.  
The High Court gave a transformative judgment, breaking the technical 
“national security” approach of the pre-independent South African Supreme Court of 
Appeal in the Katofa case. The Sikunda case was transformative in many ways. It 
revived the habeas corpus writ and confirmed the independence and boldness of the 
Namibian High Court in its adjudication of the Namibian Constitution.  The issue was 
clear – Was Sikunda in legal detention? The Court had no reason to move beyond 
the clear wording of the Constitution.  
The Sikunda judgment was a clear message to government to honour the 
separation of power and that members of cabinet are not above the law. Since the 
Minister involved was also responsible for the Ngoma crisis, the ruling of the High 
Court finding that the Minister of Home Affairs was in contempt for not releasing 
Sikunda, is an important landmark in the jurisprudential development of an 
independent judiciary.  
 
6.7   The Powers of the Attorney General and Prosecutor-General Revisited 
The government’s discontent with the Prosecutor-General was growing during 
2001. The conflict moved to the public sphere in January 2002 when the Prosecutor-
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General informed the press that although he had turned 65 the previous year, he 
could not resign since he received a letter from the President in 1996.626  changing 
his tenure of service to become the same as that of a judge, meaning that he has to 
serve for eight years in terms of the High Court Act. That left him with an additional 
two years before he can resign or retire. 
The Minister of Justice and the Attorney General disputed his interpretation on 
national radio and television.627 The predominantly black Prosecutors Association of 
Namibia followed with several statements accusing the Prosecutor-General of racism 
and misconduct.  
When it became clear that the Prosecutor-General was correct in his 
submissions, the Attorney General started a process of negotiations that lead to an 
agreement that the Prosecutor-General will terminate his services on 31 July 
2002.628 The Attorney General simultaneously introduced legislation that would allow 
the Minister and Attorney General to issue certificates to long serving   magistrates 
and prosecutors respectively. The certificates would give them entrance to the legal 
profession as legal practitioners without doing the prescribed course and the 
prescribed attachment to an admitted legal practitioner. 
The opposition blocked the Bill initially on technical grounds. When it became 
clear that it would not be passed before the Prosecutor-General terminates his 
services, the Attorney General requested him to remain in his post until November 
2002.629 The Attorney General made no secret of the fact the she wanted to give the 
Deputy Prosecutor-General of the North, Adv M Imalwa an opportunity to be 
considered as successor for the Prosecutor-General, and that it was therefore 
necessary to pass the Bill, since Adv Imalwa was not an admitted legal practitioner – 
a Constitutional prerequisite for the post of Prosecutor-General.630 
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Parliament passed the Bill despite severe criticism from, the Law Society of 
Namibia and the black Law Association of Namibia.631  When Adv Imalwa was still 
not admitted at the end of November 2002, the President appointed former Deputy 
Prosecutor-General, Adv John Walters as temporary Prosecutor-General form 1 
December 2002.632 The Attorney General denied that she favoured any specific 
candidate.  
Both the Law Society of Namibia and the Namibian Law Association 
eventually challenged the Bill in Court because they believed it was tailor-made for 
one person, Adv Imalwa, and as such undermines the independence of the 
prosecutorial authority.  
A full bench of the High Court of Namibia rejected the application. The Court 
concluded that the wording of the Act is such that one cannot conclude that the Act 
only benefitted Adv Imalwa. It had a broad application, including all experienced 
prosecutors and magistrates.633  
The President appointed Adv Imalwa as the second Prosecutor-General of 
Namibia, a position she took up on 2 January 2004. The earlier case forced to deal 
with the succession process in terms of the law.  Despite her dismay with the PG’s 
refusal to leave office when he reached the age of 65, she had to respect the 
independence of his Office. While her preferred candidate eventually became PG, 
the role players in the judicial system did not make it easy. Only after the High Court 
has considered a constitutional challenge brought by both law societies, could the 
AG implement the amendment to the Legal Practitioners Act. 
However, the judgment of the Supreme Court was extremely narrow. It only 
considered the wording of the Act. While the Chief Justice assigned acting judges 
from South Africa to sit on the bench, the opposition of both the Law Society and the 
Namibia Law Association was an indication of opposition within the legal fraternity to 
the amendment of the Legal Practitioners Act.634 Had the Supreme Court bench 
looked beyond the mere wording of the Amendment Act, and taken cognisance of 
the political significance of the Minister’s conduct, it is highly unlikely that they could 
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have concluded that the amendment was meant to serve all experienced magistrates 
and prosecutors rather than paving the way for one prosecutor to be ready for higher 
office. The extension of the agreed term of the PG and the appointment of an Acting 
PG could not have served any purpose other than allowing the amendment to 
become law before the Judicial Service Commission made a   recommendation to 
the President for a new PG. 
The Supreme Court judgment was an unfortunate formalistic interpretation, 
while the political circumstances called for a substantive investigative approach by 
the Court. However, the Minister still had to cross a final hurdle. The Judicial Service 
Commission (JSC), of which the AG is the only political appointee, had to 
recommend someone to the President. Since the members of the JSC represents 
the superior courts (the Chief Justice and another judge), two representatives of the 
profession and the Attorney General – thus only one political appointee - it is highly 
unlikely that the members can be politically manipulated. Since the JSC 
recommended only Adv Imalwa, she was clearly a popular candidate for the position. 
However, an apparent good result does not give a judgment transformative 
value. The case was a return to “hard” positivism and did not serve the principle of 
separation of the powers of the Attorney General and the PG, or the independence 
of the PG. More serious, it left the public with the perception that the Attorney 
General is the de facto recommending power in the JSC. 
 
6.8   The Gender Cases   
In this section, I wish to look at two sets of judgments where the Courts were 
challenged to apply gender equality in terms of the non-discriminatory clause  
(Article 10 [2]) and the spirit of the Constitution to negate the old standard practices 
and rules of male superiority and discrimination against women.  
The first dealt with the cautionary rule applied in cases of single female 
witnesses in rape cases and offences of a sexual nature. The second case dealt with 
the status of a lesbian co-habitual relationship before the law in the light of the 
Constitution. 
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6.8.1 The Cautionary Rule Applicable to a Single Female Witness In Sexual 
Related Trials 
The handling of cases involving women gives us an excellent opportunity to 
evaluate the Supreme Court‘s reaction to the constitutional spirit of gender equality 
and the prohibition of discrimination based on gender.635 Shortly after independence, 
the High Court dealt with the cautionary rule against single woman witnesses in rape 
cases. 
The cautionary rule has a long history, both in South African and English law. 
In a constitutional dispensation where discrimination against sexes are prohibited, 
any legal rule based exclusively on the sex of a witness, is an obvious contradiction. 
In S v D and Another,636 the High Court remarked that the rule has no place in the 
constitutional dispensation. Although a single bench judgment of the High Court is 
binding on other judges of the high court sitting as a single bench, unless it is 
explicitly found to be wrong in law, S v D and Another was not binding, since the 
reference to the cautionary rule was an obiter dictum.  
Several High Court judgments nevertheless followed the obiter until the High 
Court (again a single bench, but this time as part of the judgment) in S v Katamba637 
found that the cautionary rule was still part of the Namibian law.  
The State appealed against the judgment and the Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to revisit the issue. The Court decided that the cautionary rule had no 
place in Namibia. There can be no exceptions between women and men, neither in 
terms of the crime that was committed nor in terms of some inherent trend in one of 
the sexes. Equality means that the ordinary rules of evidence should apply in all 
cases. However, while the rule itself seems to be dead, its spirit is alive, when it 
comes to single women witnesses in rape cases. The reason for the sudden 
resurrection of the cautionary rule (or at least the spirit thereof) was an unfortunate 
case, S v Rittmann.638 
Mr. Rittmann appealed against a conviction of rape in the Regional Court. The 
High Court confirmed the conviction on appeal. The appellant then appealed to the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed him to bring evidence to the Court not 
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available at the trial in the court a quo or the High Court. In the Supreme Court, 
counsel for the State conceded that the complainant is not a reliable witness. She 
made a statement after the trial stating that she was not raped. The appeal 
succeeded.  
Although failure to apply the cautionary rule was one of the grounds of the 
appellant’s appeal, the Supreme Court correctly pointed out that the cautionary rule 
for single witnesses in sexual offence cases no longer existed and the Court did not 
base its judgment on it. However, it seems that the fact that the appellant in the 
Rittmann case had to go to the Supreme Court to get justice somehow revived the 
spirit of the rule. 
In Hanekom v the State639 the complainant was a young so-called coloured 
girl and the accused a white male. The facts were shortly as follows: The girl 
reported to her father that a white man, unknown to her, phoned her several times. 
She did not want to talk to him. Later a white man arrived at the house, forced her to 
have oral sex with him and then raped her. The medical evidence confirmed the 
presence of spermatozoa in her vagina. 
Her father traced the telephone calls (and one made the day after the alleged 
rape) to the office of the accused at his place of employment. The accused 
acknowledged being at the house of the complainant, as well as the phone calls and 
some sexual activities, but denied that he raped the complainant. According to him, 
he met the complainant at a restaurant where she worked as a member of staff 
serving at the table. When she heard that he was looking for a friend of her to 
provide her with an application for employment at Trans Namib, she told him that she 
also wanted to apply for a job. 
The accused acknowledged that he played no role in appointments or 
recruiting of staff. He nevertheless phoned her the next day (several times) and 
eventually went to her house to deliver the application form. After some discussions 
(and after the complainant has taken him on a tour through the house) the 
complainant undressed herself, touched his penis and asked him to have sex with 
her. He refused, but masturbated and when he ejaculated, the spermatozoa landed 
on the vagina of the complainant. A medical doctor, who was a state witness, 
conceded the possibility. 
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The accused was convicted in the Regional Court, and his conviction was 
confirmed on appeal in the High Court. The High Court took the abolition of the 
cautionary rule serious. There is no indication whatsoever in the judgment that the 
evidence of the single witness was dealt with in an extra cautionary manner 
The Court followed a liberal, value-orientated approach. The Court seriously 
criticized the harassment of the witness by defence council. Many of the 
discrepancies in the evidence of the witness were evaluated in the light of this 
conduct. The Supreme Court, while still paying lip service to the abolition of the 
cautionary rule, loaded the complainant with responsibilities, amongst others:  
- Why did she not bite the penis of the accused when he forced oral sex on 
her?  
But there is no evidence or even an insinuation in the record (apart from the 
cross-examination of the defence council) that this is the correct action to be taken or 
even expected action for a small, young girl, threatened by a much bigger and 
stronger man.640 
- Why did she contradict herself?  
Again the fierce and often unfair cross-examination of the defence council is 
virtually ignored, despite the specific and convincing role it played in the judgment of 
the court of first appeal. 
The court concluded that the complainant has only herself to blame for the 
fact that the conviction is finally set aside.  It is not clear what the Court meant. Does 
it mean that the accused is guilty, but that the complainant has messed up the case 
by some of her actions? The consequences of such interpretation would be that the 
court knows that the accused is guilty, or that the case has been proved beyond 
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reasonable doubt, but because of her actions or conduct as a witness, the 
complainant needed to be punished. 
Alternatively, does it merely mean that there is not enough evidence before 
the court to convict the accused? If that is the correct interpretation, why does the 
Court use the unfortunate phrase? Is she responsible for a lack of evidence by the 
State, or does it mean the complainant was an unreliable witness? If this is what we 
should make of the Court’s statement, the case was not proved beyond reasonable 
doubt and the Court could not dismiss the version of the accused, or at least 
conceded to the possibility that his version of what happened may have been true 
(even if the Court does not believe him). But why put blame on the witness?   
Alternatively, does it mean that apart from the ordinary rules of evidence the 
witness was burdened with extra obligations to make her story reliable. If this is the 
case, why is the complainant treated different from an ordinary witness in a criminal 
trial? At face value, it seems as if the Court applied the cautionary rule.  
It is possible, as I have pointed out, that the Supreme Court was of the opinion 
that the State did not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since Justice O’Linn 
concurred with the judgment, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court re-introduced 
the cautionary rule.641 O’Linn wrote the judgment of the Katamba case.642 It is highly 
unlikely that he would have turned his back on his own, well-argued judgment 
without giving reasons for his decision.  
It is more logical to accept that the Supreme Court did not apply the 
cautionary rule, at least not explicitly. If that is the case, the wording was unfortunate. 
Consequently, even if the Court did not apply the unconstitutional cautionary rule, 
the language of the Supreme Court in this case is an unfortunate return to a 
formalistic approach alien to the constitutional dispensation. Transformative 
constitutionalism expects of the Courts not only transformative judgments, but also 
transformative language. The Supreme Court must leave no doubt in the public’s 
mind that the cautionary rule has been declared unconstitutional and will never 
return to Namibian jurisprudence.  
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6.8.2  Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: The Frank Case 
Although the government’s verbal attacks on homosexuals and lesbians 
started in the mid-nineties, the Supreme Court had the first opportunity to consider 
the Constitutional rights of homosexuals in March 2001. Elizabeth Frank, a German 
citizen and a pro-Namibian independence activist in Bremen, Germany during the 
struggle for independence, filed a case against the Immigration Selection Board.643 
The Immigration Selection Board (the Board) appealed against a review 
decision by the High Court. The High Court reviewed and set aside a decision of the 
Board, refusing a permanent residence permit to Erna Elizabeth Frank (the first 
respondent). The High Court directed the Immigration Selection Board to authorize 
the Ministry of Home Affairs to issue a permanent residence permit to Erna Elizabeth 
Frank within thirty days of the date of the order. 
 
6.8.2.1  The High Court 
Elizabeth Frank, a German national, was a close associate of SWAPO since 
her days as a student at the University of Bremen.  The Immigration Selection Board 
turned down her application for permanent residence twice. Frank pointed out that 
her sexual orientation was lesbian and that if it were legally possible to marry she 
and second respondent would have done so. She felt that her lesbian relationship 
with the Elizabeth Kachas, a Namibian citizen, might have been the reason why her 
application for a permanent residence permit was unsuccessful.   
However, if her relationship with a Namibian citizen was a heterosexual one, 
she could have married and would have been able to reside in Namibia or apply for 
citizenship in terms of Article 4(3)(a) of the Namibian Constitution, she alleged.  She 
said that the Board did not consider this factor and therefore violated her right to 
equality and freedom from discrimination guaranteed by Article 10, her right to 
privacy guaranteed by Article 13(1) and protection of the family guaranteed by Article 
14 of the Constitution. 
She further stated that the decision by the respondent infringed her 
constitutional rights guaranteed by Articles 10, 13(1), 14(1) and (3), 21(1)(g) and 
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21(1)(i).644 The Board denied that the homosexuality of Frank played any role in its 
decision.  Her sexual preference was a private matter. 
As far as the relationship between Ms Frank and her partner had bearing on 
the review application, the High Court645 concluded that the Board is wrong in its 
assumption that the Ms Frank’s long term relationship was “not one recognized in a 
Court of Law and was therefore not able to assist the first applicant’s application”.  
The Court relied on Isaacs v Isaacs,646 where a South African superior court 
found a relationship where parties put all their assets, both present and any they 
may acquire in future, in a pool from which they pay expenses incurred by both, is a 
relationship acknowledged and protected by the common law. Such an agreement is 
known as a universal partnership and can be a verbal undertaking, in writing, or even 
tacitly. 
The Court a quo further pointed out that such partnership was a common 
practice recognized by the courts between a man and woman living together as 
husband and wife, but not married legally. The Court further referred to Ally v 
Dinath.647 Referring to Article 10 of the Namibian Constitution,648 the Court 
concluded that if a man and women can enter into such a relationship, and since the 
partnership is so strong that a court of law will divide the assets when it dissolves, in 
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terms of the constitutional equality principle of Article 10 (2), two lesbian women 
should also be able to enter into such a partnership. 
While not discussing it in detail, the Court also relied on articles 16 (the right 
to acquire, own and dispose property individually or in association),649 and 21(1) (e) 
(the right of association).  
Consequently, the Court found that a relationship between the applicants are 
protected by law and should have been considered by the respondent. In a bold 
judgment the Court did not refer the case back to the Board, but instructed the Board 
to grant Ms Frank permanent residence.  
Cassidy650 criticized the judgment on two grounds. Firstly, she asserted that 
the word sex in art. 10(2) of the Constitution refer to gender only.651 Secondly, since 
the alleged discrimination is not one of the enumerated rights listed in Article 10(2) 
she is of the opinion that the Court should have applied the rational connection test 
of the Mwellie case652 or the unfair discrimination analysis of the Müller case.653 
In the Mwellie case the applicant challenged the constitutionality of a section 
of the Public Service Act654 limiting the time for public servants to institute action 
against the State under the Act to twelve months, while non-public servants have 24 
months. After confirming international human rights and constitutional municipal case 
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law,655 the Court found that the classification of public servants as a special group is 
a justifiable and reasonable differentiation with a legitimate objective. Further, while 
the Act classifies public servants as a separate group, all public servants are treated 
equal. The Namibian High Court applied the test of the European Court in the 
Mwellie case.656 The Court struggled with the meaning of the word discrimination. 
Scholars have pointed out that the English word does not carry with it a moral 
condemnation.657  
The European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Commission 
have both stated in their jurisprudence that discrimination as such does not 
constitute a violation of the anti-discrimination clauses of the European Charter or 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The European Court created 
three criteria to determine if discrimination is a violation of the Charter-658 
i. If there is no objective and reasonable justification for a discriminatory act;  
ii. If the discrimination does not serve a legitimate aim; and 
iii. If the means of discrimination is disproportionate to the objectives or aims, 
discrimination is not legitimate and constitutes a violation of the European 
Charter.659  
The European Court also refers to a margin of appreciation to determine if 
discrimination is admissible. Scheinin correctly pointed out that the use of vague 
terms like this can easily lead to cultural relativity, especially in the new Europe and 
the former socialist countries becoming part of the Council of Europe.660 
The Human Rights Committee developed a different method to determine if 
discrimination is admissible not. In essence, it looked at the facts and evidence of 
every case.661  The process is known as the facts and evidence test. 
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While the High Court in the Frank case did not go into international 
jurisprudence, it took an important step in interpreting the non-discrimination clause. 
Cassidy’s criticism on the meaning of the word sex is out-dated. One can hardly 
speak of gender classification without including sexual orientation. Although the 
Court did not specifically mention any test, one can conclude that the Court applied 
the facts and evidence test in comparing Ms Frank’s position with a heterosexual 
female. The heterosexual female can marry her partner, while a lesbian cannot.  
The Court compared the two, added to it the possibility to accommodate the 
financial and assets issue, which is part of the common law. Consequently, even 
without any amendment to the present laws, Ms Frank and other lesbians could have 
been accommodated fairly had the Board applied the non-discrimination clause.  
The transformative value of the judgment was immense. It created an 
opportunity to broaden the understanding and limitation of sexual discrimination 
extensively. It would have placed some pressure on Parliament to look at the laws 
and common law rules discriminating against homosexuals. An appeal to the 
Supreme Court ruined these prospects. 
 
6.8.2.2   The Supreme Court 
The procedural issues in the case (late filing by the appellant) as well as 
factual disputes blurred the real issue. The main issue, were somehow pushed to the 
periphery: 
- The understanding of a permanent homosexual relationship in the 
Namibian legislation; and  
- The Constitutional guarantee of non-discrimination based on sex in the 
Constitution.  
It is not necessary for this thesis to go into the procedural issues of the case. 
The unprofessional conduct of the appellant (the Board) and the duress it caused Ms 
Frank (respondent in the Supreme Court) caused the chief justice in his minority 
judgment to refuse the appellant’s application for condonation of late filing. 
Consequently, the minority judgment did not consider the homosexual issue.662 
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The Supreme Court per Justice O’Linn found in its judgment that the Court a 
quo erred in mero motu considered the relationship between the first and second 
respondent as a universal relationship, since Frank did not tender this. He also found 
that the Court erred in its conclusion that law protects a lesbian relationship. 
It does not fall within the parameters of this study to evaluate all the criticism 
of Supreme Court to aspects of the High Court’s judgment other than the judgment 
on the issue of the lesbian relationship of Frank and Kachas. 
The Court gave the Immigration Selection Board extremely wide discretionary 
powers, while at the same time limiting the review powers of the High Court.   
Although this Court, as well as the High Court, undoubtedly has wide 
powers to set aside the decisions of administrative tribunals and 
even to substitute its own decision on the merits for that of such a 
tribunal in appropriate circumstances, the present case is not one 
where the substitution of our decision for that of the Board is 
justified.  In my respectful view, that would amount to usurping the 
function of the Board, entrusted to it by the Legislature of a 
sovereign country.663 
 
The Court took this tendency to the extreme when it eventually discussed the 
powers of the High and Supreme Courts to review old and new Namibian legislation. 
The Court assumed that counsel for Frank waved the issue of a lesbian relationship. 
However, both the attitude of Frank’s counsel and the judgment of the Court a quo 
can also be understood in a different manner.  Mr Taaipopi’s words that a lesbian 
relationship is neutral and had no effect on the Board’s decision could be understood 
to mean that under the new Constitution the sexual content of relationships is no 
longer the decisive factor. When counsel then stated that Ms Frank no longer relied 
on the lesbian relationship, he did not wave his reliance on the relationship between 
Frank and Kachas.  For counsel, and apparently the Court a quo, the Constitution 
settled the matter of sexual orientation and Mr. Taaipopi, counsel of the Board, 
conceded to that. 
The High Court went straight on to discuss the legal content of the 
relationship, which it found unnecessary to call a lesbian relationship.  Instead, the 
Court called it a universal partnership. Universal partnerships, the Court ruled, is 
protected by law and specifically by the Constitution.  Whether the High Court was 
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correct in its submission will be discussed below, but the Supreme Court makes two 
wrong assumptions when it concludes: 
(i) That the Court a quo did not consider the issue of the lesbian 
relationship between the first and the second respondents; and 
(ii) That the issue of a universal partnership was considered meru motu. 
The Supreme Court extensively investigated the issue of the protection given 
to lesbian couples in terms of the Constitution, especially Article 10 (2) and 
concluded that: 
(i)  It is only unfair discrimination which is constitutionally impermissible, and 
which will infringe Article 10 of the Namibian Constitution;664 
(ii) A homosexual relationship does not have the same status and protection of a 
heterosexual marriage: 
 A Court requiring a "homosexual relationship" to be read into the 
provisions of the Constitution and/or the Immigration Act would 
itself amount to a breach of the tenet of construction that a 
constitution must be interpreted "purposively";665  
 
(iii)  The review powers of the Supreme Court are limited: 
...  Parliament has the right to decide, in accordance with the 
letter and spirit of the Namibian Constitution, on the legislation 
required for the admission of aliens to citizenship and/or 
residence and or employment in Namibia. 
It is also the right and responsibility of Parliament to provide in 
legislation which classes or categories of persons should be 
given special dispensation and which not.  In this function 
Parliament is entitled inter alia, to consider and give effect to the 
traditions, norms, values and expectations of the Namibian 
people, provided it does so in accordance with the letter and 
spirit of the Namibian Constitution.666 
 
The Court then does an egg dance and stated that: 
Nothing in this judgment justifies discrimination against 
homosexuals as individuals, or deprived them of the protection 
of other provisions of the Namibian Constitution.667 
 
However, it fails to explain why Parliament should not protect the nation 
against people and a practice seen by customary law as extremely wicket but 
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rare,668 or to enforce the views of the President and Minister of Home Affairs quoted 
as value markers by the Court669 and actively oppress homosexuals. 
 
6.8.2.3   The Interpretive Key of the Judgment 
Judge O’Linn’s preference for a formal, literal approach to Constitutional 
interpretation is well known, and well documented in his judgments. He initially 
served on the bench of the High Court, and later as an acting justice of the Supreme 
Court. He disliked the idea of treating human rights protections in the Constitution as 
a sui generis in need of a substantive value-based interpretation.  
The honourable judge barely hides his disgust in dealing with this trend in the 
judgments of the Namibian Supreme Court. 
I am also mindful of the many Namibian decisions where the 
basic approach in interpreting a constitution has been expressed 
in poetic and stirring language.670 
 
It is not surprising that the innovative and highly acclaimed Constitutional 
jurisprudence (especially the judgments of the late Chief Justice Mahomed and Chief 
Justice Strydom) hardly received any attention in the judgment. Only one judgment 
of Judge Mahomed is quoted, Government of the Republic of Namibia v Cultura 
2000 671 and then only to ridicule its poetic and stirring language.672 
The then Chief Justice Strydom hardly got a better audience. When he is 
quoted, it is only short quotations to defend the literalist hermeneutics of Judge 
O’Linn.673 The bulk of Namibian and South African cases that paved the way for a 
purportive hermeneutics and transformative constitutionalism in Southern Africa are 
ignored.  
The only Namibian jurisprudence that received any attention worth mentioning 
are the judge’s own High and especially Supreme Court judgments, from which he 
quoted extensively. Instead, the judge seeks support from Judge Kentridge, former 
judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa. Judge O’Linn nevertheless pointed 
to the fact that both the Constitutional development and the two constitutions of 
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South Africa and Namibia are so diverse that it is inconceivable for Namibian Courts 
to follow the South African jurisprudence and hermeneutics.674 
The linkage to former Constitutional Court Judge Kentridge is questionable in 
the light Judge O’Linn’s interpretation of the hermeneutics prescribed by the South 
African Constitution: 
The provision in the South African Constitution leaves no room 
for the positivist school of thinking in the interpretation and 
application of the constitution and not even room for a "golden 
mean" between the "positivist" and "libertarian" schools as 
expressed by Friedman, J. in Nyamkazi v President of 
Bophuthatswana, referred to supra.675 
 
Does this mean that Kentridge was actually in error in S v Zuma & Others, 
which the judge quoted with approval? In addition, was Kentridge wrong in 
supportively quoting R v Big M. Drug Mart Ltd?676 
The fact is that the hermeneutical jurisprudence in both South Africa and 
Namibia accepted, if not exclusively, at least as an option, the path of a substantive, 
valued-based Constitutional approaches.677 Even the proponents of a different 
hermeneutical key for constitutional interpretation recognize this.678 
From a hermeneutical point of view, this is clearly Justice O’Linn’s reaction to 
the Mahomed era.  He made no secret of his disapproval of a jurisprudence that was 
the opposite of his own reliance on the text of the Constitution. The result however, 
is a legalist, literalist interpretation that does not look at the issues at stake in terms 
of the values that the Constitution protects.  
Rather, the words of Section 10 (2), and even worse, the absence of the 
words sexual orientation, became the key for understanding.   While the early 
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judgments on due process679 also acknowledged the different framing of the South 
African and Namibian Constitutions, it did not prevent them from giving the Namibian 
Constitution a broad interpretation including some of the elements specifically 
mentioned in the later Constitution. 
However, in this case the Supreme Court ignored the influence of the 
Namibian Constitution on the drafting of the South African Constitution and the fact 
that the South African drafters had the opportunity to draft their Constitution with the 
Namibian product already in operation. 
The Court interpreted in a legalistic manner when it concluded from the 
wording of the interpretive clause of the South African Constitution that South African 
Courts have no option but to apply broad, substantive, valued-based   interpretation 
that takes the spirit of the Constitution as a hermeneutical key. Since the Namibian 
Constitution has no such clause, he concluded that a literalist interpretation fits the 
Namibian Constitutional hermeneutic.  
However, the judge again does not take the role of the Namibian courts in the 
pre-constitutional era of South Africa into consideration. From the literature (see 
above) it is clear that the South African academics and the courts valued the 
Namibian Constitutional jurisprudence extremely high. Consequently, rather than 
suggesting that the South African Constitution came with a new hermeneutic, it is 
closer to the truth that the South African interpretive clause was among other things, 
framed by the jurisprudence of Namibian Constitutional development. 
Once the Court established the Namibian Constitution demands a literal or 
positivist approach to interpretation, the wording of Article 10 (2) does not pose a 
problem. The word sex as a non-discriminatory category refers to gender only – 
male and female. To back up this interpretation, the Court looked at the norms and 
the values of the Namibian people and concluded that lesbian relationships and a 
permanent same-sex relationship are not per se protected by law and in Article 10 
(2) the word excludes sexual orientation. 
The test for the values of the Namibian nation is the hate speech of the 
President and the Minister of Home Affairs against homosexuals. The Court 
concluded that since no one in Parliament has repudiated them, this must be the 
opinion of Parliament. The conclusion needs no comment, taking in consideration 
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the fragile democracy in Namibia and the almost absence of public debate on any 
issue of principle by the government and especially the governing party.   
Since South Africa cannot help the Namibian courts with the interpretation of 
the issue, the judge turned to Zimbabwe – where co-incidentally, the president is an 
outspoken enemy of all homosexuals. The case that the judge chose is the now 
infamous S v Banana,680 where the first president of the Republic of Zimbabwe was 
charged with sodomising several inferiors. 
The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe had to decide if sodomy as a common law 
crime was unconstitutional. If one bear in mind that the facts of the case pointed to 
rape rather than a long-term sexual relationship between consenting adults, and also 
that Zimbabwe did not have a law to use in cases of male rape, the emotional issues 
behind the Banana case become clear.  
While the Supreme Court had to make a judgment on the consensual life-long 
relationship between two lesbians, sodomy is a male exclusive gender crime. In both 
Zimbabwe and Namibia, sexual acts between lesbian women were never criminal 
offences. The Court dealt with the discrepancy in one sentence:  
The reason may have been that the lesbian relationship and the 
sexual act performed in such relationship never became as 
clearly defined and notorious as in the case of the homosexual 
relationship between men.681 
 
However, in a minority judgment in the Zimbabwean case, supported by 
appeal judge Ahmed Ebrahim, Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay would have struck the 
offence of consensual sodomy from Zimbabwe's statute book. In his judgment, the 
discriminatory element of criminalizing male sexual conduct and not female sexual 
conduct is untenable. The Namibian Supreme Court did not consider the minority 
judgment. 
The Supreme Court virtually destroyed judicial review by refuse to act pro-
actively and by stating that in terms of Article 81 later legislation can reverse all 
decisions of the Supreme Court.  Without going into detail here, the judge seems to 
prioritize Art 81, which is a general article dealing with stare decisis in the Namibian 
law above Article 25, dealing with the enforcement of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, thus making Parliament a higher court of review.  
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The Court’s reliance on Article 81 is somewhat flawed. If the legislature 
replaces a constitutionally correct judgment with unconstitutional legislation, an 
aggrieved person can approach the High Court in terms of Article 25 and request 
redress. 
 The Frank case is important and a blow for transformative constitutionalism.  
It addresses minority rights in a country where homosexuals are not only a minority, 
but they are also a rejected and despised group. While Article 10 (2), the non-
discriminatory clause, lists several non-discriminatory categories, it is clearly not a 
closed list. The Supreme Court followed a narrow approach which can be criticised 
for several reasons, mainly because of the unequal treatment of persons based on 
their sexual orientation. The Müller (see the next sub-chapter) test referred to by 
Cassidy, does not fit the Frank case. Unlike the Müller case, there is no other 
remedy available for homosexual couples who are in a permanent relationship. The 
results are more serious than a denial to change a surname. The family will be 
separated and Ms Frank will have to return to Germany.682  
 One can also make out a good argument for a broader interpretation of the 
word “sex” as a non-discriminatory category. The Labour Act of 1992683 referred 
specifically in several sections to sexual orientation as a non-discriminatory category. 
If the word “sex” excludes sexual orientation in Article 10 of the Constitution, it 
seems strange that Parliament explicitly included the phrase “sexual orientation” in 
the Labour Act. Since the Labour Act was promulgated on 8 April 1992, taking in 
consideration the time a bill takes from the drafting to the eventual signing by the 
President, it is likely that the bill was drafted within the first year of independence.  
 The most logic conclusion one can draw is that the first government, with its 
majority in Parliament, was in favour of making an independent Namibian labour 
enviroNMent a place where people of all sexual orientations are tolerated and not 
discriminated against. If Article 10 (2) of the Constitution explicitly opted for the 
protection of gender discrimination and the exclusion of protection of discrimination 
against homosexuals, the specific protection in the labour market does not make 
sense.  
A better explanation would be that both the Constitution and the Labour Act 
came from the same ideological source sensitive to protect sexual orientation. The 
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homophobic statements of the President and other prominent members of the ruling 
party only started in the second half of the 1990’s. This theory is further strengthened 
by the fact that in the new Labour Act 0f 2007684 all references to sexual orientation 
are removed. While the homophobic utterances of prominent members of Parliament 
and Cabinet can never be an indication of the norms and values of the Namibian 
people, the historical development of the protection of sexual orientation in Namibia 
makes any interpretation of the word “sex” as an exclusive word meaning only male 
or female, highly unlikely, if not impossible. 
Unfortunately, until the Supreme Court gets another opportunity to consider 
the meaning of the word “sex”, all courts in the country will have to abide by the 
Supreme Court judgment in terms of the stare decisis rule and the constitutionalism 
thereof in Article 81 of the Constitution 
 
2.6.8.2.4  The Limits of the Law 
 Any discussion of the Frank case will be incomplete without a reference to 
Hinz’s (Allot) theory of the limits of law. As noted above in chapter 2685, Hinz did not 
take kind of judicial activism. He approves of the South African Constitutional Court’s 
refusal to immediately translate the constitutional approval of same sex relationships  
“into an amendment of the South African law that governs marriages”, and its 
decision to to refer the case back to the legislator to change the law.686  
 Hinz does not refer to the High Court judgment, but one can assume that he 
would not be comfortable with Justice Levy’s activism. Neither is he at peace with 
the Supreme Court’s reliance on values as an interpretive tool. While the Court 
quotes the reliance of the Ex Parte Corporal Punishment Case on values “...as 
expressed in their national institutions… as well as the consensus of values or 
‘emerging consensus of values’ in the civilised international community”,687 it did not 
follow that route. Instead, the Supreme Court simply took cognisance of the 
President and a Minister’s repeated rejection of homosexual relationships in 
Parliament, while no member of the ruling party objected.688  
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 Thus, while the High Court judgment giving Frank permanent residence was 
overturned by the Supreme Court, Hinz points out that justice was eventually served 
when Frank obtained a permanent residence permit after applying in accordance 
with the requirements of the law. That, he asserts, underlines the ineffectiveness of 
the Supreme Court judgment.689 
 Hinz criticises value judgments of the South African and Namibian courts for 
its simplistic attempt of using values as an alternative to the positivist interpretation 
of the courts in applying the oppressive apartheid laws: “For the courts to opt for 
values does not mean there is an automatism between public opinion and the court 
decision.”690 In other words, there are limits to the transformative power of judicial 
activism. He acknowledges that “post-apartheid, post-colonial, postmodern 
jurisprudence has to acknowledge values” and that dealing with it is inevitable in law.   
But he warns that jurisprudence cannot solve all legal problems, or as he put it: 
 
…jurisprudence has to acknowledge the strong message of The 
limits of law that urges us to test the societal enviroNMent in 
terms of the extent to which the far-reaching employment of 
controversial values by the judiciary would be conducive to an 
intended decision, as these intended decisions would otherwise 
run the risk of becoming ineffective.  (emphasis Hinz).691 
  
 Hinz refers to the approach of the South African Constitutional Court, more 
specific the judgment of Justice Sachs in the Fourie case.692 While the Court 
acknowledged the constitutional rights of same sex partners, Justice Sachs was not 
prepared to change the South African Marriage Act693 to allow same sex marriages 
with an activist judgment in line with the Constitution without giving the general public 
the opportunity to discuss the issue.694 This approach Hinz asserts, creates an 
adequate framework for value assessments and shows respect for the limits of law.  
 Hinz has a point. Values judgments or a post-modern approach such as 
transformative constitutionalism can easily transform the judiciary in a legislator. 
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However, acknowledging the limits of law in constitutional cases can also be seen as 
a compromise that satisfies no one. The fact that Elizabeth Frank eventually 
received permanent residence did not change the fate of Namibian homosexuals in 
general. The Supreme Court’s erroneous interpretation of article 10 of the 
Constitution remained intact. While Frank did not approach the Court for permission 
to marry her partner, the legal issue in both the High and Supreme Courts was not 
limited to Frank’s residence permit. The constitutional question was the applicability 
of article 10 to permanent same sex relationships and the meaning of the non-
discriminatory category “sex” in the said article.  
 It may be helpful to allow the public to participate in the constitutional debate. 
But one should not confuse constitutionalism with majoritarianism. The Makwanyane 
case695 in the South African Constitutional Court explains the principle. The judges 
acknowledged that the majority of South Africans were in favour of the death penalty. 
Yet the Court decided unanimously that the Constitution demands the abolition of the 
death penalty.  
 At the time of writing of this thesis, no attempt has been made by either the 
government or the Namibian judiciary to reconsider the issue of the protection of 
same sex relationships. One can never predicted what could have been the result 
had the Supreme Court followed the High Court. However, even if it did not change 
the attitude of the ruling party or the majority of the Namibian nation, it would have 
given legal protection to same sex relationships.  
 While the acknowledgement of or respect for the limits of law may be helpful 
in some cases, and may caution against an over-enthusiastic bench, it does not 
make the need to interpret a post-modern constitution in a transformative manner.     
    
6.9 Minority Rights 
The apartheid history of Namibia undoubtedly played an important role in the 
fact that the Constitution does not protect minority rights as such. However, the issue 
is all but clear in international law. One school of thought does not see minority rights 
as rights at all. It prefers to see it as a general principle embedded in all protected 
rights. 
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The Namibian Constitution seems to fall in this category too. The Supreme 
Court has described the Constitution as an irrevocable... constitutional commitment 
to equality and non-discrimination and (the) eradication of racial discrimination and 
apartheid and its consequences.696  
However, one of the legacies of apartheid was the splitting of people into 
groups and sub-groups under the pretension of protecting minorities. In Namibia, this 
obsession with groups leads to many absurdities. While the country surrounded by 
two deserts hardly provides enough for its sparsely populated communities, the 
Odendaal Commission came up with a plan to split the country up in several ethnic 
states. To give expression to this ideology, in daily life not only whites and blacks 
were separated, but also the different ethnic black groups.697 
Katatura, the black township developed when the people were removed from 
Ou Lokasie (Old Location), a township surrounded by so-called white suburbs in 
1959, was from the outset divided in different ethnic areas: Wambo Location, Herero 
Location, etc. Even the development for the upper class in Katatura, is a reminder of 
the ethnic divisions of the apartheid era. The name, Wanaheda, is an acronym of the 
first letters of the different ethnic groups: Wambo, Nama, Herero and Damara. 
(emphasis mine) 
Consequently, a specific section protecting the different rights of ethnic or 
social groups, were just not on the table. For the Namibian mindset in 1990, the 
reaction against apartheid required a restructuring of society based on the rights of 
the individual rather than on groups. Instead, the Constitution opted for a general 
protection of rights, as we have seen above. In a newspaper article on affirmative 
action, Kosie Pretorius, a former Nationalist Party leader,698 and the only proponent 
of minority rights in the Constituent Assembly, pointed to the difficulties the 
Constituent Assembly had with the concept of group rights.699 
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The sub-committee of the Constituent Assembly that dealt with the issue of 
affirmative action strongly felt that only individual rights and not group rights should 
be protected. It went as far as stating that affirmative action advantages should not 
be available to blacks who, despite the system of apartheid, were not socially and 
economically disadvantaged.700 Consequently, even the wording of Article 23(2) was 
changes from  
Nothing contained in Article 10 shall prevent Parliament from 
enacting legislation providing directly or indirectly for the 
advancement of a class of persons or groups within Namibia 
who have been socially, economically or educationally …… 
To:  Nothing contained in Article shall prevent Parliament from 
enacting legislation providing directly or indirectly for the 
advancement of persons within Namibia who have been 
socially, economically or educationally ……(emphasis mine) 
 
The issue of group rights came on the agenda of the Supreme Court in an 
indirect way first In the Müller case.701  Müller and his wife Ms Engelhardt claimed 
that the Aliens Act of 1937 is unconstitutional since it unfairly discriminates against 
men allowing wives to take on their husband’s surname after marriage, while 
denying the same rights to men. Müller approached the High Court, but lost the 
case. He then appealed to the Supreme Court.  
While the issue has very little to do with groups, unless married men can in 
some way or another be seen as a identifiable group, in determining if the Aliens Act 
discriminates unfairly against men, the Court developed a test with a strong 
emphasis on groups. 
There can be no doubt that the Act clearly differentiates between men and 
women, which is an enumerated ground stated in Article 10 (2) of the Constitution. 
To place the differentiation in context, the Court stated that discrimination could not 
be approached in the Namibian context from a neutral position.  
Following the South African Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court stated 
that the words discriminate against in Art. 10 (2) of the Constitution refer to the 
pejorative meaning of discrimination and not its benign meaning.702  
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The enumerated list of categories in the anti-discrimination article 10 (2), the 
judge concluded must be seen in the light of the Namibian past. All these categories 
were in the past singled out for discrimination.  Reading Article 10 with Article 23,703 
it is clear that the purpose of Art. 10 “is not only to prevent further discrimination on 
these grounds but also to eliminate discrimination, which occurred in the past”.704 
The Court struggled with the old problem that the former oppressor could also 
use the provisions and protections of the Constitution against those people who 
opposed oppression. Ramose echoes the frustration of many when he said the 
benefits of a constitutional dispensation serves only the colonial conqueror.705  
The Court however pointed out that the Namibian Constitution differs from 
Article 9(3) of the South African Constitution. It does not create a resumption of 
unfairness in cases of discrimination like Article 9(3), and the enumerated categories 
are a closed list in the Namibian Constitution and an explicit open list in the South 
African Constitution.  
The Court developed certain guidelines to determine unfairness in terms of 
Art. 10 (2). In this process, the Court used Article 23 as a hermeneutical key to get to 
the intended meaning of the word discrimination. 
The Court emphasized that the different criteria should not been evaluated in 
isolation. The corporate effect of all the factors needs to be evaluated.  
The factors are: 
1. The disadvantaged group (emphasis mine JNH); 
2. The nature of the power causing the discriminations; 
3. The interests affected; 
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4. The impact of the discrimination on the victim; 
5. The complainant’s position in society; 
6. Whether the complainant suffers from a pattern of disadvantage;  
7. The purpose of the discrimination; 
8. The extent of the complainant’s prejudice; and 
9. Whether the discrimination has led to an impairment of his/her             
dignity. 
In applying the test to the case, the Court concluded that this is not a matter of 
unfair discrimination for the following reasons: 
- Müller, being a white male immigrant from Germany after independence, 
cannot claim that he has been part of a disadvantaged group in the 
previous dispensation; 
- One cannot conclude that the act impairs the dignity of males as a group 
or as individuals;  
- Names and surnames play an important role in the ordering of society. 
Consequently, the process and records must guarantee that proper 
identity is maintained; 
- The provision that wives may take on their husband’s surname is based on 
a tradition of longstanding in Namibia; and 
- A husband is not without remedy. He can change his surname using the 
general  procedure open to all Namibians. 
The appeal was dismissed.  
While the Müller case dealt with a very personal matter of an individual 
without deep roots in any identifiable group in Namibia, the Court opted to make 
groups an important key in interpreting Art. 10(2), which like Article 23, do not use 
the word group. If one reads the minutes of the sub-committee of the Constituent 
Assembly that dealt with Art. 23, it seems as if the omission of the word group was 
an explicit act to get away from an era obsessed with groups. 
There are two ways to look at the transformative value of the Müller case.  
One would be to see it as a traditional formalistic approach. From this perspective 
there is not much positive to be said about the judgment. The Court missed the fact 
that this is not a matter of discrimination against men per se, but in essence 
legislation intending to maintain women in a subordinate position. She will always, be 
the one to sacrifice her surname. The Court opted to ignore this historical 
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subordinate position of women in society, which is ongoing and should be corrected 
by positive transformative constitutionalism. 
One can however, analyse the judgment from a different angle. Although 
groups were not the main issue in the case, the Supreme Court judgment moved the 
case away from a mere gender issue of inequality between men and women. While 
the Court does not use the term “group rights”, it nevertheless meticulously looked at 
the position of Müller in relation to the advantage or disadvantage of his group in the 
colonial era.  
Given the abuse of group rights in the colonial era, and specifically in the time 
of the so-called Transitional Government of National Unity, emphasis on groups may 
end in a situation where national reconciliation is sacrificed for a new appreciation of 
race and ethnicity.  Recent developments in Namibia have shown than ethnic divides 
are alive and well.706 The Affirmative Action Act has also taken the groups route in 
defining their categories as previously disadvantaged groups.  
The specific application of groups in the Müller case can be questioned and 
the evolutionary interpretation of Article 10 to include groups may turn back the 
constitutional clock rather than transforming society.   
As for Mr Müller, he took the case to the Human Rights Committee, the 
complaint organ of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, where the 
advisory opinion went in his favour.707 Mr Müller added his wife Ms Engelhard when 
they approach the Human Rights Committee for relief, and made it an issue of 
discrimination against both women and men. The Namibian government did not 
change the Aliens Act because of the opinion and Mr Müller went to Germany to 
have his surname changed to Engelhard. 
 
6.10   The Independence of the Judiciary: The Magistracy  
Several magistrates’ conferences discussed the position of magistrates since 
independence as part of the independent judiciary. However, the issue got serious 
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attention when the magistrate of Gobabis asked the High Court to review his transfer 
to Oshakati. Not satisfied with the judgment, he later appealed to the Supreme 
Court. 
 The Supreme Court ruled that in the light of the constitutional independence 
of the judiciary, magistrates could not be public servants.708 Referring to the South 
African constitutional Court case Van Rooyen and Others v The State709 the Court 
stated that it does not mean that they should be appointed in the same manner as 
judges. The Namibian Constitution makes a clear difference as well. The President 
upon recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission appoints judges, their 
salaries may not be reduced and the circumstances in which they may be removed 
from office are prescribed. 
 The Constitution does not render the same protection to magistrates. There is 
not even an indication that an independent commission must appoint them.710  
However, that does not mean that their independence is unimportant. Yet, the 
hierarchical differences between magistrates and judges must considered. 
Magistrates have a lesser jurisdiction,711 they do no not have constitutional review 
powers, i.e. they cannot strike down unconstitutional laws, they are courts of first 
instance,712 aggrieved persons can take all the judgments of the magistrate’s courts 
on appeal and the High Court automatically review longer sentences of district 
courts.  
 The Court made it nevertheless clear that the independence of magistrates is 
part of the constitutional dispensation. It affirmed that Article 78,713 of the 
Constitution, dealing with judicial independence, includes all the courts in Namibia.714 
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 Since the legislator did not comply with the expectation of Article 78 to pass 
legislation regulating an independent magistracy, the Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Justice just took over the pre-independent role of the South African 
directors and the laws regulating the Public Service. Consequently, magistrates in 
Namibia were public servants and operated under the Public Service Act 13 of 1995. 
The authority of the Permanent Secretary to transfer magistrates (the issue of the 
Mostert case), came from section 23 (2) of the Act. 
 Before independence, Act 32 of 1944 regulated both South African and 
Namibian magistrate’s courts. The Act dealt with magistrates as part of the public 
service. The magistrate was not only to be the presiding officer in the magistrate’s 
court, she/he was also the head of the office. They had to handle leave of the clerks 
and prosecutors, the daily administration of all aspects of the office, such as liquor 
licenses, tax and VAT collections, issuing of birth certificates, and all other functions 
assigned to the office. 
 The main cause of disagreement of the appellant, Magistrate Mostert, was the 
power of the Minister of Justice to appoint magistrates. Act 1 of 1999 amended Act 
32, but the amendment was not aimed at bringing the magisterial profession in line 
with the Constitution. On the contrary, the Minister not only remained as the 
appointing officer of magistrates,  she/he also received the power to appoint any 
other competent staff member in the Public Service or a competent retired staff 
member to act in the place of an absent or incapacitated magistrate.715 
 The main objective of the amendment was to deal with the legality of regional 
court magistrates. After independence, the Appointments Advisory Board, a South 
African body dealing with the appointment of regional court magistrates, seized to 
deal with Namibian appointments. The Minister just took over the Board’s functions. 
The amendment gave legality to this practice. In effect, the Minister gained total 
control over the appointment of magistrates. 
 The Supreme Court concluded that the amendment did not give effect to 
Article 83 (1) of the Constitution.716  The Chief Justice then made the following 
comment regarding the two Acts: 
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It seems to me futile to leave intact the provisions of Act 32 of 
1944 which are in conflict with the Constitution. To do so would 
be to give legal impetus to provisions which are not 
constitutional. In my opinion it is necessary to finally cut the 
string whereby magistrates are regarded as civil servants, and 
that will only be possible once new legislation completely 
removes them from the provisions of the Public Service Act.717 
 
Consequently, the Supreme Court declared sections 9 (as amended) and 10 
of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 unconstitutional.  It gave government six 
months to correct the legislation. Further the Court declared that section 23(2) (a) of 
Act 13 of 1995 is not applicable to magistrates and “that consequently the order of 
the Permanent Secretary to transfer the appellant, was ultra vires”.718 
As a result, Parliament passed the Magistrates Court Act, 3 of 2003. The long 
title of the Act reads as follows: 
To provide for the establishment, objects, functions and 
constitution of a Magistrates Commission; to provide for the 
establishment of a magistracy outside the Public Service; to 
further regulate the appointment, qualifications, remuneration 
and other conditions of service of, and retirement and vacation 
of office by, magistrates; to provide that certain conditions of 
service of magistrates may be prescribed by regulation; and to 
provide for matters in connection therewith.  
 
The objectives of the Supreme Court are clear. It identified two problems in 
the status quo: the fact that Minister of Justice, a political appointee, has the 
exclusive power to appoint both district and regional magistrates, and the fact that 
magistrates are still seen as public servants despite the clear stipulations of the 
Constitution. The judgment nowhere referred to the Minister as a political appointee, 
although the separation of power remains the most important aspect of judicial 
independence. The Supreme Court solved the conflict between the Attorney General 
and the Prosecutor-General with a clear judgment that the Prosecutor-General as a 
quasi-judicial office must be independent of the Attorney General, a political 
appointee.719 
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 If the independence of the Prosecutor-General from the Attorney General is 
crucial for the independent functioning of the prosecutorial authority, cutting the 
umbilical cord of the magistrates from the Minister of Justice must be even more 
crucial.  
 During the fourth government of Namibia under the new presidency of 
Hifikipunya Pohamba, the same person held the Offices of Minister of Justice and 
the Attorney General. It is ironic if the Minister cum Attorney General is kept at arm 
length from the Prosecutor-General, but allowed to play a major role in the execution 
of the magistracy in Namibia.    
 Yet, the objectives set by the Act in section 3 still give the Minister the central 
stage: 
a) to ensure that the appointment, promotion, transfer or 
dismissal of, or disciplinary steps against, magistrates take 
place without favour or prejudice, and that the applicable laws 
and administrative directives in this regard are applied uniformly 
and correctly;  
b) to ensure that no influencing or victimization of magistrates 
takes place;  
c) to promote the continuous judicial education of magistrates 
and to make recommendations to the Minister in regard thereto;  
d) to ensure that properly qualified and competent persons are 
appointed as magistrates; and  
e) to advise the Minister regarding any matter which, in the 
opinion of the Commission, is of the interest for the 
independence of the magistracy and the efficiency of the 
administration of justice in the lower courts.  
  
While sub articles (a) and (b) emphasize the independence of the magistrates, 
the two issues dealt with in the Supreme Court, the role of the Minister in terms of 
the old Magistrates Court Act, and the role of the Permanent Secretary in terms of 
the Public Service Act, is not even mentioned. On the contrary, subsections (c) and 
(e) give the impression that the Minister is still the major role player. The only role in 
the objectives given to the Magistrates Commission is to advice the Minister of its 
opinion on matters of the interest for the independence of the magistracy.  
If it were the intention of the legislator to acclaim the independence of the 
magistracy, one would have expected a central position for the Commission in the 
Act. While the judgment did not give specific guidelines, as to how the legislator 
should meet the demands of Art. 83 of the Constitution, the reference to Van Rooyen 
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and Others v The State, possibly inspired the legislator or Cabinet to look south for 
guidelines. In South Africa, a Magistrates Commission replaced the Minister.  
The Namibian Act describes the role of the Magistrates Commission in 
appointing magistrates as follows-720 
The Commission must: 
f)     make recommendations to the Minister with regard to –  
… 
i) the suitability of candidates for appointment as  magistrates;  
 
 The appointment of magistrates is still in the hands of the Minister of Justice 
who may appoint magistrates at the recommendation of the Magistrates 
Commission. If it had not been for the permissible may in the text, the fact that the 
Minister acts on the recommendation of the Commission would have created an 
acceptable check on the power of the Minister. Recommendation is a much stronger 
word than consultation. 
 Consultation places a burden on the official to obtain an opinion from the 
consultative body. After consultation, the official is free to make her/his own choice, if 
it does not contradict the common law, principles of natural law and the Constitution.  
 The Namibian practice has created a precedent that will make it difficult for an 
official not to follow the recommendation of a body prescribed by law to 
recommend.721 It is not clear why the legislator used the permissible may rather than 
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a clear instructive sentence: The Minister shall on the recommendation of the 
Commission…… appointment…. magistrates….on the permanent establishment. 
(bold JNH) 
The word may can never mean that the Minister does not have to appoint 
magistrates to vacant posts if she does not feel like it. It clearly cannot mean that the 
Minister may leave the appointment to someone else, or to the Magistrates 
Commission, since those options are not provided for. Alternatively, does it mean 
that the Minister can also appoint without any recommendation, but he may also 
request the Commission to recommend? Such an interpretation would fly against the 
Supreme Court judgment.  
Even if the wording of the Act cannot be interpreted to allow the Minister 
unrestricted powers to appoint, it remains suspicious that the legislator used the 
permissive sense without any specific objective. If nothing else, it points to a 
stubborn challenge to the Constitution and constitutionalism by government.722 
The Act did not go unchallenged. Magistrate Mostert went back to the High 
Court.723 Mostert challenged the independence of the Magistrates Commission and 
the role of the Minister in the new Act.  
 The High Court concluded that although the Minister plays a role in the 
appointment of the Commission, it could not be said that the members are therefore 
bound to follow the directives of the Minister. There are several checks built into the 
Act that will make the appointments credible and will make it extremely difficult for 
the Minister to manipulate any process.724 
 The Commission consists of  one judge designated by the Judge-President, 
the chief lower courts,  one person designated by the Attorney General, one person 
designated by the Judicial Service Commission, one magistrate appointed by the 
Minister from a list of three magistrates nominated by the Judges’ and Magistrates’ 
Association of Namibia, a staff member of the Ministry of Justice designated by the 
Minister and  one teacher of law appointed by the Minister from a list of two teachers 
of law nominated by the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Namibia.725 
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 Although the Minister appoints three persons, he/she is limited in his/her 
choices of the magistrate and the law teacher. The Public Service Commission is an 
independent constitutional organ and they have the power to designate a member. In 
the same manner, one cannot question the independence of a High Court judge. 
Consequently, at least four of the seven members are independent.  On these 
points, I agree with the judgment.  
The applicant is also wrong in stating that six of the seven members of the 
Commission are public servants. The Court pointed out that nothing stipulates that 
the Public Service Commission designated member must be a public servant726 and 
the UNUM law teacher is also not a public servant.727 It seems strange that the 
Minister should get three nominations from the Judges' and Magistrates' Association. 
The section looks suspicious. However, it is highly unlikely that the Association will 
nominate anyone to the Minister that will not represent the Association's own strong 
principled position on the independence of the judiciary. 
The designated members of the Minister728 and the Attorney General are 
public servants, as is the Chief Lower Courts.729  Since one person in the Pohamba 
cabinet occupied the positions of Minister of Justice/Attorney General, the 
Minister/Attorney General directly oversees the employment of three of the seven 
Commission members.  
The Court erred in stating that the appointment of a politician is of no 
significance to the independence of the office. This is the position of the South 
African Constitutional Court, but not the position of the Namibian Supreme Court.730 
The Constitutional Court made the same point as the Namibian High Court:  
The Ex Parte Prosecutor-General/Attorney-General saw important significance for 
the independence of the Office of the Prosecutor-General in the fact that she/he is, 
                                            
726
Walter Mostert and Another v Magistrates Commission and Another, p. 24. 
727
Both members of the Faculty of Law, who have been appointed by the Minister since the Act was 
promulgated, were practicing legal practitioners.  
728
The Court stated that the representative of the Ministry of Justice only needs to be a suitable 
person and not necessary a public servant.  This assertion seems to be wrong if one considers the 
wording of the Act: one staff member of the Ministry of Justice designated by the Minister. 
729
See Kobi Alexander v the Minister of Justice and Others, 2009 (2) NR 712 (HC). The Court ruled 
that the Chief Lower Courts could not sit on this extradition case since he is a public servant. In terms 
of the Extradition Act the Minister and not the Magistrates Commission must do the appointment of a 
magistrate to hear the extradition application.  
730
See: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (CCT 23/96) [1996] 
ZACC 26; 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) (6 September 1996). 
 251 
unlike the Attorney General appointed at the recommendation of the Judicial Service 
Commission.731  
The fact that the Minister of Justice/Attorney General appoints two public 
servants from his/her own fold of employees, does not reflect well on the 
independence of the Commission, especially if a third member is a staff member of 
the Ministry of Justice.  
The Court stated that even if the Commission is not independent, it does not 
reflect negatively on the independence of magistrates. 
I see nothing in the Constitution which suggests that magistrates 
should be appointed by an independent body. That would in any 
event be requiring standards more rigorous than those in place 
for the appointment of Judges and would go against the spirit of 
the Supreme Court judgment. I do not therefore see on what 
basis the fact that the Minister is the appointing authority for 
Magistrates can, without more, be objectionable if Judges are 
appointed by the President who wields ultimate executive power 
in the Republic.732 
 
However, the appointment of judges by the President at the recommendation 
of the Judicial Service Commission is not comparable to the Minister who may 
appoint magistrates at the recommendation of the Magistrates Commission and the 
Minister who, appoints two members of the Magistrates Commission and plays a role 
in the appointment of four others. 
The Supreme Court obviously had a problem with the huge role the Minister 
and her/his senior public servant, the Permanent Secretary, played under the old 
dispensation. Yet, the Magistrates Act did not limit the powers of the Minister. 
Neither did it bring real independence to the magistrates or gave substantive power 
to the Magistrates Commission. 
The Act gives the magistrates in office at the time of the promulgation of the 
Act tenure of office, which meant that the newly appointed Commission did not have 
the opportunity to make a fresh start with a magistrates approved and selected by 
them. 
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The High Court quoted several South African and Canadian cases and the 
earlier Mostert case and then made the following comment: 
Judicial independence can be achieved in a variety of ways; the 
most  rigorous and elaborate conditions of judicial 
independence need not be applied to all courts, and it is 
permissible for the essential conditions for independence to bear 
some relationship to the variety of courts that exist within the 
judicial system.733 
 
One cannot argue with this position. The Constitution does not set the same 
requirements of appointment for the Superior Courts and the Magistrate Courts. 
However, both the Constitution and the Supreme Court in the first Mostert case and 
the Ex Parte Attorney-General/Prosecutor-General case laid down some 
benchmarks for independence. The Magistrates Commission Act did not meet these 
benchmarks. 
The applicants did not appeal to the Supreme Court. Magistrate Mostert 
resigned and his counsel, Adv E. du Toit, SC, passed away. Despite the positive 
judgment of Justice Strydom, the Magistrates Act and subsequent High Court case 
are opportunities lost. The magistrates were still not fully independent in 2004 and 
the authority of the Minister of Justice remained intact. For many magistrates the 
new Act meant less power and more frustration.734 Since so many aspects of the 
running of the magistrates courts are still in the hands of the Minister, magistrates 
may still look to the Permanent Secretary and the Minister to solve their problems 
rather than the Magistrates Commission. 
 
6.11  The Right to Legal Representation:  
The Relationship between the Human Rights Covenants and the Constitution 
 The high treason case against the so-called Caprivi secessionists had a very 
important legal off shoots. The case ended in the Supreme Court when the 
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government appealed against a High Court judgment,735 (hereafter the Mwilima 
case) dealt with the right to free legal representation.  
 The respondents (applicants in the court a quo), 128 of them, were all 
accused of high treason after an uprising and eventual attack on several targets in 
Katima Mulilo in the Caprivi. They were all refused legal aid and launched an 
application in the High Court (the court a quo in this case). The court a quo ordered 
the second appellant, the Director of Legal Aid to appoint legal counsel for the 
respondents. The government appealed against this decision. 
 The legal question focussed on the enforceability of Art 95(h) of the 
Constitution. Unlike first generation or civil and political rights, social, economic and 
cultural rights are not entrenched in the Bill of Rights (chapter 3). They are part of 
Article 95 under the Principles of State Policy (chapter 11).  
 The government argued that Article 95(h) - the right to free legal 
representation, - unlike the basic right to legal representation in Article 12(e), are 
limited to defined cases and resources of the State.736 The respondents did not 
agree with the issue of limited responsibility, but argued that in this particular case 
the facts and legal issues are such that the accused will not get a fair trial unless 
they get legal representation. Since the State refuses to or is unable to provide legal 
representation in terms of Article 95(h), the Court should make a ruling in terms of 
Article 12(e) – the right to legal representation to ensure a fair trial.  
 An unfortunate amendment to the Legal Aid Act, 29 of 1990, was the subtext 
of this case. Initially Section 8(2) gave a High Court bench the authority to issue a 
legal aid certificate to an unrepresented accused if there is sufficient reason why the 
accused should be granted legal aid. The certificate compelled the Director of Legal 
Aid to grant legal aid to the accused. 
 The government wanted to limit the rights of the courts to make decisions that 
could place a financial burden on the State. “Government felt that certificates were 
issued indiscriminately by the judges without due regard to available funds with the 
result that during successive years the funds allocated for legal aid were 
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exceeded’.737 Parliament amended the Act and removed the mentioned sections of 
the Act.  
 The applicants in the court a quo concentrated on the amendments and 
requested the High Court to declare them unconstitutional. The High Court found it 
unnecessary to entertain the constitutionality or not of the amendments. The effect 
was that the granting of legal aid in terms of the Act was taken from the High Court 
and placed solely in the hands the bureaucratic structures of the Ministry of Justice. 
 The government attorney, who represented the appellant in the Supreme 
Court, argued that since a Court in terms of Article 101 cannot legally enforce 
principles of state policy, the courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever to determine if 
and under what circumstances legal aid should be awarded. Any instruction by the 
Court to the State to grant legal representation to an accused would be inappropriate 
and an intrusion “on the exclusive domain of Parliament to decide how and in what 
way funds should be allocated to its various ministries”.738 
 The majority judgment, written by Justice Strydom, agreed that that art 95(h) 
expresses only the intention of government to facilitate equality and justice by 
providing statutory legal aid to those who qualify. The implementing legislation that 
gives effect to Article 95(h) is the Legal Aid Act. With the amendment, the judges can 
no longer intervene where the Legal Aid Board or the Director have turned down an 
application for legal aid. The Court called this form of legal aid statutory legal aid.739
 However, this is not the last word on the responsibility of the Court. It may be 
that the Court is of the opinion that a accused will under certain circumstances not 
receive a fair trial in terms of Articles 10(1) and 12, especially sub-article 1(e), if 
he/she is not represented. Then it is the duty of the Court to ensure that steps are 
taken to guarantee a fair trial. Article 12, being part of the enshrined Bill of Rights, is 
not part of the principles of state policy and not subjected to budget constraints or 
availability of resources. 
 How can the court obtain the authority to instruct the government to grant 
legal aid if it can no longer issue legal aid certificates and prevented by Article 101 to 
compel government to provide legal aid? The Court began its argument by pointing 
out that the categories of fair trial elements mentioned in Article 12 are not closed. In 
                                            
737
Commentary of the Chief Justice in Mwilima case, p. 250. 
738
Ibid, p. 255. 
739
Ibid, 
 255 
State v Scholtz740 where the Court looked at the principle of equality before the law 
in Article 10(1) of the Constitution and concluded that state disclosure is a principle 
of a fair trial, although state disclosure is not one of the fair trial categories of Article 
12.  
Consequently, Article 10(1) is also a test to determine if a trial is fair in terms 
of Article 12. There can be instances where two suspects have equally strong 
defences. Yet one may not get a fair trial because he/she does not qualify for legal 
representation in terms of the provisions of the Legal Aid Act or because of a lack of 
state resources. The limitations of Article 95(h) and the Legal Aid Act still stand in the 
way of a fair trial for the accused. The Chief Justice found the answer in Article 144 
of the Constitution: 
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of 
Parliament, the general rules of public international law and 
international agreements binding upon Namibia under this 
Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia. 
 
Since Namibia ratified both International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and its optional protocols, it forms part of Namibian law in terms of Article 
144 of the Constitution. Although the Court did not go into the general rules of direct 
application, it found that the ICCPR is indeed part of Namibian law and the courts 
must accede to it.  Section 14(3) of ICCPR is a combination of Articles 12(1)(e) and 
95(h), without the limitations of Article 95, providing legal aid  “... in cases where the 
interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he 
does not have sufficient means to pay for it”.  Consequently, as a party to ICCPR, 
Namibia is bound to apply section 14(3) in its municipal courts. 
 The two judges who wrote separate judgments agreed with the principle that 
the State is bound under the specific situation to grand legal aid to the accused. 
Judge O’Linn suggested that the idea of two forms of legal aid is confusing. All legal 
aid, he held, is grounded in the Legal Aid Act. Nevertheless, in terms of the 
provisions of ICCPR and taking Article 95(h) in consideration as a principle of the 
state policy in effecting justice, the Court can instruct the State to provide legal aid, 
irrespective of the fact that a specific budget is depleted.  
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 The Court made it clear that legal aid will never be automatic. The Court will 
always have to satisfy itself that it is indeed in the interest of justice to grant legal aid 
in a specific case, and that the refusal of legal aid will make a fair trial impossible. 
 The judgment was a clear message to the legislator. The protection granted 
by the Constitution and especially the Bill of Rights (chapter 3), cannot be annulated 
by innovative legislation. Justice O’Linn made the following comment:  
If the intention of the amendment was to exclude the function of 
the Court, it was an exercise in futility, because as shown in this 
decision, the Court retains the power in accordance with articles 
5 and 25 of the Namibian Constitution to decide whether or not 
legal aid must be supplied by the Government (the executive) 
and/or the Director of Legal Aid to ensure a fair trial as 
contemplated by articles 12 and 10 of the Namibian Constitution 
and section 14(3) (d) of the aforesaid convention on political and 
human rights which is part of the law of Namibia.741 
 
The direct application of the Section 14 of the ICCPR was an innovative and 
exciting development in constitutional jurisprudence in Namibia, albeit somewhat 
naïve. The constant reference to The Covenant gives the reader the impression that 
the Court is not aware of the other Covenant – The Covenant on Social, Economic 
and Cultural Rights, (ICSECR) which was ratified by Namibia on 28 November 1994, 
the same day that it ratified ICCPR.  
Nevertheless, the judgment opened the door for litigation based on a violation 
of social and economic rights. If the Constituent Assembly included Article 101 to 
make sure that government is not burdened with litigation laying claims on economic 
and social benefits envisaged in Article 95, the Mwilima case came as a wakeup call. 
Nakuta reminded us that Namibian litigation has done little to improve the 
socio-economic fate of the vast number of poor people and to narrow the gap 
between the rich and the poor.742 He reminded his readers that the Vienna 
Convention declared that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent 
and interrelated.743 
However, in Namibia, civil and political rights have a vast advantage over 
social and economic rights, mainly because of the exclusion of social and economic 
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rights from the Bill of Rights and the limitation to litigate placed on it by Article 101. 
Nakuta argued correctly that the drafters of the Constitution “bought into the idea that 
social and economic rights were not true rights”.744 As a consolation prize, some 
social and economic rights were listed in Chapter 11 as Principles of State Policy. 
Instead of second-generation rights being human rights entitlements and tools of 
empowerment, the poor are left at the mercy of government policies and 
programmes.745 
Without referring to the use of the ICCPR in the Mwilima case, but with 
reference to two other Namibian cases,746 Nakuta concluded that aggrieved persons 
could litigate for economic and social rights relying on Article 144 of the Constitution.  
He also proposed an indirect application of civil and political rights to litigate for 
second-generation rights.747  Several civil and political rights have social and 
economic consequences. If the right to dignity (Article 8 of the Constitution), is taken 
seriously, social and economic issues cannot be ignored. How can a person have 
dignity if he/she is forced by poverty to live on the streets, have no prospect to earn a 
decent living or the possibility to take care of his/her children? 
Nakuta quoted an Indian case – India has the same limitation clause and 
inferior position of economic rights in its constitution – to prove his point-748 
(t)he right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and 
with all that goes with it, namely the bare necessities of life such 
as adequate nutrition, clothing, shelter……749 
 
 The Mwilima case opened the door for more innovative jurisprudence.  One 
question remains: Is it a valid interpretive model used by the judges or is it what the 
government attorney called “inappropriate and an intrusion on the exclusive domain 
of Parliament”, and to add Judge O’Linn’s comment, a “wrongful and unlawful 
intrusion” ?750 
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The Mwilima case addressed an area of the society in dire need of 
transformation: the social inequalities of the Namibian nation. While it dealt with a 
basic civil right, it has an economic agenda – free legal representation. The Supreme 
Court, in an excellent exercise of legal activism linked free legal representation with 
the right to a fair trial guaranteed in both Article 12 of the Constitution and the 
International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights. 
 In this case, the gap between Art 95 social and economic rights and the civil 
and political rights of chapter 3 have dramatically been narrowed. One would have 
expected a floodgate opening up of aggrieved citizens claiming their social and 
economic rights from the right to health to the general right to a decent living. None 
of it happened. Mwilima remains a once off successful attempt to unlock the 
economic rights of Article 95. Yet, the effect of the judgment is important. Two 
aspects of the judgment hold the key for future litigation by aggrieved citizens who 
are being deprived of their social and economic rights: 
- The Namibian courts will, in following the Mwilima  case, treat Article 95 as 
a corpus of enforceable rights that can be enforced and not merely as a 
meaningless statement of state policy; and 
- While Article 101 limits litigation prospects for aggrieved citizens, it does 
not exclude all remedies. The Mwilima judgment opened the door to 
scrutinize the Constitution for other remedies. The litigant may find some 
possibilities in Article 144 and the ratified covenants and other treaties. 
The litigant may link a violation of an Article 95 right with a comparable 
right in Chapter 3. The right to health can be linked to the right to life 
(Article 6), or the right to a decent living to the right to education. The list 
goes on. 
 The South African experience – where economic and social rights form part of 
the Bill of Rights - unfortunately does not give social and economic litigants hope for 
real societal transformative constitutionalism. The availability of resources played an 
important role in both the acclaimed Grootboom case751 and the Soobramoney 
case.752 The Constitutional Court recognised Ms. Grootboom’s right to housing. Yet, 
despite the countless number of articles written about the case and the conferences 
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around the world to discuss this ground-breaking development, Ms Grootboom died 
homeless and penniless.753 
 At the time of the judgment Judge Richard Goldstone, who was not on the 
bench, referred to the Grootboom judgment as "the first building block in creating a 
jurisprudence of socio-economic rights".754 At the time of her death her advocate, 
Ismael Jamie, said to the Mail and Guardian - "The fact that she died homeless 
shows how the legal system and civil society failed her".755 
 Soobramoney’s fate was worst. He suffered from chronic renal failure. His life 
could be prolonged if he by an on-going dialysis treatment. The hospital denied his 
application for treatment since its limited resources only gave the treatment to people 
eligible for a kidney transplant. Soobramoney approached the Constitutional Court, 
linking his right to treatment with his right to life. The Constitutional Court refused to 
intervene, since "the right to medical treatment does not have to be inferred from the 
nature of the State established by the Constitution or from the right to life which it 
guarantees". Soobramoney died of kidney failure.756   
The South African Constitutional Court took cognisance of the limited 
resources, restricted the application of their judgment in the Grootboom case, and 
refused Soobramoney relief.  
The Namibian Supreme Court opted to prioritise the rights of the suspects and not 
the financial burden the judgment placed on the State.  Unfortunately, while the 
judgment opened the door for societal transformation, it did not change society. The 
dramatic possibilities for future socio-economic adjudication went unnoticed in the 
legal fraternity. The Court rejected an interpretation seeing Article 101 as an 
absolute rule to prevent the enforcement of chapter 11 socio-economic rights.  For 
some reason the legal fraternity never saw it as an invitation to start with an 
aggressive adjudication to enforce socio-economic rights listed in Article 95. 
Something needs to be said about the foundation of the judgment. The 
obvious positivist approach would be to accept Article 101 as absolute. The Court 
opted to go beyond Article 101 and interpreted the prohibition in the light of two other 
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constitutional principles: the right to a fair trial envisaged in Article 3 and the monist 
approach to international law in Article 144. 
Cockrell and Roux’s submission that positivism does not exclude 
transformative constitutionalism has merit. While the Court did not work with an 
“original intent” approach, it worked with the text. Even if the intention of the 
Constituent Assembly was to prevent expensive enforcement of socio-economic 
rights, they did not close all the possible constitutional avenues allowing remedies to 
enforce Chapter 11 rights to aggrieved citizens. The Court only investigated two of 
those avenues and found that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
(ICCPR), a treaty ratified by Namibia and part of Namibian law, and Article 12 of the 
Constitution, also provide for legal representation to ensure a fair trial.  
There was no purposive interpretation, no broad CLS approach and no 
judicial activism. All it took to come up with an extremely valuable transformative 
interpretation was a mere acknowledgment that Article 101 is not the only word on 
the enforcement socio-economic rights. 
 The old majoritarian argument also applies here. It was well articulated by the 
Government Attorney. The Constitution makes the granting of legal aid dependent 
upon resources and the kind of cases, and the Constitution further stated that the 
Courts cannot enforce Chapter 11 rights (or Principles of State Policy.  
How is it then possible that a Court can intrude on this exclusive domain of 
Parliament and force government to allocate money to suspects in a case where 
State functionaries denied them legal aid?  Is the Court not making law here? In 
addition, how can the Court rely on a human rights instrument if Article 144 clearly 
states that Namibian statutory law and the Constitution take precedence over 
principles of international law?757 
 The Government Attorney gave more weight to her position by stating that the 
government believes in equality before the law. Therefore, it cannot deplete its legal 
aid budget on just one case. This seems to be a fair point.  
The decision of the Prosecutor-General to prosecute all 128 accused for high 
treason does not make legal sense. Since high treason has to do with the attitude of 
the accused, his/her intention to overthrow the government, even the apartheid 
                                            
757
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules of public 
international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia under this Constitution shall 
form part of the law of Namibia. (Emphasis mine JNH). 
 261 
government seldom succeeded in convicting high numbers of accused in one 
case.758 Taken into account that many of these accused were linked to the crime 
only indirectly by applying the so-called common purpose doctrine,759 the modus 
operandi of the Prosecutor-General is questionable.  While the Prosecutor-General 
cannot be blamed for using the traditional test of a prima facie case, the external 
pressure did not make things easier.760 
Although the Prosecutor-General could have made the process less 
complicated, it still does not solve the conflict between the government and the 
Supreme Court. The Mwilima case is the textbook example of transformative 
constitutionalism. The easy way out for the interpreter would be the “clear wording of 
the text”, in this case Article 101 of the Constitution. What can be clearer than that? 
The principles of state policy contained in this Chapter shall not 
of and by themselves be legally enforced by any Court, but shall 
nevertheless guide the Government in making and applying 
laws to give effect to the fundamental objectives of the said 
principles. The Courts are entitled to have regard to the said 
principles in interpreting any laws based on them. 
 
However, the words “shall not of and by themselves be legally enforced” 
opened the door for a progressive application of Chapter 11. Consequently, once the 
Court established that free legal aid could not be enforced by law in all cases, it is 
not the end of the enquiry. The process of transformative adjudication will start when 
the interpreter is convinced that the text does not tell the whole story. In this case, 
the justice behind Article 95(h) can hardly be reconciled with the harsh No! in Article 
101.  
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This conviction may be politically motivated, but as Klare pointed out, it is no 
more political than the opposition to legal aid by the government attorney. Her 
reliance on the clear meaning of Article 101 does not address the issue and would 
have lead to gross injustice for the 128 accused. However, the debate on where the 
conviction came from not to be satisfied with the obvious answer of Article 101, is 
unimportant. More important is the fact that the No! in Article 101 is not the last word. 
By turning to Articles 12 and 144 of the Constitution, the Court did not opt for 
a political interpretation, but a result that fits the spirit and objective of Chapter 11 
and more particular Article 95(h). The issue may have been controversial, but the 
judgment, while answering a political cum legal ethical question, is not political.  
The Mwilima761 case could have been one of the most dramatic examples of 
transformative constitutionalism at work. Unfortunately, the superior courts did not 
enforce any other socio-economic right in following Mwilima, partly because the legal 
fraternity did not attempt to bring new cases to the courts. 
 While the characters of the judges on the Bench can be 
overemphasised, it is important in this case to take note of the fact that two judges 
wrote judgments, Chief Justice Strydom and acting Supreme Court Justice O’Linn, 
formed the Bench of the overturned Kauesa High Court judgment. I have pointed out 
that O’Linn was known for his insistence of adhering to the text. In this instance, 
however he, together with the then Chief Justice came up with ground-breaking 
transformative constitutionalism.  
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CHAPTER 7 
7. Analysis 
The Interpretive Models of the Superior Courts of Namibia  
As we have noted, there was no dominant interpretive model applied by the 
Namibian superior courts between 1990 and 2004. The numerous examples where 
the High and Supreme Court came to different conclusion can often be traced back 
to the interpretive models (Kauesa, Frank, Hanekom, etc).  
In terms of Article 81 and the stare decesis rule a Supreme Court judgment 
becomes the authoritative word on the issue at stake and gets legal status. Such 
judgments become law and must be followed by all Namibian courts, even if the 
overturned High Court judgment is legally more sound (Frank case). 
There are also some contradictory judgments of superior courts with the same 
status where the Supreme Court overturned none of them (Shilunga/Sikunga), or 
cases where, a judgment of the High Court was controversial or questionable, but 
not appealed (Smith) In addition, there were Supreme Court cases which were 
seriously contested in the legal fraternity, but nevertheless became law since it was 
brought before the Supreme Court by the AG in terms of the Constitution to get legal 
clarity. (The two Ex parte Attorney General cases). 
Although judgments of the Supreme Court can be overturned by legislation or 
later judgments of the Supreme Court, this process will be difficult and will only 
succeed if the earlier judgment was clearly unconstitutional. An attempt by the 
legislator to overturn constitutionally sound judgments by using Article 81 to pass 
laws contradicting the Supreme Court judgment, will fail. A superior court asked to 
give judgment on the constitutionality will have to declare the new legislation 
unconstitutional. 
 In the absence of any legislation challenging the constitutional judgments of 
the Supreme Court, these judgments have become part of Namibian law in terms of 
Article 81.   
 In this concluding chapter I will first look at a transformative model of 
adjudication and interpretation. I will then look at the legal issues and some cases 
discussed in chapters 5 and 6, and to what extent did they transform the Namibian 
legal system after independence. 
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7.1   The Development of a Constitutional Model:  
 Freedom and Constraint, Objectivity or Value-based Subjectivity 
The post-apartheid constitutional democracies in South Africa and Namibia 
ended the rule-based interpretation of statutes as the only hermeneutical model 
applied by the courts.  South African and Namibian courts were no longer satisfied 
with the old standard textbook approach to the interpretation of statutes by authors 
such as Steyn.762 Interpretation was no longer an uncomplicated set of rules to assist 
in understanding the literal meaning of the text.  
While substantive reasoning did not enter the South African (and Namibian 
scene) only at Namibian independence in 1990, Cockrell correctly states that the 
nature of pre-1994 legal reasoning in South Africa was predominantly formalistic.763 
Referring to the article of Atiyah and Summers764 who emphasise the formalistic 
approach of English law, and the more substantive content of the American courts, 
South Africa, Cockrell assumes, are even more formalistic than England. 
The Makwanyane case765 illustrates the movement away from formalism in 
South Africa.  Popular opinion was undoubtedly in favour of the death penalty. Yet, 
the Bench was unanimous in its position that it is unconstitutional.766 Kriegler 
attempts to explain why public opinion was forbidden domain. The method used in 
legal interpretation is in essence legal and not philosophical or moral, he states. 
However, the Courts do not operate without a moral foundation or in an ethical 
vacuum.  The public expect courts to make value-based judgments, but the 
framework and outcome of the judgment ought to be legal.767 
Kriegler seems to have the same problem that Mahomed, struggled with in the 
Ex Parte: Corporal Punishment case. While Kriegler acknowledges the necessity of 
substantive reasoning in determining values, he immediately retreats to the safer 
grounds of formal law, at least in theory, if not in practical terms. “Legal” seems to be  
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a synonym for formal law”.768 
Several South African and Namibian judges constantly follow the example of 
Kriegler and retreat to formal law. After a long tradition of a literalist approach to law, 
there is a strong belief that the Bench can always act objective. Closely tied to this is 
the myth that pure, indisputable legal rules of process and a formal interpretation of 
the text will lead to the truth. The white community accepted the objectivity of judges 
as a given until the 1990’s. Thereafter the new public opinion turned against white 
judges coming from the pre-1990 dispensation. They carried the stigma of their 
appointment by the colonial government in Namibia and the apartheid government in 
South Africa and their assistance to maintain the unjust legal system and laws. After 
Namibian independence objectivity of the Bench was often disputed by society. 
 Cockrell deals with the issue of objectivity in an enlightened manner.769 
Several Constitutional judges referred to the pitfall or temptation of subjectivity in the 
death penalty issue. The Court created a dichotomy between objective and 
subjective arguments, the latter being of a lower class. Nevertheless, even if some 
judges are subjective, how will any critic determine the level of subjectivity? 
 Cockrell suggests a different approach.  Arguments on objectivity of values 
are second-order claims, judgments about the content of values are first-order. First-
order claims deals with the normative aspect of values.  
Claims about the objectivity of values are second-order ('meta 
ethical') claims about the status of those values, about where 
and how they fit into the world. These may be contrasted with 
first-order claims which are judgments about the content of 
values by persons adopting a practical, normative stand. In 
other words, second-order issues are issues about morality, and 
first-order issues are issues within morality.770 
 
Whether one uses objective or subjective arguments to reach a normative 
position is irrelevant. A critical observer is not interested in questions such as the 
personal views of the judge on moral issues, but rather the logic and rationality of the 
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argument. Therefore, substantive argument does not have to be rated less valuable 
or less authoritative than formal legal arguments.   
 While public opinion may be helpful and needed to determine the values and 
aspirations of society, constitutionalism among other things, protects the society 
against dangerous and illogical public opinion. Consequently, the Court does not 
have to fall back on formal law in justifying decisions that go against public opinion or 
state policy. The requirements for a good judgment are clear logical arguments that 
can and should include political, economic and philosophical argument.  
 As indicated the basic problem with Mahomed’s judgment in the Corporal 
Punishment case lies on this level. While he maintained that the judgment interprets 
the values of the Namibian people, there are no indications how he came to that 
conclusion. Had he consulted widely with some of the role players, he might have 
found that interest groups in government and society do not see corporal punishment 
for juveniles as degrading and contrary to Article 8.771  While he possibly referred to 
the norms and values embedded in the Constitution, he never made it clear, except 
for footnote in a later case. In the footnote the Chief Justice merely stated that he did 
not have to enquire about the norms and values of the Namibian people since those 
norms are already in the Constitution.772 However, the Namibian legal fraternity 
never understood the footnote. It remains nothing more than a very short postscript 
to a complicated issue. 
 However, the mere fact that pockets of society did not agree with the 
judgment, does not mean that the Court is wrong. In the Corporal Punishment case 
and the Makwanyane case in South Africa, there are good reasons not to follow 
popular opinion. If we take the historical approach of Berker into account, the mere 
fact that the colonial government used corporal punishment in the traditional areas 
against its political enemies, is good enough reason not to allow the community 
courts to use it in a democratic, constitutional country.  
 The second question deals with the perception of law. The South African 
Constitutional Court bench often uses ex cathedra language. In other words, they 
confirm the outdated perception that somehow the text of the constitution can be 
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interpreted and dissected by the Court in such a way that the pure meaning 
becomes clear.773 Botha notes that the perception has an extremely broad 
interpretation: 
Sometimes, they seem to underscore the Court's understanding 
that it is its task to inquire into the constitutionality (and not the 
political wisdom) of a particular law or policy. However, 
sometimes the Court seems to go further to imply that the 
political beliefs of its members played no part in their decision-
making; implying that their decision was based on purely 'legal' 
grounds. It thus postulates the existence of a strict division 
between law and politics, and assumes that the law is 
sufficiently determinate to dispose of cases without the need for 
judges to have recourse to 'extra-legal' considerations.774 
 
Botha correctly sees this as a problem of freedom and constraint. A theory of 
adjudication that ignores the vast volumes of hermeneutical research since World 
War II and its radical effect in almost all the branches of the social sciences775 is out 
of step with the post-modernist world of the 21st century. Yet, it does create a sense 
of security.776   Hard core positivism, on the other hand is not only a continuation of 
the legal philosophy of pre-independent Namibia and pre-democratic South Africa it 
also maintains the myth of a single interpretation and application of the law, free of 
ideological or political influence. 
Karl Klare observes that a strong element of legal conservatism marked the 
initial process of transformation in South Africa. 
In this context, “conservatism” does not refer to political 
ideology. I mean rather cautious traditions of analysis common 
to South African lawyers of all political outlooks. Even the most 
optimistic proponents of progressive social change often display 
the same jurisprudential habits of mind as shown by their more 
pessimistic or political conservative colleagues.777 
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Klare suggests that the hermeneutical key for constitutional interpretation can 
be found in the political framework and structure of the constitution. He further 
contends, in the same line of thinking as Judge Chaskalson that it is not a case of 
the post independent interpretation being political and the interpretation of the 
previous dispensation being pure legal interpretation. The apartheid interpretation 
was as political as any value-based interpretation can be after 1994.778 
Klare, as we noted at the beginning of the thesis, opts for what he calls a post-
liberal reading of the South African Constitution, “committed to large-scale egalitarian 
social transformation”.779  In other words, he opts for an a priori egalitarian point of 
departure.  Since the South African and the Namibian constitutions, are in the first 
place the bridge to take South Africa and Namibia from apartheid to a just, inclusive 
society, one cannot interpret sub-divisions without constantly being reminded of the 
basic values and intention of the document as a whole. 
Klare’s point is clear. One cannot speak of values as if it is eternal, non-
changing universal principles that are somewhere out there for the judges to 
discover. This rigid, natural law approach does not have that much persuasive power 
in a post-modernist, pluralist society. When reading Klare and other scholars working 
with the South African constitution, it is important to understand that the Namibian 
society is more than a carbon copy of the South African society. Neither are the two 
constitutions identical, despite several similarities.  
Klare further demonstrates that a pure legal argument does not exist. He uses 
the concepts legal constraint and adjudication to explain the conflict between 
aspects of law that a judge deals with and the extra-judicial material that comes into 
play to determine values.780 All legal texts maintain elements of constraint that binds 
the interpreter. However, even the constraints are not clear-cut legal principles, but 
matter of interpretation, “not an innate, (i.e. interpreted property of the material 
themselves) that we can know objectively”.781 
The adjudicators are also not subjective interpreters who come to the text in 
total objectivity. They work with the materials of previous adjudicators (an important 
aspect of the common law with its stare decesis-rule). They also bring their culture, 
history and personal values to the table.  
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Consequently, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa 
could take a formalist approach to the constitutional issue posed by Chikane and 
Eins in upholding appeals against the value judgments of the South West African 
Supreme Court. Justice Rabie could make use of the language of the total 
onslaught, without even considering the substantive argument of the court a quo. 
The basic premise of this approach operates with a bias in favour of the status quo. 
The issue of land in Namibia is another case in point. While the Constitution 
protects property rights, which includes land ownership,782 the spirit of the 
Constitution is surely not against correcting the injustices of the past. While 
reconciliation is a major post-independence theme, it does not exclude other strong 
sentiments and objectives of the liberated people of Namibia. Transformation, 
affirmative action and liberation from colonial structures are equally important. The 
Constitution guarantees land ownership as it existed on 21 March 1990. However, 
that does not automatically close the door on any other rights that may exist on the 
land.  
Two landmark decisions, one in the Supreme Court of Australia, and one in 
the International Court of Justice, may still require the legal fraternity and the Courts 
to rethink the absolute rights the farming community claims.783 An old legal myth that 
land was a terra nullius before European colonialism was successfully challenged in 
these cases. In the Mabu case, it had the effect of affirming the fact that communal 
land rights survived colonialism.784 A more pro-active approach of the Namibian 
superior courts will open the door to deal with the land issue in a manner that will 
both acknowledge the protection of private property rights in terms of Article 16 of 
the Constitution. At the same time it will extend the present protection of property 
rights to pre-colonial rights in following the Mabu and Western Saharah cases.   
In reaction to the forced philosophy of legal interpretation that strips the judge 
from all freedom in its adjudication of the law, the American Legal Realists 
developed a scheme of interpretation that opted for substantive justice rather than 
formal law.785 Compare Fuller’s vision on substantive argument - 
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The intellectual torture which our courts inflict on legal doctrine 
will be obviated when we have brought ourselves to the point 
where we are willing to accept as sufficient justification for a 
decision the "non-technical" considerations which really 
motivated it.786 
 
In his later years, Fuller has tried to find a balance between two usually 
exclusive positions. Boyd suggests that-  
Lon Fuller was capable of showing us the inherent instability of 
any attempt to reconcile two concepts that both deny and 
depend on each other. In this case, the concepts were formal 
and substantive justice.787 
 Botha proposes a more post-modernist approach, yet one that will take both 
judicial freedom and constraint serious. Borrowed from Kennedy788 he explores 
means “to overcome the traditional conception of legal rules as long, straight 
boundaries that predetermine the outcomes of cases - except in those few instances 
that are not yet covered by the rules and in which judges are free to make new 
law”.789 
Botha emphasises the possibility and challenges of legal pluralism. Whenever 
humans interpret documents, there will always be more than one possibility. 
Kennedy insists that law is too contradictory and complicated for the judge to 
determine judgments without being influences by her/his own ideological and political 
beliefs.  
Kennedy paints a grim picture of legal clarity by looking at the freedom and 
constraints that burden judges. Legal arguments, he asserts, are based on what he 
calls stereotyped ‘argument bites’.  However, what makes law contradictory is the 
fact that every ‘argumentbite’ has a ‘counterbite’ that has the exact opposite 
meaning: The maxim pacta sunt servanda has a ‘counterbite’, rebus sic stantibus. 
Consequently, a judge can choose to either enforce a promise, or easily find that the 
circumstances changed and therefore law can confirm a broken promise. 
Within this confusion, judges can make their pick of a rule to follow and 
conclude that in their understanding it is the best one. However, as Botha points out,  
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...they are not free to justify their decisions in just any terms, but 
are expected to engage in legal argument. They must draw on 
an existing range of bites and counter-bites, must reduce 
complex fact situations and personal beliefs to patterns that can 
be comprehended in terms of the binary structures of legal 
argument.790 
 
Botha also has something to say to scholars- 
....legal scholars work hard at identifying gaps and 
contradictions in existing legal doctrine, and putting forward 
proposals that would fill the gaps and iron out the contradictions. 
Mainstream legal scholarship thus strives to substitute straight, 
clear boundaries for crooked, vague and contorted ones, to fill 
clearings of freedom with saplings of constraint.791 
 
Kennedy concludes that with all the possibilities open to the judge, law is best 
defined as contradictory rules. Consequently, the only reliable set point for the judge 
is his/her own ideological beliefs. However, the theory of law as a set of neutral 
rules, does not allow the judge to acknowledge his/her subjective ideological 
involvement in making decisions. Therefore, the judge is forced to cloth her judgment 
in “the language of legal necessity”. 
However, Kennedy surprisingly does not conclude that judgments are a 
mixture of unrelated political driven choice. Constraint comes to the play. Botha 
explains - 
For Kennedy, constraint is ultimately illusory: it is the product of 
collective denial. Judges are caught up in the contradiction 
between their own experience of law as indeterminate and 
contradictory, and the need to present their decisions not as 
their own, but as compelled by the relevant legal materials. They 
are therefore not in a position to take responsibility for their 
choices. Moreover, legal argument has a superficial quality. The 
complexity of social experience is reduced to and reified in 
stereotypical arguments, which resemble sound bites rather 
than attempts at serious ethical debate.792  
  
 Listening to Kennedy, “the development of a constitutional model” in an 
environment of legal pluralism is in many ways a contradiction in terms, if it aims at 
the development of a single authoritative hermeneutical key. Should we not just 
accept that there are multiple possibilities open to judges in each case and that the 
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judge is at liberty to choose one, provided he can cloak his judgment in one or other 
legal principle and either find an earlier judgment to rely on in terms of stare decesis, 
or a “legal” reason to deviate from it? If we also accept that the only real foundation 
for any judgment is the ideology of the judge, as Kennedy alleges, and the only 
constraint is social pressure and guilt, it makes no sense to develop a model for 
adjudication. Moreover, the interpreters, the academics and legal fraternity are left 
with evaluating judgments based on what we know of the judges. 
 Botha agrees with the basic tenets of Kennedy’s views on legal pluralism.  He 
nevertheless does not see a contradiction in legal pluralism and, but develops a 
meaningful constitutional approach to interpretation in a post-apartheid society. For 
him legal constraint is much more than Kennedy’s “ultimate illusory”.  It depends on 
several complex factors, conflicting values, policies, and the capacity of the judge “to 
rework the relevant legal materials”.  
 Botha sees the South African constitution as the key to find a post-apartheid 
interpretive hermeneutic. Like Klare, he finds determinism in the constitution itself.  
Breaking with the “traditional conception of legal rules as long, straight boundaries 
that predetermine the outcomes of cases” is a constitutional imperative for 
interpretation. Davis and Woolman likewise identify the South African constitution as 
a Creole-liberal constitution that determines a Creole-liberal model of interpretation, 
similar to Klare’s post-liberal approach. Neither of these interpreters leaves the door 
open for the adjudicators to make a case-tot-case decision on the model that she/he 
will use.  
 Botha points to the fact that the South African constitution introduced a culture 
of justification, including an expectation that judges will give substantive reasons for 
their judgments.  
 The constitution is a bridge from the old dispensation of oppression to one of 
inclusiveness. The pre-constitutional boundaries can no longer determine the rule for 
interpretation and the Courts should not be tied up by common law rules or 
judgments that have no relevance for the constitutional dispensation. Botha points to 
the fact that the constitution is a clean break with the past. There is no way that the 
concept of legal rules from the apartheid era with its solid boundaries should be 
forced into the present dispensation only to prevent transformative constitutionalism. 
One can argue that Botha’s assertion on the South African constitution clearly 
applies to the Namibian Constitution as well. Taking into account the close 
 273 
relationship between the two countries before 1990 and the similarity between the 
struggle for independence in Namibia and democracy in South Africa, it came to no 
surprise that the two constitutions have so much in common. 
Does principled transformative constitutionalism leave space for a 
conservative positivist model, or even a Drowkinian approach? Alternatively, is it part 
of a CLS definition of transformation, represented in this chapter by the opinions and 
philosophy of Duncan Kennedy? While Duncan Kennedy’s critical understanding of 
adjudication and his aversion in traditional legal argumentation are attractive for 
critical thinkers (including myself), CLS is in essence a non-authoritarian philosophy. 
Klare, while committed to understanding the South African constitution as a post-
liberal document, submits that a denial of the post-modern elements of the 
constitution does not exclude the possibility to subscribe to transformative 
constitutionalism. 
Roux, as we have seen, shares the understanding that the South African 
constitution inherently calls for transformative constitutional interpretation. Yet, he 
dismisses Klare’s view that a transformative model of interpretation operates best if 
one interprets the constitution as post-liberal, which Roux sees as a typical CLS 
model.  
Botha points out that there is at least common ground between Kennedy and 
Hart. Both accept that there are cases where there might be more than one answer 
to a legal question. In Hart’s understanding, the penumbra is small and those cases 
represent a minority. If one interprets the text in its context, there will generally be 
only one interpretation.  
Even Chief Justice Pius Langa, a committed believer in transformative 
constitutionalism, contended that where the text is clear, the court should not look for 
alternative interpretive models. Kennedy expands the penumbra to include almost all 
legal questions. The binding factor is that both the soft positivist and the critical 
proponents of transformative constitutionalism accept that the constitution bodes for 
transformative interpretation and that whenever more than one possibility confronts 
the judge/interpreter, he/she should choose the transformative option. 
Cockrell opens the door a little more when he accepts that values and norms 
are not necessarily obstacles for soft positivists. If we keep in mind that the values 
and norms that transformative constitutionalists emphasise are not the majority 
opinion (Makwanyane), but rather the norms and values of the constitution (Ex Parte 
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AG: Corporal Punishment by Organs of the State), the gap between critical scholars 
and soft positivists narrows even more.     
One can make out an argument, as Roux does, that followers of Dworkin’s 
reconstruction do not have a principled objection to transformative constitutionalism, 
as long as the transformative option fits the Dworkinian metaphoric Judge Hercules’ 
expectation of the only reasonable conclusion of a legal problem. 
This does not mean that every judge and interpreter will find transformative 
constitutionalism acceptable. The hard core positivists, personified in modern 
constitutional interpretation by United States Supreme Court Justice Scalia, and 
many others will refuse to look anywhere else than the legal text before them for 
interpretive answers. However, it seems to be broad enough to include both critical 
scholars and soft positivist in the South African debate.  
As a broad guideline to understand Namibian transformative constitutionalism 
rather than the futile attempt to prescribe it as a model, makes sense. As we have 
noted, the acceptance of legal pluralism opens the door to harmonise models that 
look irreconcilable from the outside. The superior courts of Namibia have in their first 
fourteen years often failed to break loose from the formalistic shackles of the past. 
Examples of a fundamentalist model of interpretation abound. In several instances, 
the Court could not leave the static rules paradigm behind.  
There are, however, also ample examples where the Courts moved beyond 
the formalism of the colonial times and interpreted the Constitution and the common 
law in such a manner that it not only brought justice to one litigant, but also set the 
ball rolling for a transformative constitutional interpretation that will influence society. 
Both the judges and magistrates on the one hand and the professional 
interpreters (academics, the press, higher courts) on the other need to see the 
Constitution in its historical context: A document that not only brought the guidelines 
for future adjudication, but also had to stop the war and bring peace and 
reconciliation. 
It brought a new way of looking at law where the ideas and values of the 
Constitution plays an important role in understanding the expectations of the people 
for a just society, not merely a society that are governed by rules and law. Where the 
interpreter has a choice of more than one interpretation, the transformative possibility 
needs to be the decided one rather than a mere reliance on rules, stare decesis and 
pre-independent case law. 
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Botha and Kennedy’s arguments show that even if a specific Bench claims to 
rely only on law, in our pluralist world, ‘law’ seldom, if ever, presents the court with 
only one answer. Which does not mean that judges are free to deal with the text of 
statutory law as if they a writing on a blank page. One needs to discern between 
radical judicial activism and an hermeneutical option to interpret a post-modern 
document with an interpretive model suited for a post-modern view of adjudication. 
That is the point Woolman/Davis and Klare make.  One cannot on the one hand 
accept that the Namibian Constitution presents itself as a total break with apartheid 
in toto, and yet remain with the formalistic interpretive approach of the conservative 
Roman Dutch ideologues.  And transformative constitutionalism fits - to use a 
Dworkinian principle -  the metaphor of Mureinik and further developed by De Vos of 
a jurisprudential bridge that will take the country from oppression to democracy.  
Hinz quotes South African Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs stating 
that a judgment will not change the attitudes. If we accept that the law has limits to 
change society – the impossibility of the “bridge” to change attitudes – it does not 
mean that the law has no role to play in crossing the metaphorical bridge.  
While we have no psychological or empirical research to indicate that law or 
legal interpretation can change society, a comparison between South Africa and 
Namibia in their attitude to the enforcement of minority rights to LGBT people points 
to a dramatic difference. In South Africa, where the Constitution guarantee sexual 
orientation, the degree of homophobia is much lower than Namibia, where senior 
politicians and government officials constantly use verbal offence language about 
and against LGBT people.  
One can only speculate of what would have been the result if the 
transformative judgment in the Frank case was not overturned by the Supreme 
Court. 
 
7.2   An Evaluation of a Positivist Challenge to Value Judgments 
One judge stands out as a critic of seeing a constitution as a sui generis that 
requires a value-based and transformative hermeneutic: Judge O’Linn. He criticizes 
the judgment of Ex Parte Attorney-General, Namibia:  in re Corporal Punishment by 
Organs of State by stating that that the case for corporal punishment was never 
considered. The cultural values of Namibia, he argues, are generally in favour of 
corporal punishment both in school and for juvenile and violent offenders. The use of 
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corporal punishment in the traditional courts and the role of corporal punishment in 
the raising of children should have been considered, he argued.793 
In S v Van den Bergh,794 he criticizes the interpretive approach of this case. 
Furthermore, many Namibian fundamental rights provisions 
are not clearly defined and are expressed in 'wide general 
terms'. 
Article 12(1) (d) expressly provides that a person is presumed 
innocent until proved guilty 'according to law'. In such cases 
the Canadian Bill of Rights provisions and jurisprudence as 
well as that of the USA may be more in point and more helpful 
than   for example the provisions of the Canadian Charter and 
its interpretation by the Canadian Courts. The same applies to 
the role of the Court. An example of the Namibian Court in the 
role of law-maker, in the form of case law, appears from the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Namibia in Ex Parte Attorney 
General, Namibia: In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of 
State 1991 (3) SA 76 (NMS). In that decision the provisions of 
art 8 were interpreted, but the Court made a value judgment 
and laid down, in the words of Mahomed AJA as he was at the 
time, that the value judgment 'requires objectively to be 
articulated and identified, regard being had to the 
contemporary norms, aspirations, expectations, and 
sensitivities of the Namibian people as expressed in its 
national institutions and its Constitution, and further having 
regard to the emerging consensus of values in the civilized 
international community (of which Namibia is a part) which 
Namibians share. This is not a static exercise. It is a  
continually evolving dynamic. 
Berker CJ had this to say: 
Whilst it is extremely instructive to refer to, and analyze, 
decisions by other Courts such as the International Court of 
Human Rights or the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe or the 
United States of America on the question whether corporal   
punishment is impairing the dignity of a person subjected to 
such punishment, or whether such punishment amounts to 
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment, the one major and 
basic consideration in arriving at a decision involves an 
enquiry the generally held norms, approaches, moral 
standards aspirations and a lot of other established beliefs of 
the people of Namibia. In other words the decision which the 
Court will have to make in the present case is based on a 
value judgment which cannot primarily be determined by legal 
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rules and precedents, as helpful as they may be, but must take 
full cognizance of the social conditions, experiences and 
perceptions of the people of this country.795 
 
The court’s criticism touches a sensitive nerve. While the international 
community praised the subjective interpretation as a valid and progressive 
constitutional jurisprudence, the Supreme Court does not indicate how it determined 
the values and norms of the people. And why should the values and norms of the 
international community be of such importance to determine the Namibian values? 
 Judge O’Linn was never convinced that the value judgments of the Supreme 
and High Courts were a necessary interpretive result of the constitutional era. He 
deplored the emotional language of the Acheson-case and the unsophisticated 
conclusions drawn concerning the values of the Namibian people.796 He even stated 
in public at a conference at the University of Namibia that the High Court was more 
reliable than the Supreme Court since its judges were either Namibians or 
permanent residents, while the Supreme Court under  Chief Justice Mahomed were 
all foreign judges resident in other SADC states (South Africa, Zimbabwe and 
Zambia). 
 His first opportunity to comment on the Corporal Punishment case was S v 
Tcoeib.797 The accused brutally murdered two people and the judge considered a 
relevant sentence to replace the death penalty that was a mandatory sentence if no 
mitigating factors were present before independence.  While there were no 
judgments on life imprisonment as yet, O’Linn possibly suspected that it will come 
under constitutional scrutiny and reacted - 
 
The provisions in our statute providing for life imprisonment 
have not    been abolished and it is not for the Courts to abolish 
it. If the statutory provisions dealing with the function of the 
Executive to reprieve or to allow out on parole or probation lead 
to some anomalies, such laws should be urgently reviewed.798 
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Shortly after the Tcoeib case Judge Levy equated life imprisonment with the 
death penalty.799 This decision was rejected by the Supreme Court. It was not 
practice in Namibia to make recommendations regarding parole, and legislation did 
not make provision for such action. O’Linn nevertheless recommended to the 
executive that the accused is not released on parole or probation before the lapse of 
at least 18 years' imprisonment. 
When the accused applied for leave to appeal, O’Linn used the opportunity to 
comment extensively on the Corporal Punishment case.800 Before doing so, the 
judge expressed his belief in the death penalty in no unclear words. While 
condemning peoples justice, O’Linn sees public support for the re-introduction of the 
death penalty covering the whole spectre of society from all parties in Parliament to 
the man on the street. 
Since the protection of life in Article 6 of the Constitution cannot be changed in 
terms of Article 24, it may result in people taking the law in their own hands if the 
people are not satisfied that the substituting sentence is an adequate alternative to 
the death penalty, hence the two life imprisonment sentences in the Tcoeib-case and 
the recommendation to the executive.801 
The only issue on the table was the constitutionality of life imprisonment. 
Hence, after finishing off Levy’s rather over breathed equation of life imprisonment 
with a sentence of death and a short reference to the German case law, the judges 
declared life imprisonment constitutional, provided that the accused has a legal hope 
to be released at some future date. Since the Namibian legislation opens such a 
door through parole and probation regulations in the Prison’s Act, life imprisonment 
is not unconstitutional. 
One can hardly speak of the legal clash between O’Linn and Mahomed as an 
example of the late 20th century battle between positivism and post-modernism (a 
heated academic debate in South African constitutionalism), or even between 
positivism and Dworkinian liberalism, neither a Namibian version of the American 
division between the original intent theory and living or transformative 
constitutionalism. In Mahomed’s early judgments, while claiming a value-based 
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approach, arguments are still of the second-order, to use Cockrell’s vocabulary.802 
And he clearly prefers formal law to substantive law when it comes to justification for 
a value-judgment. 
But the differences do identify at least two hermeneutical positions. And these 
positions are not only of academic interest. The course of legal thought in Namibia is 
determined by the decisions of the Supreme Court.  
 Even O’Linn’s comments on the death penalty must be seen in the light of his 
criticism of the principle of value judgments. It is possibly a tongue in the cheek 
challenge to the legal fraternity to think substantively about the contradictions that 
may develop between the norms and values of the Namibian people and the 
Namibian Constitution. Despite the Supreme Court’s attempt to reconcile the two in 
the Tcoeib case, the South African Makwanyane case is a clear example that the 
two can stand in stark opposition against one another. 
Both O’Linn803 and Monitor Action Group804 questioned the idea that the 
prohibition of the death penalty represents the norms and values of the Namibian 
people. Member of Parliament and member of the Constituent Assembly, Kosie 
Pretorius, asked if the Namibian Constituent Assembly was correct to prohibit the 
death penalty without making sure that abolition is indeed a Namibian value.805  
In addition, if the Makwanyane case in South Africa is indeed an example of 
ignoring the norms and values of the people (as may also be the case of corporal 
punishment), the Supreme Court does not assist the Namibian people in how to 
know when to follow and when to resist the values of the people. In the Tcoeib case 
O’Linn asked another important question, with apparent no logical answer: Why did 
the Supreme Court not follow its own guidelines laid down in the Corporal 
Punishment Case? It never answered (or asked) if life imprisonment was in line with 
the norms and values of the Namibian people.  
Again, playing devil’s advocate, O’Linn tries to establish the consequence of 
the Supreme Court not following its own judgment: Is it possible that in this specific 
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case the Supreme Court broke the stare decisis link with a previous case? Art. 81 of 
the Constitution makes it clear that the Supreme Court is not bound by its own 
decisions and that a Supreme Court judgment is only binding as long as it is not 
reversed by a later judgment or contradicted by an Act of Parliament.  O‘Linn, 
without stating it directly, seems to take the latter position: The Ex parte Corporal 
Punishment case does not have to be followed by subordinate courts after the 
Tcoeib case.  
However, O’Linn sees a serious flaw in the Corporal Punishment judgment. 
When using comparative constitutional law, the Court only referred to constitutional 
democracies of the global south. Why are the developed countries of the West 
necessarily a better solidarity partner than newly independent African states? When 
O’Linn looks at another article in the Namibian Constitution, namely the non-
discriminatory categories of Article 10, he specifically looked to Zimbabwe to assist 
the Supreme Court in its interpretation. One does not have to agree with O’Linn in 
everything to see that his judgments are often a reaction to what Cockrell calls 
rainbow jurisprudence.  
It seems as if the Supreme Court actually referred to the norms and values 
embedded in the Constitution itself rather than the norms and values of the Namibian 
people. While the Supreme Court seemed to have determined the values of the 
Namibian people by looking at other countries with similar constitutions, it looked at 
countries with similar constitutional norms and values.  Since they interpret their 
constitutions to be against corporal punishment, so should Namibia.  
Since Berker suggested that corporal punishment for juveniles may be a 
future possibility, the door on all forms of corporal punishment is not closed. 
Consequently, if the government fails in its obligation to ensure that juveniles are 
kept separate from adults in prisons and holding cells – an on-going government 
failure – corporal punishment will always be seen by some observers as the better of 
two evils. 
While one can criticise the Corporal Punishment case for its illogical structure, 
or for the fact that it did not go far enough, it was at least a new beginning.  The 
harsh legalised assault of the courts and traditional authorities were stopped, as was 
the assault on learners in schools. Yet, this should not be seen as the end of the 
road.  All forms of corporal discipline – spanking by parents, older siblings and child 
caretakers – fall within the definition of assault. From a legal perspective one does 
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not even need a Supreme Court judgment to address these assaults that happen on 
a daily basis in Namibian homes. But it will possibly need a High or Supreme Court 
judgment to convince the public that spanking is not a legitimate expression of one’s 
freedom of religion or parent’s rights to discipline. 
 The value judgments did not help to develop guidelines for constitutional 
interpretation or a transformative model.  The Supreme Court created confusion by 
its vague language. The Court should have made it clear that the norms and values 
of the Constitution are those agreed upon at the Constituent Assembly and are 
embedded in the Constitution. However, O’Linn’s alternative would have locked 
Namibia in the past without the possibility of further constitutional transformation.  
The High Court per O’Linn did not do much better that the Supreme Court in 
its application of the values and principles of the people in the Frank case.  He 
simply took judicial notice of the derogatory language used by prominent politicians 
against homosexuals.  The fact that they were not criticized or contradicted by other 
politicians of the majority party in Parliament, indicated that the elected members of 
the Namibian people, and by implication the people are not in favour of assigning 
minority rights to  LGBT people. 
 Both  Kriegler in the Makwanyane case and Hinz806  (as we noted) finds value 
judgments based on the values of the people problematic. Kriegler comments that 
the mere fact that the majority of the South Africans are in favour of the death 
penalty cannot make it constitutionally acceptable if the process flies against the 
principles of the South African Constitution. Hinz criticises the weak foundation for 
considering values as a specific category for constitutional interpretation.  
 A clearer approach to value judgments was found in the Kauesa  Supreme 
Court judgment.807  The Court worked with clear constitutional principles in 
determining if the police regulations were unconstitutional. The values that the Court 
applied can both be seen as transformative and valued-based constitutionalism.  The 
transformation of society forms an integral part of the judgment. And the court 
directly linked transformation to values such as freedom of speech and non-
racialism. 
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 It is unfortunate that the Kauesa case did not become the benchmark for 
further jurisprudential development.  The way in which the court replaced older 
positivist interpretive models with a progressive evaluation of constitutional values, 
begs for a further development of transformative constitutionalism. Dumbutshena, J’s 
choice for freedom of expression as a core value to be considered in the Kauesa 
case was ground breaking. The court refused to prioritise rights - it did not even 
make a distinction between freedoms and rights. Instead, it looked at the need of the 
moment for a new constitutional democracy.  
 Unfortunately the superior courts of Namibia did not develop the foundations 
of Kauesa any further. If the prioritisation of rights is contextual it would have helped 
the process if later judgments could have developed guidelines to discern the need 
of the moment.   
 When it comes to societal transformation the Kauesa case opened the door 
for an aggressive approach to public debates without fear of being trapped in a 
position where the State can stop certain categories of people to participate. It falls 
outside the scope of this study to determine if the case created a more tolerant 
Namibian society. The judgment of Kauesa at least made transformation of the 
public debate possible. 
While O’Linn seeks guidance from the elected leaders and Mahomed from the 
international community, Dumbutshena took a more technical approach in the 
Kauesa case. He refused to see dignity as the Gründnorm of the Namibian 
Constitution or to find any prioritising of rights, but chose freedom of speech as the 
important freedom to protect in the specific period. 
           Norms and values of the Namibian people as a transformative principle did 
not create a foundation for jurisprudential development. Neither did it move away 
from the old formalistic approach to legal adjudication and interpretation. However, 
the possibilities of transformative constitutionalism found its way into Namibian 
constitutional jurisprudence in several High and Supreme Court judgment. 
Comparing them with the positivist approach, more specific the contribution of 
Justice O’Linn, the yet to be developed principles laid a foundation for transformative 
constitutionalism as an on-going interaction between legal jurisprudence and societal 
transformation. 
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7.3   Transformation and Socio-Economic Rights 
 The Mwilima808 case could have been one of the most dramatic examples of 
transformative constitutionalism at work. Unfortunately, the superior courts did not 
enforce any other socio-economic rights in following Mwilima, partly because the 
legal fraternity did not make any attempt to bring new cases to the courts. 
In Mwilima the court worked with values strongly embedded in the 
Constitution.  However, in terms of Article 101 economic rights cannot be enforced 
by the courts. The Supreme Court nevertheless considered the basic right to a fair 
trial, linked with the right to legal presentation to be so important that it applied 
international law to grant the applicants relief.  This was done, as we have seen, by 
relying on Art 144 of the constitution. The values the Court relied on, are, however 
not the values of the Namibian people, but the values of the Constitution. 
 The Mwilima case addressed an area of the society in dire need of 
transformation: the social inequalities of the Namibian nation. While it dealt with a 
basic civil right, it has an economic agenda – free legal representation. The Supreme 
Court, in an excellent exercise of legal activism linked free legal representation with 
the right to a fair trial guaranteed in both Article 12 of the Constitution and the 
International Covenant on political and Civil Rights. 
 In this case the gap between socio-economic rights and civil-politico rights 
has been dramatically narrowed. One would have expected a floodgate opening up 
of aggrieved citizens claiming their socio-economic rights from the right to health to 
the general right to a decent living. None of it happened. Mwilima remains a once off 
successful attempt to unlock the economic rights of Article 95. Yet, the effect of the 
judgment is important. Two aspects of the judgment hold the key for future litigation 
by aggrieved citizens who are being deprived of their social and economic rights: 
- The Namibian courts will, in following the Mwilima  case, treat Article 95 as 
a corpus of enforceable rights that can be enforced and not merely as a 
meaningless statement of state policy; and 
- While Article 101 limits litigation prospects for aggrieved citizens, it does 
not exclude all remedies. The Mwilima judgment opened the door to 
scrutinize the Constitution for other remedies. The litigant may find some 
possibilities in Article 144 and the ratified covenants and other treaties to 
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override the limitations of Article 101. Or the litigant may link a violation of 
an Article 95 right with a comparable right in Chapter 3. The right to health 
can be linked to the right to life (Article 6), or the right to a decent living to 
the right to education. The list goes on. 
 However, even the South African experience – where socio-economic rights 
form part of the Bill of Rights - unfortunately does not give social and economic 
litigants hope for real societal transformative constitutionalism. The availability of 
resources played an important role in both the acclaimed Grootboom case809 and the 
Soobramoney case.810 The Constitutional Court recognised Ms. Grootboom’s right to 
housing. Yet, despite the countless number of articles written about the case and the 
conferences around the world to discuss this ground-breaking development, Ms 
Grootboom died homeless and penniless.811 
 At the time of the judgment Judge Richard Goldstone, who was not on the 
bench, referred to the Grootboom judgment as "the first building block in creating a 
jurisprudence of socio-economic rights".812 At the time of Grootboom’s death her 
advocate, Ismael Jamie said to the Mail and Guardian "the fact that she died 
homeless shows how the legal system and civil society failed her".813 
 Soobramoney’s fate was worst. He suffered from chronic renal failure. His life 
could be prolonged if he by an on-going dialysis treatment. The hospital denied his 
application for treatment since its limited resources only gave the treatment to people 
eligible for a kidney transplant. Soobramoney approached the Constitutional Court, 
linking his right to treatment with his right to life. The Constitutional Court refused to 
intervene, since "the right to medical treatment does not have to be inferred from the 
nature of the State established by the Constitution or from the right to life which it 
guarantees". Soobramoney died of kidney failure.814   
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The South African Constitutional Court took cognisance of the limited 
resources and restricted the application of their judgment in the Grootboom case and 
refused Soobramoney relief.  
The Namibian Supreme Court, however, refused to be intimidated by the 
financial burden its judgment in the Mwilima case has placed on the State. In this 
case the Namibian Court was willing to walk the second mile where constitutional 
principle is at stake.  While the judgment in itself opened the door for societal 
transformation, it did not change society. The dramatic possibilities for future socio-
economic adjudication went unnoticed in the legal fraternity. The Court rejected an 
interpretation seeing Article 101 as an absolute rule to prevent the enforcement of 
chapter 11 socio-economic rights.  
Something needs to be said about the foundation of the judgment. The 
obvious positivist would be to accept Article 101 as absolute. As we have seen in 
chapter 6, the Court opted to go beyond Article 101 and interpreted the prohibition in 
the light of two other constitutional principles: the right to a fair trial envisaged in 
Article 3 and the monist approach to international law in Article 144. 
Cockrell and Roux’s submission that positivism does not exclude 
transformative constitutionalism has merit. While the Court did not work with an 
“original intent” approach, it took the text serious. Even if the intention of the 
Constituent Assembly was to prevent expensive enforcement of socio-economic 
rights, they did not close all the possible constitutional avenues allowing aggrieved 
citizens remedies to enforce Chapter 11 rights. The Court only investigated two of 
those avenues and found that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), treaty ratified by Namibia and in terms of Article 144 forms part of 
Namibian law, and Article 12 of the Constitution, also provides for legal 
representation to ensure a fair trial.  
There was no purposive interpretation, no broad CLS approach and only a 
limited  reliance on judicial activism. All it took to come up with an extremely valuable 
transformative interpretation was a mere acknowledgment that Article 101 is not the 
only word on the enforcement socio-economic rights. 
While the characters on the Bench can be overemphasised, it is important in 
this case to take note of the fact that two judges wrote judgments: Chief Justice 
Strydom and acting Supreme Court Justice O’Linn. The also formed the Bench of the 
overturned Kauesa High Court judgment. Turning to Roux and Cockrell again, there 
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is clear merit in their view that transformative constitutionalism is not only the domain 
of post-modernists, Creole liberals and critical legal theorists. 
The future of transformative constitutionalism is still uncertain in Namibia. Yet, 
the foundation has been laid for future development, not only in socio-economic 
adjudication, but is all constitutional matters. The fact that a legal conservative such 
as former Chief Justice Pius Langa of South Africa embraced the principle within the 
framework of a positivist values such as respect for the clear wording of the text, as 
well as its application by a positivist such as Justice O’Linn, will make it possible for 
a broader future development, as Roux has acknowledged.  
 
7.4   Transformative Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 
 Chapters 5 and 6 dealt with several cases where constitutional interpretations 
went against government. In some of these cases the superior courts invoked their 
judicial review powers to declare legislation unconstitutional (Smith, Kauesa, Ex 
Parte Corporal Punishment). In other cases such as Mwilima and Ex Parte the 
Relationship between the AG and PG the Supreme Court interpreted phases in the 
Constitution in ways that government found offensive and against both the wording 
and intention of the Constituent Assembly, while in Sikunda and Ngoma the Minister 
involved accused the judiciary of interfering in the work of the executive.  
 The relationship between law and politics, the executive and judicial functions 
of government will always be issues of potential conflict. Namibia is no exception. 
Since the early American case of Marbury  v  Madison815 judicial review has become 
one of the most important and effective methods to limit the powers of government 
by giving the courts the power to review both laws of  parliament and administrative 
actions of the executive in the light of the constitution or constitutional principles. 
 Transformative constitutionalism and judicial activism, like judicial review, 
have been criticised as means to defeat the will of the people. In the Frank judgment 
the Supreme Court criticised the High Court judgment ordering Parliament to amend 
the Aliens Act to protect permanent homosexual partnerships. The Supreme Court 
also found the interpretation given to the word “sex” in the High Court to include 
“sexual orientation” to be contrary to the norms and values of the Namibian people. 
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If the Namibian people have a need to amend the Act, it is the duty of 
Parliament to do so. In a letter to the High Court judges, the same judge, Justice 
O’Linn, criticised the Supreme Court for taking cognisance of the Constitutional 
reference of Affirmative Action, protected by Article 23 (2) of the Constitution at a 
time when no Affirmative Action legislation has been promulgated at the time.816  
In the same manner the Ex Parte Attorney General: The Relationship between 
the AG and PG case has been criticised for ignoring not only the semantic meaning 
of the phrase “final responsibility”, but also the clear intention of the drafters of the 
Constitution. 817 
However, judicial review and transformative constitutionalism are seldom 
appreciated by the executive and legislator. The idea that judges can find the 
legislation of the elected representatives of the people - needed to fulfil their 
constitutional responsibility to their constituency – unconstitutional, or to attach a 
meaning, are perceived by politicians as an intrusion of the courts in the mandate of 
the legislature and the executive. Namibia is no exception.   
Not every lawyer, or every human rights lawyer for that matter, is in favour of 
judicial review or obvious political judgments. Retired Constitutional Court of South 
Africa judge, Albie Sachs is a case in point.  He initially believed that the Bill of 
Rights proposed for the South African constitution was aimed at entrenching the 
advantageous economic position of the white community. He also has a problem 
with judicial review per se. For him it was inconceivable that a post-apartheid 
democratic elected government could be limited and its action reviewed by middle-
aged white men and ill-informed positivist judges.818  His alternative was a committee 
of hand-picked men and women who understood the South African context and like 
the Public Service Commission. 
Sachs’ committee can be compared with a special constitutional court.  He 
preferred non-judicial presiding officers of the committee.819 There are two major 
flaws in Sachs’ model- 
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-  the committee will not be equipped to deal with complicated legal issues, 
and  
- the committee will never be independent, a basic pre-requisite for judicial 
review.  
American chief justice Marshall explained the necessity of judicial review as 
follows-  
The powers of the legislator are defined and limited: and that 
those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is 
written. To what purpose are powers limited and to what 
purpose  is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits 
.may at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? 
The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited 
powers is abolished if those limits do not confine the person on 
whom they are imposed and if Acts prohibited and Acts allowed 
are of equal obligation. It is emphatically   the province and the 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. 
Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity 
expound and interpret that rule. If two particular laws conflict 
with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of 
each.820 
 
 Most common law jurisdictions in the English-speaking world with written 
constitutions entrusted the courts with review powers. Namibia follows that tradition.  
 As I have pointed out, transformative constitutionalism, because of its less rigid 
approach to the text, has often come under the same criticism of taking over the role 
of the legislator.  
 But even in the United States, the birth place of judicial review, powers of the 
courts have been a bone of contention. Since new legislation often deals with issues 
and circumstances that were not even envisaged when the constitution was written, 
lay people cannot understand the hermeneutical link between the constitution and 
the new legislation. On school of interpretation suggests that one should never move 
outside of a strict textual determined approach. Namibian cases, as we have seen, 
abound.  
The USA Roe v Wade821 is a textbook example of a constitutional decision 
dealing with an issue - abortion - that was not even discussed at the time of the 
writing of the constitution. The Supreme Court of the USA nevertheless found that 
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allowing a female the right to terminate her pregnancy is a constitutional right. In a 
critical review of the case Ely contends that it is a bad decision because it does not 
trace its premises to the charter from which it derive (sic) its authority.822 In other 
words, one cannot derive a pro-choice right to abortion if that right is not protected in 
the Constitution.  
 The problem with Ely’s criticism is obvious. Firstly, non-discriminatory clauses 
do not necessarily limit themselves to interests and issues that are textually 
determined. This is true of the non-discriminatory clause in the Namibian 
Constitution, but also of the so-called Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses823 
in the United States constitution.  
As we have already seen, Dworkin and other interpreters in North America  
refer to rights that are worthy of protection and derivable from the spirit and context 
of the constitution, but not specifically mentioned, as unenumerated fundamental 
rights.824  The term unenumerated right, is already a misnomer since it suggests that 
there are other rights listed in constitutions that are enumerated.  Even when rights 
are indeed listed, it still needs to be interpreted. 
 We now return to the word sex in Article 10 of the Namibian Constitution. 
While the South African Constitution makes specific mention of sexual orientation as 
a category of non-discrimination,825 the Namibian Constitution only mentions sex. 
Before the Frank case some expected the Namibian courts to follow the South 
African Courts and read sexual orientation into the word sex.826 
 The expectation was neither far-fetched nor without precedent.  Some years 
earlier prosecutors pointed out that the Namibian Constitution, unlike the South 
African Constitution, does not include the right to be warned of a right to legal 
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representation. The Namibian High and Supreme Court concluded that although the 
right to be warned is not explicitly mentioned, there is no real difference between the 
two constitutions in this regard and the warning right should be read into the 
Namibian Constitution.827 
 Dworkin contends that there is no real difference between unenumerated and 
enumerated rights since both need to be interpreted.828 Crump, following Dworkin, 
calls it a difference of degree.829 
The anti-review thinking is flawed on at least one point. Parliaments or other 
legislative bodies can never be the people. Once the population of the city-state is 
too big for them to assemble in the market square, democracy needs symbols to 
represent the people.  
The second flaw flows from the first. If the legislator is not really the people, 
but only a representative symbol, there is not necessarily an anti-thesis between the 
judiciary and the legislator. Both are symbolic representatives of the people, one to 
express their will in making laws, the other in executing the laws.  
The counter argument in Namibia will be that judges are not elected, and only 
indirectly appointed by the executive.830 In the United States the issue is partly 
resolved by the prerogative of a serving president to fill vacancies on the bench 
during his/her term of office, which will not solve the problem of the “old guard” on 
the bench who could have been appointed by a previous president from the other 
party.  
 While constitutions are the ultimate expression of a people and their 
aspirations, it is also necessary to have independent supervisors of the expressed 
values rather than politicians. Dworkin observes that democracy is not only majority 
rule, but majority rule subject to those conditions that make majority rule fair”.831 
The limitation of government is usually attained by a separation of powers with 
strong developed checks and balances built into the system. While legal 
philosophers did not always make a clear differentiation between the rule of law and 
constitutionalism, the basic idea was always to create a system of law that can 
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outlive the ideological or nationalist outbursts of illogical hate and hysteria, or as 
McIlwain put it: 
We must leave open the possibility of an appeal from the people 
drunk to the people sober, if individual and minority rights are to 
be protected in the periods of excitement and hysteria from 
which we unfortunately are not immune.832 
 
Writing shortly after World War II, McIlwain possibly had the destructive result 
of Nazism and Fascism in mind. A constitution which makes it difficult for a power 
drunk government to suspend the rule of law and to rule by decree, is no guarantee 
for a Rechtsstaat, but the process of change will at least be slowed down and give 
logical thinking  an opportunity to bring reasonableness back to the system. 
The Namibian Constitution gave the High and Supreme Court review powers 
over all legislation and actions of Parliament, any sub-ordinate legislative authority, 
the executive and agents of government,833 as well as any law in force immediate 
before the date of independence.834 This includes legislation intact at the time of 
independence, new legislation of Parliament, sub-ordinate regulations, customary 
law and even the common law.835 
To understand the need for an independent interpreter of a constitution and a 
transformative court to take cognisance of the needs of a changing society, judicial 
review and transformative constitutionalism must be seen in the light of the court’s 
responsibility towards the final guardians of the constitution: The People.  Judicial 
review fits the basic principle of transformative constitutionalism. It limits the 
possibility of the executive ignoring constitutional principles or transformative 
judgments.                                                                                                                                                  
 
7.5   The Executive and the Judiciary 
While there is no indication of major attempts from the executive to interfere in 
the operations of the judiciary, negative attitudes of government often reflected in the 
mass actions of the people, most of the time initiated by the ruling SWAPO Party. As 
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noted, at the height of the time of reconciliation the release of Acheson did not result 
in any major reactions. But the light sentences of the accused in the Kleynhans case 
caused a major outcry against a judge who gained the respect of SWAPO in exile for 
his fearless defending of political prisoners. Comparing the two cases, one would 
expect serious protest against the release of Acheson by Judge Mahomed. It 
virtually brought the prosecution of the Lubowski murders to a still stand, and as we 
know now, to a more or less finality. The only concern came from another High Court 
judge, Judge Levy, during the inquest where he pointed out that a chance to serve 
the ends of justice was lost once Acheson was released. 
 The angry reaction against Judge O’Linn was probably the result of a concern 
that the white right may become a future problem. Although unorganised at the time 
of the Kleynhans case, they could have posed a security threat if left to organise. All 
adult males were trained soldiers under the conscription policies of the South African 
government and later the transitional government of South West Africa/Namibia. It is 
also significant that the government did not play a significant role in the protest 
(although the executive as leaders of the SWAPO Party was certainly sympathetic to 
the protests). It remained a party driven programme. While the secretary-general of 
the Party, Moses Garoeb, was also a Member of Parliament, he was acting in his 
capacity as a party official. 
 The silence of government in the Corporal Punishment case was predictable 
despite the fact the traditional communities – many of them ardent SWAPO 
supporters836 – were in favour of corporal punishment in the customary courts.  
 Yet, none of the traditional authorities commented on the banning of corporal 
punishment by the Supreme Court.  The reason is possibly to be found in SWAPO’s 
initial opposition to traditional authorities. There is a contradiction in this position 
since SWAPO in exile was also in favour of establishing customary law a legal 
system in an independent Namibia. The traditional authorities were slow to do 
anything that would harm their relationship with government. Since the government 
accepted the judgment, it would possibly have been futile to raise their concerns. It 
may also have strengthened a general belief that customary law is not compatible 
with constitutionalism and human rights. 
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 It is also known that the traditional authorities and customary courts, in their 
general co-operation with the South African authorities used corporal punishment as 
a tool against the liberation movements.837 At the time of the Corporal Punishment 
case the activists and the political populists supported the government in its attempts 
to limit the powers of the traditional authorities.  Bearing in mind the role corporal 
punishment played in colonial times, the silent acceptance by the people is 
understandable.   
 The several issues involving Minister Jerry Ekandjo need some further 
scrutiny.  In the Osire Star saga the Chief Justice was quick to accept a so-called 
apology by the Minister.  However, the Minister’s reaction can hardly be seen as an 
apology. In the Sikunda case, the court found that the Minister was in contempt of a 
court order. 
 In both instances the government made statements respecting the authority of 
the judiciary and the rule of law.  However, in none of these cases was the Minister 
disciplined or even strongly repudiated by the executive.  The same goes for the 
actions of the late Moses Garoeb in the Kleynhans case. 
 The criticism of the Prime Minister in 2003, that the Bench was still lily white 
and Dr. Kavana’s criticism of the criminal justice system were more direct criticism 
coming from the executive. The Prime Minister later explained that he did not refer to 
the judges, but to the legal fraternity.  The use of the word “Bench” was only a wrong 
choice.838  In the same manner Dr. Kavana was concerned with the implementation 
and interpretation of the constitution.839   
 The High and Supreme Court did not follow a clear pro- or anti-government 
approach.  One thing seems clear: The Namibian superior courts did not hesitate to 
go against the interest of the government and constitutional institutions. Despite 
some indirect pressure from government on the judiciary, the superior courts were 
often almost surprisingly critical of government and its institutions. A list of the most 
important cases analysed in this study indicates that government did not always get 
what it wanted. 
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- In Ex Parte Attorney-General: In re The Constitutional Relationship 
Between The Attorney-General and The Prosecutor-General840 the 
Supreme Court explicitly ruled against a prosecutorial role for the Attorney 
General and for an independent Prosecutor-General; 
- In Ex Parte Attorney-General, Namibia:  in re Corporal Punishment by 
Organs of State.841 the Supreme Court found corporal  punishment by 
organs of the State unconstitutional despite the fact that it was generally 
practised in schools and by traditional authorities; 
- In State v Smith and Others842 sections of the Racial Discrimination 
Prohibition Act 26 of 1991 were declared unconstitutional; 
- In Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs and Others843 important section of 
the Police regulation were declared unconstitutional and the right of a 
junior officer to criticise  the commanding structures of the Namibian Police 
were recognised;  
- In Frank and Another v the Immigration Selection Board,844 the High Court 
ruled against a decision of the Immigration Selection Board refusing a 
lesbian women living in a permanent relationship with another women 
permanent residence, despite the fact that the Board denied that her 
sexual orientation played a role in their decision. The judgment was, 
however overturned by the Supreme Court.  
- In four Sikunda cases the High and Supreme Court ruled against the 
Minister of Home Affairs detaining Sikunda.845 
- In Government of the Republic of Namibia and Others v Mwilima and All 
Other Accused in the Caprivi Treason Trial, 2002 NR 235 (SC) the 
Supreme Court granted the Caprivi secessionists State funded legal aid 
despite Article 101 of the Constitution stating that Article 95 rights (the 
category in which paid legal aid falls) are not enforceable in a court of law. 
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- In a long series of cases, the courts declared reverse onuses and 
presumptions against accused persons, infringements of the constitutional 
right of accused not to give evidence against themselves and to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
 
 The list goes on. It seems clear that during the first fourteen years of 
independence, the superior courts remained independent. While the government 
may have placed some external pressure on the courts, there is no evidence of any 
direct attempt by government to influence judgments or to appoint judges who will be 
sympathetic to government or party interests. 
 
7.6   Judges and their Influence 
Traditionally the public expect judges to be objective and not to allow personal 
opinions to influence their judgments. As we have noted above, this is an 
unattainable ideal. Since it is impossible to measure the influence of a judge’s 
ideology, Cockrell suggested that the ideology or political conviction of the judge 
should play no role is the analysis of his/her judgment.846 The substantive value of 
the judgment is the important issue. Cockrell found the denial of South African 
Constitutional Court judges that their ideology and political convictions played no role 
in their rejection of the death penalty unnecessary. 
The legal realists, on the other hand, give the judge the freedom of a 
legislator. Lon Fuller, who influenced Duncan Kennedy847 realised in the 1940’s that 
law cannot function without formal rules, hence his eight prerequisites for a proper 
legal system. Fuller defined the rules in the negative as elements undermining the 
legal system: 
- Failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be  decided on an   
ad hoc basis;  
- Failure to publicize, or at least to make available to the affected party, the 
rules he is expected to observe;  
- Abuse of retroactive legislation;  
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- Failure to make rules understandable;  
- The enactment of contradictory rules; 
- Rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; 
- Introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot   
orient his action by them; and 
- Failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual 
administration.848 
 The Realists nevertheless emphasised the unrealistic expectation to uphold a 
pure doctrine of separation between the judge as an interpreter and the judge as 
legislator. Even the liberal positivist Herbert Hart accepted that in the penumbra 
there are situations where the judge may have more than one option. 
The American Realists made the personality, social position, background and 
character of the judge important issues to take cognisance of in understanding 
judgments. The prejudice of a judge is hidden behind the doctrine of independence, 
neutrality and the formalism of the system. Frank, a Realist legal philosopher who 
became a judge, suggested that the awareness of the human component is 
important in understanding the legal process,849 but also for the self-awareness of 
the judge. If the judge conscientiously acknowledges his/her own sympathies and 
prejudices, he/she can neutralise its effect. 
 The important question for this study is to what extent the historical 
background and ethnicity of the judges played a role in the development of two 
schools of thought, represented by the legal clash between O’Linn and Mahomed. 
 How does the South African debate reflect on the hermeneutical differences 
between O’Linn and Mahomed/Dumbutshena, or between the High and the Supreme 
Courts? If one takes the South African debate seriously, it seems inappropriate to 
lower the Namibian debate to a clash between the old positivist school and a 
progressive value-conscience bench driven by transformative constitutionalism.   
 O’Linn cannot be described as a product of the apartheid system. 
Ideologically he was always under suspicion by the South African administration and 
even the transitional government during the colonial era. As a young lawyer, he 
refused to toe the white political line. His participation in white opposition politics was 
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not exactly revolutionary, but his views were in the best tradition of liberal opposition 
to apartheid.  O’Linn was respected as an advocate and his objectivity 
acknowledged by friend and foe. He was willing to go to Lusaka and engage in a 
transparent manner with the SWAPO Party despite the fact that some members of 
the transitional government saw people like O’Linn as traitors and communists.850 
Yet, when SWAPO cadres crossed the borders into Namibia on 1 April 1989, O’Linn 
as chairperson of Peace Plan 435 fearlessly criticised the liberation movement.851 
As chairperson of the commission monitoring violence during the run up to the 
Resolution 435 elections for a Constituent Assembly, he gained the respect of all the 
parties and the international community – despite initial complaints by the internal 
parties that he will be biased in favour of SWAPO.852 
As a member of the Windhoek bar, he defended Plan fighters and SWAPO 
members simply because he believed in the rule of law. O’Linn brought that same 
commitment to the bench, doing constitutional interpretation the old-fashioned way, 
to use a phrase once used to describe the method of American judge Antonin 
Scalia.853 O’Linn disliked what Scalia calls a Living Constitution or judges that go 
beyond the written text to discover the meaning. 
For the political analyst, his love/hate relationship with the SWAPO Party is 
difficult to understand. The defence advocate of guerrilla fighters, but also the judge 
who was seen to be soft on white right wing terrorists, the judge who had no 
understanding of the need of a black police officer to criticise the white leadership, 
but shared the politician’s concern about crime. The list goes on.  
However, understanding O’Linn’s background and ideological or legal 
philosophical point of departure, makes his judgments more predictable. His 
commitment to the text of all legislation and a faith in the basic interpretive rules 
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leave little room for the idea of reading the Constitution as a sui generis or 
considering transformative constitutionalism as an interpretive option. 
  His positivist approach may bear strong resemblance to the conservative 
approach of a Scalia in the USA or the South African bench during the apartheid era 
so severely criticised by Dugard, Chaskalson and Dyzenhaus. However, O’Linn 
never used the criticised dictum of Hart that law and morality hve nothing to do with 
one another. He does not fit the positivist “yes man” image portrayed by Radbruch 
(and criticised by Mertens as the legal problem of the Nazi period).  
 O’Linn’s insistence of the text resembles Fagan’s reliance on Raz’s textual 
moral position rather than the morals of the external rules of constitutional 
interpretation.854 The Constitution as a legal text should not be dealt with mystical 
moral rules and clothed in poetic language. If the legal text is not ambiguous, it 
should be treated like any other legal text.   
 O’Linn’s criticism of the Corporal Punishment judgment has merit, as shown in 
Chapter 5. It resembles Cockrell’s criticism of the “rainbow jurisprudence” in South 
Africa. His criticism of Mahomed was not so much the application of value 
judgments. O’Linn himself applied value judgments, while defenders of “soft 
positivism” such as Cockrell and even Roux are at pains to point out that positivism 
are not in principle against value judgments. Even Hart saw moral superiority as the 
basis for the law making process of judges in difficult cases where the legal problem 
lies in the so-called penumbra. 
 Consequently, criticism of the corporal punishment case does not attack 
moral judgments or the reliance on the values of the Namibian people. Neither is it 
based on a preference for positivism against transformative constitutionalism. As 
Roux pointed out, transformative constitutionalism is not necessarily the domain of 
critical legal studies, and both Dworkinism and positivism can operate comfortable 
with the principle. As I noted in analysing the constitutional judgments in chapters 5 
and 6, the Namibian superior courts did not rely on CLS arguments in any significant 
way.  
 If we take Woolman and Davis seriously, the real divisive moment between 
O’Linn and the more progressive part of the bench (Mahomed, Dumbutshena and 
possibly Hannah), can be found in the understanding of the political foundation of the 
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Constitution.  The conservative approach of O’Linn saw dignity as the foundation of 
all rights listed in the Constitution. For him the battle or struggle for independence 
was based on the acknowledgement of the dignity of all humans. Unlike the 
freedoms, dignity is unrestricted and not subjected to any other legislation or law. 
Fundamental freedoms on the other hand, are subjected to the other laws in 
Namibia. Therefore, O’Linn found it inconceivable that freedom of speech can 
override the dignity of individuals. To rely on affirmative action, which may be a 
constitutional principle, but is not even a constitutional right, to backup the priority of 
freedom of speech over the need to respect the dignity of individuals, as the 
Supreme Court did, spelled heresy to O’Linn.  While O’Linn obviously operated 
within the clear and known parameters of a positivist approach, he is at the same 
time defending typical liberal values.  
Mahomed worked with an even stronger anti-apartheid background. Only, he 
was more than a sympathetic observer. He experienced the oppression and 
prejudice in his life. Mahomed could not join the exclusive white Pretoria Bar after his 
studies, and when he joined the Johannesburg Bar, the Group Areas Act prevented 
him from occupying an office in the city. He nevertheless became the first black 
lawyer to receive Senior Counsel status from the President of South Africa. In the 
early 1990’s he was involved in civil society activism for a democratic South Africa. 
There are clear differences between the backgrounds of Mahomed and O’Linn: 
- O’Linn started his career as a police officer, 
- Mahomed struggled to enter the legal profession because of his colour; 
- O’Linn was a respected member of the South West Africa Bar, 
- Mahomed struggled to get entrance into the Johannesburg Bar, and had to 
work without an office. 
There are also obvious similarities: 
- Both were fierce defenders of the rule of law during the apartheid era; 
- O’Linn played an active role in both liberal political opposition to apartheid 
and civil society’s drive for Namibian independence as chair of the 
Namibian Peace Plan 435.  
- Mahomed was chair of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa in 
the early 1990’s. 
 The conflict between the judges, and the total different approaches, makes it 
difficult to determine a sociological or psychological reason for their judgments. If 
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O’Linn’s “soft” judgment in the Kleynhans case can be ascribed to his history as a 
former police officer, how does one explain the judgment of Mahomed in the 
Acheson case? If O’Linn’s judgment in the Kauesa case are attributed to his loyalty 
to the white police officers, or his respect for discipline, does it mean that one has to 
ignore his explicit preferential choice for dignity as the foundation of the Namibian 
Constitution? 
 Taking note of Klare, Botha and Kennedy’s criticism of the presumptions 
underlying legal interpretation, it remains an almost impossible task to use race or 
political association as interpretive guides to understand the different approaches of 
the first fourteen years of Namibian jurisprudence.  
 Although Judge Levy was a South African coming from the old dispensation, 
he was more willing than his colleagues to move the boundaries of judicial activism 
and freedom away from the old formalistic approach of the South African Supreme 
Court of Appeal. His judgment on the High Court bench in the Frank case did not get 
the credit it deserved, mainly because the Supreme Court overruled it. As noted, the 
judges of the South West African Supreme Couth during the 1980’s, which included 
Judge Levy and the later judge president and Chief Justice, Judge Strydom, already 
broke ranks with a pro-government conservatism.  
 The fearless conduct of judges Hoff and Mainga in the Sikunda case, both 
black judges appointed after independence, but both judges who cut their teeth on 
the Bench as magistrates before independence, is worth noticing as an example of 
judicial independence.  
 One of the reasons for the demise of American Realism is the difficulty of 
categorising judges. The realist Fred Rodell, looking at behavioural tendencies, 
predicted the results of the now well-known Baker v Carr855 fairly accurate in an 
article after argument but before judgment.856 However, it becomes much more 
difficult to use race or social tendencies as predictable yardsticks or interpretive 
explanations.  
 In the case of S v Mushwena and Others857 the Court had to decide on the 
jurisdiction of the High Court to trail suspects involved in the failed Coe d’état 
attempted in the Caprivi in 1999. The Namibian Police brought all the suspects 
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(respondents in the Supreme Court) to Namibia from neighbouring countries by 
unlawful means and without following extradition procedures. Three judges of the full 
Bench of the Supreme Court, Judges Mtambanengwe, Chomba and Gibson ruled in 
favour of the State, while two judges, Strydom and O’Linn ruled in favour of the 
respondents, finding that the High Court did not have jurisdiction to try them.  
 The immediate use of racial categories can easily be interpreted as a victory 
for progressive judicial activism by black judges on the Bench, resisted by the white 
component operating with a typical pre-independent apartheid mind-set and its 
obsession with form rather than content.   
 The black judges are concerned with the territorial integrity of the new 
Republic, the need for criminal trials to end all violence in the Caprivi and to send out 
a clear message that secession attempts will not be tolerated. While extradition is 
the normal way to get fugitives from law back in Namibia to stand trial, the 
succession attempt created an abnormal situation asking for radical action.   
 If we categorise the bench as a difference of opinion based on nationality, our 
interpretation can come to a different conclusion. Then the Namibian judges are the 
fearless protectors and defenders of the rule of law, the rights of an accused and the 
necessity of all the role players in the criminal justice system to come to court with 
clean hands. The foreign judges are dependent on the goodwill of the government 
for their contracts and their position on the bench. The answer may even be legal 
and based on substantive differences between the two groups on two clearly 
discernible interpretive positions and following two streams in international law, while 
the interpretation of the facts possibly also played a role. 
 O’Linn and Strydom followed a reasonably late South African case858 and 
accepted that while no one was abducted, neither was anyone deported. The 
handing over of the suspects to the Namibian police were not spontaneous actions 
of Botswana and Zambia, but initiated by Major-General Martin Shali of the Namibian 
Defence Force with the full knowledge of the Namibian Police.859  In following the 
“clean hands” approach of the Ebrahim case, the judges concluded that the High 
Court was correct. It did not have the jurisdiction to try the respondents, except for 
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Charles Sambona, who returned to Namibia voluntary and co-operated with the 
Namibian Police.860 
 Both Gibson and Mtambanengwe, while acknowledging the “clean hands” 
doctrine of the Ebrahim case, showed more interest in the “act of state” doctrine, 
traced back to a series of cases in the United Kingdom and the United States, going 
back to the late nineteenth century.861  In terms of the rule the actions of a foreign 
state has no relevance to the arrest of a suspect on territory of the state who trials 
the suspect or the jurisdiction of the courts to do so.   
 At the heart of the difference between the two groups lies the role Namibia 
played in the delivering of the accused to the Namibian Police. 
Mtambanengwe/Gibson (and Chomba, who concurred without writing a judgment) 
concluded that Major-General Shali’s request to the Zambian authority could not be 
seen as a Namibian initiative that lead to the handing over by the Zambian or 
Botswana authorities. O’Linn/Strydom saw a direct link between Shali’s action and 
the events following that lead to the handing over of the suspects to the Namibian 
police. 
 There are no indications in the judgment itself that the judges were driven by 
anything but their own convictions. O’Linn and Strydom relied on South African law. 
Their experiences the previous dispensation may have influenced their more critical 
approach to government action in following the Ebrahim case. The fact that 
Mtambanengwe gave a similar judgment while on the Zimbabwean bench, 
undoubtedly also had an influence on his views.  
 However, to link the judgment with the nationality of the judges or their 
ethnicity seems to be a bridge too far, to use Pierre de Vos’ expression. When 
interpreting the interpreters, it is possibly better to judge them on the weakness or 
strength of their substantive arguments. 
 If one opts for transformative constitutionalism, the judgment of O’Linn and 
Strydom is the way to go. Not only does it fit the development in Namibia’s 
neighbour, but it also opts for a broad, purported interpretation of individual rights. 
Namibia was, like South Africa, plagued by autocratic state abductions and even 
killings of political opponents in neighbouring territories. The Ebrahim case 
addressed and overturned the non-democratic judgment that bound both countries 
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during the apartheid era. Although the action of the Namibian Police and Defense 
Force cannot be compared to the rogue actions of the South African occupation era, 
a strong burden on the State to follow its own rules when freedom of citizens are 
concerned, seems to be the logical approach to break the bonds of the past and 
create new rules and structures for the future.  
 The difference between the majority and minority judgments is not only the 
the case authorities they preferred to follow, but a choice between an burden on the 
Namibian State to follow its own stringent rules, even if its neighbours can assist 
Namibia without asking questions, and a blind acceptance of the actions of 
neighbouring states, even if they are suspect. 
 Von Doepp, an American social scientist, used a comparative model to 
determine if expat judges are more likely to make judgments that favour 
government.862 
At the same time, there are some areas of concern. Most 
notably, there appears to be one category of judges – foreign 
judges appointed in the mid-1990s – who have tended to side 
with the government. Does this mean that they always side with 
government? Absolutely not. There is clear evidence that such 
judges will decide against government.863 
 
 Von Doepp’s methodology is questionable since he does not analyse the facts 
but rather compare trends only.864 He explains his methodology as follows: 
 
Studies of the courts in a variety of settings have made effective 
use of statistical techniques to try to answer this type of 
question. Via such methods, analysts have been able to discern 
the extent to which political and other types of factors shape the 
decisions that are rendered by judiciaries.865 
 
 Even if one does not agree with Von Doepp’s methodology, his conclusion 
summarises the relationship between government and the judiciary accurate: 
This certainly suggests that the Namibian political environment 
remains supportive of human rights – a very positive sign for the 
deepening of democracy in the country. 
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Finally, the evidence presented here suggests that, in general, 
the government has not politicised the bench via its 
appointments. As indicated, decisions from more recent 
appointees have been no more likely to be decided in 
government’s favour than those appointed before them.866 
 
It will be an overstatement to allege that transformative constitutionalism was 
the main jurisprudential model of the first twelve years of independence. But one 
needs to take notice of the fact that both liberal and judegs who preferred a positivist 
approach, contributed to the development of transformative constitutionalism, even if 
they may not have been familiar with the concept and never quoted Mureinik, Klare 
or te writings of Davis/Woolman. It is irrelevant to ask if they consciously applied 
transformative principles. The post-2002 judgment may give us a better 
understanding of the ongoing influence of positivism and the development of 
transformative constitutionalism. 
 
7. 7   Final Conclusions 
 After evaluating the important cases between 1990 and 2002, looked at the 
South African debate and placed it in a broader interpretive perspective, we can now 
come to some final conclusions: 
 While the term transformative constitutionalism was relatively unknown in 
southern Africa when Namibia became independent, the Courts clearly understood 
the principles. Both the Supreme and High Court presented judgments with clear 
transformative objectives. Yet, it will be wrong to call the superior courts after 1990 
transformative courts. There were also judgments that did not move away from the 
formalism and conservatism of the colonial era. 
 There is little, if any, indication that an ideology of apartheid played any 
significant role in post-independent jurisprudence. The Kleynhans case stirred the 
emotions, possibly because of the timing of the planned co d’état shortly after 
independence. There is little in the judgment indicating any sympathy with the 
accused. This also applies to the Lubowski murder. The South African Defence 
Force was still powerful during the period before the constitutional negotiations 
started.  In several cases, the Courts made decisive judgments against apartheid, its 
ideology and discrimination. 
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 The Courts regularly crossed the dividing line between politics and law in the 
first fourteen years. The mere fact that certain issues such as socio-economic rights 
were nested safely in Chapter 11 of the Constitution, with Article 101 limiting the 
jurisdiction of the Courts over such issues, did not prevent the Courts from taking 
socio-economic rights serious.  
 Yet, no single model of constitutional interpretation was developed.  Roux, a 
follower of Hart and Dworkin, points out that transformative constitutionalism has a 
positive role to play in constitutional jurisprudence.  It must however be understood 
as a mode of interpretation based on the values and principles of the Constitution. 
Roux challenged the idea that transformative interpretations are dependent upon a 
specific hermeneutic approach such as CLS or legal realism, or a specific 
understanding or reading of the constitution such as a post-liberal or Creole liberal 
reading.  
 It is not clear what the dividing line in the Namibian jurisprudence of the first 
fourteen years was. O’Linn’s positivism and literal interpretation resulted in several 
good, transformative judgments such as the Mushwena case. Although it was one of 
two minority judgments, it was a good transformative interpretation, preventing the 
police and defence force to ignore extradition laws. In the Mwilima case, O’Linn (with 
Strydom), loyal to his literal model of interpretation, interpreted the text of the 
Constitution, albeit not with a fundamentalist hardness. It turned out to be possibly 
the best examples of transformative constitutionalism of the first fourteen years. 
Yet, it would have been possible to predict the outcome of judgments merely 
based on the known ideology or legal philosophy of the judge on the Bench. The 
Frank judgment of O’Linn was a disappointment, not because of his positivist 
approach, but because of a too narrow interpretation of the word sex in Article 10(2). 
This approach, while a literal approach like the Mushwena judgment, misinterpreted 
not only the word sex, but also the spirit of Article 10(2). In the Mushwena judgment, 
the judge opted for a broad interpretation of Article 95(h). While it is by no means an 
activist judgment, it captured the spirit of chapter 11. 
In some cases the transformative elements of the judgments was not 
immediately clear. For progressive lawyers the interpretation of the phrase final 
responsibility in Article 87(a) as referring only to administrative issues and excluded 
responsibility of prosecutorial decision was a disappointment. It excluded the then 
AG, Hartmut Ruppel from the opportunity to transform the Office of the PG into a 
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human rights and gender sensitive authority. The independence of the PG from 
political authority became clear only if the interpreter managed to differentiate 
between the possible influence of the two office bearers and the principle of 
independence.  
But the judgment is not without transformative significance. It went beyond the 
mere wording final responsibility which seems to make the Prosecutor-General a 
subordinate of the Attorney-General. Acknowledging both the principle of separation 
of powers, and the historical abuse of the apartheid colonial government, the 
Supreme Court opted to look to the future. An independent Prosecutor-General, the 
Court concludes, will break with the subordinate prosecutorial policies of the old era 
and replace it with a democratic, independent constitutional Prosecutor-General. 
As a rule, the Namibian superior courts still approach the law as sacrosanct 
principles. The idea that a Constitutional problem may have more than one “correct” 
answer, is seldom, if ever,  mentioned by the Courts. Every judgment appears to be 
the only possible interpretation, hence O’Linn’s criticism of the Supreme Court 
judgments of Kauesa and the Corporal Punishment cases. 
The Courts prefer formalistic arguments. Even the acclaimed value judgments 
such as the Corporal Punishment and the Frank cases are not based on substantive 
arguments. Consequently, the value judgments did not help much to develop 
guidelines for constitutional interpretation.  O’Linn correctly criticized the judgment in 
the Corporal Punishment case.  There is no indication how the values of the people 
are determined.  Rather than determining the values of the people, the Court simply 
assumed that Namibia shares the values and norms of countries with similar 
constitutions. 
 Even Mahomed was confused on how he determined the values of the 
Namibian people. Judge O’Linn did not do much better in his application of the 
values and principles of the people in the Frank case.  He simply took judicial notice 
of the derogatory language used by prominent politicians against homosexuals.  The 
fact that they were not criticized or contradicted by other politicians in Parliament, 
was proof enough for O’Linn to accept that the norms and values of the Namibian 
people do not include the acceptance of same sex relationships. 
 A more acceptable approach to value judgments came from the Kauesa 
Supreme Court judgment.  The Court worked with clear constitutional principles 
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when it determined if the police regulations was unconstitutional. This opened the 
door for a more reliable value model. 
 While the history of the Namibian people and the preamble is important to 
understand the past, this should ideally lead to a correction of the past, but also the 
transformation of the Namibian society. Both the Smith and the Müller cases is 
against the spirit of the Constitution, and of the preamble to conclude that previously 
advantaged are limited in their enjoyment and protection of constitutional rights.  The 
Constitution should be interpreted in such a manner that a bridge (Mureinik) is 
crossed from oppression to democracy, freedom and equality for everyone. 
 In several cases, the court ignored international law and used comparative 
law as an interpretive tool:   
- Frank (Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent South Africa);  
- Corporal Punishment case (Australia and Canada).   
In both these cases international law could have played a positive role in developing 
transformative constitutionalism. 
 Something needs to be said about the traditional jurisprudential models.  
Namibian judges can hardly be placed in a Dworkinian or Hartian model. During the 
early years, the debate between O’Linn and Mahomed showed some traits of a 
battle between positivism (O’Linn) and transformative constitutionalism (Mahomed).  
However, none of them were consistent or dogmatic in their different approaches. 
While the two judges obviously operated form different jurisprudential models, the 
differences often did not end in different results (Tcoeib, etc.). 
 A last question:  “To what extend did the political atmosphere influence the 
jurisprudential development?” 
 The court clearly went through different stages.  Initially both the High and 
Supreme Courts followed a liberal approach. The rights of individuals were 
protected, even when this caused serious outcries in the community (Corporal 
Punishment case, Kleynhans and Kauesa). 
 The Namibian High and Supreme Court established the new Republic as a 
Rechtsstaat, a jurisdiction where the rule of law is observed and where there is a 
clear separation of power between the judiciary and the other legs of government.  
 While the judgments did not always follow a consistent mode of interpretation, 
there is no evidence of any government interventions in the judgments of the 
superior courts. 
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 The lack of cohesion between different judgments and the use of different 
hermeneutical keys to unlock the Namibian Constitution need to be taken seriously 
by the Namibian courts in the 21st century. The old perception of law and the role of 
the courts are no longer tenable or realistic.  
 It is also clear that the last word of positivism has not been spoken.  Moderate 
positivists such as Fagan and Cockrell do not operate with an old-fashioned view of 
law. Cockrell’s challenge to lift both the academic debate and the judgments of the 
superior courts to the level of substantive legal issues rather than structural law still 
holds.  
The test for good or bad judgments should not be an ideological shibboleth for 
or against value-based or positivist judgments. Rather, transformative 
constitutionalism ought to be accepted as the best possible way. Namibian 
jurisprudence since independence has examples of good transformative judgments 
such as the Kauesa case, but also less convincing examples of value-based such as 
the Corporal Punishment case. Often different hermeneutical approaches 
nevertheless produce the same results, such as the Tcoeib cases.  
South African scholars such as Roux, Cockrell and to a lesser extent Fagan, 
have pointed out that even closer to home positivism does not equal stagnant, 
outdated fundamentalism. Consequently, the soft positivism of Cockrell and Roux 
fall outside the domain of rigid, literalist interpretation.  
If the Namibian bench is going to learn anything from the first fourteen years 
of constitutional development, the legal fraternity needs to take cognisance of the 
debates and developments in textual interpretation. A Namibian debate, almost 
non-existent in the first fourteen years since independence, will possibly 
concentrate on substantive arguments.  
 Finally, we can point to a few other developments during the first fourteen 
years of constitutional development.   
- The Supreme Court of South West Africa was a worthy forerunner of the 
superior courts of an independent Namibia in the 1980’s during the period 
when the Transitional Government of national Unity governed the country 
with the South African representative, the Administrator-General. While 
Proclamation R101 was not a constitution of the territory, the attached Bill 
of Rights gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to develop a human 
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rights jurisprudence even before independence. Unfortunately, the 
Transitional Government often challenged the judgments of the court 
based on Proclamation R101 in the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Bloemfontein, South Africa, where fundamentalist judges regularly 
overturned the South West African decisions on clearly political grounds. 
- Despite early criticism that the composition of the superior courts’ benches 
are such that it will keep unelected middle aged men in power for a long 
time, the transformation of the bench soon created a fairly representative 
bench, taking into account the initial lack of available black Namibian 
judges. There is no indication, either in the appointments of the Judicial 
Service Commission or in the judgments of the courts that judges are 
appointed with political motives, or that judges are inclined to make 
favourable or unfavourable judgments in cases where the state is involved, 
based on the nationality, race or political alliance of the judges. 
- Despite some law reform, the umbilical cord between the Minister of 
Justice and the magistrates are not cut yet. The independence of the 
magistrates improved with the implementation of a Magistrates 
Commission, but it did not take away all the powers of the Minister over 
the fate of magistrates. 
- No clear discernible constitutional model of interpretation evolved in the 
Namibian superior courts in the period investigated. In some instances 
specific judges used a clearly definable model or a 
philosophical/jurisprudential method. In this regard one can refer to the 
positivist approach of Judge O’Linn, clearly demonstrated in the Kauesa 
case in the High Court and his severe criticism of Judge Mahomed’s value 
judgment in the corporal punishment case. However, in the Frank case in 
the Supreme Court Judge O’Linn, while still faithful to the positivist 
approach, also relied on the values and norms of the Namibian people to 
justify his position. 
- Positivism as an interpretive model has led to some good as well as 
questionable judgments. Nevertheless, it is an overstatement to say it 
always leads to undemocratic or conservative judgments. Despite severe 
criticism of South African scholars after apartheid, and to lesser extent 
German scholars after World War II, positivism cannot be blamed for the 
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powerlessness of the bench to protect human rights. It is more correct to 
say the apartheid judges abused positivism. South African liberal scholars 
such as Roux, Cockrell and Fagan have pointed out that all the basic 
elements of a transformative constitutionalism and even values of the 
people can be accommodated by positivism, Dworkinianism and legal 
liberalism. Cockrell’s position that the quality of the judicial officer’s 
substantive argument rather than the interpretive model she/he used 
should be the yardstick to evaluate the judgments.  
- Where the courts relied on the values and norms of the Namibian people, 
it was not always clear how they determined the values and norms of the 
Namibian people. In the Corporal Punishment case, Judge Mahomed 
relied on the practises of other “civilised” countries with sections similar to 
Article 8 of the Namibian constitution to determine what the norms and 
values of the people are, possibly because Namibia shares their 
constitutional norms and values.  Chief Justice Berker implicitly worked 
with an historical yardstick. The people reject corporal punishment by 
organs of the state because of its political abuse in the past.  
- Judge O’Linn accepted the outbursts against homosexuals by the then 
President and a senior cabinet minister against homosexuals, as clear 
evidence that homosexual relationships are not condoned by Namibians. 
He added that neither members of the ruling party nor the opposition 
challenged them in Parliament. Consequently, homosexual relationships 
are not worthy of protection as a non-discriminatory category in terms of 
Article 10. 
- The norms and values referred to in the Corporal Punishment case are the 
norms and values embedded in the Constitution rather than the norms and 
values of the Namibian people. Judge Mahomed said so much in a 
footnote in the Tcoeib case. In the early Acheson case, it also seemed to 
be the values of the Constitution itself that determined the treatment of 
Acheson by the High Court rather than the values of the people. 
- Namibian judges preferred to solve constitutional issues by referring to 
formalistic law rather than substantive argument. Judge Mahomed 
presented no substantive argument on why corporal punishment should be 
considered cruel and inhumane, either as a value of the people or the 
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Constitution, but relied exclusively on the practices of other liberal 
democracies. Judge O’Linn’s criticism is likewise a formalistic argument 
that Judge Mahomed and the Chief Justice did not follow the formal rules 
of the High Court in holding a specific enquiry as prescribed. His own 
application of values in the Frank case is likewise not based on a 
substantive argument or enquiry into the values of the people, but a 
conclusion based on populism political statements. 
- Judge Dumbutshena’s judgment in the Kauesa case in the Supreme Court 
presents a more successful approach to value based judgments. 
Accepting that values of societies change over time, he did not prioritise 
freedom of speech as a permanent priority in a clash between dignity and 
freedom of speech.  He limited his judgment to the need of the time to give 
priority to freedom of speech to enable the Namibian people to enter into 
open and free debates after the colonial era with all its limitations on 
freedom of speech. 
- In the Kauesa case in the Supreme Court rejected a prioritising of rights 
and a distinction between rights and freedoms. 
- Both superior courts interpreted freedom of speech in a broad purposive 
manner.  
- While the superior court judges acted generally with restraint, there are at 
least two occasions where the courts played a significant activist role. The 
first, the Kauesa judgment in the Supreme Court has been discussed 
above. In the Mwilima case the Supreme Court bench applied Article 144 
and thus international law to enforce a socio-economic right (the right to 
free legal representation) despite the prohibition created by Article 101 on 
enforcing socio-economic rights in court. 
- The Mwilima case opened the door for the enforcement of other socio-
economic rights by linking it to either a right listed in Chapter 3 or a right 
protected by international law. 
- The Ex Parte Attorney-General/Prosecutor-General case afforded the 
prosecutorial authority with the exclusive power to make decision on 
prosecutorial issues. The independence of the Prosecutor-General vis-à-
vis the Attorney General, a political appointee, was confirmed and firmly 
established. Without stating that prosecution is part of the judicial function 
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of the State, the Supreme Court placed the Prosecutor-General in the 
company of judges. Prosecution in Namibia can be described as an 
independent constitutional function unrelated to the executive. 
- Same sex relationships are not protected as a category of non-
discrimination under Article 10. While homosexuals enjoy the general 
protection of their rights under the Constitution, the Frank case maintained 
that sodomy as a crime is constitutional and the non-discriminatory 
category described by the word “sex” in Article 10 means male and 
female. 
The ultimate questions needs to be answered: To what extent did the 
Namibian superior courts contribute to develop a transformative jurisprudence during 
the first fourteen years of nationhood? In addition, which hermeneutical models did 
they apply in their development a transformative jurisprudence? My preference for a 
critical approach and my appreciation for the foundational work of the American 
Realists and the CLS movement played a role in my own interpretation. 
The Supreme Court Kauesa case and the Ex Parte AG: in re the Relationship 
AG/PG were good examples of transformative constitutionalism. Both judgments had 
the future in mind. Although the bench never referred to a futuristic approach in their 
judgments, Judge Dumbutshena prepared the way where the previously 
disadvantaged will be able to speak for themselves and criticise the authorities. 
Judge Leon, in the Ex Parte case did not base his judgment on a preferential choice 
for Adv. Heyman. He looked back at the devastating effects of a prosecutorial 
authority being subservient to government and interpreted the Constitution in such a 
manner that it will not happen again. 
The judgments were not mere situational ethical choices. However, I will not 
follow the Dworkin route to say that those judgments are the only possible 
interpretation of the Constitution for the specific legal problem. As I noted, Judge 
O’Linn‘s criticism of the Kauesa case has merit. On what legal grounds did the 
Supreme Court decide that freedom of expression is more important than dignity? If 
we consider the Ex Parte PG/AG case, we may well ask on what legal grounds the 
Court limited the meaning of the phrase final responsibility to refer only to 
administrative responsibility.  
In both cases, one needs to move broader than the traditional text, even if the 
text is unambiguous. The judges in both cases would probably justify their choices 
 313 
on a more extensive reading of the Constitution in context. Klare would refer to the 
ideology of the Constitution, as would Woolman/Davis. Whether one calls it a post-
liberal or Creole liberal constitution, both Klare and Woolman/Davis concluded that 
the constitutional content demands a different reading of the text.  
I agree with that position. If one add the insight of Mureinik and Chief Justice 
Berker and see the Constitution as a bridge from the old to the new, the judgments 
make legal as well as transformative sense. It is indeed unthinkable, as Judge Leon 
stated in the Ex Parte AG/PG case, that the Namibian people would want a repetition 
of the political manipulation of prosecutions of the colonial era. The constraints on 
freedom of expression during the colonial era obviously played an important role in 
the judgment of the Kauesa case in the Supreme Court. The message of the Court 
was clear: In future, the limitation of rights will not be lightly allowed. A liberal 
approach to free speech is important to overcome the oppressive colonial era with all 
its propaganda and limited opportunities for the public to participate in public debate.  
However, the Office of the Attorney General may deconstruct the argument of 
the Supreme Court. They may argue that faster and sustainable transformation of 
the bench demanded the ruling party who opposed the oppression of the colonial era 
in control and not the prosecutors who prosecuted the people fighting for liberation. 
The real threat of a fair and just prosecutorial system is not the political appointee 
sanctioned by the Constituent Assembly to have the final responsibility, but 
prosecutors schooled in the apartheid courts, working hand in hand with the 
occupational forces from South Africa. O’Linn would want to know if the demand for 
an open society justifies the defamation of senior police officers without giving them 
an opportunity to answer to the serious allegations. He would maintain that the 
struggle for independence was primarily a battle to restore the dignity of all 
Namibians. Both these arguments have value. Even liberal or CLS adherents will 
admit that without an element of constraint, the law will become unpredictable. Since 
constraint is not measureable, interpreters will always argue on the limits of 
transformative constitutionalism. 
The above examples can be multiplied. Think of the application of Article 144 
in the Mwilima case. A positivist judge may ask if the Court considered the limitations 
of Article 144 - “Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of 
Parliament...” when it reverted to the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. Every 
transformative judgment can be criticised from a positivist position. However, even 
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Roux and Cockrell agreed that transformative constitutionalism and value judgments 
are not alien to positivism.  
I agree with Botha that the courts can fully accept legal pluralism without 
sacrificing legal clarity and predictability in the process. The South African/Namibian 
legal history provides several constraints that will prevent transformative benches 
from becoming a law unto itself. The values and determinism of the Constitution, and 
to quote Botha, conflicting values, policies, and the capacity of the judge “to rework 
the relevant legal materials” all place a burden on the courts to seek for the best 
possible solution of a legal problem. Botha added one more constraint: There must 
be an expectation from the public, and more specifically from the legal fraternity to 
insist that the judges will give substantive arguments for their judgments. 
Lastly, it is important to understand that positivism is not the enemy of 
Namibian transformative jurisprudence. Some judgments came to the wrong 
conclusion mainly because the argumentation was not good enough, rather than the 
fact that the judge is inclined to positivism (Frank, Supreme Court), while judges with 
known positivist convictions, gave good transformative judgments (Mushwena, 
Mwilima cases). Cockrell is helpful when he insisted that judgment ought to be 
judged, not by the ideology of the presiding officer or the hermeneutical key he/she 
used, by the persuasiveness of his/her arguments.  
The late chief justice Pius Langa said it all in his epoch-making lecture in 
Stellenbosch: 
It is no longer sufficient for judges to rely on the say-so of 
parliament or technical readings of legislation as providing 
justifications for their decisions. Under a transformative 
Constitution, judges bear the ultimate responsibility to justify 
their decisions not only by reference to authority, but by 
reference to ideas and values.867 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
867
Prestigious Lecture delivered on 9 October 2006. Published as Langa, P. 2006. Transformative 
Constitutionalism.17 Stellenbosch Law Review, p. 351 on p.353. 
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Earlier Research and Published Work Included in the Thesis 
The above mentioned thesis was written over a period of time.  Having taught Public 
Law subjects, and specifically Human Rights Law and Constitutional Law at the 
University of Namibia since 2002, some of the material in the present thesis came 
from earlier articles and notes that I have collected over the years. 
Herewith a list of publications that dealt with material used in the thesis: 
1. A chapter I wrote in a book I co-edited in 2008 formed the foundation of 
Chapter 3 – The Time between the Times: 
2008. The independence of the judiciary in pre-independent Namibia: 
Legal challenges under the pre-independence Bill of Rights (1985–1990), 
in Horn, N and Bösl, A, The Independence of the Judiciary in Namibia,  
Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia, p. 45. 
 
2. I used chapter 4 of the thesis after the writing thereof in a chapter of a 
book I co-edited celebrating twenty years of constitutionalism in Namibia: 
2010. The Forerunners of the Namibian Constitution,  in Bösl, A, Horn N 
and Du Pisani, A, Constitutional Democracy in Namibia: A critical Analysis 
After Two Decades, Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia, p. 63. 
 
3. I used earlier research done for my LLM dissertation as well as a chapter 
in the book on the independence of the judiciary I co-edited in 2008, 
referred to in point 1 above as the foundation for parts of point 5.8: 
 2000. The unique constitutional position of the Prosecutor-General of 
Namibia and the effect of the independence of the office on the 
functioning of the prosecuting authority in relationship with the Ministry of 
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Justice and the Attorney-General, LLM thesis, Pretoria: University of 
South Africa. 
2008. The independence of the prosecutorial authority of South Africa and 
Namibia: A comparative study, in The Independence of the Judiciary in 
Namibia, supra  point 2 above, p.113. 
4.  An article I wrote in the first edition of the Namibia Law Journal, of which I 
am the editor, in 2009, relied on material I collected for this thesis. 
Chapter 6.3 was in the making at the time and  I strongly relied on the 
article in the present draft of my thesis.  
2009. Freedom of expression and hate speech in Namibia. Namibia Law 
Journal, Vol1, No 1, p. 43. 
5. Chapter 5.1 - 5.4 and more specifically chapter 5.6  includes part of an 
on-going research project on the adjudicative approach of the French 
defence lawyer, the late Jacques Vergés. Since it was a new field for me, 
I published an article on Vergés and the Namibian approach in the 
Lubowski case in the Student law journal of the University of Namibia, to 
test the application. I received generally positive feedback and included 
the theory in chapter 5.6 of the thesis.  
2013. S v Acheson and Kleynhans: The First Test for Constitutionalism in 
Namibia, University of Namibia Students Law Review Volume 1, No.1, p. 
63. 
 
 
 
 
